CURRENT ISSUES

Future Capabilities of Parachutist, Airborne and Special Forces in the EU/NATO context
The Soviet-Indian Alliance
The Yom Kippur war: political and military challenges of the seventies and today
Warfare on the internet
Triggered Food Bomb
COE OR COE or PMESII-PT? Methods to identify and analize operational environment Part 2.
Great Power Ambitions of the Russian Federation
Scientific Periodical of the
Military National Security Service

Responsible Publisher:

Lt-Gen József Kovács, Director General,
Chairman of the Scientific Board

Editorial Board

Chairman:  Brig-Gen. János Béres, PhD
Members:  Col. István Kobolka, PhD
          Secretary of the Scientific Board
          Col. Eng. István Resperger, PhD
          Lt.-Col. Eng. Tóth Sándor, PhD
          Prof. Dr. Habil. Sándor Szakály, DSc, Vice-Rector for Science and Research of NUPS
          Prof. Dr. Zoltán Dövényi, DSc, Institute of Geography of the University of Pécs
          Norbert PaP, PhD, Habil. MA, MSc
          Director of Centre of Eastern-Mediterranean and Balkan Studies UP

Responsible-editor:  Col. Jenő Ledács Kiss
          Col. István Kobolka

Make-up editor:  Capt. Viktoria Magyar

Language editor:  Col. Mihály Szabó

A kiadásban közreműködött az MH Geoinformációs Szolgálat
Szabályzatkereszt és Kiadó Osztálya
Nyomdai munkák: HM Térképészeti Közhasznú Nonprofit Kft.
Felelős vezető: Németh László ügyvezető igazgató
CONTENTS

EVALUATIONS, ANALYSES, STUDIES

Maj – Gen. Dr. JÓZSEF BODA
Future Capabilities of Parachutist, Airborne and Special Forces in the EU/NATO context ................................................................. 5

ADAM MAYER
The Soviet-Indian Alliance ........................................................................ 17

CURRENT ISSUES

Dr. Habil. (PhD) JOSEF KIS-BENEDEK
The Yom Kippur war: political and military challenges of the seventies and today ............................................................. 40

Prof. TIBOR TÓTH, PhD - GEORGE WAGNER, PhD aspirant
Warfare on the internet ............................................................................. 52

CONSULTATION

Dr. ENDRE KANIZSAY C.Sc. - ATtila MÁTHÉ M.Sc. – PÉTER Gergő Juhász M.Sc.,PhD student
Triggered Food Bomb ............................................................................. 61

FORUM of PhD CANDIDATES

Dr. JUDIT WEINHOFER, PhD aspirant
The role of military health care in the development of medical sciences................................................................. 82

Capt. LAJOS LISZNYAI, PhD aspirant
COE or PMESII-PT? Methods to identify and analyze operational environment Part 2. ................................................................. 100

ANITA DEÁK, PhD aspirant
Great Power Ambitions of the Russian Federation: Military Presence in the Near Abroad ................................................................. 112
NEWS, EVENTS, INFORMATION

Lt. Col. Dr. JÁNOS BESENYŐ (PhD), MH GEOSZ
Review of „Vérrel elnyert jutalmak” .......................... 123

PÉTER MARTON, PhD
Review of “Magyar békefenntartók Afrikában” ..................... 126

CONDITIONS OF PUBLICATIONS ................................. 129
FUTURE CAPABILITIES OF PARACHUTIST, AIRBORNE AND SPECIAL FORCES IN THE EU/NATO CONTEXT

Abstract:

This paper discusses aims and objectives of Parachutist, Airborne and Special Forces in the context of European and NATO Future Collective Security System.

Collective Security is a system of maintaining world peace and security by concerted action on the part of nations of the world. To envision the Future Capabilities of Parachutist, Airborne and Special Forces, we need to evaluate the past Airborne and Special Operations. Currently, most of the member states of Europe belong to the NATO and EU Collective Security System.

After the Second World War, airborne deployments tended to be restricted to battalion-size jumps rather than brigade- or divisional-size operations. During the Suez crisis in 1956, 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (Great Britain) successfully jumped into Egypt, securing their objectives with very few casualties despite heavy resistance. The success of this operation represented a zenith in airborne forces capabilities.

Thereafter, combat jumps became a rarity.

This article reviews the basic documents on Collective Security and the recent special operations by NATO Parachutist, Airborne and Special Forces Units.

Keywords: Parachutist, Airborne and Special Forces, European Union, Collective Security System. NATO, operations, Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali

1. Preface

Since the establishment of the Europe Union, the EU has always assumed global responsibilities and followed global ambitions. Nowadays, the EU is accountable with its allies for securing the civilization in an age of uncertainty. In the history of Europe, it retains the perennial values we believe in and we thus should proceed to defending them in the coming decades. The European and National leadership has to be more thoughtful, more strategic and more coordinated in the way these interests are advanced in order to protect national and EU collective security.
According to Article J.1 of title V of the Maastricht Treaty the European Union defines and implements a common foreign and security policy that covers all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which are to:

- Safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;

- Strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;

- Preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;

- Promote international co-operation;

- Develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.¹

International security depends very much on economic security and vice versa. So bringing the defense budget back to balance is a vital part of how people in charge tackle the deficit and safeguard national security. We are very proud and grateful to all those who tirelessly work for keeping all of us safe at home, protecting our European interests all around the world – our military, police, national security officers, diplomats and many others. They represent the basic part of our sense of European identity. And it is vital importance for the security of future generations that these capabilities are retained. For retaining their effectiveness, they must adapt to face the realities and challenges of the 21st Century.

The world is facing several threats that have origins at home and overseas, with an ever more diverse range of security risks. The most effective way to tackle risks posed to our global security is to identify them – through an integrated approach – in an early stage and treat their causes, rather than having to deal with the consequences. That is why Collective Security draws this entire effort together. This approach recognizes that when we are going to fail to prevent conflict, we will be obliged to intervene militarily, which costs far more. And that is why our leaders aspire to expand the ability to deploy military and civilian experts together to support stabilization efforts and build sustainable capacity in other states, as a long-term investment in a more stable world.

¹ europa.eu › ... › Building europe through the treaties, Letöltve: 2013. 11. 03.
Beside the military field, integrated approach is needed also in a wide range of other areas crucial to EU security, including civil emergencies, energy security, international organized crime, counter proliferation, illegal migration and border security. We have to maintain effective intelligence capabilities and co-operations to contribute across the spectrum of national security activity. Therefore, we have to reconfigure our Military Forces to make them better prepared to meet the threats of the future.

In this age of uncertainty, ground forces will continue to have a crucial operational role. Therefore, is important to retain a significant, and well – trained and equipped Army. Most of the EU countries are able to deploy a self-sustaining, properly equipped brigade or battalion-sized force anywhere around the world and sustain it indefinitely. The introduction of new armored vehicles, effective communications equipment and new strategic lift airplanes, will make the ground forces more mobile and more flexible. It will be better adapted to face current and future threats, with the type of equipment it needs to prevail in today’s conflicts. The Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR)\(^2\) is a subordinate unified command of US European Command exercising operational control of theater Army, Navy, and Air Force Special Operation Forces (SOF).

2. The European Security Strategy

The European Security Strategy (ESS) is a political document that defines the European Union's international security strategy. Its headline reads: "A Secure Europe In A Better World". The document was approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana. With the emergence of the ESDP, it was the first time that EU has formulated a joint security strategy.

The ESS starts with the declaration that "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free". Its conclusion is that "The world is full of new dangers and opportunities". Along these lines, it argues that in order to ensure security for Europe in a globalizing world, multilateral cooperation within Europe and abroad is to be the imperative, because "no single nation is able to tackle today's complex challenges". As such the ESS identifies a string of key threats Europe needs to deal with: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states, and organized crime.\(^3\)

\(^3\) [www.eeas.europa.eu › ... › About-csdp](http://www.eeas.europa.eu) Letöltve: 2013. 11. 10.
2.1. The European Union Battle Groups (EUBG)

The EUBG’s concept is adhering to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the European Union. The organization is based on contributions from member states, each of the eighteen Battle Groups consists of battalion-sized units (1 500 troops) reinforced with combat support and combat service support elements. The groups rotate actively, so out of the eighteen, two are ready for deployment at all times. The EUBG’s are under the direct control of the Council of the European Union.

The Battle Groups reached full operational capacity on 1 January 2007, although, as of January 2013 they are yet to see any military action. Their operations are based on existing ad hoc missions that the European Union has undertaken and has been described by some as a new “standing army” for Europe. The troops and equipment are contributed by the EU member states under a “lead nation”.

Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was the first EU led military operation in 2003, which demonstrated the EU’s rapid reaction and deployment capabilities – with the EU going from Crisis Management Concept to operation launch in just three weeks, then taking a further 20 days for substantial deployment. Its success provided a template for the future rapid response deployments allowing the idea to be considered more practically.

On 10 February 2004, France, Germany and the United Kingdom released a paper outlining the “Battle group concept”, which was further developed by the EU Military Staff. The document proposed a number of groups based on Artemis that would be autonomous, consisting of 1,500 personnel and deployable within 15 days. These can respond to the UN requests at a short notice and can be rapidly tailored to specific missions. They would concentrate on provisionally pursuing operations, before a larger force can relieve them, for example UN or regional peacekeepers under UN mandate. The plan was approved by EU Military Committee in 2004 and in November that year the first thirteen Battle Groups were provided with associated capabilities.

The EU missions geographically locating outside the Balkans and the DRC have taken place in Georgia, Indonesia, Sudan, Palestine, and Ukraine - Moldova. There is also a judicial mission in Iraq (EUJUST Lex). On 28 January 2008, the EU deployed its largest and most multi - national mission to Africa, EUFOR Tchad / RCA. The UN - mandated mission involves troops from 25 EU states (19 in the field) deployed in areas of eastern Chad and the north - eastern

---

Central African Republic in order to improve security in those regions. EUFOR Tchad / RCA reached full operation capability in mid-September 2008.

Currently the EU is involving in 17 missions in 15 countries including 9 deployments in Africa.

**EU Troop Numbers** of Military Missions and Operations are the following:

- EUTM Somalia – 126
- EUTM Mali – 500
- EUNAVFOR Atalanta – 1400
- EUFOR Althea – 800.

### 3. NATO in the changing world

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the NATO needed to develop a new policy and had to reorganize its structure accordingly.

The NATO’s very first mission of this type was launched in April 1992 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its task was to enforce the UN arms embargo on weapons in the Adriatic Sea (in cooperation with the Western European Union from 1993) and enforce a no-fly-zone declared by the UN Security Council.

Between 1994 and 1997, a new concept for regional cooperation for NATO and its neighbors was introduced, like the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The NATO - Russia Permanent Joint Council was established in 1998. Just before the war on Yugoslavia in 1999, three former communist countries, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, joined NATO. Its membership was expanded in 2004 with the accession of seven more Northern and Eastern European countries to NATO: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. During the Istanbul Summit in 2004, NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with four Persian Gulf nations.

New NATO structures were also formed while old ones were abolished. The NATO Response Force (NRF) was launched at the Prague Summit in 2002, the first summit in a former socialist country. A major restructuring of the NATO military commands began on 19 June 2003, as the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic was abolished and a new headquarters, the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), was established in Norfolk, Virginia, United States. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

---


SHAPE) was reorganized and became the Headquarters of Allied Command Operations (ACO). The ACT is responsible for driving transformation (future capabilities) in NATO, whilst the ACO is responsible for ongoing operations. The NATO’s Baltic Air Policing began in March 2004, which supported the sovereignty of Estonia Latvia, Lithuania by providing air support to react to any unwanted aerial intrusions.

During the 2006 Riga Summit in Latvia, the issue of energy security was highlighted. It was the first NATO summit to be held in a country that had been part of the Soviet Union. In 2006 during the Bucharest Summit, in Romania, the member states agreed to the accession of Croatia and Albania and both countries joined NATO in April 2009. The issue of Georgian and Ukrainian membership in NATO prompted harsh criticism from Russia.

US President Barack Obama in 2009 proposed using the ship-based Aegis Combat System, though this plan still includes stations being built in Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Romania, and Poland. NATO will also maintain the “status quo” in its nuclear deterrent in Europe by upgrading the targeting capabilities of the “tactical” B61 nuclear bombs stationed there. In 2010, twenty-eight NATO members maintained the strength of 3,793,778 active military, including 137,836 forward deployed U.S. troops. The command structure was reduced to 11 headquarters organized in three echelons.

Since 1992 the NATO was engaged in eleven missions:

- NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-2004);
- NATO in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2001-2003);
- NATO’s first counter-terrorism operation (2001-2002);
- The second Gulf Conflict (2003);
- Protecting public events, Olympic Games in Greece (2004), and NATO Summit in Latvia (2006);
- NATO and Iraq (2004-2011);
- Hurricane Katrina (2005);
- Pakistan earthquake relief assistance (2005-2006);
- Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan (2005-2007);
- Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa (2008-2009);
- NATO and Libya 2011.

Currently, about 100,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions all around the world, successfully managing complex ground, air and naval operations in all types of environment. NATO military forces are currently operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean Sea, off the Horn of Africa and in Somalia. NATO troops has been engaged in missions that cover the full spectrum of crisis-management operations – from combat engagement and peacekeeping and providing training and logistics support to surveillance and humanitarian relief.8

4. Recent Special Operations

After analyzing the EU and NATO concepts and recent developments in policy and structures we need to look into the outcome of special operations to define the future need for Airborne Parachute and Special Operations.

The most recent British airborne operation was in Sierra Leone in 2000, but this used helicopters not parachutes.9

With the 75th Ranger Regiment's parachute assault on 19 October 2001 onto Objective Rhino at Dry Lake Airstrip in southern Afghanistan began the US ground combat operations in the war on terrorism. It was the first mass tactical combat parachute drop since the 75th and the 82nd Airborne Division jumped into Panama during Operation Just Cause in December 1989.10

On March 26, 2003, the 173rd Airborne Brigade conducted a jump into Northern Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the largest airborne assault since D-Day. More than 1,000 soldiers of the 173rd Airborne Brigade loaded up onto C-17 jets lining the Aviano Air Base runway.11

Most recently, January 28, 2013, 250 French paratroops of the 2e REP (2nd Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment) were parachuted into strategic points overnight to prepare the way for Malian forces to recapture Timbuktu from Islamist rebels.12

4. 1. Smaller Airborne Operations

The US Marine Corps maintains the use of parachuting as an expeditionary oriented means of insertion for selected units. Its focus is on the

---

clandestine insertion of personnel for execution of their primary mission or on the resupply of expeditionary forces by means of parachute.

The Marine Corps maintains the following parachute capabilities: Low level round static line parachutes in alignment with US Army forces and training requirements, Ram-air static line capable parachute systems (RAPS), Ram-air military freefall capable parachute systems (MFFRAPS), Tandem Offset Resupply Delivery System (TORDS) for reconnaissance operations, and various cargo parachutes for expeditionary air delivery insert of supplies and material to forward deployed Marine forces where land transport is either still risky or unattainable.

Six recon pathfinders from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, the 1st Marine Division jumped into the Iraqi night sky and into history from a Marine KC-130 Hercules cargo plane. The high altitude high opening jump took place in western Iraq, on 23 July 2004.  

The post war model for airborne operations has essentially followed lessons learned from previous World War 2 operations, although modern equipment such as the Lockheed C-130 Hercules and C-17 transport aircraft have proved to be more efficient delivery tools than the old Douglas DC-3 Dakota.

5. Advantages and Disadvantages of using Paratroops

Nowadays, there are the many elite units of all regular armies that provide a steady stream of recruits for Special Forces.

While modern tactical helicopters offer many benefits, mass airborne assaults using paratroops still offer a range of attractive advantages over heliborne assaults:

1. **Strategic reach.** Aircraft like the A400 and C17 are strategic assets that enable paratroops to reach objectives well beyond the reach of helicopter borne forces. Paratroops can attack virtually any location on the planet within 18 hours of wheels-up.

2. **Speed.** There is still no faster way to put 1 000 or more troops on the ground more or less simultaneously in a forced entry operation. Parachute operations are still the preferred technique for airfield seizure during a forced entry.

---

14 www.thinkdefence.co.uk//the-future-of-airborne-force...Downloaded May 14 2013
3. **Load-carrying ability of strategic aircraft.** Modern transport aircraft such as the C17 can drop much heavier equipment and armour than any modern helicopter can.

4. **Vulnerability of helicopters.** Helicopters which have to land, take-off, or hover are much more vulnerable targets for enemy small arms and RPGs than fixed wing aircraft flying at 500-1000ft and 125 knots over the drop zone.

Despite recent developments and refinements in military jump techniques, a number of disadvantages still remain:

1. **Landing Zone dispersion.** Parachute delivery can deposit forces over a large area requiring them to regroup which can take time. Unexpected winds can blow units way off target, causing disorientation and increasing the distance between the landing zone and final objective and thus the time taken to secure it. This can void any element of surprise and may result in mission failure should a determined enemy be able to quickly mount a counter-attack.

2. **The amount of weapons, equipment and ammunition that airborne soldiers can carry is limited.** The practical load limit that can be carried by dismounted troops is around 70 kg. Battle order reduces this to around 35 kg. The more kit you pile on a soldier, the more you reduce his combat effectiveness. The very real limits of equipment that a paratroopers can carry, means they can only hold positions for a few days before ground forces will need to link-up with them. This makes airborne operations short-term, limited initiatives even with air re-supply.

3. **Limited number of strategic transport aircraft reduces level of immediate armoured support that can be delivered.** While it is now possible to air-drop a variety of light tanks, heavy weapons and support vehicles, such as jeeps and Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked CVR/T/s), the availability of sufficient aircraft is a practical limitation. While hand-held anti-tank guided missiles (ATGWs) will provide a reasonable defensive capability, scope for offensive actions by parachute troops will be limited.

   Essentially, the ideal use of contemporary airborne forces is to deploy them behind enemy lines to seize strategic targets such as airfields, bridges, supply dumps, or areas inaccessible to vehicles. Operations may also include outflanking manoeuvres that deny the enemy access to key routes or strategic resources. Once an objective is captured, the airborne unit holds it until relieved. In some situations, airborne units may be dropped merely to delay an advancing enemy. This tactic can be used to cover a withdrawal or act as a diversion.

   Perhaps most relevant to today, parachute delivery is ideal for the covert insertion of special forces. HALO (high-altitude, low-opening) or HAHO (high-
altitude, high-opening) parachuting both require a higher degree of training, but this is consistent with the specialisation of such troops anyway. HAHO is more dependent on wind and weather conditions than HALO, but allows units to track large distances across country before landing near their objectives.

6. The situation in Hungary

Since 1989, when the political changes took place in Hungary, the armed forces have been undergoing constant reduction.

In 1993, the 88th Air Mobile Battalion was established with parachute capability. Later on, in the year of 2000, the battalion became the 1st Light Mixed Infantry Regiment. In 2005, the regiment was downsized to battalion level, called 25/88 Light Mixed Infantry Battalion.

In 2004, there was a tendency to dismiss all special parachute units for financial and political reasons (joining the EU). With the assistance of Fellowship Association of Hungarian Parachutists (FAHP), the special parachute units survived the changes again, but number of units and members of the units have been reduced.

By now, there are three battalion size units - the 34th László Beresényi Special Forces Battalion (LB SPB), the 25/88 Light Mixed Infantry Battalion and the 5/24th Bornemissza Gergely Reconnaissance Battalion - with parachute capabilities and three air bases with parachute support staff and search and rescue capabilities. Altogether, we have approximately 470 military parachutists in Hungary. These battalions are constantly engaging in EU and NATO missions. Currently we have two combat elements and some support staff participating in Special Operations in Afghanistan from the 34 LB SFB.

6.1. 21st Century Military Parachuting

While there is a clear strategic and tactical justification of the requirement to retain parachute-capable troops, the cost of maintaining such assets is frequently debated. It is argued that only Special Forces are required to land by parachute in order to secure landing zones for main heliborne assault forces. While there may still be a strategic requirement to rapidly deploy large-scale parachute forces, analysis of the potential circumstances where this might be necessary are increasingly considered to be exceptional rather than routine. Notwithstanding such concerns, the USA remains committed to the retention of two parachute-trained divisions.
The United Kingdom is less certain and only one battalion of their three regular Parachute Regiment battalions serves in a dedicated parachute-ready role at a time. If there are further defence cutbacks, the number of parachute battalions could even be reduced. Given the elite status enjoyed by Parachute Regiment soldiers, there is considerable resistance to reducing their numbers. That being the case, the UK continues to spend a lot of money on a military parachute jumping capability that is seldom used. The UK maintains 16 Air Assault Brigade as a rapid reaction force that can be quickly sent to trouble spots. Despite a reduced parachute-jumping requirement, it is probably not expedient to rename the Parachute Regiment as the ‘Helicopter Regiment’.

What modern military parachute operations do not take account of is recent developments, not only in civilian sports parachuting, but also in extreme parachute base jumping. There is evidence to suggest that these might be extremely relevant to an improved capability.

Parachute design has undergone a continual metamorphosis over the last 20 to 30 years. These new equipments could be effectively used by Special Operations Units.

Conclusion

The Hungarian Armed Forces are looking forward the 21st century challenges to a bigger number of professional operators equipped with latest high technology equipment, with a broadened spectrum of special operations capabilities, emphasized in Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Direct Action and Military Assistance, trying to comply with the EU requirements in the frame of Common Security and Defense Policy. In addition, other activities including, crises management operations and peace keeping support and humanitarian assistance operations will be developed.

All these are promoted, always under the current policy and philosophy that humans are more important than hardware and that quality is better than quantity. A few carefully selected, well - trained, equipped and well-led people are preferable to larger numbers of lower quality personnel.

Special operations forces (SOF) are particularly suited for many contemporary emerging missions, including crises management and peacekeeping operations. SOF face two major challenges: they must integrate with conventional forces, friendly foreign forces and other international organizations, yet they must preserve the autonomy necessary to protect and encourage the unconventional approach that is the soul of special operations. SOF language capability, regional and cultural orientation, as well as expertise
in civilian sector disciplines will continue to make them a peacetime force of choice that is mature, discrete, low profile, and effective. Because of its low cost / high-payback ratio, SOF will continue to be called upon whenever is needed to promote stability and thwart aggression.

In a world of increased global interaction and diminishing human and economic resources, SOF will continue to be a unique mechanism to promote regional stability with an affordable, yet effective force for implementing national and international strategies, providing flexible and precise, lethal and non-lethal options.15

As with any military operation, a mission analysis and an analysis of the enemy are critical to the success of a mission. For the future Airborne Parachute and Special Forces, the mission will probably remain the same: to deploy rapidly anywhere in the world and be prepared to conduct combat operations to protect collective and national security interests. The enemy, however, is changing significantly. The mechanization of the Third World forces, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the availability of weapons of mass destruction are only a few from the future threats that the modernized Airborne forces will be expected to deal with. With the increasing instability of the Third World, the Parachutist, Airborne and Special Forces will almost certainly be involved in a situation that will require a deployable, versatile and lethal Airborne force.

References

1, www.armyrecognition.com/serval...mali.../index.php? Downloaded on May 14 2013
2, www.thinkdefence.co.uk/.../the-future European Parachute -of-airborne-force...Downloaded May 14 2013
4, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Security_Strategy, Downloaded on November 10 2013
5, www.nato.int/strategic-concept Downloaded on May 14 2013
7, www.kormany.hu/.../new-national-military-strategy-an-i, Downloaded on May 14 2013
8, Maastricht Treaty
9, http://www.soceur.eumomil, Downloaded on November 10 2013
10, www.eeas.europa.eu .../About-csdp, Downloaded on November 10 2013
12, www.nato.int/DUCU/comm/2004/06-istanbul/home. Downloaded on November 10 2013
13, fcnl.org/issues/nuclear/BombFlyer2.pdf Downloaded on November 10 2013
14, www.nato.int/cps/ar/natolive/topics_52060.htm Downloaded on November 10 2013

THE SOVIET-INDIAN ALLIANCE

Abstract:

The USSR from 1952/1953 aimed at engaging and befriending nonaligned India. Later its objective was to draw her into an offensive alliance against the PRC. This latter aim proved abortive, but a formal defensive military alliance for security purposes emerged between the two countries in 1971. In the 1980s, the USSR wanted to obtain official India’s silence over the Afghanistan occupation, an aim it achieved. Secondary aims included economic gains, and some cultural and ideological purposes. Most importantly however, India never entered any alliance directed at the strategic encirclement of the USSR and posed no threat to Soviet security. This was a feat that was as much due to Soviet influence as the convergence of interests, manifested in unequivocal opinions in various world conflicts. What strengthened the Soviet-Indian relationship was a shared ideological antagonism towards the West. Nonalignment deemed immoral as a foreign policy stance by especially the republican administrations in the United States, was viewed favourably by the USSR as a movement that would decrease Western influence worldwide.

Keywords: Russian-Indian relations, Russia, Soviet foreign policy, India, Soviet-Indian relations, Armaments trade, Great Game, Nehru, Khrushchev, Krishna Menon, Indira Gandhi

The Republic of India, ever since its inception in 1950, pioneered the concept of nonalignment in foreign policy. Indeed, it was the single most important architect of the Nonaligned Movement. Members of that movement however, did occasionally enter alliances. In this paper, by way of historical narrative and by foreign policy and security analysis, I attempt to present the precursors, the evolvement, and the contours of a Soviet-Indian defensive military alliance for security purposes that stretched from 1971 to the collapse of the USSR.
Precursors

Early Indo-Russian ties

Indo-Russian links go back quite far in history. Robert C. Horn maintains that it was the Russian emperor Peter the Great (1682-1725) who first established commercial contacts with the Moguls of India. In this he errs. By the late 17th century, Russia had established fairly regular commercial relationships with various sub-continental states (260 related official documents are published). Also, the Tver merchant Afanasiy Nikitin, who was the first known Russian to travel to India in the 1470s, was a household name in the vein of Marco Polo for Soviet schoolchildren. The USSR erected a bronze statue to Nikitin, shot a feature film on his life, and named after him one of its most widespread brands of beer. For this thesis’ purposes, the way the USSR portrayed Nikitin has a certain descriptive force. Until 1953, Nikitin was to be revered as a great explorer who managed to precede Vasco da Gama in reaching India. Post-1953 USSR realized that such a depiction would be antagonistic to Indians who saw Vasco da Gama in a different light; so historical instrumentality shifted towards an emphasis on the fact that his mission had no tint of military conquest.

The Great Game

Russian-Indian ties are bound to reflect geography. From the 19th century to 1991, the buffer zone that demarcated the Russian sphere of influence and later the USSR proper from India was the Wakhan corridor, an extremely thin stretch of land that belongs to Afghanistan. It had been designed for this purpose. Until 1991, India and Pakistan were de facto neighbours of Russia, a fact that was emphasized by Nehru, Indira Gandhi, and even Pakistani dictator Zia ul-Haq.

This geographical situation set the stage for the Great Game, a century-long contest over Asian hegemony between Great Britain and Russia. The Great Game was a distant war as the main adversaries’ armies never directly fought each other in the region. Until 1907 when they finally carved out their respective spheres of influence for good, their antagonism was the source of innumerable tribal proxy wars, acts of subversion, and clandestine operations from Persia to Tibet. The British acquired suzerainty over Kashmir in 1846, and won a final victory over the Sikhs in 1848. Having established their sub-continental paramountcy, they were eager to secure their possessions. The Russian victories

2 N. M. Goldberg: Ocherki po istorii Indii, Nauka, Moskva, 1965, p. 6
3 “You can’t live in the sea and create enmity with the whales. (...) The Soviet Union is on our doorstep.” Zia is cited by Robert C. Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations – Issues and Influence, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1982, p. 217
at Gök-Tepe and Merv over the Tekke Turkmen in the 1880s brought them into closer proximity with the Khyber-pass (the gate to India). The distant war between Russia and England was to have its own “Cuban missile crisis” in 1885. The great powers resolved this crisis by designating Afghanistan to be their buffer zone, and by drawing the Durand Line, the current Pakistan-Afghanistan border, in 1893. That Line reflected strategic necessities and was entirely unrelated to the ethnic composition of the area. By halving ethnic Pachtun lands, the Line planted the seeds of animosity between independent Pakistan and Afghanistan in the latter half of the 20th century.

The communist parties of India

The Communist Party of India (CPI) proved to be an important Soviet asset in South Asia. Traditional Indian society and nascent capitalist production were not devoid of creating social friction in India itself in the 19th century. However, the first bona fide Indian communist organization was nurtured after 1915 within Amanullah’s anti-British Afghanistan by emigrant Brahmin intelligentsia, and was established formally under Soviet tutelage and on Soviet soil; in Tashkent, on 17th October, 1920. The CPI was first headed by M. N. Roy. Assumed idealism, “colour-blind” communist internationalism, and the offer of an alternative to the Western colonial arrangement and its economic exploitation of dependencies, were behind its ideological appeal for the largely middle-class Indians who joined the CPI. The party would maintain its extreme loyalty to the USSR until the late 1980s. The CPI did not participate even in pro-independence struggle during WWII upon Stalin’s assessment who did not want to see anti-British moves weaken his ally! CPI’s Maoist splinter CPI-M (Marxist), formed in 1964, has been taking markedly pro-PRC stances even in wakes of Sino-Indian armed border conflicts (1962, 1969, 1975). These facts point to the extreme ideological preoccupation and foci of loyalty on the part of communist parties of India, even at the cost of blatantly defying the national interest. We are later to note similarly strong ideological preoccupations on the part of Indian centrists, including instances of foreign policy.

Indian National Congress and the USSR

Before embarking on a discussion on independent India’s foreign policy and more specifically on Soviet foreign policy in India, it is imperative to briefly examine the way India’s centrist forces, the backbone of the INC, viewed the USSR even prior to Indian independence. The USSR was a colonial power whose core community was European. Also, it maintained its tsarist dependencies in Asia, and showed signs of expansionism in Xinjiang and Manchuria in the early 1940s. Lenin and Stalin embarked on policies that amounted to cultural and linguistic russification. Stalin ruthlessly crushed the

---

basmachi rebels of Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s, and deported ethnic Koreans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Volga Germans en masse, and relocated some Jews in the 1940s. He also violently tore apart the fabric of traditional societies from Chukotka to Georgia, notably including Islamic lands between with traditional ties to South Asia. What were those features of the USSR’s home policy in Asia which still helped augment a pro-Soviet tilt for most opinion makers in the Indian National Congress despite these phenomena, and despite the USSR’s anti-liberal and totalitarian general outlook that Indian centrists never had sympathies for?

First of all the fact must be noted that Moscow’s characteristically colonial political rule in its Asian territories nurtured a political economy that differed from classical metropole-colony relationships to a very significant degree. The USSR practiced forced industrialization in Central Asia, but it was still industrialization, built upon investments from the European part of the USSR.

Secondly, on the basis of an internationalist ideology, policies of affirmative action were set up informally and later formally in the Republics, to secure places for non-Slavs at schools and universities, in the modernizing segments of the Republics’ economies, and in the ranks of their local nomenklatura. Stalin’s usage of collective ethnic punishments did much disservice to Soviet credibility as an internationalist state. However, contemporary world standards of racism were sometimes worse. Nehru’s sister Vijayalakshmi Pandit, when touring the United States in 1945, had to use racially segregated entrances for blacks. Although Nehruvian centrists held sacred Western ideas such as liberal democracy, civic duty, individual freedom, a multi-party system or some of them even British Fabian socialism, it would be wrong to underestimate the alienating impact of an ugly and racist side of the contemporary West on Nehru and his centrist friends, offending in a major way their elementary human dignity.

The third most important set of phenomena that conveyed a positive Soviet image in India came into play only in the 1950s. Those were USSR achievements in science and technology such as the successful launching of the sputnik in 1957, but even more importantly, in industrializing successfully, a backward economy that had showed structural similarities to underdeveloped India. Nehru as prime minister would attempt at economically strengthening a liberal democratic India with the help of Soviet inspired economic tools like central planning (along with other, more Western, Keynesian tools like governmental investment in the economy to spur demand, public works, and in general, state capitalism). His experiment with a mixed economic system,
continued by his successors, eventually proved a very limited success, and led to the infamous Hindu rate of growth (3%).

Stalin and India

As the immediate precursor to this chapter’s focus, it is imperative to discuss Stalin’s India policy. In the preface to Horn’s monograph, Alvin Z. Rubinstein asserts that “India has been a target of special Soviet interest ever since it became independent on August 15, 1947.” This seems untrue. Between 1947 and 1952, Stalin never received an Indian diplomat, not even Vijayalakshmi Pandit, who was India’s first ambassador to Moscow. Stalin believed that India would quickly disintegrate after the bloodbaths of partition, communal tensions, and Gandhi’s assassination. He also looked at independent India as a semi-colony, since British officers remained in its diplomatic corps and in its army; and in 1950 the new Republic chose to stay within the British Commonwealth. Nehru’s pro-British stance regarding Malaya reinforced Stalin’s convictions. As Horn points out, Stalin had also burnt his hand in the 1930s with the Kuomintang in China, diminishing greatly, his trust in Southern non-communist nationalists.

Till 1952, Stalin’s India policy was de facto reduced to his handling of the CPI. The party was instructed to oppose the INC government as imperialist agents and in class terms, as representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie. The long term foreign policy aim of overthrowing capitalist governments translated into a discreet short term Soviet goal in May 1948, when in Telengana, in the ‘native’ princely state of Hyderabad, a quasi-communist uprising materialized. Soon in September, home minister Sardar Patel ordered troops to oust the nizam and integrate Hyderabad into India. Telengana’s embryonic commune was also crushed at that point, whereupon Stalin started to call for restraint in armed class struggle. It must be noted however, that Soviet willingness to commit any resources to that struggle had been limited in the extreme in the first place, apart from pampering the CPI.

In West Bengal, the violent ultra-leftist Naxalite movement that is still not dead today, originally had a strong ideological affinity towards both Stalinist Marxism and Maoism, but first the movement was abandoned by the USSR, and later it vehemently turned against the institutionalized Maoist party. Today’s ‘Maoist’ rebels and Naxalites of India, present in various pockets of underdevelopment and tied to social sub-casts of under-privilege, form localized movements of political self-governance and banditry in the jungle.

---

Stalin’s slow and guarded move to engage India came in 1952. The intransigent CPI had achieved disastrous election results in 1951-1952. However, what proved much more important in changing Stalin’s perceptions on India was the foreign policy outlook of the Nehruvian leadership. Nehru advocated that the PRC gain the Chinese permanent seat on the UNSC. This was denied by the West, keeping instead Taiwanese representation on that body. Nehru detested the Kuomintang primarily because of ideological reasons but also added to his suspicions the fact that the KMT leadership claimed Burmese territory in 1947. He refused to condemn the PRC in 1950 when its troops clashed with US troops at the Yalu River in Korea. He categorically refused to send Indian troops to Korea to aid the US led campaign. He also refused to sign the San Francisco Treaty, maintaining that it did not respect Japan’s sovereignty. Nehru also worked for UN General Assembly resolutions against apartheid in South Africa, which the USSR decided to back. (The preoccupation with South Africa’s system did not only stem from general anti-racism but reflected upon the plight of many Indians who lived in Durban and elsewhere in that country.) Nehru kept the portfolio of external affairs minister along with his premiership till his death in 1964. Through his foreign policy course, he aimed at articulating a new Asian voice in world politics, and asserted India’s independence and sovereignty. Until 1962, the year of the realist shock of Chinese armed attack on its territory, India’s foreign policy was highly pacifistic, moralistic, utopian, and ideological. The chief negotiator’s role at the multiparty talks on Korea fitted that image perfectly. V.K. Krishna Menon, a South Indian aristocrat, ex-Labour MP in Britain and Nehru’s longtime friend with whom he had visited civil war torn Spain, and whose first diplomatic assignment was to serve as Indian ambassador to the UK, was sent to Geneva and was leading negotiations on Korea there. At this latter juncture Menon was already accredited to the UN as ambassador, where he delivered extremely long ideological speeches outlining how India viewed the imperatives of international understanding and peace. The highly ideological nature of India’s foreign policy at its early stage was highlighted by the fact that India supported the PRC candidacy for the UNSC even during and after their border war in 1962.

Nehru’s foreign policy decisions were not in any way aimed at gaining Stalin’s trust, and their usefulness for the USSR was incidental rather than a result of a conscious design. However, Stalin’s approval they gained. Shortly before his death, he received two Indian ambassadors, stopped inciting violent uprisings like those of Naxalites, and instructed the CPI to assume a more constructive role in domestic politics.

---

Soviet foreign policy objectives unfolding in India: power and security

Horn makes a surprising statement about USSR foreign policy goals in India when he opines that “Although they have never been heavily emphasized, security or strategic goals ought to be ruled out.”9 Certainly, no CPSU leader would ever say, or probably even entertain, ideas most famously quoted by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy who would want to see Russian soldiers “wash their boots in the warm water of the Indian Ocean.”10 In this basic sense of immediate territorial aggrandizement, the USSR certainly did not set an eye on India. This will not be true regarding the sub-continent however, where in Afghanistan the Soviets had clear, distinct power goals of creating a territorial dependency.

Also, it would be wrong to ignore security threats to the USSR that emanated from the sub-continent itself. Already in 1949, US president Truman received reports from the Army Chief of Staff and the CIA, which proposed to alter the traditional US reliance on the UK in South Asia. Indeed, they highlighted the eminent usefulness of Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar as possible future locations for air bases for US reconnaissance aircrafts and as hubs of anti-Soviet CIA operations.11 Those plans were to materialize in the mid-1950s. Lockheed Martin’s U2 planes came to fly regularly over USSR territory until 1960. In that year, the Soviets shot down one of them. Khrushchev bluntly phoned Pakistan’s president to warn him of the dangers of USSR nuclear might. U2 activity was immediately terminated.

Pakistan was to be a most important link in Asia in the US-sponsored cordon sanitaire around the USSR as it joined both the Baghdad Pact in 1955 (later to become CENTO), and SEATO in 1954. It proved to be an ineffective member of both. Evidently, it was in the interests of the USSR to keep India out of that cordon, especially given that contemporary missile technology necessitated close geographical proximity for attacks on its territory. The need for securing India’s strategically benign stance on the USSR remained even as CENTO and SEATO eventually proved ineffectual as security organizations, and the USSR faced a severely weakened cordon.

Power and security objectives present themselves even more forcefully when we observe Soviet foreign policy goals in the world context, and in the context of the security constellation in Asia. The Soviet-Indian relationship under discussion, characterized as we shall see, by an oft emerging coincidence of interests, and volatile but enduring consensus, must be looked at in its Cold War framework. On the world stage, policies aimed at the balance of power

---

10 Biographical entry on Vladimir Zhirinovsky at BookRags’ Encyclopedia of World Biography, date of access 1st September 2012, www.bookrags.com/Vladimir_Zhirinovsky

The patterns of superpower enmity and regional power enmity collided in 1972 with the US-PRC thaw. That thaw resulted in a gross overall reduction of USSR maneuvering space. The USSR responded to this challenge with ostentatious activity in regions where its exercise of power and influence had little instrumental purpose like Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Afghanistan. When the US in the early 1980s resolved to commit resources to a new arms race, USSR overstretch, coupled with the strains of that arms race and the inherent inefficiencies of the Soviet economic system, put an end to USSR superpower standing, the USSR socio-economic system and to that country’s territorial integrity. In the ensuing paragraphs, this study will explore USSR power and security aims in India within this overall strategic framework.

Nehru’s foreign policy outlook gave new USSR leaders the opportunity for engagement on terms that they viewed favourable. Before the late 1960s, this drive was devoid of an aim to construct a full fledged security alliance. Its most immediate purpose was engagement itself. The USSR as of 1953 was surrounded by its buffer zone dependencies to which it granted formal independence in Eastern Europe and Mongolia. Compliance was maintained by the tacit military threat of occupation, or by continuation of WWII Red Army deployment. Apart from this self-contained camp (the USSR’s own empire), the country was extremely isolated and had in effect restricted its foreign policy tools to communist parties and communist labour unions.

Stalin’s death left Lavrentiy Beriya in charge. Beriya held only the perhaps humble position of Deputy Premier at that time but since Premier Malenkov was ineffectual and Khrushchev had not solidified his power base as CPSU first secretary, Beriya, with his firm grip on the secret services, was the new dictator. Beriya had little time to construct a foreign policy of his own in 1953. After Khrushchev managed to stage a coup to capture and quickly try Beriya and his associates, his genuinely new leadership voiced the need to open hitherto closed foreign policy options for the USSR. This required initiating USSR presence and engagement with various countries, increasing foreign trade, opening the country to foreign students, embarking on joint scientific projects, and strengthening the KGB’s foreign expertise.

It is necessary as we approach the focal time frame of this chapter to elaborate on the question of which groups and institutions were responsible for formulating foreign policy decisions in the USSR and in India. In the USSR it was not the foreign policy establishment or the government of the state, but the
Politburo of the CPSU where foreign policy decisions were taken. That institution reverted to cooptation for membership, rubberstamped post factum by the CPSU Central Committee. It was first secretaries Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, to a lesser extent Chernenko and Gorbachev who, with the aid of their Politburo affiliates and friends, determined the course of foreign policy. Gromyko’s foreign ministry carried out their decisions as an executive body. Eduard Shevardnadze under Gorbachev assumed a slightly more independent standing.

In India before 1962, despite the liberal democratic nature of that polity, foreign policy was the exclusive domain of Nehru and a close circle of his affiliates (Vijayalakshmi Pandit, K.P.S. Menon, K.M. Panikkar, R.K. Nehru ambassadors, G.S. Bajpai, and N.R. Pillai civil servants, and of course, V.K. Krishna Menon). After Krishna Menon’s substantial mistakes as defense minister, INC party bosses compelled Nehru to oust him. Those bosses assumed a role in foreign policymaking from that point onwards. After Nehru’s death, pro-Soviet and pro-US lobbies became increasingly active in the Indian parliament’s lower house Lok Sabha and were able to put some pressure on the government for their respective foreign policy aims.

Before the emergence of USSR-PRC rivalry in 1958/1963, medium term Soviet foreign policy goals of power and security included first the core short term objective of keeping India out of the cordon sanitaire and putting pressure on Pakistan, an active member of that anti-Soviet cordon. Secondary medium term objectives were: weakening worldwide USSR isolation by establishing presence and contacts with India, reducing Western influence in that theatre, and cultivating India as a negotiator in conflicts. After 1958/1963, the containment of China became a core Soviet short term foreign policy objective that bore forcefully upon Soviet intentions in South Asia. India’s short term security objectives eminently included countering the Pakistan threat, and from 1959 the China threat, and they reflected also the need to maintain India’s independence and its non-alignment. Indian power objectives aimed at achieving hegemonic leadership in the sub-continent, which India basically reached in 1971. In 1964 the PRC went nuclear, rising substantially the level of threat to India, both by the unlikely but ever present threat of a nuclear attack on the latter’s territory, and by China’s willingness to share nuclear technology with Pakistan.

The USSR was in the position to offer a continued veto of UNSC resolutions on Kashmir that were proposed in favour of Pakistan. This fact gave the USSR substantial leverage vis-à-vis India. Kashmir has been the foremost preoccupation of India’s foreign policy from 1947 to this day. Keeping most of

---

12 J. Bandyopadhyaya: The Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1970, p. 168
Jammu and Kashmir State, a majority Muslim province in the Union has had a compelling rationale for India. As such, it highlights and validates the secular political system of India (the only secular nation in the sub-continent). Kashmir’s inclusion nullifies the two-nation concept behind the very establishment of Pakistan, the ideology that Muslims and non-Muslims form separate nations. This concept has been seen in India as detrimental to nation building not only in Kashmir but Kerala, Gujarat and other regions as well. India has a 12% Muslim minority. For Pakistan, naturally, occupying Azad Kashmir (a segment of JK State) and continued attempts at subversion in Indian Administered Kashmir also lie at the heart of counteracting her own centrifugal forces, and of vindicating the founding ideology of the nation itself. Hence, the Kashmir problematique has been the single most important generator of conflicts in South Asia. It led to a full scale war in 1947, played a role in the wars of 1965 and 1971, incited the Kargil war of 1998/1999, had a role in the early 2002 nuclear crisis, and today it fuels a nuclear stalemate.

**Economic objectives as secondary goals of USSR foreign policy in India**

From 1953 to 1969, with a short temporary cooling period in the early 1960s, we see rapport building by the USSR in India. The pursuit of economic gains, cultural influence and prestige all came secondary to power and security objectives however. The movement towards closer relations came with fanfare. In 1953 alone, fourteen Soviet delegations were dispatched to India. Ilya Ehrenburg, the versatile Soviet writer and gifted propagandist was furnished with the opportunity for a lengthy stay. His “Impressions of India,” published in 1956, was an extremely sophisticated eulogy of the achievements of Indian civilization.\(^\text{13}\) On 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) Dec 1953 the two countries signed their first commercial treaty, to be followed later by many. The volume of their commerce increased thirty-fold until 1991, peaking first in the mid-1970s and again in the 1980s. The second peak, as we shall see, will visibly reflect political, rather than economic, prerogatives.

Economic objectives constituted an important secondary short term objective for Soviets in this relationship. Still, the USSR was not ready to jeopardize security goals for economic gains. It was a constant source of friction between Moscow and New Delhi that the USSR was almost never ready to supply India with her latest sophisticated weaponry, whereby decreasing her own relative military power as capability, even though the USSR perceived India as posing no threat to her security. The only time the USSR supplied India with its latest sophisticated arms was in the early 1980s when India’s strategic worries over the USSR’s Afghanistan occupation had to be calmed.\(^\text{14}\) It was only

---

\(^{13}\) Ilya Ehrenburg, Putevye zapisi, Indiyskiye vpechatleniya, Isskustvo, Moskva, 1956

after the fall of the USSR that Russia started compromising generally on this policy due to its grave economic deprivation.

Tangible spoils were also regularly provided by the USSR to India regardless of economic rationality, whenever strategic necessities so demanded. First it was the aim of establishing rapport with India that was behind such decisions. From the late 1960s, the Soviet drive to construct a military alliance in Asia against the PRC became paramount. In the 1980s, the Soviets’ main aim was to silence Indian dissatisfaction with the disturbance in Afghanistan. Spoils came in the form of industrial projects, loans and trade concessions. Steel plants or pharmaceutical companies had the advantage of partially producing for the guarded Soviet market at rock bottom labour costs, and providing highly sought after expatriate jobs for the Soviet professional middle class. Loans were repaid, although without sufficient interest.

Some of the trade concessions however, were startlingly irrational if looked at from an economic point of view. The USSR in 1980 agreed to selling crude oil to India at the height of the Iraq-Iran war. As a result of that, the USSR was compelled to cut back on her crude oil exports to Western Europe, where buyers paid in hard currency, whereas Indian purchases were compensated for in goods and Rupees. The Soviet objective of not alienating India, an ally at a crucial moment, overrode any consideration of economic rationality.

The Nehruvian leadership was eager to receive Soviet offers of assistance for nationally owned plants and projects, as it was mired in Fabian socialist and Keynesian economic thought and socialist protectionism but its revenues were insufficient for the governmental investments those lines of thought advocated. Also, Western private and state investors were skeptical about the economic viability of Nehru’s dams, infrastructural projects and heavy industry plants. The Soviet Union was happy to fill the void.

The Bhilai steel plant was first in 1956 to herald Soviet industrial assistance to India (647.4 million Rupees, roughly $64.74 million). The Ranchi heavy industry (machinery) factory came second (940 million Rs, $94 million), then a plant was built in Durgapur (to produce coal mining equipment), an electronics factory was set up in Hardwar, a surgical instruments factory in Madras, and precision instruments factories at Kotah and Palghat. A large antibiotics plant was built by the USSR in Rishikesh (150 million Rs, $15 million), a synthetic drugs plant in Hyderabad, a thermal power station in Neyveli, and the massive Bhakra dam (940 million Rs, $94 million). The Indian oil industry was set up and first run by Soviets, and in 1959, the first oil refinery

---

15 Op. cit, p. 199
in Barauni was constructed (190 million Rs loan, $19 million) after Soviet scientists found oil under ground. Soviet loans for such projects were given at a 2.5% interest per year, generous in international comparison, and most of them could be repaid in goods.

These common undertakings, along with trade itself, provided not only shared interests but also sources of friction. “Trade is no brotherhood,” claims an old Yiddish saying. In 1978, after years of negotiation, the USSR achieved setting the Rubel-Rupee exchange rate to its distinct advantage. Also, it was profitable for the USSR to ‘outsource’ say, manual shoe production to India, as our theoretical chapter concludes. In the 1980s, there appeared a printed leather shopping bag depicting Indian women in saris, an exemplar of which seemingly, every other female in the entire socialist camp owned and sported. On the other hand, constant underproduction in state owned Indian plants, deadline problems with production commissions, and insufficient quality standards proved a constant worry for the USSR in relation to the industrial plants that were set up with its help. Ranchi and the pharmaceutical companies made heavy losses in the late 1960s.

It must be noted that the USSR never retained ownership of those plants, as it did in the case of its Eastern European proxy states where the Soviets simply took over German possessions and shares in companies in 1945, and established other ‘joint ventures’ with the locals. Unlike there, the Soviets in India were repaid for their investments in goods produced by those companies in question, and also in goods that were unrelated to such companies like raw materials and leather products, also in Rupees, and in expatriate jobs at those companies. Upon anecdotal evidence, it might be noted that Soviet professionals did not exhibit the same kind of arrogance in India as in Eastern Europe, Cuba or Vietnam, their compounds were less secluded, and they carried themselves less with the air of colonizers. They faced none of the racism that South Asians in Moscow sometimes encountered. High pay, servants and the simple pleasure of legally leaving the USSR, made these jobs a dream for many.

Outside the socialist camp and the Soviet Union’s socialist allies in the Third World like Cuba, India presented Soviet professionals with a rare opportunity to establish real life human level international contacts. Indian institutions like pre-1991 Jawaharlal Nehru University and other educational institutions especially in West Bengal and Kerala were hotbeds of leftist intelligentsia who nurtured their Soviet friendships. But also, friendships devoid of any political ties, and even closer romantic relationships developed, as in the

---

case of Stalin’s daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva and many others, who married Indians.

Before 1964, independent India saw many famines. The country had insufficient resources to buy wheat on the international market, and it was in dire need of food aid. The USSR was in no position to help as it was never self sufficient in wheat or most other agricultural produce. In the early sixties, the success of the green revolution in populous Uttar Pradesh and in the Punjab eliminated massive famines in India. However, to some extent food aid was still an issue in the 1970s. The United States filled the void under the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. Wheat loan funds were treated as a foreign policy instrument by the Nixon administration in 1972, coinciding with the use of gunboat diplomacy in the Bay of Bengal. Such political food aid conditionality, together with US political behaviour fueled resentment against the United States in the early seventies in India, making it easier for the Soviet Union to appear as a selfless friend by comparison. What we may see as the common theme underlying US policies vis-à-vis India at the time, is a general lack of interest in that country for strategic purposes, and a near-total lack of meaningful engagement.

India did not have a sufficient domestic industrial base for a military production complex. That lack stimulated a demand for USSR weapons first in 1960. In that year, India bought 24 Ilyushin-14 and 16 Antonov-12 large transport aircrafts, and 24 Mil helicopters (Mi-4). At the same time India tried to diversify her purchases and obtain Lockheed F-104 Starfighters, but because of Pakistan’s appeals the USA was not ready to supply them. Hence India was left with no option but buy MiG-21s from the Soviets. Since 1968, India has been producing MiG jet fighters in Nasik and Koraput under license. Radars and air-to-air missiles were also licensed out for production in India already in the 1960s. 1968 saw the first three Soviet submarines in India, necessitated by Pakistan’s purchase of Trench class submarines from the United States. In the late 1960s, India bought torpedo ships, four corvettes, frigates, and four F class submarines from the USSR. After the 1971 Bangladesh war, the loss of war materiel necessitated purchases that were about triple the size of 1960s purchases. India bought MiG-21s, new Sukhoys, helicopters, 450 main battle tanks (T-54, T-55 and T-62), light arms, and rocket systems. In 1977, 70 T-72 medium size tanks, two Kashin class destroyers, five Ka-25 helicopters and two Il-38 reconnaissance aircraft were bought. In 1978, the Soviets agreed to licensed production of MiG-21 s in India. These local MiGs later stayed in operation for too long and anecdotal evidence suggests that they acquired the

---

18 Op. cit, p. 87
nickname of ‘flying coffins’ in India. In the early 1980s, massive purchases of latest USSR weaponry ensued (Mig-25s, MiG 23 Floggers, Antonov-32 transport aircraft, Mi-8 helicopters, and 100 new T-72 medium size MBTs, 5 MiG-25 Foxbat missile equipped air defense fighters, *all purchased on credit*). They were part and parcel of Brezhnev’s package of crude oil, credit, weaponry, and sending an Indian into space, for the Indian silence on Afghanistan.

Generally however, the role of a main weapons supplier brings both influence and leverage for the seller on the buyer. Spare parts and ammunition are a constant worry for armies, so the buyer is forced to keep as much stability in the relationship as he can, unless he wants to risk Sadat’s fate who after sending home Soviet military advisors, abrogating his Treaty with the USSR and assuming a pro-US foreign policy orientation for Egypt, was denied every spare part for his MiGs. This must have been one of the reasons behind PM Morarji Desai’s continuation of India’s USSR alignment in 1977,\(^{20}\) despite the fact that his Janata government’s sympathies lay elsewhere.

*Diplomatic history: power, security and prestige goals*

In the early 1950s, Soviet-Indian diplomatic relations accelerated with rapid speed. In 1955, Nehru toured the USSR amidst glamour and much ado. In the winter of that year, Khrushchev toured India for nearly three weeks. He went there with gifts of Ilyushin-14 aircraft. The leaders engaged in Portugal-bashing together because of the Portuguese colonial enclaves on Indian territory. They exchanged compliments, and glossed over gaps between the two countries’ diverging social systems and foreign policy aims. Ideologically, this presented a problem for the Soviet Union, where a pro-Indian foreign policy required marvels of dialectical logic when commentators had to explain Soviet backing for a capitalist country. The same Soviet problem recurred later in relation to many countries in the Third World.

Net prestige objectives, devoid of any other goal, are not very frequent in international relations. Rare examples of pure prestige objectives are: employing around ten thousand people at the Rashtrapati Bhavan (the Indian President’s mansion), which was hailed as a residence hard to equal in vastness and magnificence;\(^{21}\) or displaying red stars made of tons of real rubies at the Kremlin gates in Moscow are examples of pure prestige objectives. Arguably in both cases however, the targets of these ostentatious displays were and still are, as much the locals as foreign dignitaries.

The USSR drive to engage the South in general, presented a varied spectrum of objectives apart from pure prestige as this thesis points out


\(^{21}\) President of India’s Official Website, at presidentofindia.nic.in, date of access 1st September 2012
regarding the case of India. However, trying to engage the non-aligned movement itself was probably fueled by Soviet aims to secure more favourable General Assembly resolutions at the UN, a goal that even if achieved, would have hardly translated into tangibles. Specifically, the 1970s drive to make the non-aligned movement agree on a declaration that would denote the USSR as ‘a natural ally’ of non-aligned countries was eminently motivated by net prestige objectives and devoid of any instrumental purpose. To illustrate India’s precarious position as one of the leaders of the non-aligned movement but still temporarily aligned with the USSR was highlighted by the fact that India itself withheld USSR pressures for that declaration, and what is more, it actively lobbied against taking such a resolution. At the same time, India tried repeatedly, to bring the USSR to Afro-Asian and later, to nonaligned, meetings.

In cases when establishing a Soviet presence or gaining influence did nothing to increase Soviet power understood as capability, as was probably the case in the horn of Africa in the 1970s, we are again forced to conclude that USSR’s overriding medium term goal was so close to mere prestige that it is hardly separable. We may opine that although fueled by power frustrations elsewhere, such goals present examples of net prestige objectives. The man on the street in the USSR realized this fact early on. The lack of any instrumental purpose, the staggering costs to achieving prestige in parts of the Third World, sadly coupled with the racism of a closed country, provoked unpleasant scenes against foreign students in the Moscow metro, and a USSR-wide recurrence of extremely tasteless jokes. As subtle differentiations are rare for street opinion, conundrums and jokes applied equally to South Asians in Moscow and the USSR. However, the opinion of the street rarely made its way to Soviet foreign policymaking.

Following up on the thread of diplomatic history, we have to first narrate the emergence of a Sino-Indian rift. China converted her feudal suzerainty into near full sovereignty over Tibet in 1950. Initially, there had been Indian troops inside Tibet which patrolled certain roads even beyond the Tibetan-Indian border, the McMahon Line (a colonial arrangement). Nehru’s India was initially sympathetic to the PRC, firmly standing behind assigning the Chinese permanent UNSC seat for the PRC. The two entered into a territorial agreement in 1954. That agreement was the first intergovernmental document where Nehruvian principles of non-aligned co-operation explicitly appeared as a basis of interstate relations, even before the Bandung declaration of 1955. Those five principles, the panchsheel, stood for common values like peace and respect for each other’s territorial integrity.

The PRC started taxing India’s herdsmen beyond the Mac-Mahon Line in 1955, on Indian territory. In 1959 the PLA occupied Tibet, and the Dalai Lama took refuge in India. This led to mutual Sino-Indian verbal assaults and it made China voice her territorial grievances against the validity of the McMahon Line. In 1962, India and China fought a border war where China occupied 35,000 sq miles of territory in Assam, Ladakh, the Aksai Chin, and in Indian dependency Bhutan. Minor clashes ensued in 1969 and 1975 between China and India, but the line of control has been roughly stable until today.

Krishna Menon, who as defense minister was partly responsible for the 1962 border fiasco, had gone along with Soviet assessments of international conflicts throughout the 1950s, notably including both the Suez crisis and the Hungarian uprising in 1956. India’s support for the Soviet Union over Suez came as a natural Indian reaction to the last classical colonial initiative. The second decision regarding Hungary was a result of a lack of interest in a struggle that did not lend itself easily to classical colonial comparisons. In the case of Hungary, Menon employed his formula of not signing declarations that used condemnatory language, very successfully. This solution was to recur in 1968 and in 1981. The same lack of condemnation regarding Afghanistan will tarnish India’s image in the developing world, but Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland were not in Asia and India’s reluctance to raise its voice was understood as natural in each of those cases.

Until 1958, India’s positive stance on the PRC was a cementing force in the Soviet-Indian relationship. In 1960, Khrushchev famously refused granting nuclear technology for war purposes to China. He perceived Mao’s doctrine of the inescapability of an all-out nuclear war with the West as insane, and he was also unwilling to undermine relative Soviet military capability (that is, Soviet military capability relative to PRC military capability). After the Soviet-Chinese rift came into the open in 1963, their mutual relations deteriorated quickly. In 1969, USSR-China border clashes at the Ussuri River and later in Dzungaria signaled China’s unwillingness to accept what she perceived as the unequal border treaties of the 19th century. 1969 ushered in an era of Soviet strategic preoccupation with the PRC. The PRC viewed post-Stalinist USSR’s leaders first as revisionist Marxists, but later its press plainly referred to Soviet leaders as Fascist dictators. USSR leaders referred to the Maoist leadership as leftist extremists and later as political adventurers.

The Pakistani army took over executive powers in that country first in 1958, with Ayub Khan as Pakistan’s first military dictator. Later Yahya Khan, Zia ul-Haq and most recently, Pervez Musharraf assumed similar roles and

---

23 H. W. Brands, India and the United States, The Cold Peace, Twayne Publishers, no date, p. 84
responsibilities. Pakistan concluded a border agreement with the PRC as early as 1963, started buying PRC weapons in 1964, the two started building a common road (the famed Karakoram highway) in 1969, and soon they developed far reaching ties in nuclear technology. Their axis posed an immediate security threat to India in Kashmir, and later pushed India to resort to nuclear deterrence.

India and Pakistan tried and failed to conclude an agreement on Kashmir in 1962. New sources of friction appeared upon the sharing of the water resources of the Ganges River. In 1964, Nehru died and Khrushchev was ousted by hard-liner forces in the Politburo. Lal Bahadur Shastri became PM and Leonid Brezhnev became CPSU leader.

The early 1960s brought something of a minor Soviet-Pakistani thaw. The USSR was concerned that its new Arab friends would be alienated by its overly tough stance on that country, and having achieved a halt on U2 and CIA activity in Peshawar, it wanted to sell weapons to Pakistan, and to the extent possible, also tried to draw that country farther from China. However, the USSR still vetoed a pro-Pakistani resolution on Kashmir in 1964, signaling a limit to that relationship.

In April 1965, India and Pakistan went to war over the Rann of Kutch, an uninhabitable piece of land covered by the sea half of the year. President Ayub accepted Soviet mediation in the conflict which led to the signing of the Tashkent Treaty in early 1966. Ayub was convinced to accept USSR mediation upon strong American advice. Surprising as that may be, US president Johnson wanted to make a gesture of good will towards the Soviets, as a sign of détente. US-USSR thaw had its origins in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the realization of the need for improved relations if the superpowers wanted to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. Kissinger worked for that détente, acting upon his conviction that US hegemony was impossible to maintain and that a new concert of powers had to be set up with the United States as the concert’s main guarantor. Growing US tilt towards China in the late 1970s, and the Soviet march into Afghanistan together killed détente in the early 1980s.

Tashkent was a diplomatic feat for the USSR and enhanced worldwide Soviet prestige, if not Soviet security or Soviet power. In 1965 India tried in vain to secure a Soviet presence at the non-aligned meeting in Algiers. Other nonaligned nations protested. This group was growing larger than ever due to the early 1960s wave of decolonization in Africa. Within that group, India was losing some of her prestige due to rising Chinese influence, Pakistan’s pro-China stances and Indonesia’s strong pro-PRC policies before 1965.
Indira Gandhi (Nehru’s daughter whose family name came from her Parsee husband), became India’s premier in 1966. With a Janata interregnum in between (1977-1979), Indira stayed PM until 1984 when she was assassinated by one of her Sikh bodyguards. The USSR often expressed deep satisfaction with her left wing domestic policies. She nationalized banks and insurance companies, ousted multinational companies like the emblematic Coca Cola from India, practiced state capitalism by setting up state owned enterprises and by keeping out foreign competition by tariffs and non-tariff barriers to international trade. She levied punitive taxes on the middle class. She also revoked government-paid privy purses and official licenses for the 600-odd royal families of India (maharajas, rajas, nizams, nawabs, sardars and other minor feudals). The USSR viewed Indira’s Emergency rule (1975-1977), a rule that bypassed the law and put down democracy, quite favourably. However, it would be an oversimplification to assert that USSR satisfaction with Indira’s home policies lied at the heart of the continuing Soviet-Indian consensus relationship. Morarji Desai supported all Soviet-Indian security or commercial treaties, visited the USSR, and duly revoked his pledge that he had made while in opposition, to restore genuine Indian non-alignment. This he did despite of his well known personal disdain for any form of socialism, and his clear personal contempt for the USSR.

However, neither Indira, nor Desai had sympathy for the overarching new Soviet security goal in Asia: constructing a full fledged continental security pact with an anti-PRC edge. This goal was a recurring medium term foreign policy objective that the USSR tried to achieve from 1969 to 1979. As détente and common security gained momentum in Europe, this drive was masked as a similar attempt to construct an Asian Collective Security System, institutionalizing interstate peace, noninterference and confidence building. However, as the PRC was not invited to the system, and various Asian countries notably including Pakistan were, the real intentions behind this collective security system were clear to all. India’s resolve to withstand Soviet pressure for the system stemmed from its wish to rather achieve peace with the PRC itself, than enter a collective pact against that country. This would come into the open in the late 1970s when India initiates a thaw with the PRC, much to the annoyance of the USSR.

Yahya Khan let Kissinger utilize his relations with the PRC to initiate dialogue in 1971. Nixon’s ensuing 1972 visit to Beijing marked an effort at the strategic encirclement of the USSR as its universal and regional enemies were resolving their differences and came to a strategic understanding of sorts

25 Leszek Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia, Croom Helm, London-Sydney, 1986, p. 40
(although sources of friction remained). In October 1971, the PRC came to replace Taiwan on the UNSC. As a second best option to a collective anti-China pact, the USSR offered India a security treaty. Robert C. Horn proves by a meticulous analysis of 1969 diplomatic history that the Soviet-Indian treaty was drafted already in that year. It was publicly signed only in 1971, when the Soviets got wind of the coming US-PRC détente, and when the immediate prospect of a war with Pakistan over East Bengal seemed inevitable for India. India feared the worst of prospects if the PRC took arms on Pakistan’s side in 1971. That was the reason why the signing of the treaty gives an impression of being hurried by the Indian side.

The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, signed on 9th August 1971 and legally binding for twenty years, was signed in New Delhi. In the event of the casus foederis, the treaty obliged mutual consultations, a reasonably strong commitment. It was a defensive military alliance for security purposes. However, the treaty did not spell out the Soviet role in supplying the Indian armed forces, it did not prescribe Soviet military assistance to India, and it did not deal with India’s commitment to any form of socialism. In those aspects it was unlike most other alliance treaties that the USSR entered. This treaty actually respects the sovereignty and independence of India. Alignment in itself was problematic for India’s proclaimed non-alignment in the public relations sense. However since non-alignment itself had been constructed as a measure for the maintenance of independence, which the treaty did not jeopardize, and which it helped to upkeep with the utilization of another country’s resources, we can reasonably opine that the treaty furthered India’s national interests. This it did despite the apparent compromise on non-alignment and the Nehru legacy.

India emerged victorious from the Bangladesh war in 1971. That war dismembered Pakistan and made India the unrivaled hegemon of the subcontinent. Growing Indian strategic confidence led to the incorporation of former princely state and Indian protectorate Sikkim in 1974/1975, which enraged the PRC and worried Pakistan. The Bangladesh war also tilted world public opinion in favour of India, given West-Pakistan’s large scale genocide in that province. Not surprisingly perhaps, the French media was most vocal as the arms employed for the genocide were American.

Soviet-Indian diplomatic gala visits abounded in the 1970s. A flow of verbal niceties helped expressing consensus. The Soviets built a metro in Calcutta. Plans were made to coordinate economic planning between the two

---

27 Op. cit, p. 16
28 Op. cit, p. 73
countries (those plans reaped meager results). When in May 1974 India exploded an atomic device in Pokhran, the USSR was largely sympathetic.

Friction arose regarding great power strategic presence in the Indian Ocean. The US established her naval presence on that ocean in 1968, built Diego Garcia as its naval base, and practiced gunboat diplomacy in 1971 in an attempt to aid Pakistan in East Bengal. India would have preferred zero superpower presence on the Indian Ocean which she considered her own rightful domain. In Visakhapatnam, on the tip of littoral South India, the USSR built a port, and Soviets would have expected special extraterritorial rights for their naval forces there. Those rights were not granted.

Morarji Desai and his external affairs minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the leaders of the Janata government (1977-1979) realized that the treaty with the USSR was a matter of expediency and that it was based on mutual interest. Hence they continued the pattern of cooperation, and engaged in diplomatic visits. The first rift in the Soviet-Indian treaty relationship appeared in the late 1970s with the Sino-Indian thaw, culminating in foreign minister Huang Hua’s gala visit in New Delhi in 1981. Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok speech and his May 1989 visit to Beijing marked a new Soviet willingness to engage the PRC. That willingness put an end to the security rationale behind the Soviet-Indian treaty from the Soviet point of view, whereupon analysts and policy makers were forced to consider it de facto null and void even before it expired.

Between 1979 and 1986, Soviet-Indian relations were put to a test due to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In 1980, when Brezhnev went to New Delhi, his convoy had to be heavily guarded against massive and violent demonstrations organized by Afghan refugees and others. India extracted a heavy toll for her silence on Afghanistan until 1986. India obtained crude oil and arms. The Soviets agreed to put an Indian into space. India gained Soviet help for her own space program. India also purchased heavy water, obtained massive loans in cash and in wheat, and received elaborate Soviet courtesy. Over 120,000 specialists were trained by the Soviets in India: their numbers peaked then. In the early 1980s, scores of academics worked on 112 joint projects. Rakesh Sharma was the first Indian astronaut in space in 1984.

Robert C. Horn makes the surprising argument that India’s silence on Afghanistan cannot be proved to have emerged as a result of Soviet influence. Horn provides a meticulous microanalysis of events and points out (extremely convincingly) that there had been no instance when India’s aims to break her

---

30 Anatoliy Kutsenkov: “Partnership Strategies,” In: Prasanna Kumar Pratasani (ed.) : India and Russia, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Samskriti, New Delhi, p. 129
silence changed course due to Soviet offers or pressure. In this, Horn assumes that wielding influence is a billiard ball game. He takes the view that influence is always a relationship that results in a discreet act. He dismisses entirely, the strong evidence to influence working not only as a relationship but as a pattern over time, and that influence works by anticipation.

This theoretical distinction is vindicated clearly if we try to hypothetically visualize a non-engaged USSR in Asia without any influence in India in the way she had been in 1947. Had a non-engaged and sub-continentally un-influential USSR attacked Afghanistan in 1979, a South Asian nation whose anti-Pakistan stances were moreover very important to India, it is clear that India would have voiced extreme dissatisfaction and anger. She might have been even pushed to a more pro-US stance in her foreign policy, irrespective of Pakistan’s heavy reliance on that country. However, by 1979, the USSR had engaged India for 25 years, and established a pattern of influence. She did not have to blatantly push India into silence on Afghanistan in 1979 or 1980. But firstly, their pattern of consensus assured India that the Afghan occupation posed little threat to India’s security in the immediate sense. This was still not enough to maintain complete Indian silence however, given the circumstances. But influence is a multilateral concept. Also, influence worked by anticipation in this case. Soviet influence successfully silenced the government of India but still allowed it to enter into the business of gaining tangible goods for its helpful foreign policy behaviour. The connection between Brezhnev’s immense package and the workings of Soviet influence to the end of silencing India on the Afghanistan occupation must have been clear to most observers, except Horn. Power projections, “strong statements” were not necessary, and they were not appropriate to the long term consensus relationship that had reaped mutual benefits. Soviet influence was rather exercised by the granting of rewards and the tacit, but ever-present, threat of withdrawing arms spare parts and of withholding Soviet veto on Kashmir on the UNSC.

In a different sense however, the effects of that occupation bore a heavy strategic cost for India. Massive US backing and arming of Zia’s Pakistan, the emergence of international Islamic mujaheddin forces that later proved active in Kashmir, and an enhanced CIA role in the sub-continent, were all detrimental to Indian strategic interests of the day.

Gorbachev took over as CPSU first secretary in 1985. His perestroika in the USSR was greeted enthusiastically by the Indian public but Gorbachev’s softening the Soviet stance on China and the West was viewed as working against India’s interests by that country’s foreign policy establishment, and with justification. Rajiv Gandhi received Gorbachev in New Delhi in 1989 and was intent on bringing life into the Soviet-Indian special relationship. However,
evidently that relationship had lost its strategic rationale with the new Soviet foreign policy aims by then. In the late 1980s, India’s strategic weight was lessened significantly, and her future as a major world power seemed more improbable than ever, due to the West-ward looking stance that the USSR took. A new economic doctrine and new economic policies will emerge in India in the early 1990s however, which will catapult the country into the world of enhanced capabilities and foreign policy options.

*Soviet ideological and cultural objectives in India*

The promotion of socialist ideology was one medium term objective of the USSR in India, but it was confined to areas where it did not conflict with other goals. The USSR constructed experimental agricultural plants modeled on sovkhozes (state owned agricultural production units in the USSR) in Suratgarh and Jetsar. It emphasized the values of nationalization and state owned enterprises especially to Indira Gandhi who herself had an inclination to those. The CPI received constant Soviet backing and some back channel financing, and it was repeatedly elected to join state governments in West Bengal and Kerala. Soviet radio stations were very active all over India. Soviet publishing houses translated classical Russian and other literature into a multitude of local languages and dialects in India, and they sold their copies for a low price. The USSR provided numerous scholarships to Indian students and there were times when not only were there Indian floors in the dormitories at Pushkin Institute or Lumumba University in Moscow but indeed, there were dormitories fully occupied by Indians.

India could export Bollywood films to the USSR where they had a large market especially in the Southern Republics but also in Russia. India’s other main cultural exports like the Ramakrishna Mission, along with other gurus and ashrams were strictly kept out of operation in the USSR, as they stood for an ideology that was incompatible with the USSR’s state enforced atheism.

*Conclusion*

The USSR first aimed at engaging and befriending India. Later its objective was to draw her into an offensive alliance against the PRC. This latter aim proved abortive, but a temporary defensive alliance emerged between the two countries. In the 1980s, the USSR wanted to obtain official India’s silence over the Afghanistan occupation, an aim it achieved. Secondary aims included economic gains, and some cultural and ideological purposes. Most importantly however, India never entered any alliance directed at the strategic encirclement of the USSR and posed no threat to Soviet security. This was a feat that was as much due to Soviet influence as the convergence of interests, manifested in unequivocal opinions in various world conflicts. What strengthened the Soviet-Indian relationship was a shared ideological antagonism towards the West and
its form of capitalism, and the role of the United States in world politics. Non-alignment, deemed immoral as a stance by the republican administration at the time of Eisenhower, was viewed favourably by the USSR as a movement that would decrease Western influence worldwide.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CURRENT ISSUES

DR. HABIL (PHD.) JÓZSEF KIS-BENEDEK

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR: POLITICAL AND MILITARY CHALLENGES OF THE SEVENTIES AND TODAY

Abstract

Forty years ago, Israel experienced the most devastating war in its modern history. The article analyses the local and regional challenges of the Yom Kippur war, shows the wars and the low intensity conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the consequences of the 1973 war felt in Israel and in the Arab countries, as well as the effects of wars on the military strategy of Israel. The author gives an overview on the challenges facing Israel and its neighbors by comparing the wars between states and non state actors. The author tries to give answer; weather the threats of the seventies or the current ones are more dangerous.

Key words: Yom Kippur, Israel, Arab countries, wars, challenges, regional situation.

1. Regional situation before and after the Yom Kippur war

Forty years ago, Israel experienced the most devastating war in its modern history.

Since the establishment of the State of Israel the country has been involved in a number of wars and large-scale military operations. These are as follows:

- In 1948, the Arab-Israeli War – after six month of civil war – turned into a regular war and ended between Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan with an Armistice Agreement in 1949, establishing the armistice line between Israel and neighboring countries, known today as the Green Line.

- Between 1950 and 1960 several small confrontations happened, when Arab guerrilla forces infiltrated from the Sinai and Jordan into Israel.
In 1956 during the Suez crisis Israel participated together with UK and France in the occupation of the Suez Canal. Although the Israeli invasion of the Sinai was successful, the USSR and the US forced Israel to withdraw the IDF from the Sinai.

The Six Day War broke out between Israel and the Arab neighbors (Egypt, Jordan and Syria). Iraq Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Kuwait offered arms and troups to the Arab countries. Following the war, the territory held by Israel expanded significantly. Israel captured the West Bank including East Jerusalem from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria, the Sinai and Gaza from Egypt. After taking possession of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank during the war, Israeli officials were faced with a serious challenge: How to marginalize the fedayeen, or terrorists, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, who, because of their close proximity to Israel and the support they received from Arab countries were furious that having lost the war, could wreak havoc on Israeli civilians. Instead of attacking the fedayeen head on, Israeli officials under the leadership of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, worked to keep a “low profile” in the occupied territories. They kept their armed forces away from occupied areas, allowed the continuation of the existing administration and personnel, supported the existing law and law enforcement agencies, rapidly removed curfews and other security restrictions, restored essential services disrupted by the war, and encouraged the local authorities to redress themselves to public welfare projects. This was the so called “Open Bridges policy”

To understand the today’s discussions and eventual solutions, I think it is extremely important to mention this war. The Yom Kippur War – which is the topic of this study – was a relatively short war from October 6 to October 26 1973 by a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria against Israel to recapture a part of the territories which they lost in the Six-Day War. The war began with a surprise joint attack by Egypt and Syria on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. Egypt and Syria crossed the cease-fire lines in the Sinai and Golan Heights respectively. Arab forces were defeated by Israel and there were no significant territorial changes.

During 1971-1982, several confrontation (even) war happened between IDF and Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon, after the PLO relocated from Jordan to South Lebanon. This was the so called Operation Litany. In 1982 the IDF succeeded in expelling the PLO from South Lebanon and created an Israeli security Zone in South Lebanon which was a source of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel during several
years till the fully withdrawal of Israeli Forces from South Lebanon in 2000\textsuperscript{1}. This was a long operation (18 years) and I am not convinced that it was absolutely necessary. At the end, prime minister and defence minister Barak proposed to “bring the solders home from Lebanon”. I think this was a wise decision.

- The next conflict happened in 1987-1993, the so called First Intifada, the conflict with the Palestinians, which was a low intensity conflict, an asymmetrical warfare and much better as the Israeli military terminology used to say ebb and tide conflict. In the literature we can read the expression the “war of stones” as well.

- The second Palestinian uprising (Intifada) happened between 2000 and 2005, but I am not sure it has been officially finished, however people speak in Middle East about the possibility of a third Intifada.

- In 2006, the Lebanon war broke out in response to the abduction of two Israeli reserve soldiers by the Hezbollah. The operation that strengthened gradually became a wider confrontation. The principal participants were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the IDF. The conflict started on 12 July 2006 and continued until a UN brokered ceasefire went into effect on 14 August 2006. The war resulted in the pacification of southern Lebanon and in the weakness of the Hezbollah (which suffered serious casualties but managed to survive the Israeli onslaught).

- The next conflict was the Gaza war (December 2008 - January 2009). This was a three-week armed conflict between Israel and Hamas during the winter of 2008–2009. In an escalation of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel responded to rocket fire from the Gaza Strip with military force in an action named "Operation Cast Lead". Israel opened the attack with a surprise air strike on December 27, 2008. Israel's stated aim was to stop rocket fire from the Gaza Strip and the import of arms into Gaza. Israeli forces attacked military and civilian targets, police stations, and government buildings in the opening assault. Israel declared an end to the conflict on January 18 and completed its withdrawal on January 21, 2009.

- To prevent the rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip Israel launched the Operation Pillar of Defence offensive in November 2012.

\textsuperscript{1} The author had the chance to serve in Tel Aviv as a defence attaché during the withdrawal. The preparations and the accomplishment of the action happened in one night, without any casualty.
To be precise, we cannot forget the fact that Israel launched several military operations abroad not against state but against insurgency, or military facilities suspected dealing with development of atomic, chemical or biological weapons or against forces transporting weapons to terrorist organisation.

As we see, from the establishment of the State of Israel no day passed without war or confrontation. The several terror attacks against Israel inside and outside of the country were not mentioned in the enumeration; however the number of attacks and victims are very high. I am convinced that we can understand the Yom Kippur and other wars only after analysing the domestic, regional – sometimes – global effects of the conflicts. We always have to take into consideration the challenges and only after the assessment of the detail we can judge and make decisions. To understand the lessons of the Yom Kippur war, it is important to understand the three key elements that led to it. These are: Muslim deceptiveness, American diplomatic pressure and Israeli complacency. I would like to underline the last remark: the politicians even the population were very satisfied with the success of the Six Day War and with the growing of land. This satisfaction contributed to the fact that the decision makers did not take seriously the warning of the Intelligence on the preparations for an imminent attack; in addition, there were a lot of intelligence failures as well. Israel was warned to avoid any provocative responses to military preparations of Egypt. A preemptive strike, the move that had won the Six Day War, was out of the question. Instead of this, Israel could only react to overt aggression, while letting an enemy force growing larger than its own to make the preparations for war and dictating the terms of battle.

Israel had beaten Egypt before. That meant that even though Egypt had twice as many soldiers, and the combined Arab attack forces had nearly twice as many tanks, Israel was considered the stronger party. And just like today, it was expected to show restraint against a “weak” Muslim enemy.

**The assessment of the Yom Kippur war from the regional aspects**

We cannot forget the global and the regional factors during 1973:

- The period of the cold war, the confrontation of the West and the East and its consequences in the Middle East. Opening of the Suez Canal (1969).
- Soviet global policy: détente on three fronts: USA, Europe, Asia.
- Soviet policy towards the Middle East (strategy, economy, policy and ideology). The Soviet interests were to protect the southern flank of
the Soviet Union and deploying the Soviet fleets to the Mediterranean by neutralizing the US fleet (strategic missiles).

- Soviet participation in Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Algeria and Iraq.
- Soviet-Arab relations (political and military).
- Soviet-American relations.
- Soviet attitude towards the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- The international repercussion of the six day war.
- The decline of Nasserism and the rise of the “political petrolism”.
- The Egyptian - Saudi axis, competition for a position of a power.
- Pan-Arabism, mutual recognition of sovereignty.
- The rise of militarisation.

The sudden attack on the holy day of Yom Kippur was the most traumatic attack in Israel’s history. The war, which began on October 6, 1973 with a surprise attack by the Egyptian army, saw the very existence of Israel threatened as it faced enemy assaults on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. But the Israeli forces soon rallied, what had initially seemed like a devastating onslaught within days transitioned into an overwhelming military victory. The success of the Egyptian and Syrian army at the first day of the war and the occupying of the Bar Lev defense line along the Suez Canal as well as considerable portions of the Golan Heights, the loss of 300 out the 500 tanks that defended Israel when the war started posed the most serious threat to Israel’s existence since the 1948 war. The Arab accomplishment was the direct outcome of the failure of the military intelligence’s to provide to political and military echelons strategic warning of the impending attack. Such a warning was expected to be given at least 48 hours before the attack. This is a necessary condition for the mobilization and the deployment of the reserve forces. Although the IDF ultimately won the war, the heavy losses that it suffered and its failure to attain a decisive victory that would erase Arab achievement at the initial stages of the war left the Israeli security doctrine badly shaken.

Consequently, the variance in the causes of the surprise attack on Yom Kippur makes it a very important case also for the development of theory of strategic surprise.
The 1973 war was an Israeli military victory: the IDF demonstrated a rare ability to overcome a surprise attack on two fronts and ended up 100 kilometers from Cairo, deep into Egypt, and within artillery range of Damascus.

The Israeli military victory in 1973 was marred by pain over the nation’s casualties and disappointment with the country’s leadership. Israel learned that it needs close strategic coordination with the USA, while Israel’s Arab enemies learned that they cannot destroy it by force. Forty years after the 1973 war, Israel prospers, and the differences between Israel and its neighbours have greatly widened.

In terms of international politics, the war left Israel vulnerable to attempts to isolate it in the international arena, particularly since the Arabs effectively used the oil weapon.

One important factor that led to the IDF recuperation after the initial surprise of the war was the fact that the fighting started at defensible borders and not in proximity to Israel’s heartland. The “1967 borders” could have hardly allowed the IDF to regroup and go for a counter-attack. This is an important lesson for the future that seems to have been internalized by a significant part of Israel’s decision-makers.

2. Lessons learned from the Yom Kippur war

The deliberations about the reasons for the initial 1973 surprise and the resulting military debacle indicated a clear need for expanding the circles that engage in the study of national security issues. This has led to a more pluralist intelligence establishment, although the IDF still plays a major role in supplying national estimates. Nevertheless, strategic surprises may happen, which means that Israel still has to prepare itself for worst-case scenarios.

Israel had emerged stronger since the war, and would remain vigilant with regard to its security and would not fall asleep on its watch, because going to war is one of the hardest decisions a government can make.

In historical terms, the 1973 victory taught the Arab leaders that even under most auspicious conditions they cannot eradicate the Jewish State by force. While Israel failed to hold on to the position that changes in the territorial status quo require peace agreements, and instead accepted interim agreements, the military outcome of this war brought about the change in Egypt, the largest and most important Arab state that decided to make peace with Israel. The war was the last attempt by Arab armies to invade Israel. Gradually, for a variety of reasons, the likelihood of a large-scale war was drastically reduced. Today, the
Arab world is in disarray as result of a socio-economic and political crisis. The actual situation in the Arab countries makes the possibility of a large-scale war even more distant.

Based on the lessons learned from the Yom Kippur war, the doctrine of the IDF emphasizes among others the following:

- The IDF’s security objectives are to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State of Israel, deter all enemies, and curb all forms of terrorism that threaten daily life.

- Its main tasks include reinforcing the peace arrangements; ensuring overall security in the West Bank, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority; spearheading the war against terrorism, both inside Israel and across its borders; and maintaining a deterrent capability to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.

- To ensure its success, the IDF's doctrine at the strategic level is defensive, while its tactics are offensive.

- Given the country's lack of territorial depth, the IDF must take the initiative when deemed necessary and, if attacked, quickly transfer the battleground to the enemy's land.

- Though it has always been outnumbered by its enemies, the IDF maintains a qualitative advantage by deploying advanced weapons systems, many of which are developed and manufactured in Israel for its specific needs.

- In preparing for defense, the IDF deploys a small standing army (made up of conscripts and career personnel) with early warning capability, and a regular air force and navy. The majority of its forces are reservists, who are called up regularly for training and service and who, in time of war or crisis, are quickly mobilized into their units from all parts of the country.

It is important to note that the Yom Kippur War was a conventional war in which two (or more) armies were confronting each other. Following the definition of William Lind this kind of war belongs to the third generation of wars. In the third generation war the combat activities are on the „other side”, the war takes place between countries, based on strict rules, and there are winners and losers. The wars of today are most complicated and belong to the fourth generation of war (asymmetric warfare) in which there are no rules, the

---

combat activities are inside the countries with the participation of non state actors and there are no winners and losers.

3. The security situation of the region

We have to analyse whether the regional security of today is better or much worse than at the beginning of the seventies.

Since the Yom Kippur War the security situation in the Middle East has been significantly changed. Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979. The peace treaty between Jordan and Israel was signed in 1994. However for the Egyptian and Israeli relationship we use the expression cold peace, this is a real peace. Unfortunately, with Syria, the other belligerent country of the 73 war was no possibility to sign any peace treaty and actually the prospect of a compromise is almost zero.

Today the most important challenge of the region is the terrorism and the proliferation of the weapon of mass destruction, which means a threat not only for the region but for Europe as well. Among the lessons learned by Israel from the Yom Kippur (and other war) is the effective organisation of intelligence with special regard to the early warning.

What are the security challenges of today for Israel?

The five principal national security challenges that confront Israel in 2013 are: Iran’s nuclear weapons program; preservation of the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan in the face of the changes in the Arab world; the civil war in Syria and the danger that it may ignite the northern border; relations with the Palestinians, and in particular, efforts to renew negotiations; the military challenge from Gaza; and finally, maintenance of Israel’s international standing.

The most urgent challenge facing Israel is Iran’s standing at the forefront of the anti-Israel bloc in the Middle East, while progressing toward military nuclear capability. Nuclear capability will endow Iran with greater influence in the Gulf, including the energy resources in the region and perhaps also regimes in the region. For now, Tehran is showing much resilience in the face of current international pressure, manifested by economic sanctions that are much harsher than those in prior years.

---

The economic sanction and of course the Iranian presidential elections contributed to the change of the Iranian policy towards the West and led to the signature of the deal the P5+1 has reached with Iran. It is still not clear that the Supreme Leader will accept it or that Iran will put it into practice. It is a preliminary agreement that must be followed up by lasting Iranian compliance, acceptance by the U.S. and other nations, and must be maintained indefinitely into the future.

From the Israeli point of view, there are two threats from Iran. One is the nuclear program. The other is Iranian support given not only to Hezbollah but also to Hamas and other extremist groups in the region. Iran is far from Israel and poses no conventional military threat. Arms control agreements fail all too often in the course of time if they do not lead to political agreements and improved relations. Time and new technologies can undermine even the best agreements, and the nuclear issue is only one issue that divides the Middle East. Iran's tensions with Israel have already triggered an Israeli nuclear effort to deter and confront Iran with assured destruction. The Gulf States and many other Sunni Arab state see Iran as a critical threat because of its role in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, and other Arab states and due to its growing asymmetric threat in the Gulf. Agreements can only be judged in terms of its full contents and not emphasizing some aspects of it.

The concessions Iran has committed to make as part of this first step will also provide us with increased transparency and intrusive monitoring of its nuclear program. In the past, the concern has been expressed that Iran will use negotiations to buy time to advance their program. Taken together, these first step measures will help prevent Iran from using the cover of negotiations to continue advancing its nuclear program as we seek to negotiate a long-term, comprehensive solution that addresses all of the international community's concerns. Iran faces the reality that it cannot develop the nuclear forces it needs without provoking a response. Iran cannot develop a credible nuclear force under the terms of the interim agreement or any full agreement with the same constraints. As long as Iran faces the agreed inspection and controls on enrichment, it cannot act in ways that will prevent Israel from at least having mutual assured destruction capability and the U.S. from deploying an effective form of extended deterrence. Iran cannot be sure that Saudi Arabia cannot match or exceed its rate of nuclear deployment.

Iran’s ability to punish Israel is quite limited. Its missile arsenal can partially or perhaps largely be intercepted by Israel’s anti-ballistic missile system, featuring the Arrow 2 missile. Iran’s terrorist activities against Israeli targets abroad in recent years have not been very impressive. Iran’s allies on Israel’s borders, Hezbollah and Hamas, have many thousands of missiles that
can do much damage. But their full subservience to Iran remains to be seen. Even if they act as Iranian proxies, Israel has the military capability to invade the missile launching areas and limit the price they can exact from Israel’s home front. Finally, preventing a nuclear Iran is an important objective that justifies Israeli losses.

After the signature of the deal with Iran, the possibility of an Israel attack against the Iranian nuclear facilities is low but not impossible.

The wave of sociopolitical tremors in the Middle East that began two years ago reflects the growing involvement of the civilian populations in their respective national political theatres. The upheavals caused the fall of old dictatorships while threatening to undermine others, and brought radical Islamic powers to prominence. None of these factors created fundamentally new threats, but they have nevertheless sharpened the military challenges Israel faces in its immediate vicinity and therefore also the political challenges it tackles on the international arena, particularly an accelerated process of illegitimating 4.

The peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan remained in effect, despite the establishment of the new government in Egypt, led by the Muslim Brotherhood and later with the new military establishment.

Egypt played a constructive role in the conflict between Israel and Hamas, and it appears that it is well aware that a military confrontation with Israel is not in its interests.

Syria, the country with the strongest armed forces among all of Israel’s enemies, is in the midst of a tiring civil war that is depleting its military’s strength, readiness and morale. The Syrian military has hundreds of long range missiles and thousands of rockets capable of reaching Israel’s heartland, a modern air defense, high quality anti-tank weapons, and a trained commando force. These military capabilities posed less of a threat to Israel at the end of 2013 than at the beginning, and concern that fighting in Syria would spill over into Israel has proved unfounded. Other than some isolated shells that strayed into Israel, the Golan Heights and Lebanon fronts remained quiet.

No doubt from security point of view the growth of a terrorism threat in Sinai is a negative tendency, whilst the removing of chemical weapons from Syria is a positive event.

---

4 Prof Efraim Inbar: Forty years to the Yom Kippur War (BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 215, October 2, 2013. Downloaded: October 02. 2013.

49
The impasse in the political process with the Palestinians continued. Facing a politically and economically weak Palestinian Authority (PA) that chose to challenge Israel by way of the international arena and reconciliation with Hamas, Israel, given international constraints and the desire to avoid the overthrow of the PA, adopted a passive position of punishing the PA with moderate measures.

In tandem with the upheaval in the Arab world, the Israeli-Palestinian political stalemate is getting worse. Efforts to begin effective negotiations on a permanent settlement appear to be fruitless. In the absence of alternatives to a permanent settlement, signs of instability and uncertainty among the Palestinians are increasing the continued erosion of both Israel’s international status and legitimacy and international tolerance for its settlement policy. The United States, Israel’s principal and most important ally, continued to provide Israel with impressive diplomatic support. The administration demonstrated its extremely strong commitment to Israel’s security, and many countries backed Israel in its conflict with Hamas in Gaza by recognizing Israel’s right to defend its citizens. The ongoing erosion in Israel’s standing in Europe, and even among its traditional supporters in the US, however, cannot be ignored. The condemnations of Israel's construction in the West Bank and even in East Jerusalem have for the first time led to the possibility that concrete punishment measures will be taken against Israel as a result of settlement construction in the territories.

Although two years have passed since the upheaval known as the “Arab Spring” began in the Arab world, it is still not clear what political directions the regimes in the main Arab countries will take, what regional and global postures they will assume, and what their policies toward Israel will be.

4. The threats and opportunities Israel is facing now

The threats facing Israel are as follows:

1. An Iranian nuclear breakout or an Israeli/American decision to attack Iran.
2. A military conflict with Iran and its proxies Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and less likely, with Hamas, as a result of an attack against Iran.
3. Erosion of the peace treaties.
4. Israel’s diplomatic isolation.
5. Expansion of uncontrolled regions on Israel’s borders.

---

6. The collapse of the PA and the rise of Hamas.
7. Restrictions on Israel’s freedom of action due to the power of the Arab street.
8. Restrictions on Israel’s freedom of action due to concern about further illegitimating of Israel.

_The Opportunities_

Besides the threats, the current situation in the region also represents several opportunities:

1. A possible change of regime in Syria.
2. Aggravation of the conflict between Iran and the Sunni Arab countries.
3. Common interests with Turkey.
5. International recognition and understanding of Israel’s security problems.
6. Potential for renewing the political process with the Palestinians.

To sum up we can make a statement that the regional situation of today is more complicated and dangerous than it was in the seventies.

**Bibliography:**

1. Prof Efraim Inbar: Forty years to the Yom Kippur War (BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 215, October 2, 2013. Downloaded: October 02. 2013.
WARFARE ON THE INTERNET

Abstract

Recently, Internet has been actively used almost in all fields of life. In the beginning, in the course of design and realization, the primary goal was the assurance of operating ability of the net (robustness). An additional goal was to make it possible to start new services and their availability on the joined computers in a fairly simple way. However, security issues were examined both in the course of design and implementation (e.g. in the case of ftp and telnet protocol identification of the user), but this was not an essential question. As a result of the progress of computers and software developing systems, there has arisen the possibility to recognize and exploit security shortcomings. In this regard, some firms have appeared in the market the main profile of which is to search for security gaps. The experts working here can be involved in researching computer security issues (touching upon national security), and in replying to this kind of issues respectively, but they can be applied in planning and/or realizing computer attacks as well. A computer attack can be aimed at paralysing a service inside a country, but it can also be directed towards against the IT tools of a non-friendly country. The attacked side gets ready for several kinds of aggression, therefore always newer and newer methods have been developed. The paper draws the reader’s attention to such an attack method that is based upon a virtual computer and for this reason its disclosure decreases in a significant way.

Keywords: Internet, warfare, Anonymous, computer attack, virtualization, virtual computer, DDoS

Introduction

Today, there are more and more articles in different news portals [1] about attacks methodically carried out on the Internet. The attacked targets vary: well-known security firms, banks, law enforcement and other government bodies, stock exchanges, any kind of political organization and other institutions are also on the list of targets. In most cases the attackers are hidden, or identified with a fancy name, throwing a kind of a challenge to the official authorities taking actions in defense of the law.

Here are some thought-provoking short news items about the new type of “war” unfolding on the internet:

- January 10, 2012: Hackers of the group Anonymous acquired and shared the passwords and credit card data of several employees of the European

- **January 13, 2012**: Gaza hackers attacked the website of the Israeli fire service.
- **January 17, 2012**: the Israeli Defense Forces Group entered the website of the Saudi Arabian and the United Arabic Emirates stock exchanges.
- **January 26, 2012**: the website of the European Parliament was disabled by a Denial-of-Service attack.
- **January 27, 2012**: an attack against the system of the Lithuanian National Bank online service.
- **January 28, 2012**: the website of the Slovakian Government became unavailable because of an attack.
- **February 2, 2012**: attacks against the website of Ukrainian official bodies.
- **February 10, 2012**: Denial of Service attack against the website of the CIA, “Tango Down”.
- **February 13, 2012**: Denial-of-Service attack against the website of the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ.
- **February 15, 2012**: attack against the governmental website of a Hungarian political figure, Rozsa Hoffmann.
- **March 4, 2012**: on the website of the Constitutional Court, the Fundamental Law of Hungary was modified.

These do not seem accidentally time-identified cases of a war. This war actually began much earlier, and is not even close to an end. The listed attacks did not originate from one source, and were against different targets. We can ask the question: Are not these previous tryouts for a later, larger-scale war? Small-scale activities that do not cause serious damage can be (unofficially) supported by a military, or rather a quasi-military service can do it (not officially) with money, technology or knowledge. From the successful or unsuccessful attacks serious experiences can be gained for the future [2].

The group Anonymous, which disabled the portals of U.S. Justice Department and the FBI for several hours in January, and also carried out a successful attack against the website of the CIA, has suffered its first serious loss. In October, Interpol arrested 25 members of the hacktivist group in Europe and in South America.
The seat of war

In the 21st century, few civilized countries can afford to wage war with another country face to face. At the same time, if we compare the targets of attacks listed in the introduction, we can see that those were typically governmental websites, available on the internet. The perpetrators who undertook the attack actually attacked a country, and if another country’s government was proved to support the attack, then we can really talk about a war between two countries.

It is hard to draw the line where an “amateur” attack ends, and where a “government-supported” team’s attack starts. It is suspected that, in these cases there is a careful request in the background, or some diplomats involved, to drop the investigation of the case.

They say “Wise men learn by others’ harm”. Most developed countries did not wait for an attack on their important systems. Since attacks carried out through the web have long been known, governments and military bodies have been dealing with this problem for a long time, and are mostly prepared. In a June 2011 article of ComputerWorld [3], the British Minister of War admitted that his government is developing an Internet “arsenal of weapons”, which besides self-defense, can be suitable to attack other countries as well. The United States describes this problem in a different way [4]. Concentrating on the kickback, according to a Reuters news report, the Pentagon considers an attack against the Internet network of the United States to be an act of war.

Though the attacks listed in the introduction were all successful, the shutdown lasted for various lengths of time. This means that in some cases the attack did not continue, while in other cases the defenses of the attacked target were not successful. Attacks through the web, compared to organized, traditional military actions, are most similar to attacks of those kinds of “partisan groups” who involve civilians in actions without their knowledge. In a war, in many cases civilians took part in partisan actions that lived their usual lives after the action. Their liquidation was hopeless, unless someone had successfully integrated into the group.

In the case of Internet attacks, the explanation for integrating civilians is that successful DoS attacks need so many attacking computers. This means not only that their purchase and centralized operation is fairly high cost, but the risk of getting caught is high because of the scale of preparations. In case of the 2008 Internet attack against the nation of Georgia [5], the estimation of the number of computers involved in the attack was based on the data of US Department of Homeland Security. According to the estimation there were more
than a million attacking computers. Supposing one computer and four family members per household, if there is a computer in every third household, this means 12 million inhabitants were involved. A smaller country has not got this many inhabitants (Slovakia: 5.4 million inhabitants, Czech Republic: 10.4 million inhabitants, Estonia: 1.35 million inhabitants, Hungary: 10 million inhabitants, etc.). It is difficult to estimate how big a place, how many specialists, and what kind of electricity supply and other IT support are needed for operating computers concentrated at one place. It is obvious that the computers involved in such an attack are not at one concentrated place, but can be anywhere in the world with appropriate infrastructure. The attacking computers against the Lithuanian National Bank were in Lithuania, Canada, China, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine and in the United States.

If we try to estimate how much time is needed to turn on the computer, than supposing that one computer can be turned on each second, then for turning on a million computers, a million seconds are needed. Since there are 3,600 seconds in an hour, and there are 168 hours in a week, 1 week = 3,600 x 168 = 604,800 seconds, so around two weeks are needed.

The Hinterland

During conventional warfare mostly civilians are not at the front but in the hinterland, where education and the everyday (but unconventional) life continues. Along with them, the replacement of military technology is in the hinterland and newer tactical research is being carried out. So, it is accepted that the hinterland can be attacked because of this, for example by bombing or through sabotage done with involvement of the local resistance, etc. At such times, the goal is to interfere with the military technology replacement and to prevent development by destroying the infrastructure partly or completely. The destruction of the morale of the population is also a significant goal.

In accordance with the development of the technology, serious IT support is used in almost every production plant and infrastructural institution (gas works, water works, electric distribution, etc.). Complex systems of IT assets and software are needed:

- for automated operation,
- for rapid intervention in case of errors,
- for reducing the number of operating staff.

IT assets communicate through the web, the different sensors forward data and get commands from the control system and report back the execution of the command. If there is a physical attack against the computer system, then in case
of damage, the directly connected institutes and their tool systems built on this network are not able to communicate. If we concentrate on the damage, and within that to the unavailability of the network, then it is obvious that dysfunction can be achieved also by computer attacks. There are several methods:

- misconfiguring the parameters that control the correct operation of the tools assuring the operations of the network,
- preventing the operation of some tools with Denial of Service,
- damaging the wiring,
- causing disturbances in the forwarding medium in the case of wireless forward.

In Denial of Service attacks the emphasis is on the proper selection of the target, the number of attacking computers, the method of attack and possibly on the precise timing. In most countries in the case of really critical systems they try to disconnect the network needed for their operation from the internet, but with this they lose the advantages of the internet (for example, that the systems are accessible almost everywhere). Aside from the additional cost of building up a Private Network the other disadvantage is that significant sources (staff, reserve asset park, monitoring tools) are needed for its operation.

In traditional attacks, the attackers are usually near to the event: people, who fire the weapons, push the plunger, install the timed mechanism, cut the cable, etc. But in an internet attack, usually this is not typical at all. One of the most important principles when designing the Internet was robustness and adaptability. Almost all of the communication protocols were designed according to this. Data streams are divided into smaller units (packets), in which the IP address of the sender and the addressee is included, as well as other accompanying information. Of course in some cases this is not so obvious, since NAT-ing (Network Address Translation) is used in several places as well. The following of the packets still can be ensured by requiring the management of the needed log files. This is why a typical Internet attack almost never comes from the computer of the real attackers. In most cases they intrude into a network whose security is not strong enough: with no system administrator or an under-qualified one, and/or with no or a deficient security policy [6] [7]. In other cases, there is a qualified administrator, but there is a lack of financial resources. They look up those intruding points in the network (mostly general-purpose personal computers), from where the turnover of other tools on the network can be monitored, so other information for breaking into other computers can be obtained: host names, IP addresses, port numbers for reaching services, log-in names, passwords. At this stage, besides obtaining information, the primary aim is latency and avoiding being caught. Virtualization provides great help to the
attacker in this. We can prepare to ward off attacks by analyzing the possibilities of the attacker [8] [9].

**Virtualization [10]**

On the successfully attacked computer, a program to take over the control of other computers is run without the knowledge of the owner. This program is also able to start an attack (for example request of repeating a service) under the appropriate conditions, like at a specific date, at the log-in of a specific user, or at the start-up of a specific program. These programs are fairly widespread, so mainly there are known security systems against them. Antiviruses and Smart Security Systems identify these programs in a way similar to viruses, they signal their presence and usually they also remove them. The modern antiviruses look up the harmful programs typically in two ways:

- they look for the identifying sequence made from the significant, individual command part of the dangerous programs;
- they examine the typical behavior of harmful programs.

There can be a problem in determining the identifying sequence: if the sequence is too general, then the antivirus can signal also programs that are not harmful. If the sequence is determined very accurately, then it will not identify the small modification of the harmful program. The modification can be caused by an automatic “mutation”, programmed by the creator of the program, or a slightly different version built on this, created by another programmer. Neither of them is positive. In the first case, the user loses confidence in the antivirus program, and may even remove it because of many false warnings. The second case is more obvious: it lets a harmful program work. The security reliability can depend on this narrow bound, so the method of creating a sequence is strictly guarded at development firms.

The antivirus program oversees the security of only that computer on which it runs. Of course it cannot see the programs running on other computers.

The performance of currently available computers is so huge that in many cases the running of the installed program does not load its resources. The administrators in many cases oversize these because of security reasons. Recognizing this, and because of other operating viewpoints, software has been made that creates a virtual computer when started. If these are started several times, then several virtual computers run simultaneously. These virtual computers are totally empty. At first, as with a real computer, an operating system has to be installed, then the other applications which we would like to run on this virtual computer. Let us imagine a computer on which Server 2003 is
installed, and three virtual computers (for example VMWare Workstation) are running on it. On two, the Windows Server 2008, on the third one, a Linux (e.g.: Ubuntu). This time 1+3 operation systems will be running simultaneously. 1+3 operating systems load the CPU and consume the memory. What is the advantage of this system?

- Only that program is installed on each virtual computer, which is needed for ensuring the service.
- The program, which ensures the service, does not “argue” with other programs, so the operating of the system is more reliable and more computable.
- In case of a problem, the original state of the virtual computer can be restored very quickly.
- The program which lets us see the virtual computer can emulate a computer which the user does not have.

Because all of these are advantages it is worth dealing with virtualization more seriously. Though, everything has got disadvantages as well. In this case, if the real computer goes wrong, then none of the virtual computers running on it will operate. However, in this case the functionality can be restored relatively quickly, if there is another computer nearby with the same software environment. Only the files belonging to the virtual computers have to be copied, then imported, and the system is available again. The needed time cannot be compared with the time needed for installation on a real computer.

The virtual computers let us see the resources and ports of the real computer, depending on the setting: for example the network card, USB ports, the whole hardware, or just some part of it. The virtual computer does not see, and does not even know about the other virtual computers. It can share data only through the real computer.

Not only do the virtual computers not see each other, but the programs installed on the real computer also do not see the virtual computer, or the programs running on them. Recognizing this, more than one program has been created which creates on the attacked computer a virtual computer with minimal resources, puts on an operating system with minimal needs, and the attacking program runs on this. The hardware need of this virtual computer can be very small, so it does causes no noticeable slowdown on the attacked computer. It manages with less than 100 MB from the hardware, and cleverly managing the memory, also around 100 MB is enough. A modern notebook in many cases has a 4 GB memory. From this, the use of 100 MB is not noticeable, unless someone checks for it. Also, a notebook like this can be ordered with 300-500 GB
hardware. A 100 MB loss cannot be easily noticed, considering that the operating system right after installation occupies 3-4 GB.

The possibility mentioned earlier – that the program running on the virtual computer can access the resources of the real computer – causes the attacker program on the virtual computer to use the network card of the real computer. At this time the packets appearing on the network contain the IP address of the real computer as sender. This observes and logs data and passwords stolen from the network and sometimes or regularly sends them to a programmed place on the internet, or to a hardly checkable e-mail address, e.g. Gmail or Freemail. These kinds of intrusions are very hard to detect. A help can be the earlier mentioned regular and detailed log file and a conscientious administrator who regularly checks the logs, and not just archives them or in worse case deletes them without reading.

Summary

The article tries to draw the reader’s attention to the reality that with the help of everyday-used Internet we can not only quickly and effectively obtain information from computers, but with the help of the same computer other computers on the network are also available and attackable. If programs run on these computers to ensure the operation of the infrastructure, then by attacking these computers the standard of the infrastructure service can be reduced or halted completely. In official circles, in this area, most of the concerns are about the computers of electronic services. Though these computers are mostly well protected, with a hiding method (which is not known widely), the program needed for an attack can be hidden as well. This method is built on the virtual computers.

The article tries to delineate the modality of the defense through describing the possibilities of the potential attacker.

Sources

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research work partly summarized in this paper was carried out in the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Informatics at the University of Miskolc, Hungary, as part of the TÁMOP-4.2.1.B-10/2/KONV-2010-0001 project in the framework of the New Hungarian Development Plan. The realization of this project is supported by the European Union, and co-financed by the European Social Fund.
INTRODUCTION

Without the intent to ring alarm bells about food prospects of the coming years, allow us to start this paper with the warnings of Lester Brown\(^1\) (2013) stating: "We are entering a new era of rising food prices and spreading hunger. Food supplies are tightening everywhere and land is becoming the most sought-after commodity as the world shifts from an age of food abundance to one of scarcity. The geopolitics of food is fast overshadowing the geopolitics of oil."

Obvious signs of such a scenario can now be clearly seen on different continents, the referred author is far not the only one to raise words in this context. The UN and primarily its specialized organizations (FAO, WFP) have been permanently releasing their warnings; however the mainstream politics and key decision makers seem to willingly ignore the related issues.

As for recent period, the food prices were already close to record levels, having risen 1.4% in September following an increase of 6% in July globally. Prices of main food crops such as wheat and maize are now close to those that sparked riots in 25 countries in 2008. FAO data show that 870 million people are malnourished and the food crisis is growing in the Middle East and Africa.

\(^1\)President, Earth Policy Research Center, Washington D.C., U.S.A.
Armed aggression is no longer the principal threat to our future. The overriding threats to this century are climate change, population growth, spreading water shortages, expanding biomass fuel cultivating areas on fields that are suitable for food production and the results in rising food prices.\textsuperscript{2} We are about to face food unrests in other places as well, and also the excess of migrants if no co-ordinated measures are taken under a complex approach that can solve the food problems \textit{in situ}, locally in a way that the affected countries be able to supply their people even if with the most basic staples.

\textit{So when triggered food bomb is mentioned, or the question is asked, saying: Food, fuel or war?}

By today the phrase has become much more meaningful and much more actual than a simple slogan.

In 2013 Budapest hosted two major international events, namely the Africa Forum and the Budapest Water Summit. It is quite talkative sign of the decision makers' intents that none of the two main events discussed the role and the prospects of agriculture and food production in their integrity, however, some segments were grabbed and the final statements focused on these standalone elements. It is rather surprising, because the closing statements of both reputed events concluded the main problems similarly and many of the declared points have direct connection to food and agriculture related issues.

The Budapest Africa Forum in June 2013 summarized the main problems of the region as follows:

\begin{itemize}
\item poverty and food shortage;
\item lack of appropriate quality water;
\item and other politics-related problems (lack of good governance practices, presence of corruption, issues of democracy, human rights etc).
\end{itemize}

The Budapest Water Summit (in October) successfully brought together the 3 main participating levels of global water management:

\begin{itemize}
\item UN organizations,
\item Scientific and professional bodies and
\item Banks.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{2} Besenyő János: Országismertető-Szudán, Székesfehérvár, 2010
After the work of different sections (including one assigned to irrigation, as the biggest water consuming sector and another to food security from water management aspects), the final statements reflected very prospective, however general and much more strategic approaches, briefly:

- Water is fundamental and it is the key to our future development.
- Water unites one country to another, unites among and across generations, nations, cultures and stimulates co-operation.
- Water connects. It requires new innovative policy within the water sector and other ones (health, food, energy).
- Water and ecosystem: rehabilitating the environment.
- Millennium Goal: Sustainable development goal on water: A Water-secure world.

The above warnings – in connection with food and the possible outcomes of food crisis – can be directly translated into the terms of water availability and security, so the two segments, food and water, cannot and must not be divided from each other.

Through the authors' inevitable personal and professional linkages to the African continent, the present paper deals primarily with the problems and prospects bound to this area, not underestimating, however, the severity of situations at any other places around the World.

**Timeliness of the topic**

Globalization in world economy means and results in:

- on one hand – huge capital accumulation,
- on the other - poverty.

*The problem is not that the globalization is spreading, therefore the lion eats the antelope but:*

- 1.3 billion people live on less than 1 $/day,
- 3 billion people live on less than 2 $/day,
- 1.3 billion people lack clean water,
- 3 billion people lack appropriate health care system.

Beyond and behind the above mentioned global phenomena there is a crawling danger also for the developed world, mainly for the North-Atlantic region, and specifically for Europe, which is thinking it can save itself from such
problems. However, it is the fact that the masses of “economic refugees” from many underdeveloped and food crisis-exposed regions are anchoring sooner or later in one of the European “rich” countries, especially after the obvious filtering effect from the North-African countries (Libya, Egypt), which fail to function any longer due to their domestic political turbulences.³

Let us refer to a Hungarian author, György Pálóczi-Horváth who as early as in 1948(!) in his book. Thousand millions of indigenous at the gates⁴ stated “Present situation is characterized by an atmosphere of starvation, revolution and war.” His statement is more than ever up to date in our present situation.

**Why does Africa starve?**

Practically, half of the world fails to have proper alimentation. Within this segment the African continent is extremely among the most sensitive areas, partly due to the post effects of the former colonization and partly due to their incapability to stabilize their inner and cross-border relations.

---

⁴ Ezermillió bennszülött a kapuk előtt, Szikra, Bp.1948.
As the above Figure 1 shows, we have this huge geopolitical, economic and social 'arena' of 54 individual countries (with more than 3,000 tribes, speaking about 1,000 languages) to solve the following critical issues:

- eliminating poverty, starvation and illnesses,
- elaborating peace,
- involving upcoming countries into the processes of globalized world in a fair way.

**Development strategies and programs**

*Characteristics and types of development*

Development programs are carried out on 4 main levels and / or in 4 main contexts:

- Specialized organizations of UN: (FAO, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNESCO).
- Economic policy (EU, OECD).
- NGOs and charity organizations.
- Development activities of certain countries (e.g. USA, China, UK, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway).

Their main targets:

- production development,
- education,
- information,
- extension.

Recently, beside the conventional development programs, new approaches and development factors emerged based primarily on complex approach and environmental sustainability. Among such new concepts the Twin Strategy of FAO must be emphasized as the most general one in terms of both geographical coverage and contextual diversity.

The *Twin strategy of FAO* focuses on the following critical points:

- simple technology
- infrastructure
- improving soil fertility
• natural resources
• market sectors
• food security, quality
• research, extension, training
• mother and infant nutrition
• school alimentation
• supplying pensioners and jobless people
• food for work and learning
• targeted financial support
• public kitchens and canteens
• food bank and emergency reserves.

All these crucial points are in accordance with the Millennium Goals of U.N. (incl. F.A.O.) approved by the votes of all the 191 member states. These goals to be achieved by 2015 are as follows:

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development

How these goals can be achieved?

• more complex measures in reducing poverty,
• blocking violent conflicts,
• good relations between donors and beneficiaries,
• special attention must be paid on support-dependency, especially in Africa(!!!),
• mapping governmental risks (corruption…)

66
The original goals said that by 2015 the number of people living on less than 1 and 2 dollars a day must be halved. However, the present picture shows that their number has almost doubled. The main apparent problem is that the development programs of different UN organization (FAO, WFP, UNIDO, UNESCO etc.) are not sufficiently synchronized within the UN itself, therefore the individual effects of such programs are reduced and fail to reach the expected impact level of harmonized interventions.

**Development policy of E.U.**

The underlying concept of European developments in Africa is Trade & Aid.

Near half of the development capital launched to Africa comes from E.U., it is an undoubted fact. Also the statement that the *industrial* products of ACP countries (African, Caribbean, Pacific countries) have green light to E.U... but to judge the real relevance of the measures, the rather sarcastic question drops itself afore:…*How many high-tech electronic manufacturers have you seen in Upper Volta?*

EU system of trade policies:

- non discriminating systems (U.S.A., Japan, Australia),
- preferred systems (Latin-America, Asia, Mediterraneum),
- free trade systems (Lomé Conventions 1975–2000, Cotonou Agreement, 2000–2020),
- discriminating systems (Cuba, Iran).

The Lomé Convention is a trade and aid agreement between the European Community (EC) and 71 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, first signed in February 1975 in Lomé, Togo.

Follow up of Lomé Conventions is the Cotonou Agreement:

- Between EU15 and 79 ACP countries in 2000. (Revised in 2005 and 2010.)
- Integration ACP to world economy (eliminating poverty)
- Reciprocal trade !!!
- Requirement: keeping western values.
- Technical Center for Agricultural and Rural Co-operation.
- Strengthening capacities (including agriculture).
- Focuses on private sector through European Investment Bank (EIB).
Results:

“Lomé Conventions, however, prevented further decrease of ACP countries’ shares on E.C. markets, but as a progressive step toward development and prosperity, it hasn’t been proved to be useful for us up till now.”

“It has been argued that while the main pillar of the Cotonou Agreement is poverty reduction, aid allocated to Africa under the 9th EDF has had limited impact on the majority of the poor.”

Aid & Development Projects:

- 2002–2007: 9th EDF (European Development Fund) 13.5 billion Euro,
- 2008–2013: 10th EDF 22.7 billion Euro with 5.6 billion targeted for regional development.

Some examples:

- Namibia (agriculture development);
- Senegal (business ventures);
- Egypt (crop protection);
- Kenya (vegetable, flower etc.);
- Sudan (greenhouse vegetable production etc.).

Recent and future developments:

- 2001 – New Program: Products of 49 least developed countries entitled to tax free entry to community markets.
- 2004 – Accession: 10 new EU member states (Hungarian situation).
- 2008 – New Balance, regional integration (pl.: COMESA in Africa), responsible government, suitable institutions, keeping to achievements of Doha Development Rounds.

---

5Labour Research, June 1979
7Common Market For Eastern and Southern Africa
Ongoing support:

- 30 billion Euro/yr, 0.34% GNP of 25 member states (more than per capita subsidies in U.S. or Japan).
- 6 billion Euro through direct E.U. intervention (Goal: 0.7% of GNP, up today reached by: Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden).
- 2010 – 0.56% of GNP for support.
- 2015 – 0.7% of GNP for support.

E.U. supports are mostly non repayable.

- 2004 – EIB, 3.5 billion Euro subsidized credit.
- 2014 – 2020 EIB framework of cca. 3.5 billion Euro for ACP region.

As a participant of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (2006 Spain) put it as a remark on the margin of the development incentives: “We are the biggest contradictions in the world. We are sad to have to board ships which then sail into walls.”

**Development policies of OECD**

- The targeted sum was stated as 130 bn $ per year to be achieved by 2010 to accomplish suitable measures against poverty.
- Are managing systems of humanitarian emergencies strong enough? (Nigerian food crises, Darfur, South-Sudan, Somalia.)
- At G8 Summit in Italy (2009) one of the highlighted topics is food situation in Africa.

**Key issues of NEPAD**

NEPAD is the acronym for New Partnership for Africa's Development. It was established by merging two former development programs, the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the Omega program. Founders of the plan were the presidents of Ghana, Nigeria, South-African Republic, Senegal and Algeria and its key concerns are the followings:

- “tap of supports” must be handled only by wise national governments;
leaders of African and developed states draw a “contract” (agreement) for NEPAD (understood as an African Marshall Plan);
• it can be used for different types of projects (education, infrastructure, market development etc.);
• in turn, the rules of play must be kept (Good Governance Practice);
• prerequisite of NEPAD operations is an investment volume of 64 bn $/yr;
• Later it turned out that defining initial requirement had been slightly (?) unrealistic.

Development policies of OECD has been criticized by a number of civil groups and developing countries, by saying:

• Membership is limited to a choice of rich countries (Julin, 2003).
• Multilateral agreements on investment emphasize protection of human rights, labor and environment standards and the OECD reduce the sovereignty of nations (Christians, 2008).

NGOs and charity organizations
• Their activities are filling the gaps,
• future role of them is expected to be more highly appreciated.
• More effective work implies:
• harmonization with other programs,
• co-operation with university and research experts.

In Hungary, the most reputed NGO in this field is the African-Hungarian Union. It is a NGO that collects the experiences of different specialists, with a minimal on site period of 1 year, (physicians, engineers, agricultural specialists (from almost all specializations).

Main activities:
• Agricultural production information, project planning, food balance calculations, extension etc. (in 18 countries);
• Physicians in 9 countries (Field work);
• Education programs in Hungary and in Africa.
USA support policies

USAID goals were defined in 1961 by John Fitzgerald Kennedy as:

- Disaster relief
- Poverty relief
- Global issues
- Bilateral interests
- Socieonomy development

USAID in agriculture

2010: Presidential policy. Determination of global development (Bureau for Food Security)

How USAID works?

- Controversy over goals
- Poverty relief = Geopolitical influence
- Technical or financial assistance
- Economic interest e.g.:
  - 40% of Afghan aid went back to donors,
  - Irak reconstruction, cca. 600 million $ dispatched to companies close to administration (Slavin, 2013).

Heavy critics

- Political interests: Gov directs aid to reward political and military partners rather than to advance genuine social causes.
- Close working relationship with CIA. Officers often operate abroad under USAID cover (Blum, 2004).
- ALBA\(^8\) countries repelled USAID from member countries.
- Influence on UN: Foreign aid is used as a political weapon.

\(^8\) Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) from 2004 with 9 member countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela and Saint Lucia).
The US and the EU have some contradicting opinions about the developing programs. The US already complained to WTO that the EU-ACP agreement is not compatible with WTO regulations.

*Changes in the known subsidy practices after 9/11*

As a common view among experts it can be stated that: “*Washington looks every aspect of international life through a glass of fight against terrorism. Thus, in this context, black Africa can be easily thrown back to the junkyard of geopolitics.*”

**Development programs by China**

- China-Africa Development Fund (5 billion $ investment to Africa).
- 2009 – Sharm Al Sheik:
  - 10 billion $ for livelihood
  - Write off debts
  - Renewable energy resources (solar, hydro, biomass)
  - Lower custom duties (95% of African products).
  - Demonstration farms (100)
  - University and post-graduate studies (2000)
  - Medical materials and infrastructure

In contrary to IMF and WB, China does not dictate in terms of investments, human rights and does not bind its support to any structural changes.

**What is happening in the reality?**

As it was set forth in the Introduction, the biomass fuel production is getting ever stronger all over the world. Of course, the authors acknowledge the importance of it and do not deny its economic relevance, however the main problem is still present and that is, the fuel crops are grown mostly in areas

---

being suitable also for food crops. Therefore the profit-driven economic approach (turning toward cropping fuel crops) is directly contributing to the raising of food prices; hence it fails to stabilize the food situation in the affected areas (Kanizsay, 2011; Máthé-Gornas, 2011a, 2011b). It leads us to quite a contradicting situation, that increased profit through fuel crop growing (supposing the profit remains in the growing area and not pumped out totally to investor countries), and the resulting increment in purchase potential of local population is washed off by the rising staple food prices generated by the fuel crop growing. And none of the above development programs exclude the possibility of such practices, not even makes any warn toward the capital owners to think over again their investment decisions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area (1000 ha)</th>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Investor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>jatropha</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Denmark, USA, Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>jatropha</td>
<td>Italy, Norway, Canada, Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>jatropha, oil palm</td>
<td>Italy, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>jatropha</td>
<td>UK, Canada, Portugal, German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>jatropha</td>
<td>Japan, Belgium, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>400 (?)</td>
<td>jatropha</td>
<td>Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Gulf States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>jatropha</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Bio fuel production in some African countries (2010)
Source: own collection

Development Conclusions

Let us cite here Oscar Chacón10 who in a speech mentioned that “Neoliberal model is a complete failure.” In case of the development programs, the same model raised grotesque or even absurd contradictions:

• “Each 1 Euro support for the South bring 5 Euro profit to Northern economy.”
• “Poultry production in Mali was ruined by over subsidized frozen chickens from E.U.”
• “In Dakar, European peaches cost the third of the local one.”

10Advisor of Ford Foundation.
Co-operation fields between Hungary and African countries

Hungary had a traditionally strong relation with Africa during the 70s and 80s. In the following fields Hungary was extremely reputed among the African countries:

- education (SZIU Department of Tropical and Subtropical Agriculture);
- research (HAS, Ag universities, institutions);
- extension (FAO, TESCO);
- corporal (Agroinvest);
- integrated farming, household farm integration (National Centre of State Farms, National Council of Co-operatives).

The main partners in Africa were Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin, Nigeria, and Ghana.

The present situation:

Connections have been drastically reduced since the former “Pannon Puma” turned into a fat house cat that needs even food to be taken to bed.

It means: the present Hungary has practically no African linkage, not on higher level at least. There are rare initiatives on company levels, but many of them were born dead at the beginning, mostly because of the stereotypes and preconceptions of the Hungarian business sector towards the African companies. It is a backtracking for the whole national economy because other European countries are making fruitful co-operations and deals on the continent.

In the last part, let us introduce a Sudanese development project having been carried out with Hungarian participation to illustrate and suggest (recommend) the type and direction of possible co-operation with African countries

Ag development in Africa. A Hungarian technological case study

Initial experiences

Main problems of agricultural development are the lack of:

- Managers
- Specialists
• Extensionists
• Skilled laborers
• Machinery – hire and service center
• Education and extension systems
• Farmer and special organizations
• Basic data, information and planning systems

Field and aim of the projects are as shown in Fig. 2:
• Organizing plant-growing farms in Sudan
• Collect basic data
• Elaborate production conditions
  • Agro-ecological
  • Economic
  • Social

Fig. 2 Project areas within Sudan. Sites indicated by red: Jebel Marra Area (West) and Nile Area (Central)

Recommendations on main crops

Our recommendations were focusing on:
• Obtaining the food self-sufficiency of the country
• Their importance in the national export of the country (cotton, groundnut, millet, chilies)
• Their effect on developing the alimentation structure (wheat, potato)
• Improving the efficiency of the national agricultural industries (tobacco)
• Increasing soil fertility (horse-bean)
• Employment of regional manpower (chilies)
• Putting main forage crops of animal husbandry (maize, Trif. alex.) into crop rotations was aimed to settle the nomads.

For “Jebel Marra” area, primarily rainfed farming:
• Millet, tobacco, groundnut;
• Irrigated: horse-bean, maize, chilies or horse-bean, maize, potato.

For “Nile” area, irrigated farming
• Cotton, groundnut, Trif. alex. or
• Cotton, wheat, Trif. alex.

By elaborating the recommendations, the relationship between production conditions and technological development had to be concerned as shown in Fig 3:

![Fig 3: Relationships between production conditions and technological development](source: own design)

For the recommended crops complete production technologies have been elaborated as it is shown for the case of millet in Table 2:

A Reference Databank has been set up including parameters for the followings:

• Normatives of production technologies
• Technological varieties for
  • different level of mechanization
  • different varieties and yields
  • rainfed and irrigated cultivation
  • machine-, manpower- and material requirement
  • cost of machine, -manpower and material
  • input-output costs

Along with the actual technology development, the theoretical and practical foundation of a Service Center was needed for assisting small farmers improving their production quality. The functions of the Service Center were as follows:

• Extension of the cultivated area
• Experimental work
• Demonstration, education and extension work
• Services
• Commodity production

The management chart of such a Service Center is shown in Fig 4:

![Management Chart of Nyertete Service Center](Fig 4: Management Chart of Nyertete Service Center)

Source: own design.

Designing and implementing such a service center can ensure the appropriate flow of information concerning production knowledge to the individual producers and also, reciprocally, it can ensure that the actual knowledge needs and requirements are directly fed back into technological
research and into agricultural education. The scheme of this information interchange is shown in Fig 5:

![Flow of technology through extension to farmers](image)

**Fig 5: Flow of technology through extension to farmers**

**Utilization of results**

For the leaders of the Ministry of Agriculture:

- information (about the needed tractors, equipments, etc.) is vital for the national agricultural development;
- helps in organizing the training of skilled laborers or even determining the profile of training;
- home production and consumption as well as export can be calculated.

For in-farm higher level leaders:

- basic point of planning investments (farm buildings, group of machines);
- rate of irrigated and rainfed cultivation can be easily planned;
- since the crops are changeable within a crop-rotation, the production-cost parameters are essential in elaborating the most economical crop-rotation;
- feasible, optimal farm sizes (Simultaneously it shows the essential number of specialists and managers in different levels of the management chart. Again, it is a feedback toward to ministry indicating the status and desirable trends of agricultural education.)
For middle- and lower level farm leaders:

- The method gives them the possibility of proper planning (decade, month, season, year); besides, it is useful in determining daily work-distribution and in organizing and controlling different on-farm operations.

As a conclusion we can state that Hungary still has a potential on the African knowledge market in the following main fields:

- complex planning of rainfed and irrigated projects
- field crops
- animal husbandry
- veterinary hygiene
- seed production (plant breeding)
- medical plant production
- biotechnology
- fish-breeding
- fodder factory
- food industry
- education, research and extension

Summary

As it was shown through the paper, the global food crisis is getting ever closer and ignoring or mistreating it can lead to severe consequences. The climate change, the uncertain yield probabilities can cause unforeseeable effects not only in the developed world, but also in the emerging economies placing more and more economic and social burden on the developed world.

However, the present practices and forms of externally initiated development programs and their influence cannot be underestimated, nevertheless, they do not seem to bring the expected results, therefore, it is advisable to restructure them. The restructuring should target to solve the food problems in situ, locally in the affected countries, enabling them to reach self-sustaining level of production at least in the terms of staple foods. The present system of development programs and frameworks are likely to be either serving the interests of the donor societies or turning into a sort of weapon, pressing the affected countries into directions they would not take on their own decisions.
Food and water are the key issues of our future top level decision makers and/or policy makers, who apparently are delaying with suitable strategies or actual measures.

The African continent is extremely sensitive in the above issues. Hungary should find its place (or rather find it again) in the development programs in those fields in which we, as a country and nation, are competitive. This sector can be the agricultural and rural development, and to illustrate it a Sudanese project has been shown as a successful example.

References

FORUM of PhD CANDIDATES

DR. JUDIT WEINHOFER, PhD aspirant

THE ROLE OF MILITARY HEALTH CARE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL SCIENCES

Abstract

The history of mankind is accompanied by wars. In wars, it is mainly the numerous, different injuries and infectious diseases that offer opportunity of gaining significant experiences. The establishment of military health care is a historical process, which is closely related to the history of medical sciences. Its roots can even be found in the prehistoric and ancient ages. In the course of history, the current military health care with its special activities and methods was formed gradually. Its new ways largely contributed to the development of medical sciences. In my essay I follow the most important achievements of military health care within the history of medical sciences. These results were later used in civil health care and became parts of the every day practice.

Keywords: treatments of injuries in the ancient ages, shot wounds in the Middle Ages, amputations on the battlefield, the Treaty of Geneva, generations of warfare, the unity of classification, supply and evacuation, PTSD, asymmetric challenges, ROLE 1-4

Introduction

The history of mankind is the history of wars. Wars-demanding a great toll- gave the opportunity to gain significant experiences mainly in the field of treating injuries and eliminating epidemics. Therefore, the history of military health care and medical sciences has interlocked inseparably. In the course of history military health care, as it is today, was formed gradually with its special activities and special methods. Its results have been used to great extent, in civil health care as well. Of course the process has two directions but there are a lot of innovations today which are definitely due to the influence of military health care. These achievements mostly appear in emergency treatment, in the different fields of surgery, disaster medicine, psychiatry and rehabilitation. My essay deals with the history of medicine, especially with the significant results which were later used in civilian health care as well.
1. Therapies from the beginning to the Middle Ages

1.1 Prehistoric therapies

We gain our knowledge about prehistoric people by studying findings of bones and drawings in caves because even the most primitive written records were created only at the end of the prehistoric age. According to the archeological findings, prehistoric people gained the basics of therapies by experience and they utilized them by using medicinal plants in treating injuries. People who were injured in hunting or in the fights of the hordes were left behind in the beginning but later they were treated in a primitive way. When they started to keep animals, experience was also acquired when treating the injuries of the animals. Broken bones were fixed, sprains were located, teeth were pulled out and abscesses were cleaned.

Modern people can hardly imagine how they could carry out serious ‘operations’ in such unfavourable circumstances and with such primitive instruments. Skull trepanation was made even more than ten thousand years ago. They drilled an even round or square hole into the cranial bone and if the archeologists found scars in the findings the patient might have survived the operation. They carried out this operation on patients suffering from epilepsy, skull injuries or for religious reasons. [1,2,3] In the Neolithic age the rate of survival was 73% after a trepanation made with flint knives while in the Middle Ages, no matter how more modern the instruments were, the rate of survival was 50%, according to the researchers. [3]

1.2 Therapies in the Ancient Societies

In the ancient Egyptian societies from 3000 BC, people had quite developed knowledge of anatomy they mostly acquired in mummifications. When examining the Egyptian mummies, we can draw conclusions on their illnesses, and the surgical treatments of that age. We know that they used splints and a material similar to the modern plaster, which was made from flour and honey and became firm after drying, to fix broken limbs. The job of the priest, the magician and the doctor merged into one another and the patients were often treated with medicine and wizardry at the same time. In 1400 BC in the countries around the Mediterranean, people knew that sedatives and a drug, called opium, could be cooked from poppy seed pods. As mostly Egyptians traded it, its name was ‘sal thebaicum’ (the salt of Theba). The main of the source of the Egyptian therapies is the Ebers papyrus, while the Edwin Smith papyrus is the professional book of the old Egyptian treatment of injuries. The latter describes all the possible human injuries from top to bottom.
In AD 900 Hebrew writers described the medical knowledge of their age in the Old Testament. One third of the orders of the Bible contain health care rules, and preventive measures. For example the Bible writes the following about sacrificed roast meat. ‘Eat it on the day of the sacrifice and the next one, but burn the leftovers on the third day.’ If somebody eats from it, it is disgusting, it cannot be fine. ‘Don’t eat dead and lacerated animals or you will become impure.’[4]

In Greece the Iliad and Odyssey were probably written at that time by Homer, in which we can also observe the medical and military knowledge of the age. In the life of the heroes of Homer physical exercise, healthy lifestyle and washing played an important role. The author gives a detailed and expressive account of the treatment and cures of the injuries soldiers suffered from in the war of Troy, for example in Iliad he mentions 141 wounds and their treatments. [5]

The story of a soldier called Hegistrates originates from the 5th century BC. He was captured and he could only escaped by amputating his own leg. Later he fought again wearing a wooden leg, as on a piece of vase (from the town of Cluny) in the 4th century BC a man can be seen wearing an artificial leg. These military-medical relics show the first efforts of rehabilitation. [6]

All the records of the wars before Christ mention dysentery epidemics, typhus, small pox, plague, venereal diseases, cholera, that is the infectious diseases caused by bad hygienic conditions, as the inevitable companions of fights. These epidemics that accompanied the wars caused more serious havoc than the wars. [2]

Hippocrates, who is regarded as the father of European medical sciences, was born on the island of Kos in about 460 BC. His knowledge was handed down in Corpus Hippocraticum. The book titled ‘Peri Arthron’ was written before 300 BC and it is also regarded as the work of Hippocrates. It gives a detailed account of sprains and the ways fixing them and of different injuries as well. In the beginning in the Roman Empire, as medical jobs were considered as menial, medical slaves (servus medicus ) did this kind of work. [5]

In the ancient world surgery reached the highest level in the Roman Empire. The continuous expansion, constant wars and the fights of the gladiators provided ample experience. They achieved new and significant results in the field of fixing muscles, ligature and treating wounds. Hospitals, valetudinariums, were built for the legionaries in the whole territory of the Roman Empire. One of the first was built in Aliso next to Haltern in Westphalen. However, others were also built in the valleys of the Rhine and the
Danube, on the British Isles and in North Africa. Their main task was to treat soldiers. [2, 7] In the territory of Hungary the valetudinarium in Acquincum was excavated the most thoroughly and medical instruments, water piped wards and a heated bath were found. Its layout was similar to that of the hospitals today. [8]

Dioscorides made a book of medicines in the 1st century which was still used in 1500 years’ time. He worked as an army doctor on Roman warships therefore he could travel in the Mediterranean region. He studied the most important medicinal plants, described its shapes, and production, and their use as medicines. He summarised his experiences in a book titled ‘De materia medica’. The European medieval medical science used his work for more than 1500 years. [7]

Plinius also gave one example of the sparse ancient rehabilitation. A warrior called Marcus Sergius lost his right hand in the Roman-Pun war (2nd century BC). He had an artificial hand-made and continued his life as a soldier. [6]

To sum up, significant results were achieved in the ancient age with treating wounds, fixing sprains and therapies using medicinal plants and minerals. In the Roman Empire the treatment of the great number of healthy soldiers, needed for the wars, gained great emphasis.

2. Relics of military health care from the middle ages and from the beginning of the Modern Age

2.1 Therapies in the Middle Ages

The first big hospital of the middle ages was built in Caesarea founded by Saint Great Basileios and existed between 330 and 379. As in the Eastern Roman Empire there were constant wars and a lot of epidemics (mainly the plague), bigger settlements built their own hospitals. Justinianus (527-567) constantly employed doctors and nurses for the army and the navy.

In the medieval Arab Empire, mainly in Bagdad and Cairo, big hospitals were also built which educated doctors as well. There medicine was a secular science while in the medieval, Christian, Western European countries it belonged to the church. One of the most famous health resorts was the monastery in Monte Cassino, founded by Saint Benedict. The Benedictines spread their medical knowledge throughout Europe and in Hungary as well. Prince Géza and our king Saint Stephan invited Benedictine priests to the
country and they wanted to establish mainly Benedictine monasteries as their medical knowledge was as important as their proselytization.

Bishop Saint Gellért was a Benedictine monk, who had medical knowledge. ‘The nursing and curing activities of the hospitals in the monasteries had a decisive role to upkeep the Hungarian nation, to maintain their health and to introduce and to reconfirm Christianity…’ [8]

During the crusades the Byzantine and Arab health culture had a great influence on the medical activities of the order of knights. In the 13th and 14th centuries medical education was introduced in several universities (Salerno, Naples, Paris and Rome etc.). [8]

In the middle ages surgeons were not regarded as real doctors. Minor surgical interventions were carried out by barbers while major ones were made by doctors. Only internists were regarded as real doctors. Surgery only became part of medical education in the 19th century. [1]

The story of the robber Götz von Berlichingen, whose right hand was amputated after a war injury, is well-known from the middle ages. He got such a perfect artificial hand that he was not only able to fight with it but his name is also remembered as a result of this. He was able to bend his fingers, clench his hand in fists and hold his sword. [6]

Military doctors mainly treated stabbed, cut wounds and lacerations. Their tasks changed significantly after the invention of the gun powder in 1330. Bullet wounds were washed with hot oil for 150-200 years. They thought it helped healing, however it only caused unnecessary, severe pains, long-lasting inflammations and rough scars. The death rate caused by sepsis was also high. [1, 2]

2.2 Therapies in the beginning of the Modern Age

Ambroise Paré (1510-1590) worked as a military doctor. In the beginning, he also rinsed bullet wounds with hot oil according to the traditions. Once he ran out of oil, and he could not treat all the patients with it. Then he was astonished to see that the wounds which were not rinsed with oil healed better. From that time he did not use this cruel treatment in spite of the arguments of his fellow doctors. He introduced the forgotten ligature which was used in the ancient times. Until that time the bleeding of bigger blood vessels were soothed by burning with a red hot piece of iron. He designed orthopaedic instruments and prosthesis and also had them made. In his prosthesis he tried to substitute the joints with different devices.
At that time, surgical interventions were only limited by the pain and wound infections. Doctors tried to reduce pain with icing, with snow and ice, alcohol and narcotic herb teas, but operated people must have definitely suffered from terrible pains. In the 1500s ophthalmological, otologic and plastic surgeries were also introduced. [1,2]

Wilhelm Fabricius Hildanus worked out new amputation technologies in the first part of the 1600s. Joannis Scultetus wrote a book about the first aid treatment of casualties at that time. In 1718 Lorenz Heister summarized his experiences in the field of army surgery in his book titled ‘Surgery in which all knowledge about surgery can be found’. The Josephinum, the Military Surgery Academy was opened in Vienna in 1785 and a military hospital with 1200 beds belonging to it.

Together with the changes of the methods of warfare, demands for healthcare also changed. First generation warfare started together with the establishment of modern nation-states in (1648). Warfare was the exclusive monopoly of the state. Its characteristic feature was that crowds of people fought in rows just like in the Napoleon wars. Army hospitals moved with difficulty they could not follow the troops. The injured soldiers often remained on the battlefield until the end of the fights. A lot of the injured could have been saved if they had been treated in time. [9]

Dominique-Jean Larrey (1766-1842) was Napoleon’s military surgeon. His operation skills were legendary in the battle of Borodino he made 200 amputations in 24 hours. At that time the main merit of a surgeon was his speed because anesthetisation was unknown at that time. The cold and alcohol soothed the soldiers’ pain. Larrey, for example, performed operations on the snow. It was his idea that the injured should reach the hospital somehow. He organized the so-called ‘flying lazarettes’. They were equestrian units consisting of doctors and nurses, who took bandages and surgical tools with them. They carried the casualties in light coaches and baskets. The unity of evacuation and care took place here for the first time in military healthcare in 1792. When there were several injured solidiers Larrey’s idea was to make a triage. The military surgeon Percy initiated that the lazarettes should be regarded as neutral. [2,6,9]

Later, when narcosis, asepsis and antisepsis became wide-spread, the most important thing was to create a perfect stub and not the speed, for example at the operations of Syme and Pirogov. [6] Creating a perfect stub had functional importance. It made possible to wear and use an artificial limb and in this way it contributed to the reintegration into the society and the family.
3. Military-health care in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century

3.1 Therapies in the battle fields of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century

The father of military army surgery was Nikolai Ivanovic Pirogov (1810-1881), who graduated from the University of Medicine very early, at the age of 17 and the studied anatomy. He had cuttings from deep frozen bodies and created his famous anatomical atlas on the basis of them. In Russia he was the first who applied ether anaesthesia in the form of recalis clysma. He studied wound purulency, which was the biggest enemy of the doctors at that time. In the Crimean war he worked out the ways of mass injury health care, he was the first who used ether in the army in battles and he created a new way of leg amputation. He employed voluntary nurses to look after the injured soldiers. In his work ‘The basics of military surgery’ he writes that good organizational skills in the battle field are more important than pure medical work. Everybody must get the necessary help, disregard of their nationalities the tasks of the doctors are examination, triage and emergency health care. His voluntary nurses looked after the injured of all nationalities. As at that time there were not treaties about the medical attendance of the injured and the neutrality of health care this attendance, from a humanitarian point of view, far exceeded his age. [10, 11]

The nurse Florence Nightingale also worked in a hospital treating injured soldiers in the Crimean War but on the British side. She found very bad hygienic and supply conditions. She improved the medicine and food supply and the poor hygienic conditions, which increased the death rate of soldiers significantly. Later her experiences were used in nurse training in Britain and she became the founder of modern nurse training. [2]

In the battle of Solferino on 24 June 1859, 33,000 people were injured. Influenced by the terrible number, Henri Dunant, a businessman from Geneva wrote a book titled: ‘Un souvenir de Solferino”. In this book he suggested founding an international organization which helped people in trouble regardless of their nationality and political belief. Influenced by him, the International Red Cross was founded in 1863, and in 1864 the Geneva Convention was signed by 16 European countries. The name of the treaty was: ‘Convention to improve the condition of soldiers injured in battle’. It declared the neutrality of the health service including the casualties of both parties, the health care staff, the civilian casualties, hospitals and other health care institutions and health care supply. They determined precisely who could be regarded as a prisoner-of-war, and how they had to be treated. Henry Dunant was awarded with the first Nobel Peace Prize. [2,12] Since then the original Geneva Convention has been amended several times, today the 1949 amendment is considered to be in force. Together with the Hague Conventions they are the basis of the humanitarian law.
In the wars the main measures were made to treat casualties, however fights were accompanied by epidemics as a rule. They were different in quality and quantity from the illnesses and injuries that usually occurred in the years of peace. High quality organisation is needed to treat them. In the course of the history of military health care the unity of triage, treatment and evacuation evolved gradually in ever changing conditions. By the end of the 19th century the main principles of military health care had been formed. The importance of triage, treatment and evacuation became clear and the main guidelines of army surgery were formed too. [9]

3.2 Army health care in Hungary in 1848-49

During the Hungarian revolution and war of independence in 1848-49, the establishment of the independent Hungarian military health care was started together with the organization of the Hungarian Army. As early as on 23 May 1848, Ignác Stauer national chief of medicine announced that he was looking for doctors for the battalions of the Hungarian Army. In the autumn of 1848 Kossuth appointed Ignác Stáhly army chief of medicine and laid a charge on him to organize all the military health care cases. Sauer organized civilian doctors. The troops, fighting on the Hungarian side, had their own doctors, while the recruited home guard were helped by civilian doctors. Their task was to treat the injured, eliminate epidemics and to organize nursing. From the summer of 1848 a great number of cholera cases appeared and tuberculosis and venereal diseases were also common. The extraordinary cold weather in the winter of 184-49 increased the number of patients further on. From January 1849 Ferenc Flór was in charge of the organization of army health care.

Injuries were mainly caused by cannons, the bullets of guns and the thrusts of bayonets. Injured soldiers were taken to the dressing place, which in fact were temporary army hospitals. Then they were taken to the mobile army hospitals on carts, which had more professional equipment and they were 1-2 days far behind the army. After this they could get to the permanent army hospital in the hinterland. They had permanent equipment and staff and they were located mainly in the towns. In the battlefields the pains of the injured were tried to ease by ether and chloroform. In military surgery chloroform was first applied in the Hungarian and Italian fights of 1848-49. The residents prepared bandages for the soldiers. In the spring of 1849 Lajos Kossuth appointed his younger sister national head nurse but they did not have the time to organize a national nursing service. The injured were mainly treated by voluntary nurses. The government promised money and land for the invalids. The building of a palace for invalids was also planned. However, after the defeat of the war of independence, these plans all failed. [13]
4. Military health care in the 20th century

4.1. Military health care in World War I.

The second generation of warfare is characterised by stationary warfare. The most typical example is World War I. Health care tools were put near the battle field, military surgery developed, casualties were generally transported by rail and air and the principle of periodic treatment (Oppel) became dominant. [9]

Based on his experiences in World War I, Oppel divided evacuation into sections. The injured, according to their conditions, got higher and higher level treatment at the different stages. At a lower stage, the treatment of the lightly injured person and the transportation of the seriously injured soldier was the aim. A system was formed at that time according to which military health care had the task not only to treat the casualties but to find the optimal level of treatment, triage, to make transportation possible, to find the way of humane transportation and to estimate the available time and the distance. [2,14,15]

Surgeons had to treat new kinds of injuries (splintering) in unusual conditions (battle field) on patients of impoverished health. As an effect of the new experiences the results of military surgery improved significantly in World War I than earlier. 75% of the injured soldiers returned to fight if we do not count the victims died on the battlefields. ‘The final battle of World War I was fought by recovered soldiers’. [16]

The history of military psychology also started at World War I. In the USA in World War I the so-called alpha and beta psychological tests were used to evaluate soldiers’ abilities. 400 psychologists examined 1,700,000 soldiers. As these tests were successful and they made the training of the soldiers faster and more efficient, they became wide-spread and they were used in several European countries as well. [17,18,19]

Although the history of military psychology started with aptitude tests, its tasks have been expanding ever since. In the descriptions of the American Civil War (1861-1865) and in the Russian-Japanese War (1904-1905) there are stories about mentally exhausted soldiers. In the beginning of World War I psychological harms were tried to be concealed by trying the depressed people by court martial. However, during the war, more and more mentally damaged people occurred therefore these cases could not be concealed or handle as a court procedure. This war neurosis was called as ‘grenade shock’. In 1917 W.H.R. Rivers was the first one who described the symptoms in a lecture. (The repression of war experience). 6 years after the war 58% of the patients suffered from grenade shock in an American veteran hospital. [20, 21] In the army of the
Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy psychological aptitude tests were started in 1917. Mainly pilots, drivers, telephone operators were tested. [18, 21]

After World War I following the peace ultimatum of Trianon the army of more than 100,000 soldiers was reduced to 35,000 soldiers. As a consequence, the military health care staff was also reduced by the same rate. In the next two decades there was no development in the field of military health care and military doctor training was not available. Recovery could only been seen at the end of the 30s, but then the shadows of an approaching big war could be perceived. [2, 9]

4.2 Military health care in World War II

Military historians speak about third generation warfare from the end of World War I until the Gulf War in 1991. This kind of warfare can be characterised by blitzkrieg, attacks from unexpected directions, the exploitation of surprise, and bombing the heartland. As the heartland was bombarded and attacked, the number of injured civilian population increased. As a consequence of this the cooperation of military and civilian health care came into the limelight. Since the end of World War I military medical science has become an independent specialization in medical science. [9]

In World War II military health care was characterised by quick organization, adaptation to quickly changing situations, the decrease of epidemics and the increase of civilian victims. Military surgery specialized further on, odontologists and neurosurgeons appeared in the battle field. The technology of anaesthesia developed, shock prevention, newer plasma substitutes and tinned blood were applied and antibiotics were used at a larger scale. [2]

In the USA, during World War II the activities of military psychology expanded further on. The aptitude tests, developed in World War I, were improved then altered and they were used at the recruitment of more than 20 million conscriptees. Meanwhile, in Hitler’s Germany and in the Soviet Union the military psychological service was terminated. [17, 18, 19]

However, in World War II soldiers’ nervous breakdown was still regarded as cowardice. Between the two World Wars in the army of the Austrian Hungarian Monarchy not only aptitude tests but career guidance was also introduced and returnees were given guidance for their civilian life. In 1933 the Hungarian Royal Central Institute of Aptitude Examination was established mainly to carry out military aptitude tests. [18, 21]
In Hungary the air force became so developed that it needed its own health service. Its task was mainly to select, check the crew and protect their health. The number of patients of military health care institutions increased with the close relatives as well therefore new specializations appeared such as gynaecology.

The underdevelopment of army health care after Trianon had its influence as long as the end of the World War II. In the attack against Yugoslavia in April 1941 the health care service did good work but they also had a delayed action. The same fault could be seen at the attack against the Soviet Union June 1941. The 2nd Hungarian Army deployed in several steps from April 1942. In the summer months health care, with hard work though, could fulfil its tasks, but even at that time there were difficulties with evacuation. Until 30 August, 10,836 injuries and 3,631 patients were treated. They were also able to keep the number of infectious diseases (dysentery, typhus, malaria, tuberculosis and venereal diseases) low. After 19 November 1942, when the soviet counterattack started the number of injured soldiers soared, the health care system was overburdened two or three fold. The number of frost injuries cases of starvation also increased and the transportation to the heartland also faltered. Between 12 and 24 January 1943, in the Don bend the 2nd Hungarian army became 150 thousand dead, injured and missing soldiers or prisoners of war. The rate of the dead or injured was 1:1. Health care workers did their job tirelessly. [22]

Hospital-trains had a special role military health care. Hospital-trains were converted from usual MÁV (Hungarian State Railway) trains and they usually consisted of 22 carriages. In 10 of the carriages there were bed-cases suspended by special straps. In 5 carriages sitting patients travelled and 7 carriages were used by the staff. Usually 500 – but if was needed – even 700 patients were transported in these trains. The most important furniture was a fixed surgery-dressing room, pharmacy, kitchen car, a service and staff car made up the train. ‘Their task was to transport the treated injured soldiers from the hospitals of the battlefield to the military and Red Cross hospitals of the heartland and on the way back they transported Red Cross nurses, doctors, staff officers, bandages and other health care materials to the battlefield.’ On the basis of the Geneva Convention hospital trains had a relatively protected condition; however in the battle their damage was inevitable. As a consequence of this, amputations were not made by specialists and the aspects of rehabilitation were not taken into consideration. The rate of injuries caused by splinters increased and they mainly injured limbs. At the end of the war hospital-trains did not have even the basic equipment. [23]

During World War II the health care service often struggled with organizational problems. They were the delayed deployment, insufficient
amount of fuel to transport injured soldiers, the too fast translocation of hospitals back to the heartland, which resulted that the injured could not reach them, the difficulties in the cooperation between the health care institutions and the shortage of health care materials. At the end of the war there were not any health care institutions in the country which were able to work. [9]

Doctor Mihály Bak gave a reliable summary of the characteristics of military doctors:.....The military doctor is not a fighter in any armies, but – according to his oath – he is supposed to treat, help and cure the soldiers of his own army and the injured prisoners of war of the army of the enemy.’ [23]

4.3. Military health care in the second part of the 20th century

After World War II, in the years of the cold war, two world powers confronted each other. An enormous arms race started, there were hardly any political, economic and cultural connections between the two sides. Danger-oriented mass armies were formed and the governments spent huge sums of money to develop new kinds of weapons. At that time calculability, planning and the ability to treat a great number of injured people characterised military health care, which resulted in compromised medicine. The expected number of conscripts, reservists and injured soldiers could be calculated. The escape of the injured was planned to stop at two medical units before the final treatment. That was the model of the discontinuous evacuation. After World War II, in local fights this discontinuous evacuation was favoured when the injured soldier stopped at least at two medical units. [14, 15, 24, 25]

In the second part of the 20th century partly new weapons were developed, partly the new generations of the traditional weapon systems were created in order to increase the effectiveness of weapons. Mainly small arms and effective explosive weapons became wide-spread. In the previous ones the direction of the bullet track can change in the body several times, it releases its energy to lateral directions therefore although the input aperture is small it largely destroys the inner tissues. Explosive weapons with increased impact cause complex and multiplied injuries as a result of the air-blast waves, the heat effect, toxic gases, splinters, and secondary fragments. The injuries usually occur on the limbs then on the head and neck, the chest and on the abdomen. In the fights of the second half of the 20th century the rate of injuries caused by splinters increased further compared to gunshot injuries, therefore multiplied injuries show an increasing tendency. [26]

In the Korean War (1951-1953) the United States developed Mobil Army Surgical Hospitals, MASH. Lifesaving operations were performed in them near the front line, which increased the chance of survival. 7 MASH trains were used
in which an increasing number of injured people were treated closer and closer to the front line at a shorter time of deployment. Significant experiences were obtained in the field of evacuation as well. In the beginning evacuation was carried out by rail (hospital trains) and sea, then by air. An ambulance like vehicle was developed which became able to run both on the roads and on the rails as well. [9]

In the Korean War (1951-1953), the Hungarian military health care could gain significant experiences. After the outbreak of the war the Hungarian state set up a military hospital (Mátyás Rákosi Hospital), operated as a civilian hospital for 4 years after the war. 8 Hungarian medical teams worked here continuously one after the other. There were very bad public health and climatic conditions and the situation in the war was life threatening. Their main task was to treat war injuries but they also cured civilians, and they were able to deal with training and research as well. However, the truth is that the maintenance of this hospital caused significant burden for Hungary. [9, 27]

Dr. János Zoltán, who laid down the basics of plastic surgery, also worked in the Korean War (1951-1953). He wrote about his Korean adventures in literary books, but his scientific work also relied on his experiences in Korea. [28]

In the Vietnam War (1959-1975), the frequent terror attacks and gerilla fights made the next step of the enemy completely unpredictable. The constant uncertainty, the difficult climatic conditions and drug addiction made the American soldiers war-torn both in their body and soul. Because of the nature of warfare health care institutions were settled because in this way they could provide more modern service at a higher level. Besides, the mobile health care containers, which had their own electric supply from a turbine, were used here for the first time (MUST, Medical Unit Self-Contained Transportable). The bigger part of soldiers needed health care to cure their illnesses (69%), but they usually recovered soon. The recovery time of war injuries (17%) was much longer. The rate of neurological and psychological disorders increased by two and a half between 1968 and 1970 and it became the second most frequent cause of discharge from service. [9]

In the Vietnam War, the most important change in emergency care was the use of ambulance helicopters. The injured soldiers were taken from the front line to the final health care station by helicopter (one stage care). It was applied first in 1962 and in 6 years’ time more than 100 helicopters helped the health support. Evacuation by helicopters was first introduced in Vietnam and the favourable experiences led to its regular use. Injured people were taken to the final health care basis immediately therefore they could get the highest standard
care in a relatively short time. This one-stage evacuation started to spread after the favourable experiences here but the significant development of vehicles was necessary to achieve this. The development of evacuation by air made it possible to use the civil health care institutes of the neighbouring peaceful territories within a limited period of time. Meanwhile new diagnostic and therapeutic methods were established which were close to the applications in peace. The development of emergency vascular surgery decreased the number of amputations in the case of limb injuries. At the on-the-spot treatment of shock the focus was on parenteral hydration and the modern parenteral products (FFP, complete blood and dextran) decreased the rate of deaths significantly. Using the modern anti-shock methods and the evacuation by air there were hardly any injured people who could not be transported. [2, 9, 14, 15, 24, 25]

Talking about the Vietnam War, we must mention the post-traumatic stress disorders. The possibility of the soldiers’ psychological break-down was a well-known fact in any periods of history. These people were regarded as cowardly, weak and unmanly. In the 20th century so many people took part in wars and the use of mass destruction weapons resulted in so many victims that the number of psychological illnesses dramatically increased. It is impossible to ignore these people. In World War I it was called grenade shock, in World War II it was the war exhaustion. In the 50s it was started to call stress-reaction, which was considered as treatable condition, possible to be treated. In civil life it occurs in great numbers when disasters happen, but people who survived aggression or trauma can also suffer from it. In fact it is the reaction of normal people for extreme and intensive stress. Acute stress reactions and the so-called post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) were separated from each other. The first one is a psychological and physiological reaction when fear hinders the individual to act in a usual, logical way right during or after the trauma. PTSD indicates psychological trauma which appears after a certain time – usually several months. Its research started mainly after the Vietnam War. As I mentioned before, in the Vietnam War neuro-psychiatric diseases were the second most frequent cause of discharge from service. The ‘Vietnam syndrome’ was regarded as the special form of PTSD. [29]

The most important factors that triggered PTSD were being taken prisoner-of-war, the sight of the death of a fellow soldier and serious injuries. PTSD is a vicious circle in which the individual struggles continuously. He cannot escape because in his memory he lives the traumatic events through again and again, he is continuously tense, sleepless, and has a guilty conscience. His personality changes and he develops assimilation disorders. Without help he can turn to alcohol and drugs or he commits suicide. Most of the time PTSD can be found behind the family and social assimilation disorders of the soldiers who could return home. [30] In peace 0.5 % of men and 1.3% of women develop
PTSD. [31] Among the Canadian veteran soldiers, who fought in Vietnam, this value was even as high as 65%. [32] Among Croatian veterans this value was 15%. [30] The study of the symptoms, prevention and treatment of PTSD became one of the most important military health care tasks. Its results greatly helped the development of modern psychology and psychiatry.

In the Gulf War, the USA relocated 44 military hospitals (it meant 13 thousand beds) and more than 23,000 health care staff in the area. Besides, in Europe 1,800 and in the USA 25,000 beds and at the air force and on the hospital ships a significant number of beds were available. ‘Personal, material technical over insurance characterised military health care at that period.’ [14]

At the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and mainly during the Gulf War, it was increasingly accepted that peace time standards and schedule must be kept in warfare as well. In warfare it was also supposed to keep the ‘golden hour’, which meant that the injured person had to receive first aid within an hour. The Gulf War (and especially later the Iraq War) was given huge publicity and the war could be followed live sitting in an armchair, watching TV. At that time, it became obvious how little the public could tolerate the evitable death or injury of even one soldier. They hauled the authorities up for the life of both soldiers and civilians. The public did not accept avoidable risks. [2, 24, 25]

Comparing it to other wars, the use of the latest technology and computer systems made it entirely different. Medical supply was designed according to the principles of the American medical care. Endoscopic instruments, CT, screening systems without film and instruments that can produce liquid oxygen were used first in the Gulf War.

Head and limb injuries dominated and the rate of poly-traumatic cases, face injuries, face and hand burns were also high. On the basis of the Gulf War it was obvious that triage and evacuation have a decisive role in the treatment of the injured. After analysing the progress of diseases, it turned out that over-specialization is a drawback in warfare treatment. [14, 33, 34]

In the wars of the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the rate of sick soldiers outnumbered the rate of the injured. Mainly infectious and neuro-psychiatric diseases were frequent. The number of bacterial infections significantly decreased comparing them to the previous wars, however virus diseases and especially the occurrence of hepatitis increased markedly. The rate of the occurrence of hepatitis is still the biggest indicator of public health conditions in warfare. [2, 14, 26] In Vietnam between 1965 and 1973, American soldiers mainly caught virus hepatitis, malaria, and intestinal infections. Soviet soldiers struggled with the same diseases in Afghanistan. War stress could be observed
on the soldiers fighting in Vietnam and Afghanistan in large quantities. This fact greatly contributed to detailed study of the psychological processes of soldiers and the development of military psychological and psychiatric care. [14]

To sum up, at the end of the 20th century, tensions which were created by the bipolar world order were gradually taken over by local conflicts, ethnic and religion problems, terror attacks, refugee problems, migration and environmental disasters. Humanitarian movements had an increasing emphasis. The fall of the bipolar world and the occurrence of asymmetric challenges changed the processes of military health care methods that were used until then. At the same time social expectations also changed. The individual had right to the same high standard health care both in war and peace time. [24, 25]

In the last third of the 20th century, the number of non-war military actions increased considerably. Even years before the accession to the NATO, Hungary took part in missions with its health care experts. After the accession to NATO in 1999, this tendency was even more intensive. The conversion of the Hungarian military health care was made according to the standards. In warfare, the injured are treated progressively according to the ROLE ability levels. On the first level of ROLE-1 there is first aid, on the ROLE-2 level there are lifesaving and limb saving interventions, on the ROLE-3 level there are other urgent operations and on the ROLE-4 level there are other definitive treatments. Our participation in the military health care in Afghanistan and in the Balkan contributed significantly to the spread of the reputation of the Hungarian military health care. It is proved by the fact that in 2008 the NATO Military Health Care Excellence Centre was established. The terrible events of 11 September 2001 opened a new chapter in military health care, but this can be the topic of another article.

**Conclusion**

Military health care carried out its basic duty that is the cure of injured and sick soldiers, while it continuously adapted to the changing historical, economic, technological and ethic circumstances. Its experiences were used in civilian health care and contributed to the results of general surgery, amputation and plastic surgery, neurosurgery, orthopedics, emergency and catastrophic care, intensive therapy, public health, psychology and psychiatry and rehabilitation. The triage, evacuation and emergency care of people injured in mass and environmental disasters are based on the experiences of military health care. The flow of the results of medicine has two directions from civilian health care to military health care and back but the latter one does not have such a big reputation. The aim of my essay is to limelight the results of military health care.
References

Capt. LAJOS LISZNYAI, PhD aspirant

COE OR PMESII-PT? METHODS TO IDENTIFY AND ANALYSE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Part II.

Referring to the first part of my article, first I am going to describe the PMESII-PT. Second, I would like to compare the effectiveness of the COE and PMESII-PT analysis methods. I will compare the different operational environments of our days on the basis of the 11 and 8 points of COE\(^1\) and PMESII-PT\(^2\). Finally, as I have already compared the failed states in the first part of my article, now my aim is to highlight the differences and similarities between the above mentioned points through the example of Afghanistan.

Analysing the operational environment by PMESII-PT

According to the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) (interim V 1.0 dated 17 December 2010) and FM 3-0\(^3\) there are six main domains of the PMESII analysis as follows:

- Political;
- Military;
- Economic;
- Social;
- Infrastructure;
- Information.

Conducting analysis based on these above mentioned domains is useful, when the planning team develops an initial system perspective of the situation focusing on the potential adversaries, friendly and neutral actors as well as other aspects of the operational environment relevant to the potential security risks and threats. Now I am going to describe these domains on the next couple of pages in general and also giving some examples.

---

\(^1\) COE: Contemporary operational environment
\(^2\) PMESII-PT: Political, military, economic, social environment, infrastructure, information, physical environment, time available.
\(^3\) “Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment but also the population's influence on it. Joint planners analyze the operational environment in terms of six interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. To these variables, Army doctrine adds two more: physical environment and time. As a set, soldiers often abbreviate these operational variables as PMESII-PT.” FM 3-0, p.1-20.
Political domain:

“The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance. Political structures and processes enjoy varying degrees of legitimacy with populations from local through international levels. Formally constituted authorities and informal or covert political powers strongly influence events.”

In the case of Afghanistan, the type and stability of the insurgents cannot be defined according to the COE because they are opposed by the official Afghan administration and the international community, but they are not state level actors. However, in terms of PMESII-PT the home and foreign political effects of the insurgent activity can be analysed and assessed. Since the country is not a unified national state, owing to the national and tribal circumstances the events together with their political, social etc. impacts need to be examined separately (not only by districts but by provinces level as well).

From a political point of view, the Taliban represent the determining force of insurgents. Since 11th September 2001 (almost) every country and organisation has separated themselves from them. Major achievements were reached in the first years of the Afghan war as well as in beating down the Taliban rule/influence. The Taliban-related Al-kaida and its leaders were forced into illegality and emigration (mostly to Pakistan). However, since 2009 their influence has been strengthening again. Officially they may not be part of the government but (because of their growing influence) they have become a political force that cannot be ignored.

Recently the American diplomacy is also being forced to realise that without moderating the Taliban influence there is no way neither to stabilise the Afghan home politics nor to maintain the achievements of the last more than 10 years. The most significant sign of this was the opening of an office for the Taliban in Qatar in 2012. Hamid Karzai and his government supported the negotiations in the beginning, but the later American-Taliban overture and the American pressure to reach consensus most probably contributed to the turnaround of the Afghan president. Formerly, he used to be in favour of the close cooperation with the Americans and NATO – even if the allied forces used disproportionately great forces to achieve their aims – thus causing the death of innocent civilians. However, for the past two years, Karzai has lifted up his voice more and more firmly about an unsuccessful air strike or the use of disproportionate forces – partly in order to ‘act’ for the population of the country. It is not happened by coincidence that the ‘independent’ Afghan

---

5 WAGNER 2012 p.3.
president does not want to prolong the presence of the allied forces after 2014. His second presidency will expire in the next year and according to the constitution he cannot be re-elected again.

Parallel with the above mentioned issues, a certain social group is on the rise on both national and provincial levels. These people owe their influence to Karzai and his immediate environment through getting different positions. Partly this is the reason why provincial-level leaders (governor, major police officers) are relayed so frequently. Although these positions can only be acquired with relationships and money, they cannot be taken for granted for long. In Baghlan province for example, there was an obvious clash of interests between the local township leaders and the ‘stranger’ governors appointed by Kabul. Only occasional alliances and bargains could lead to cooperation and development – with no respect to the amount of money at disposal.

The relationship between the Afghan government and the neighbouring countries is characterised by a certain duality. Not only because (neither) Afghanistan can be regarded a national state in the area, but also because the (in)stability of the country is determinant for both regional and world level. The solution to this situation cannot and should not be looked for only inside Afghanistan. One of the excellent example of this is the case of Iraq, the stability of which depends not only on the attitude of the USA and Russia but also on its neighbouring countries like Turkey, Iran, Saudi-Arabia and Syria. Although the American foreign policy has been emphasising since 2007/2008 that it wants to settle the Iraqi situation by involving the affected neighbouring countries, in fact, it does not (or only restrictedly) take Syria’s and Iran’s suggestions and interests into consideration. Today it is obvious that the revival of conflict and violence in Iraq cannot be definitely and exclusively contributed to the withdrawal of the American troops. There are religiously devoted armed groups in Syria and Iraq (and Lebanon), which are experienced in armed conflicts. Their military fight focuses on the armed conflict, largely increasing the instability of the whole area.

The situation is similar in the case of Afghanistan as well. Not only the armed troops can move uncontrolled across the Afghan-Pakistani border, but the Iranian, Uzbek and Tajik influence also needs to be taken into consideration as well. North-Afghanistan shows traditionally varied ethnic picture. There are Uzbek and Tajik residents in a great number, who do not get exclusive cultural

\[ \text{SALEHYAN pp. VIII-IX.} \]
support from their home country. Their extremist groups (eg. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)) are directly or indirectly influencing the events.\(^7\)

The success of state building depends more on the inner safety, operable and incorrupt jurisdiction of the country than on the amount of money invested into development or modernisation of public administration. However, the latter two are closely connected to the success.\(^8\)

As a conclusion, let me cite a quotation on failed statehood and the necessity of the international community’s intervention: ‘(Afghanistan) is a failed state but even so, it is the best we have ever had.’\(^9\)

Military domain:

“The military variable includes the military capabilities of all armed forces in a given operational environment. For many states, an army is the military force primarily responsible for maintaining internal and external security. Paramilitary organizations and guerrilla forces may influence friendly and hostile military forces. Militaries of other states not directly involved in a conflict may also affect them. Therefore, analysis should include the relationship of regional land forces to the other variables. Military analysis examines the capabilities of enemy, adversary, host-nation, and multinational military organizations... Understanding these factors helps commanders estimate actual capabilities of each armed force. Analysis focuses on each organization’s ability to field and use capabilities domestically, regionally, and globally.”\(^10\)

With regard to the military skills, there are no significant differences between the subsystems of COE and PMESII-PT. The only substantive difference derives from the fact that COE 11 examines only the army (ground, air, possibly naval services) of a given country. While, in the PMESII-PT analysis the strength, composition and equipment of the armed forces are crucial.

This difference modifies the former general idea that the role of armies is to defeat/eliminate the enemy on the battlefield. Current military conflicts and experience of asymmetric warfare have proved that it is not enough to defeat the enemy on the battlefield, but the population also has to be won for peace (winning Hearts and Minds).

\(^7\) The insurgents have almost unlimited freedom of movement and freedom of action alongside national borders, but for the official national authorities (border police, police, army) not allowed to cross international borders and pursue their enemies. For more details: SALEHYAN pp. 1-2.

\(^8\) DORRONSORO p.19.


\(^10\) FM 3-0 p.1-21.
Events of the Iraqi and Afghan theatres of operations obviously prove the complexity of tasks that military (sub-)units have to face. It is no longer enough to organize the cooperation of multinational contingents at army level. It is also necessary to do so between soldiers and other armed forces (eg. in the case of Afghanistan: ANCOP, ANP, ALP, ABP, NDS etc.) as well as between soldiers and representatives of public administration.

Rephrasing my former statement, this means: following a victory on the battlefield, military organisations have to be able to organise the cooperation with other national and international armed forces and to collaborate with representatives of public administration. On the one hand, this task is complicated because of its multinational nature where all parties are involved in a coalitional fight for a different reason. On the other hand, the soldiers themselves have to understand and acknowledge the skills/abilities and restrictions of the host nation and its organisations. In the course of planning process of certain levels, the battle space owner has to be aware of the strength, equipment, level of military training, capability, and motivation, as well as the (national) caveats of the subordinated units.

In the case of Afghanistan, during the process of Transition (Inteqal),\(^\text{11}\) the leadership and responsibility was mostly transferred to the Afghan party. However, there have been certain inadequacies regarding training and skills (command and control, capabilities/limits of combat support and combat service support units) that cannot be completed. Thus, these gaps are fulfilled and provided by ISAF (mainly by the USA). As a result of all this, ISAF participation is still crucial to carry out the task successfully. In many cases, there are lack of ability to cooperate within the ANSF, which indicates that. There may be a long-term need for the ISAF activity to promote the coordination among the nations (and ethnicities) and to seek consensus. The mentoring activity of the OMLT/MAT\(^\text{12}\) elements greatly increase the adequacy of Afghan subunits, however, there is no doubt that the equipment, training and skills of ISAF forces (regardless of NATO STANAGs) is at least as varied as the way how the Afghan battalions are being mentored.

---

\(^{11}\) A transitional process the aim of which is to transfer administrative and military lead to the host nation in areas occupied/controlled by international forces. In Afghanistan, this process started on 28 August, 2008 when ANSF took over Kabul. The process was officially announced only in November, 2010 at the NATO summit in Lisbon. About 58,4% (163 battalions) of the Afghan National Army, which has a strength of 195000, has successfully completed the validation process. For more details: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_92726.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_92726.htm) Downloaded: 25 August, 2013.

(In Baghlan province, which is crucial regarding Hungarian participation, the Transition Ceremony took place in September, 2012).

\(^{12}\) OMLT: Operational Military Liaison Team, MAT: Military Advisor Team
Economics domain:

“The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources... While the world economy continues to grow more interdependent, local economies differ. These differences significantly influence political choices, including individuals' decisions to support or subvert the existing order. Many factors create incentives or disincentives for individuals and groups to change the economic status quo.”

When examining the aspects that determine the economic abilities (as well) of Afghanistan, it shows that 12 out of the 24 big cities of the country are situated in the northern part of the country. While 10% of the whole population lives in the capital, many of the most significant cities can be found in the north.

On the basis of the available information and different mathematical calculations, it can be stated that the natural population growth of the city of Pol-e Khumri has fallen after 2004. This is not the same with Baghlan-e Jadid, whose population has moderately increased and with Mazar-e Sarif and Kunduz whose population has sprung. Currently, 68,1% of the urban population of the region lives in the above mentioned four cities.

Like in other countries, economic development and production can be related to urban areas in the case of Afghanistan as well. However, we should not forget about poppy-seed plantations and the related opium production. Afghanistan is the world’s biggest opium exporter but this ‘world-authoritative position’ cannot be felt in its GDP. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, it is the lack of centralised control and the underdeveloped nature of the taxation system. Turnover taxes are not collected properly either inside or through the borders of the country. Almost everywhere in the country at ANP points the crossing freight and passenger vehicles are subject to a tax, however, these taxes never reach either the provincial or the national budget...

The 90% of the budget of Kabul is made up of support coming from international (mainly American) organisations/communities. So it is difficult to understand why Karzai’s government (for the above mentioned reasons) confronts its main military and financial supporter.

For the rural population, growing poppy seed continues to be the most important source for living. Winding up poppy seed production (in spite of all American effort) would cause such social and economic consequences, for

---

13 FM 3-0 pp.1-21 - 1.22.
14 Urban growth in Northern Afghanistan, Annex 1. (The last official census in the country was in 1979. When making the statistics there were no available accurate data about the cities of Aqcah, Aybak and Balkh).
which the international community is not prepared. Thousands of families (millions of the whole population) would be left without proper job for living and this also could lead to a famine, similar to that in Somalia in the 1990s. In addition, the judgement of the international community would deteriorate and this indirectly would increase the social support of the insurgents instead of separating the civilian population (hinterland) from them.

Social domain:

“The social variable describes societies within an operational environment. A society is a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of identity. Societies are not monolithic. They include diverse social structures. Social structure refers to the relations among groups of persons within a system of groups. It includes institutions, organizations, networks, and similar groups.”

The variegation of the country can be felt in the social diversification of the Afghan higher classes as well. The political, economic, military, religious and cultural upper class is formed by the ad hoc alliances. People who are decisive on a national or provincial level often change their allies. And this is what the history of Afghanistan (also) teaches to its population. The survival of the tribe or family – in a wider sense – often depends on whether the leader realises the opportunity to betray their former ally in time. A typical example of this is the life of General Daud Daud who, due to his sense of political and military matters, was a determining (and controversial) political figure in Afghanistan.

On the basis of the experience gained in Iraq, it is becoming more and more obvious that the American party here also has given up their intention to build a nation and a western-type democracy. It is impossible to establish a democratic state in the western sense of the word in a country where there is no peace in economics, in society, within the country and with the neighbouring countries. Due to the majority of the population being undereducated (illiterate) and to the strong tribal ties it is precluded that everyone should express their own will at the elections.

1. Picture

15 FM 3-0 p. 1-22.
As I mentioned in the first part of my article, the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) can endanger both the internal and the regional stability. The host nations have to face an ever-growing tension, because they cannot conduct their pacification as effectively as would be necessary. This holds true especially for Pakistan, inhabited by millions of native Pashtuns. In addition, millions of Afghans fled to Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war and after 9/11.

Based on the above mentioned reasons and also on the lack of cohesion, a relatively well functioning country and a non-extremist government could be the only realistic aims.

Information:

“Joint doctrine defines the information environment as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). The environment shaped by information includes leaders, decision makers, individuals, and organizations. The global community’s access and use of data, media, and knowledge systems occurs in the information shaped by the operational environment. Commanders use information activities to shape the operational environment as part of their operations.”

In the world of information technology, the flow of information within and outside the alliance and the activity against the insurgents’ black propaganda are equally important. As it was indicated by the negative events of the past few years (e.g.: the Parwan incident), the situation can rapidly change in provinces, which were considered relatively peaceful before. As a result of that, great mass demonstrations can evolve and the necessary amount adequately trained and equipped troops are not always available. Different international organisations (US AID, UNAMA, RED CROSS), and the INFOOPS activity greatly decrease the above mentioned negative trends and manage to positively change the local population’s point of view. However, the role of these organizations should not be overestimated. This is just one of the tools in the hand of the commander that supports the realisation of his will in order to carry out his mission successfully.

---

17 See more details in Lajos LISZNYAI: COE or PMESII-PT? Methods to identify and analyse operational environment Part I.
18 FM 3-0 p.1-23.
Downloaded: 29 September, 2013.
Infrastructure domain:

“Infrastructure comprises the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for a society to function. Degrading infrastructure affects the entire operational environment. Infrastructure includes technological sophistication—the ability to conduct research and development and apply the results to civil and military purposes.”

The other side of the coin is to check how efficiently the international aids are used. It is instructive to see how wisely the often countless amount of aids are used. The main supply roads (MSRs) continuously need to be reconstructed. The Afghan ‘ring-roads’ were last reconstructed during the Soviet occupation. However, international participation in such reconstruction works are restricted. Corruption has grasped an area that uses the decisive part of international aids. In contrast with all these, neither international aids nor road constructions or prestige investments are able to increase the productivity of the country. They can provide only temporary living for a small segment of the Afghan population.

Similarly to the former Soviet considerations, the main military doctrine of the American party (as the main force of ISAF) is based on providing freedom of movement and freedom of action along MSRs by occupying key terrains, roads and cities. In the case of such a rural settlement structure, this could lead only to moderate the results and it can only be ensured until ANSF and the international forces are able to demonstrate the necessary force in the region.

In spite of the above mentioned urbanisation efforts, a vast majority of the population live in rural areas and they are fully relying on agriculture. Since the influence of the international community is focused along the MSRs, which are under their control, the insurgents are given the opportunity to firm their influence on the undeveloped rural areas. Later, they could use these areas as a base for expansion towards cities.

A great experience of military history is that the loyalty, sincerity and neutrality of the population devoted to those party directly or indirectly contribute to their living conditions. This kind of passive cooperation between the population and the insurgents overshadows the technical/technological ascendancy of the allied forces.

Expenses of the mission have been considerably increased by the long delivery routes between the homeland and the theatre of operations. The

20 FM 3-0 p.1-23.
neighbouring countries (Uzbekistan, Pakistan) gain considerable incomes and a favourable bargaining position with NATO. A good example of this was the closure of the Khyber-pass. The importance of North-Afghanistan and the neighbouring countries increased for the American party at this time. American forces of great strength started to move to the area of responsibility (AOR) of RC North. Also, preparations for the reconstruction of the Salang-pass and the construction of an alternate route in the south started at this time. It became clear for the American party that the more or less stable northern region was essential in receiving supplies and the later in withdrawing the forces. At the other end of the scale there is a very similar situation with the Soviet-Afghan war, which happened 30 years before. ISAF is also concentrating its main efforts and forces around the Afghan ring-roads. Although forward operation bases (FOBs) and combat outposts (COPs) have been maintained on the key terrains, the operational action radius have not changed compared to the Soviet-Afghan war. The restricted manoeuvring possibilities (in spite of the available helicopters and other air transport facilities) make it is easy for the enemy (insurgents) to define the area, where the military, economic, etc. superiority of allied forces are present, and the enemy can also easily define the local security forces’ manoeuvre radius. At the same time, the population outside this ‘bubble’ is completely exposed to the insurgents. This was the case in Khost wa Fereng or Fereng Gharo etc. districts in Baghlan province as well. In those areas neither the ISAF nor the government of Kabul has any leverage at all.

**Physical environment and time domain:**

Referring to the first part of my article, analyzing these domains there are no differences between the COE and PMESII-PT methods. Overlays, products and conclusions should be the same; either aspect had been used by soldiers/analyzers.

**Assessment and comparison of COE and PMESII-PT:**

A COE nature and stability of states analyses a state as a whole, through aspects (e.g.: political will, security forces available, economic background, natural resources) that form independent parts in the case of PMESII-PT.

In addition, a majority of nowadays’ operational areas (Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan) do not have statehood in the classical sense of the word. As a result, it is not the stability of the state that needs to be examined, but its political environment, in which the conflict takes place. Much rather, these states bear the hallmark of a failed state. The problem needs to be approached

---

22 Failed state „...a government that cannot control the overall territory of a state, most of the population doesn’t accept the political elite, it has weak legitimacy, the government can’t ensure the public security and public
and handled through the home and foreign political relations, instead of the stability of the state. This does not mean that COE and its subsystems (aspects) are not relevant. Only, their significance is smaller. We should remember: while the 11 aspects of COE have been created for the classical theatres of war, where the opposing parties (mostly) fight a conventional war against each other, PMESII-PT can be better used during the planning processes of asymmetric warfare.

Examining the operational environments of our days the difference between the two ways of analysis lies in the assessment of the forces of opposing parties. According to COE’s 11 aspects it is mostly the task of the intel section (S2/G2) to deal with the enemy’s strength, equipment and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). However, in PMESII-PT, the wider staff is responsible for examining all aspects of the assessment criteria both from the enemy and the civilian population’s point of view. As it derives from what was said formerly, the latter is a much more complex approach. It does not only predict the enemy’s aims and future steps, but it gives reasons for the priority setup and tries to define the purposes of the enemy and the civilian population as well. It greatly increases the efficiency of the analysis and allows the staff to contribute to the wargames and the decision making process.

As I have mentioned before, the analytical aspects of PMESII-PT can be primarily used in case of asymmetric warfare and peace keeping operations when civilian data-(bases) are also available. This implies that an UN or other mandated contingent has been operating for a while in the given area of operations/interest. Above this it also implies that all the fundamental information and social networks are available, which are necessary to analyse the civilian component since their aim is to defeat the enemy primarily through the civilian population.

When it comes to the part for determining the task in the traditional sense the formerly mentioned aspects are overshadowed. The importance of analysing terrain and enemy is highlighted and PMESII aspects put themselves forward in connection with consolidation operations.

As a conclusion of my two-part article, I would like to draw the attention to the essential nature of the above reviewed aspects in the course of analysing nowadays’ operational environments. For those interested in military history and science these aspects provide certain ways of analysis and associated assessment that lend neutrality to the author, which makes it possible to compare areas of services (e.g.: health care, education), can’t possess the monopoly of maintaining armed forces.” WAGNER p. 344.
operations on the basis of standardised criteria and also to identify and use the lessons learned.

**Bibliography**

1. DORRONSORO, GILLES: The Taliban's winning strategy in Afghanistan, Carnegie endowment, 2009, p.34.
2. FM 3-0 Operations, Washington DC., Department of the Army, 2011 (with change 1), p.223., PIN 079091-001
3. FM 3-24.2 Tactics in counterinsurgency, Washington DC., Department of the Army, 2009, p.300., PIN 085323-000
5. LISZNYAI Lajos: COE OR PMESII-PT? Methods to identify and analyze operational environment Part I., In: Tradecraft review 2013/1, pp. 139-153, ISSN 2063-2908

**Other (internet) sources**

ANITA DEÁK, PhD aspirant

GREAT POWER AMBITIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE NEAR ABROAD

Abstract:

This article is about the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ presence in different countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and other parts of the world. In practice, through its military bases, the Russian state and military leadership intends to maintain or even to increase the Russian influence - in political, economic, cultural and military fields. First and foremost we are witnessing this tendency in the countries of the “Near Abroad”.

Keywords: military presence, buffer zone, rassian military bases, allies of the RF

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly established sovereign post-Soviet states including the Russian Federation had to find out how to ensure their existence as a state under the new political circumstances. There were different ways of advancement and most regrettably several ethnic and territorial armed conflicts erupted in the post-Soviet area in the most critical years of transition, in late eighties and early nineties of the last century.

The new leadership of the Russian Federation inherited a country which had to be rebuilt from the ruins. This process meant the reconstruction of the economy, state administration, and political system, which took more than a decade, in these years Russia had to concentrate on the internal issues and so it had to play a modest role in its international relations. In order to keep an eye on the other countries of the post-Soviet area, it was sufficient for the Russian leadership to lead the Commonwealth of Independent States and to maintain the military-technical cooperation with the countries of the Near Abroad, as well as to secure the Russian military presence in those countries through the former bases of the Soviet Army.

The Baltic States have declared their sovereignty and have started their way towards the Euro Atlantic integration. They decided not to join the newly established organisation of the post-Soviet states, namely the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). All Russian troops were withdrawn from Estonia,

---

1 The regional organisation in the post-Soviet area. There are nine full fledged member states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Ukraine and Turkmenistan are de facto members (signed, but not ratified the CIS Charter).
Lithuania and Latvia in early nineties – just like from Central and Eastern European countries that have once belonged to the Warsaw Pact.

There are three countries in the Western direction, connecting Russia with the European Union and also separating Russia from the West or more specifically from the European NATO member states. The Russian Federation regards Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova as a special buffer zone with regard to the security challenges potentially emerging from the West. All these countries are members of the CIS and all of them have Russian troops on their territory even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union occurred more than two decades ago.

The South Caucasus is still a problematic area of the post-Soviet territory, due to several unresolved, frozen conflicts. Abkhazia, South Ossetia in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan are still maintaining the tensions in the Caucasus region. Russia still has a military base in Armenia, and only recently had to finish its military activity in Azerbaijan. Also this geopolitical region suffered from the most recent armed conflict, namely the Five-Day Georgian-Russian war in August 2008. As a consequence of the armed conflict and the declaration of the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian leadership decided to deploy Russian Armed Forces on these territories in order to defend its old-new allies. The Caucasus region also serves for Russia as a security buffer zone from the potential challenges emerging from the direction of the Middle East.

The third buffer zone includes the Central Asian states of the CIS. These countries have a quite fragile security situation which could be further endangered by the potential challenges emerging from the surrounding countries. Nowadays, the geopolitical importance of this region is growing more and more, especially due to the security situation in Afghanistan and the planned withdrawal of the NATO-led security mission, i.e. the International Security Assistance Force in 2014.

**The Western buffer zone**

**Belarus**

In the Western direction the key military ally of the Russian Federation is Belarus. The two states cooperate with each other in the framework of the CIS\(^2\), they actively collaborate within the Collective Security Treaty Organisation\(^3\),

\(^2\) On January 1, 2013, Belarus assumed the presidency in CIS.
\(^3\) CSTO is a military organisation, the current members are: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan.
and moreover, they have formed a supranational entity, the Union State\(^4\) of Russia and Belarus. The two member states of the Union State are engaged in considerable military-technical programmes.

“As a result, the Union State functions like a military alliance: an external attack on one of its members would be treated as an act of aggression on the Union as a whole, as confirmed in article 5 of Russia’s New Military Doctrine adopted on 5 February 2010. Over 30 known binding agreements, the two countries are engaged in a close cooperation in the military-technical field, for coordinating border troops [...] as well as R&D activities and operations on the battlefield. Pursuant to the 1995 Collective Security Concept of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), in October 1999 Russia and Belarus also established a Regional Group of Forces (RGF). In peace time, the RGF combines the troops stationed in Belarus and in Russia’s Western Military District.”\(^5\) Besides the programmes of military industrial and military educational cooperation, the member states regularly conduct joint exercises – for example the last strategic army exercise “Zapad/West-2013” in September 2013. There are also plans for the creation of joint regional air defence system of the Union State: Russia and Belarus signed an agreement regarding the creation of the joint regional air defence system in 2009. In April 2013, Sergei Shoigu, Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, General of the Army, stated that Russia intends to establish an airbase with fighter planes on the territory of Belarus. “In 2013 Russia is to establish a military commandant’s office and provide a wing of combat fighters on alert duty. By 2015, a complete Air Force regiment will be based there according to Russian plans. Russia will also deliver and hand over four battalions of S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Belarus in 2014.”\(^6\) This airbase will not be the first Russian military installation in Belarus: presently there are two of them used by the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The first one is the Volga-type radar station commissioned in 2003 in Hantsavichy/Gantsevichi (near Baranavichy): this radar station belongs to the Russian ballistic missile-attack early warning system run by the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces, rented by the Russian Federation unit 2020. The second military station is the 43\(^{rd}\) naval communication centre in Vileyka which provides connectivity between the Russian Navy and the subordinated

\(^4\)According to the Agreement (1999) on Establishment of a Union State of Belarus and Russia, the Union State seeks “to secure the following eight major goals: ensure peaceful and democratic development, set up uniform economic and customs area, set up a single legal framework, to ensure sustainable economic development, pursue the agreed foreign, defence and social policies, ensure security and fight against crime.” [http://www.mfa.gov.by/en/courtiers/russia/ (12.05.2013)]


submarines on a very low frequency range. The new military station, at least according to the Russian–Belarusian standpoint, is not directed against any of the neighbours of Belarus, the key reason behind the decision is to strengthen the Russian-Byelorussian unified military space. However, it is very likely, that the neighbouring NATO member states see it differently.

Ukraine

The issue of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship is quite complicated. The military cooperation is defined by the military-industrial interdependence of the parties. The key element is the stationing of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine with its headquarters in Sevastopol. The Black Sea Fleet deployed in Crimea has a communications centre, an air-defence missile regiment, a naval infantry regiment, an electronic-warfare regiment, a military hospital and other bases. There is one more very important military facility used by the Russian Armed Forces, namely, the NITKA Naval Pilot Training Centre which is located at Novofedorivka air field near Saki, Crimea. In line with a 1997 bilateral agreement, Russia occasionally uses the NITKA Naval Pilot Training Centre in Ukraine. This is the only land-based training facility for the Russian carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft pilots used to train Northern Fleet pilots. The NITKA Centre was built in the Soviet era for pilots to practice taking-off and landing from aircraft carrier decks. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the facility remained under Ukraine’s control. In order to decrease its dependence on the facility in Ukraine, the Russian leadership has decided to construct its own NITKA in the city of Yeisk, on Russia's Black Sea coast. The Russian NITKA facility may become operational already in 2013. Thus, in April 2013 the Russian leadership notified the Ukrainian Defence Ministry that it had no plans to use the facility in the Crimea; moreover, in September an official notification confirmed Russia’s intention of stop using it. It seems that the construction of the facility in Yeisk goes on according to the planned schedule, as far as Russia has already started the flight tests in July 2013. It is important to mention that the new facility in Yeisk is planned to have not only the construction similar to the Novofedorivka NITKA, but also a helicopter component. This is very conscious decision: there is only

8 NITKA: НИТКА - Наземный испытательный тренажер корабельной авиации
one aircraft carrier in the order of battle of the Russian Armed Forces, namely the Admiral Kuznetsov, however there are Mistral-class helicopter carriers to come.

In April, 2010, the Ukrainian and the Russian President concluded the Ukrainian-Russian Naval Base for Gas agreement, whereby the Russian lease on naval facilities in Crimea would be extended beyond 2017 by 25 years with an additional 5-year renewal option (to 2042–47), in exchange for a multiyear discounted contract to provide Ukraine with Russian natural gas. According to the Agreement, the Russian Federation received a possibility for further stationing of the Black Sea Fleet on the Crimean peninsula and it has no necessity to resettle its naval forces on the Black Sea into Novorossiysk, Russia. However, according to Russia, it is not pleased with the present situation because Ukraine is still hampering the Black Sea Fleet’s day-to-day work and development. On the other hand, Ukraine is not satisfied with the situation: the prices of natural gas are very high and the conditions for the bilateral gas transaction are unfavourable for the Ukrainian party, and from time to time there are actions against Russian military presence performed by Ukrainian activists. Nowadays, the Russian military presence in Ukraine is the biggest considering the number of the troops as the number of personnel reaches 14000 troops. The Russian military presence was especially important for Russia in those years when Ukraine wanted to join NATO. The presence of the Russian military has been a tool to hamper Ukraine’s potential NATO accession and to maintain the geopolitical influence of the Russian Federation over Ukraine. Still it has a geopolitical importance for the Russian leadership to sustain its Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea – it offers an opportunity to control the regional processes and the developments in the area of the Black Sea – in the proximity of NATO member states like Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and a membership candidate Georgia.

Moldova

Moldova declared its independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. It has joined the Commonwealth of Independent States and also the NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. Moldova follows the foreign policy of neutrality, thus, in contrary to many CIS member states, it has not joined the Russian led CSTO. Also, it does not aspire for NATO membership.

Russia had withdrawn its troops from Moldova by 1993 and it has neither military bases nor military installations stationed there. Actually, there are Russian troops in Moldova, namely in Transnistria. The security situation of Moldova is complicated due to the fact that this country includes the territory of the breakaway region called Transnistria. The leadership of Moldova does not recognise the independence of the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic and considers its territory as a part of Moldova. The 1990–1992 conflict of Transnistria still has not yet been resolved. In order to reach a settlement, the 5 + 2 format negotiations have been initiated with the participation of Transnistria, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and also the United States of America and the European Union as external observers. This is one of the frozen conflicts on the territory of the CIS.

In 1992, the cease-fire agreement between Moldova and Transnistria led to de facto independence of Transnistria and to the establishment of the Russian peacekeeper presence on its territory. The headquarters of the Russian peacekeeper forces located in Tiraspol. Beside the Russian peacekeepers, there are contingents from Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, Moldova, and military observers from the Ukraine. There are also Russian troops in Transnistria in order to guard the Soviet-era 14th Soviet Army ammunition depots in Kolbasna (there are more than 20,000 tons of ammunition). At present, Russia is estimated to have some 1,50015 troops stationed in Transnistria.

The Moldovan political leadership insists that stationing of the Russian troops in the breakaway region is against the will of the Government of Moldova and they should leave “completely and unconditionally”. Even NATO has urged the Russian Federation to withdraw its military troops from Transnistria. However, the Transnistrian leadership wants Russia to stay or even to increase its military forces stationed in the de facto independent Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. In May 2013, Dmitry Rogozin, Russian Deputy Prime Minister, special presidential envoy for Transnistria told that Russian troops are to stay in Transnistria as long as necessary.16

The security situation remains unresolved even after 20 years; the political status of Transnistria still has not yet been defined. It is very likely that the solution might depend on the political games of the key players: the European Union and Russian Federation.


**Caucasus**

**Georgia**

The Russian Federation withdrew all its military equipment and forces from the territory of Georgia by the end of 2007. However, presently it has substantial number of troops in both formerly de facto independent republics of Georgia: Abkhazia and South-Ossetia. The events of August 2008 have served as motivation for Russia and for the two secessionist regions. After the August 2008 Georgian-South Ossetian armed conflict, Abkhazia and South Ossetia received official recognition of independence from the Russian Federation. And Russia has gained old-new allies in the Caucasus region. Most of the independent countries of the world consider the two territories as integral part of the sovereign Georgia. On July 9, 2012, the OSCE parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution in which it emphasized Georgia’s territorial integrity and referred to breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia as “occupied territories”. Nowadays, the Russian leadership considers the Georgian conflict as finished one. In order to prevent the events similar to August 2008, i.e. the potential Georgian aggression, the Russian-Abkhazian and Russian-South-Ossetian allies agreed to set up military bases on the territories only partially recognised by the international community. In 2010, Russia signed bilateral agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, under which it has a possibility to set up and operate military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia for an initial term of 49 years, with possible extensions for an additional 15 years.

According to these agreements Russia has deployed the 7th Russian Military Base in Abkhazia (main locations: Gudauta, Bombora, Ochamchire) and the 4th Russian Military Base in South-Ossetia (main locations: Tskhinvali, Java). Both in Abkhazia and in South-Ossetia the Russian Armed forces have 3,500-4,000 military troops and 1,500 Russian border guards (under the command of the Federal Security Service).

**Azerbaijan**

Azerbaijan is a member state of the CIS, but it has no membership in the CSTO. It cooperates with Russia on bilateral terms in the sphere of culture, education, economy and also in military-technical field.

---

17 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhazia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhazia), (06.05.2013)


20 “ICG: Russian Military Settling In For Long Haul In Abkhazia”, 11.04.2013, [http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66813](http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66813), (2013.05.06.)
Nowadays, Russia has no military bases on the territory of Azerbaijan. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Daryal-type radar station in Qabala became the property of Azerbaijan. However, it was leased and used by Russia on favourable conditions (USD 7 million a year). The Daryal-type radar station was a part of the Russian ballistic missile-attack early warning system and was operated by the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces by the end of 2012. As far as the negotiations concerning the prolongation and its financial terms have been unsuccessful, and Russia had already built a new Voronezh-type Armavir radar station (in Krasnodar Krai, Russia), the Russian Armed forces stopped using the radar station in December 2012\(^{21}\) and withdrew its troops in 2013.

**Armenia**

Armenia is the key ally of the Russian Federation, member state of the CIS and the only CSTO member state in the South Caucasus. The Russian Armed Forces have been stationing the 102\(^{nd}\) Russian Military Base in Gyumri since 1995 and there is also an airbase in Yerevan. Armenia has about 5,000 Russian troops on its territory. Their armament includes the MiG-29 (FULCRUM) fighter aircraft and S-300PS (SA-10 GRUMBLE) surface-to-air missile. In 2010, the bilateral agreement on the prolongation was signed, thus Russian troops can stay in Armenia until 2044.\(^{22}\) For the Armenian leadership it is extremely important to have Russia on its side: the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is a frozen conflict, a deadlocked situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenia occupies the territory of Karabakh, actually not only Karabakh but also some other territories of Azerbaijan. In recent years, the financially strong Azerbaijan has spent a huge amount of its revenues originating from the sale of its hydrocarbon resources for the development and rearmament of its armed forces. Armenia hopes that the stationing of the 102\(^{nd}\) Russian Military Base on the Armenian territory would prevent a potential military aggression on the disputed Karabakh area from the Azeri side. However, it is not quite obvious that Russia would intervene in case of an armed conflict in Karabakh on Armenia’s side. It is very likely, that Russia would prefer to prevent such a situation or if it would not be possible, to react in the framework of the CSTO.

---

\(^{21}\) [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabala_Radar_Station](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabala_Radar_Station), (06.05.2013)

Central Asia

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is one of the most important allies of the Russian Federation, member state of the CIS and the CSTO. Kazakhstan is one of the members of the Belarusian-Kazakh-Russian Customs Union, also an initiator of the 2015 Eurasian political and economic union integration project.

The Russian Federation rents several military bases in Kazakhstan, the most important ones are the following ones. The Baikonur Cosmodrome is the world’s first and largest operational space launch facility, situated on the territory of Kazakhstan and it is used by Russian Federation.23 The facility is managed by the Russian Federal Space Agency and the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces. In order to decrease its dependence on Baikonur, Russia has already started to construct on its own territory the “Vostochny Cosmodrome” in the Russian Far East. It is very important for Russia to have the experimental facility for missile defence, namely the Sary Shagan24 testing range. Kazakhstan also hosted and afterwards it received the responsibility to demolish the never operational Daryal-type Balkhas radar station25 in 2002. In 2013, after many years of cooperation, Kazakhstan and Russia decided to raise their bilateral military relations to a new level: the parties signed a deal to establish a regional defence system, which will also include missile defence.26

Tajikistan

Tajikistan is a member state of the CIS and the CSTO. In October 2012, the Russian Federation signed an agreement with Tajikistan on the prolongation of the stationing of the Russian military base on the territory of Tajikistan until 2042, with possible extensions by further five-year periods.27 The 201st Russian Military Base located in Dushanbe, Qurghonteppa and Kulab with personnel of 7,500 troops.28 There is a further important Russian military facility (it is owned by Russia) in Tajikistan: the Okno opto-electronic complex (Nurek), which has been a part of the Soviet/Russian space-monitoring system.29

23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baikonur_Cosmodrome, (06.05.2013)
24 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sary_Shagan, (06.05.2013)
25 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkhash-9, (06.05.2013)
26 “Aiming high: Russia, Kazakhstan agree on joint air defense system” 30.01.2013 http://rt.com/politics/russia-kazakhstan-agreement-us-missile-defense-059/, (06.05.2013)
27 “Ратифицировано соглашение с Таджикистаном и Киргизией о военных базах,08.05.2013 http://ria.ru/world/20130508/936420854.html, (13.05.2013.)
Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan is a member state of the CIS and the CSTO. In September 2012, the Russian Federation signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan on the prolongation of the stationing of the Russian military base on the territory of Kyrgyzstan until 2032, with possible extensions by further five-year periods.30 Kyrgyzstan hosts the Russian Air Base in Kant, a naval testing site for antisubmarine torpedoes near Karakol (on the lake Issyk Kul). In addition to these bases, there is a naval communications centre and a radio seismic laboratory.31

The Russian Federation has decided to strengthen its military presence especially in the Central Asian region. For many years, the Central Asian CIS member states have served for the Russian Federation as a buffer zone against the growing security challenges emerging from the south, especially from the direction of Afghanistan. In 2012, through bilateral agreements on stationing Russian military bases, the Russian leadership reached one of its aim, namely to strengthen its military presence and gain more influence in the Central Asian region of the CIS. The other aim is to oust other global and regional powers and actors (China, USA, and NATO) from this region. In 2011, in order to reach this goal, Russia persuaded the CSTO member states to pass a resolution according to which only on the basis of an unanimous decision of all member states it would be possible for a third country to establish a military base in the region. For its part, Russia promised to guarantee the security of the Central Asian region, as it is declared in the key Russian security documents. The Russian leadership considers that after the withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan, the security challenges and threats could show even a more sophisticated picture in Central Asia in 2014. Considering this possibility, the Russian leadership has decided to respond in advance – with strengthening its military bases in the Central Asian CIS member states and to counter the security challenges in the most appropriate place, thus as far from the Russian borders as possible.

After the years of political and economic stabilization, the Russian Federation intends to strengthen its influence in the countries of the Near Abroad. And the military presence provides an opportunity for it. But why is it so important for Russia?

30 “Ратифицировано соглашение с Таджикистаном и Киргизией о военных базах, 08.05.2013” http://ria.ru/world/20130508/936420854.html, (13.05.2013.)
The Russian political and military leadership intends to replace the current unipolar world order with a multipolar one. The Russian Federation would like to participate in this process and as a consequence, it would like to become one of the centres of power. Actually, the Russian leadership plans to regain the global power status of the former Soviet Union. The Russian Federation seeks to receive an international recognition as a significant player in global security issues. Increasing its military presence and also the cultural, economic influence within the framework of the CIS could serve as a tool also for the development of its political influence. For Russia it is also important to strengthen the CSTO as far as it means not only the development of the organisation itself, but also the reinforcement of the Russian-led alliance. As a result, the Russian Federation, the leader of political and military alliances, namely the CIS and the CSTO, might feel even more confident on the international scene. And this could take Russia closer to its objectives.
My attention was drawn recently on a book, written by Gábor Besenyi; its title is „Vérrel elnyert jutalmak”, and is written about the military medals and badges of the Third Reich, published by Monarchia Publishing House. While I was reading this high quality book, I remembered a case that happened years ago. I, a militaria collector, often visit the respective fairs and collector's gatherings. On one occasion, I met a good friend of mine, who came to buy nice items for his collection. After a short chat, we started to discover the fair and said good bye.

A week later, I went to visit the popular “Monarchia Coin Shop” in Budapest, and surprisingly I met this friend of mine. He looked very sad, while the shop's owner (who is a collector of Austro-Hungarian militaria as well) showed him several books and pictures about German medals. It turned out that my friend managed to buy two rare German medals, a Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross,\(^1\) and a Spanish Cross.\(^2\) The shop's owner had to inform him that both are fake, actually quite low quality fakes. Unfortunately he paid a considerable amount for the items, and he had no way to recover the lost money. After that, he gave up collecting very soon. The shop's owner, Mr. Ákos Biro told me later on that this happens on a weekly basis; beginners or less experienced collectors are being cheated very often, as the German militaria is one of the popular among the collectors, and related items are being produced in many variants by Hungarian and international cheaters. They not only fake these items, but spreading incorrect and false information as well to justify their products. This will cause lost of money to the collectors, and also fakes history itself. Since

---
\(^{1}\) The Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross is the a higher grade German military medal, established at the beginning of the Second World War; later on further, higher grades were established linked to this award. Exact criteria have not been set up for the award, it required one or a series of brave and self-sacrificing action in battle; only 7331 examples were awarded. (Besenyi Gábor: Vérel elnyert jutalmak, pages 34. – 37.)

\(^{2}\) The Spanish Cross has been established on the 14th of April, 1939, to decorate the soldiers of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe who took part in the Spanish Civil War on the side of General Franco, in the Condor Legion. It existed on Bronze (7869 pcs. without swords, 8462 pcs. with swords), Silver (327 pcs. without swords, 8304 pcs. with swords), Gold (1126 pcs.), Gold with Brilliants (28 pcs.) grades. (Besenyi Gábor: Vérel elnyert jutalmak, pages 70–71.)
there is no any corresponding literature issued in Hungarian so far, which would enable the collectors to successfully identify these copies, he plans to publish a book like that along with one of the most reputable collector, even though if himself is not interested in collecting or dealing with WW2 German militaria at all. At the time I heard this plan, I thought it would remain a promise only, which one can hear often, but I was wrong; the book has been written and published indeed.

This book describes a large number of German medals and badges in details. Such technical parameters and characteristics of these items, help the current and future collectors with exact data that cannot be questioned. The introduced items are part of Hungarian private and public collections, most of them are generously granted by the Hungarian Military History Institute, and they are all genuine. Ribbon bars and miniatures are not being shown in the book, only full size medals, cases of issue, and original award documents, some of them are issued for Hungarian soldiers, for instance the Diploma of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross was awarded to Colonel-General Gusztáv Jány, commander of the Royal Hungarian 2nd Army.

All data and information are based on actual items, and the 20 years long expertise of the writer, Gabor Besenyi. These pieces of information are absolutely necessary for any collector who is being involved in collecting German militaria. But it might be also very interesting for anyone who is interested in the history of the Second World War. Most of these pieces of information have not been published in Hungarian so far, and beyond the description of these medals, the writer links these awards to actual happenings during the war; and the production of the german medals and badges in general. It ruins numerous wrong information which is widely spread by collectors, but unfortunately is incorrect or fake and distributed by the cheaters on purpose. Although the book cannot describe every possible variant in details, it would be an enormous job to do so, but it definitely lists many variants, and therefore offers a tool for the collectors to easily identify fake items.

The book contains hundreds of high-quality and high resolution photos made by Peter Szikits; these photos are extremely valuable and offer a very rare insight in the phaleristics of Germany during the war; the appendix contains full

3 The Hungarian collectors are generally using only foreign sources, due to the language barrier, with more or less success. Information published in Hungarian is available only from articles written by a very few experts, such as the article written by Dr. Gergely Sallay about the official exchange of military medals between Hungary and Germany in 1942. This was published in the Vol. 8. of Hadtöréneti Múzeum Értesítője, back in 2005.

4 Gabor Besenyi is one of most well known and respected collector of German medals and badges in Hungary; his expertise is based on the actual study of several genuine items, and the knowledge of the international literature of the topic; his professional opinion is well respected in the international forums as well.
list of the official maker's LDO and PKZ numbers and a wide range bibliography as well.

Who should be reading this book then? I would recommend it for collectors, first of all, but it will be a valuable and interesting issue for any researcher, or virtually anybody who is interested in the military history of the Second World War.

---

5 There was a well organized and controlled manufacture of the medals and badges in the Third Reich. These coding systems were used to identify the actual makers of the items on their products.
REVIEW of “Magyar békefenntartók Afrikában”.
written by János Besenyő


This book, a collection of thirty semi-structured interviews, will be of great help to those researching the personal experiences of military and other peace support personnel. As such it is an enormously valuable material for students and scholars of state- and peace-building, peace support operations, military diplomacy, and conflict resolution. Given its focus on African peace support missions, it is also a required reading for those studying contemporary politics in Africa, those who may be pursuing Regional Studies, and those who are interested in Hungary’s relationship with the continent in general. The book probably ought to be translated to English as well, as it would merit and most likely rightly expect wider readership.

At the same time it provides a very useful overview of Hungarian military and police officers’ lessons learned in the dynamic environment of foreign missions. These people are some of Hungary’s finest, people who have served their country and their respective missions to the best of their ability, often encountering unexpected challenges and dangers, the overcoming of which demanded good use of all of their knowledge as well as their instincts – and sometimes a little luck as well. Utilising this experience is clearly a great opportunity and a must for a country like Hungary.

One of the book’s main overarching themes is exactly this. A recurring question posed to interviewees is if they have been debriefed upon coming home from their foreign missions and if their experience has been methodically collected and built into the training and the preparation of newly departing

---

1 Associate Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest
personnel. As the volume makes it clear, there is still room for improvement in this respect, and in fact the collection of interviews presented here serves as a major step in just this direction.

The volume groups the interviews very conveniently for the purposes of researchers. Officers who have served in the same country or in the same mission are heard from in succession. The interviews are loosely structured in such a way as to present a comprehensive picture of the interviewees’ path through preparation (including biographical data on their previous career), the mission itself, and after coming home. The questions posed related to their mission involvement addresses the respondents’ set of tasks they had to deal with, their assessment of the politics and the outcome of the mission concerned, the everyday difficulties they were accustomed to and how best to overcome them, as well as what one may learn from outstanding problems solved and dangerous situations overcome during the interviewees’ time in the field. At the end of the volume, researchers are further aided by the annexed complete list of the names of personnel from Hungary who have served in African peace support missions so far.

Moreover, the interviews are not simply presented out of context. They are preceded by an introduction by the author, János Besenyő, outlining the most important trends related to Hungary’s peace support involvement in Africa, including a strategic assessment of the importance of this. It may be surprising to note for some readers that trends are anything but linear. Whilst there is at the present growing interest in Africa, and the indications are that Hungary may see more involvement there in the future, the country was in the past more intensely engaged, largely through UN missions, in various conflict zones around the continent – this period came to an end as Hungary joined NATO and the EU and became involved in their missions instead. A re(con)naissance of some of this experience is therefore required, and the volume undertakes to assist with this in a timely manner.

Through the large number of precious anecdotes about their service shared by the soldiers and policemen who account of their experience in the volume, one may well grasp why this is important even for a small country such as Hungary. In the contemporary environment no one can afford to look the other way and not share in the burdens of mitigating the human suffering in unstable parts of the world – this is possible neither in a moral, nor in a strategic sense. Idealism and realism ought to be soberly seen as organically interwoven in this context. The missions discussed in the volume serve to improve a country’s reputation and build goodwill for it in both the host countries where the missions take place and the partner countries with whom Hungary jointly operates. It is noteworthy and telling how in one of the interviews a respondent
tells of a chance encounter with a Hungarian road construction engineer in Uganda. It may be useful example of how globalisation requires the building of all-channel contacts everywhere, and a country that isolates itself from such engagement stands to lose in various ways. Even the strategic aspects of this are manifold. A good example is the last interview in the collection, with Ensign József Csorna who has served as a web administrator in the EU NAVFOR mission off the Horn of Africa (operating from the United Kingdom). Through his experience insights are gained related to practical challenges to the contemporary networked approach to security, and learning from this ought to better prepare a country for the 21st century.

Last but not least, the book is required reading for all personnel preparing to take part in foreign missions in the future. Such personnel show real thirst for as much information as possible from those who have served in similar functions before them. It clearly transpires from the interviewees’ own experience how for them as well this was the kind of knowledge they most eagerly sought. Thanks to the publication of this book, that experience is very conveniently available now.
CONDITIONS FOR PUBLISHING IN TRADECRAFT REVIEW AND INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

Requirements to be met by the writings

_Ethical requirements:_

- the writing has not been published yet elsewhere in its present form;
- it represents the author(s)’ exclusive literary property, which is verified by the author(s), through his signing an author’s declaration;
- it must be annotated with correct references that can be easily checked up;
- as well as with appropriate bibliographical information (including the literatures referred to, the list of Internet material, together with the date of downloading);
- it can reflect the author(s)’ own opinion, which does not need to necessarily coincide with the Service’s standpoint.

_Content requisites:_

- we publish in our reviews – in conformity with their nature – those scholarly writings (studies, essays and articles) that relate to home defense, first of all to military science, national security, intelligence, reconnaissance, military security and security policy;
- the writing must be logically worded, easy to survey, coherent, relevant and well-arranged;
- the formulation of the author(s) own concept needs to be clear, his (their) conclusions have to be well-founded, supported by clear arguments and data.

_Formal requisites:_

- the size of the manuscripts can not possibly exceed the space of one author’s sheet (40,000 characters or 20-21 pages); written by Times New Roman 12 letters, 1.5 spacing; the pictures and graphics prepared in an easy to be processed format (.jpg or .tif), on electronic data carrier (CD), accompanied by a printed hardcopy. All this has to be taken into account when the author(s) sends his (their) writing to our address;
- however, the manuscript can be sent also by Internet to the following E-mail addresses: _szakmai.szemle@knbsz.gov.hu_ (Tradecraft Review) and _felderito.szemle@knbsz.gov.hu_ (Intelligence Review).
It is necessary to attach to the manuscript the author(s)’ name, rank, position, sphere of activity, permanent address, phone number and Internet address;

– we pay royalty for the accepted and published writings, based on the contract of agency, in harmony with the relevant HDF regulations and according to our available financial resources;

– the Editorial Board has the manuscript revised in every case by the Service’s competent, officers (with academic degree) or other experts;

– the Editorial Board preserves the right – taking into consideration the advisers’ recommendations – to deny (without justification) the publication of those works that have proved to be ill-qualified to appear. However, it does not send back such writings and does not hold them either;

– everybody is entitled to publish in our periodicals, if the Editorial Board assesses his writing – on the basis of ethical, content and formal requirements – to be suitable for being published in our reviews and on the Internet. The Board holds until the end of the given year those writings that have been accepted, but not published. If the author wishes, we are ready to return his writing to him;

– the author has to enclose in his work an “Abstract/Résumé” maximum in 10-12 lines, in Hungarian and also in English;

– he also has to provide at least 3-5 keywords in Hungarian and English;

– we kindly ask the author to send us also the correct English title of his writing.

**Concrete formal requirements of academic communications**

Our periodical publishes exclusively such studies that are provided with appropriate references and are prepared on the basis of the MSZ ISO 960 design standard.

The author has to attach to his communication:

– NAME OF THE AUTHOR, (his rank);

– TITLE OF HIS WRITING (in Hungarian and English);

– ABSTRACT/RESUME (in Hungarian and English);

– KEYWORDS (in Hungarian and English);

– AUTHOR’S DECLARATION.
**Bibliographical reference**

We kindly request the author to apply the usual numbered references, with the method to be found in “the Bibliographical references, (Bibliográfiai hivatkozások) MSZ ISO 690. p. 19-20”.

If the author fails to use this method, we send back his writing for re-elaboration.

**Citations:**

If the author has citations within the text, he has to mark them with raised numbers (superscripts) in the order of their appearance, immediately following a passage of research information. At the foot of that same page, a note beginning with the corresponding number identifies the source of information.

**First citations:**

If we have a list of citations (bibliography), the first citation has to comprise at least: the author’s name, his full address, the page-numbers of the citation, in such a way to be easily identified in the list of biographical references.

**Examples:**

2. Tibor ÁCS: Military culture in the reform era. p. 34.
4. www.globalsecurity.org/army/iraq (downloading time: 19 04 2012)

**List of biographical references** (biography):

We have to fill the list by arranging the authors’ name in alphabetical order.

**Examples:**


Requirements for pictures, sketches, illustrations, diagrams and other appendixes:

- title of the picture or illustration;
- source of the picture or illustration (or its drafter);
- serial number of the picture or illustration, (e.g. 1. picture);
- if it is possible, a Hungarian legend should be provided when the caption of the picture or illustration is given in a foreign language.

Requirements for abbreviations and foreign terms:

- foreignisms and abbreviations should be explained – at their first appearance – in the footnote, in Hungarian and in the original foreign language;
- e. g. WFP – World Food Program – ENSZ Világélelmezési Programja.

Points of Contact of the MNSS Scientific Board:

Postal address: Katonai Nemzetbiztonsági Szolgálat Tudományos Tanácsa
1502 Budapest, Pf. 117

E-mail: szakmai.szemle@knbsz.gov.hu
federito.szemle@knbsz.gov.hu

Dr. Kobolka István ezredes,
a Tudományos Tanács titkára
HM: 61–300
E-mail: kobolka.istvan@knbsz.gov.hu

Dr. Resperger István mk. ezredes,
HM: 65–050, mobil: 06(30) 231-6141
E-mail: resperger.istvan@knbsz.gov.hu