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2011/1
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EVALUATIONS, ANALYSES, STUDIES

Bálint KUNOS PhD

THE “EURODÉFENSE” NETWORK FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY
/ A civil association for Europe /

The EuroDéfense international Network

The EuroDéfense Network is a pan-European forum of leading opinion formers, with a strong commitment in the development of security and defence in Europe. It is independent of government or commercial influence although its members have political, foreign affairs, military, academic and industrial background. The mission of EuroDéfense is to promote the concept of a European Security and Defence Identity within the context of NATO, in order to strengthen the European pillar, to enhance industrial co-operation between nations and widen the European contribution to the preservation of global peace and stability.

EuroDéfense is divided into national associations, each led independently by a President with the support of one or two Vice-Presidents. The contributing nations are: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, UK, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Netherlands.

EuroDéfense formulates, conveys, and disseminates common recommendations on national as well as international level by conferences, workshops, personal discussions and common positions. At the same time EuroDéfense contributes to the shaping of the public opinion. In its field of interest European political decision makers and representatives of the defence industry figure in the same way. In order to reach different generations and involve them into the opinion forming process, EuroDéfense organises special seminars in Europe with the intention of educating and training young people in security and defence policy matters.

During the more than 15 years of history of EuroDéfense, which has a membership of over 300 persons, it became one of the most important meeting

* President of EuroDéfense-Hungary
point of defence experts, diplomats, and political persons. Its thematic working groups organize meetings several times in a year, they have at least two meetings per year in major cities of Europe. At the same time the members are in continuous contact to discuss daily developments.

EuroDéfense conferences are unique. They present an excellent opportunity for informal discussion and debate of subjects, which are shaping the Security and Defence Identity of Europe. Opportunities exist via EuroDéfense for individuals of member nations to change information, inform and influence the political and industrial dimensions, aside from the constraints of normal diplomatic and commercial intercourse.

The EuroDéfense Presidency is a rotating presidency

The acting President is in charge of:
- arranging the annual « International meeting EuroDéfense,
- arranging and chairing the meeting(s) held in conjunction with this annual meeting,
- co-chairing the first annual Council meeting arranged by another association,
- submitting to the European Authorities the findings approved by the Presidents, with mention of the reserves made by the associations if the consensus has not been reached,
- making known, within and without EuroDéfense, all the Council decisions.

He is assisted, upon request, by the Secretariat General EuroDéfense.

The Secretariat General EuroDéfense is assigned by the Council to one of the associations. The term of office is four years. It is renewable.

Under the authority of the Secretary General, who is designated by the in charge association, the Secretariat General is responsible for :
- updating the list of the associations members of EURODEFENSE network, the EWGs list and the schedule of activities,
- bringing its support, if needed, to the EuroDéfense Presidency,
- facilitating the preparation, the implementation and the taking advantages of the EuroDéfense activities,
- making sure, in connexion with the President, the communication within EuroDéfense, particularly by putting together and issuing :
• the EuroDéfense directory, after annual updating (each association being responsible for the content pertaining to itself),
• documents produced by the various national associations,

The EuroDéfense Working Groups (EWGs) constitute the working framework for the national associations. Its purpose is to provide members with the possibility to exchange views on the topics associated with the objectives of EuroDéfense. It aims at:

• facilitating the development of a common and global vision on the essential and emerging themes,
• strengthening the links between EuroDéfense associations and taking advantage of this common understanding as an influential group, either at European or national level.

The EuroDéfense-Hungary

EuroDéfense-Hungary was established in 2005 by the Századvég School of Politics Foundation and became the first newly acceded member state of the European Union which joined the Europe-wide EuroDéfense Network.

EuroDéfense-Hungary functions within the framework of Századvég Foundation and it is not a legal entity. The Foundation is providing the necessary infrastructural background in order to EuroDéfense-Hungary can work towards achieving the goals set below.

EuroDéfense-Hungary is a member of the EuroDéfense-network.

The aims of EuroDéfense- Hungary are:

- to propagate the part of the system of common values and interests European Defense and Security Identity Conception in the interest of to be the European Union identical partner for the United States,
- to analyze the vulnerabilities, threats and risks that Europe is facing, both now and in the future,
- to create opportunities for meetings in the field of the European Security and Defense Policy,
- to foster the idea of common interests in Hungary and to develop a greater spirit of European defence,
- for the Hungarian decision-makers and European Union institutions to promote the findings of EuroDéfense and to formulate concrete proposals,
to help to extend EuroDéfense network to all EU countries and wherever possible to engage new co-operations

To achieve these aims, action will be taken by EuroDéfense- Hungary in three main areas:

1. as a part of relationships within EuroDéfense-network
   - to participate to establish and manage a plan of activity of the network,
   - to cooperate with the national EuroDéfense associations on the established fields and to participate to make the co-operations efficient,
   - to participate in the work of established European Working Groups and National Working Groups, to create new ones if needed and to support to establish new working groups,
   - within the framework of the EuroDéfense-network presents and propagates EuroDéfense defence and security proposals.

2. EuroDéfense-Hungary propagates European security and defence issues. Therefore

   a) within the frame of the EuroDéfense-network once a year:
      • attends at least one meeting of the national associations, where the most possible number of members are present,
      • attends national seminars which are organized national associations,
      • organizes conferences within the framework of the EuroDéfense-network.

   b) to best of its possibilities attends all events where the aims of EuroDéfense will be best promoted.

3. Within the frame of the EuroDéfense communication:

   - to best of its possibilities participates in the content development and distribution of the EuroDéfense publication, which is published at least once a year
   - to best of its possibilities participates in the content development and distribution of the regularly published documents of EuroDéfense, which are covering important areas and issues defined by the member associations, and is according to the aims of the EuroDéfense-network,
as a national member association operates its own homepage, in order to foster the achievement of its own aims and that of the EuroDéfense-network, where it propagates the aims and achievements of the organization.

**Structure of EuroDéfense- Hungary:**

1. EuroDéfense- Hungary is lead by the President
   - The President can independently represent EuroDéfense- Hungary,
   - The President is appointed by the Foundation's Board of Directors for an unlimited period,
   - The President regularly, but at least once a year, co-ordinates with the Board of Directors about the activities of EuroDéfense-Hungary,
   - The President is a member of the council of the EuroDéfense-network

2. The president is assisted by the Secretary General
   - In the absence of the President the Secretary General can represent EuroDéfense- Hungary,
   - The Secretary General is appointed by the Foundation's Board of Directors for an unlimited period

**Membership of EuroDéfense-Hungary**

- Member of EuroDéfense- Hungary may be any natural person who shares the aims of EuroDéfense- Hungary and who is accepted as member by the Foundation's Board of Directors.
- Membership is valid for an unlimited period.
- The member is bound to participate actively in the achievement of aims of EuroDéfense- Hungary and the EuroDéfense-network and to participate in their work.

**EuroDéfense Presidents Council, Budapest 2011**

The former presidency of the EuroDéfense-Hungary – following the practice of international organizations - has undertaken to organize EuroDéfense Presidents Council – during the term of the Hungarian EU Presidency - in Budapest.

Consulting with the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Ministry competencies, the EuroDéfense Presidents council meeting will take place 12 and 13 May 2011 in Budapest.
The official agenda for the meeting is under construction, but has already seen a few topics of agenda which will discuss by the presidents of member organizations:

- the European Security and Defence Policy, supporting bilateral and multilateral initiatives, including the role of information will be given to the Franco-British military cooperation Agreement and the Hungarian-Austrian initiative "Central European solutions for sharing and pooling of capabilities," Conference Series outcomes
- will discuss the different expert groups (EWG) reports
- will discuss the European Defense Agency (EDA) and the EU Commission and NATO bodies in contact hours, the results of forms
- future inter-parliamentary scrutiny of EU foreign, defence and security policy.
- the presidents of member organizations will be counted euro defence events
- on behalf of the Hungarian government there will be briefings on the events and successes of the Hungarian EU presidency.

With the successful organization of the programme, the presidency of the EuroDéfense- Hungary intends to contribute to the efficient work of the Hungarian EU presidency.
SECURITY GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF ISRAEL

Introduction

Israel located in the basin of the Mediterranean Sea is a part of the Middle East. This area connects three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. The name Middle East can be defined mostly by the political order as the territory bordered by the Mediterranean Sea, Mesopotamia, The Persian (Arabian) Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. This area was of key importance in the migration of the primitive men from Africa. The Fertile Crescent – Mesopotamia was its eastern, the Mediterranean Sea and the Nile valley its western boundary – made possible the farming, the permeation of irrigation and the evolvement of handicraft and merchanttry. The Incense Route\(^1\) which transected the eastern-western trade traffic was located on the western and northern part of the Arabian Peninsula. The nomad clans established their settlements at first on the mountain areas, later on low-land regions. These places organized to cities and about BC 3000 to city states. The empires of the area extended their control over the post Canaan\(^2\) (known as Palestine). The historical past of the territory’s population was in close connection with the east, west and over seas origin settlers. Figure 1 presents the empires in the Middle East in 1914.

Figure 1 The empires in the Middle East in 1914\(^3\)

Israel was established for the separated Jewish religious groups over the world, on the region of Palestine. Nowadays Palestine known as an area with no exact geographic borders and its boundaries have changed many times during

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\(^1\) A network of major ancient trading routes between Egypt and India, across Arabia. It was a channel for trading goods, frankincense and myrrh from Arabia; spices, ebony, silk and textiles from India; rare woods, feathers and gold from Eastern-Africa.

\(^2\) The area which connects Mesopotamia and Egypt.

\(^3\) UniMaps (http://unimaps.com/mideast1914/mainmap.gif - Downloaded: January 2011)
the history. In ancient times the conjunctive belt, the Nile valley and the area on
the river Jordan’s eastern side bordered by the Arabian Desert was defined in
this manner. The name Palestine came from the Philistines, who immigrated
from the seaside at the conquest of the Roman Empire about 70 AD. The present
Palestine can be defined as the territory on the northern edge of the Arabian
Peninsula between the Jordan Rift Valley, the Mediterranean Sea, the Lebanon
Mountains and the Sinai Peninsula. It is 100 km wide on the average, the current
Arab population got the attribute “Palestinian” from the name of the area.

The first identified ancient populations were Semitic clans. The first
Jewish communities emigrated from Mesopotamia about BC 1500 – which is
not scientifically proven – to Canaan. By the reason of the following migration
of Jewish clans and the conquest of the surrounding empires the size of the
Jewish population continuously changed. At the time of the Roman conquest
they totally scattered and the abandoned places were occupied by the Arabs.
Palestine – after the persecution of the Jewish population – became a part of
different empires; the longest being the Turkish.

The nearly 2000 years homelessness and the increasing level of anti-
Semitism against the Jewish minorities on different continents caused the
establishment of the Zionist movement⁴, which aimed at trying to find a
common home country for the Jews from all over the world. This ideology had
chosen the once homeland Palestine, where buying the land originally owned by
the Ottomans started in 1881 to make settlement possible for the first Jewish
pioneers. The settlers arrived in several waves from the beginning of the 20th
century; the largest groups appeared at the 1940’s and 1990’s. Half of the
immigrants arrived to the land of covenant from the surrounding Arab countries,
the other half from Europe. During World War I Palestine came under British
subjection. After the war its status changed to British Mandate area⁵. The British
approved the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people. At first the
Palestinians patronized the conception, later their approach changed critically
when they realized that the immigrants occupied the area and demolished the
Arabic settlements.

From the establishment of the first Jewish town the various heavy armed
conflicts became daily. The British Government was unable to keep the peace
and suggested UN competence to handle the situation. The UN General Assem-
bly Resolution 181 was declared on 11.29.1947 to recommend to divide the ter-
ritory of the British Mandate for Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one
Arab. The resolution was rejected by the Arabs and the British too. The surroun-

⁴ A Jewish nationalist movement which supported the establishment of a sovereign Jewish national
homeland for the separated Jewish communities around the world.
⁵ Mandate area is the area of the countries which temporarily unable to organize their own
administration and superintended by a UN assigned country.
ding Arab countries urged the creation of independent Palestine authority; the British obstructed the accomplishment of the partition plan. The Arab administration and intellectual leaders left the Palestine area one after another. Until today 4.5 million of Arabs escaped both from the Jewish and Arab assigned areas.

At 05.14.1948, after the British troops left Israel published the Declaration of Independence. The independent country declared equality and full religious freedom for all citizens. 24 hours later 5 Arab countries attacked the young country. The war was longer than one year, but Israel was not demolished, moreover it could enlarge its territory, while several parts of the Palestine state came under the neighbour country’s subjection.

The independent Israel was in continuous conflict with the Palestinians and the surrounding Arab countries too. Almost all the past decades saw major wars, in the course of which Israel suffered losses, but could enlarge its territory. The peace agreements did not achieve permanent peace, the Palestine population started Intifadas\(^6\) several times against the Israeliite subdivisions. Nowadays Israel and several Arab countries aspire to agree, but the road to total peace is very long. Figure 2 shows the states in the Middle East at the beginning of the 21\(^{st}\) century.

![Figure 2: The states in the Middle East at the beginning of the 21\(^{st}\) century.](image)

Several demonstrative thematic maps tried to make the understanding of these issues easier. These maps were composed by ArcView 9.3 geoinformatic software and were updated with the data of ESRI, Global Administrative Areas.

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\(^6\) Palestinian uprising against the Israeliite occupation.
(GAAM), Digital Chart of the World (DCW), Corine Land Cover 2000 (CLC 2000), the climate data of World Climate Data – Current Conditions 1950-2000, the elevation data of SRTM-3 V4.1 or GTOP 30 and the satellite images of Landsat 7 ETM+ (SLC of 2003-).

The map which presents the present states of the Middle East was made in Mollweide, the other maps in UTM projection.

Israel

General geographical parameters

Absolute geographical location: located on the North Hemisphere, between 29° 32’ – 32° 24’ northern latitudes and 34° 15’ – 35° 44’ eastern longitudes. Relative geographical location: located on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, bordered by Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. (Figure 3)

Israel is the area’s second smallest country, 22,072 km² (8522 sq mi) in total. Expansion from north to south is less than 450 km, from east to west 1017 km. From this 273 km is coast line. The country has access to the Red Sea through the Gulf of Aqaba on the south.

Natural geographical parameters

The country’s territory can be divided into 4 distinctive parts: the 20-40 km wide Israeli Coastal Plain by the Mediterranean Sea, the diversified north-south axis of hilly-mountainous area with rich valleys, the River Jordan’s valley in the Jordan Rift Valley and the Negev Desert. The country’s highest point is the 1208 m high Har Meron in the Lebanon Mountains, the lowest is the -408 m deep Dead Sea.

The Jordan Rift Valley forms a part of the Great Rift Valley which rose by the northern dislocation of the Arabian Plate forming a several-kilometre shift on the eastern side. This transformation resulted in an uneven, sometimes more than 1000 m relief difference between the bottom and the top of the tension. There is no volcanic and seismic activity in the country nowadays, but the
Jordan Rift Valley is rich in volcanic type soils from the past. Figure 4 shows the relief and hydrographic parameters.

The only significant river is River Jordan which flows to the Dead Sea. The water in the river’s last section has a very high salt concentrate that makes it unsuitable for agricultural irrigation. The runoff of the short rivers significantly differ depending on their south or north location. The amount of water carried by the southern creeks is continuously decreasing and most of them are periodic.

Important stagnant waters are the Dead Sea and Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee). The deepest continental area of the world is the Dead Sea; its water surface level is 408 m deeper than that of the Mediterranean Sea. This wonderful natural formation has two basins and these are separated by a peninsula. The depth of the basins is different; the northern one is 300-400 m, the southern one is about 6-8 m deep. By the reason of increasing fresh water use at the upper sections of River Jordan the Dead Sea’s water level is permanently decreasing. The lake’s salt concentrate is extremely high, 26 per cent which makes inefficient for irrigation and drinking water consumption. The high dissolved mineral content makes the water perfect for healthcare. Lake Tiberias is the deepest located freshwater lake of the Earth with its water surface is 212 m deeper than that of the Mediterranean Sea.

The country is located in the temperate climate zone. In the Mediterranean coastal area the Mediterranean (long, dry summer and warm humid winter) on the southern region the tempered desert climate effect (long arid summer and warm, dry winter) modify the basic climatic parameters. The country’s and the area’s hottest zone is the Dead Sea basin – in the summer the temperature is over 30 °C – but in the valley of the River Jordan tropical heat is also typical. On the northern part of the Negev desert besides the high temperatures heavy winds and sandstorms make the weather ungrateful. The average annual temperature is 25 °C. (Figure 5)

*Figure 5 Israel’s average annual temperature*

Temperature diversion shows great differences between the country’s north and south parts in the summer; but these differences are mostly moderated in the winter. A short spring and autumn make the year arrangement higher. (Figure 6)
The average annual precipitation is 200 mm which is mostly rain; snowfall is an infrequent event and can happen only in the high mountains. Typical annual distribution is the winter maximum (more than half between December and February) and the summer minimum. The most arid period is from May to August. (Figure 6)

While on the northern region the number of days without precipitation is 60-70, on the range of the Aqaba Gulf it is only 0-10. A distribution duality can be observed between the northern-southern and western-eastern areas too. While the annual value can reach 600-800 mm in the northern border of the Meron Mountains, on the Dead Sea coast it is only 50-70 mm, and less than 20 mm in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Along the coastal line 300-700 mm is typical, but it is decreasing to 50-200 mm towards the east. (Figure 7) The distribution of precipitation in time is unpredictable, frequent heavy rain showers are significant, which determine water use and water collection.

Figure 6 Climate data (Eilat, Har Meron)

Figure 7 Annual precipitation map of Israel
The east winds have disadvantageous impacts which have a drying and, cold effect at wintertime and a hot air stream from the desert area at the warm period of the year. The latter also generates dehydration in the vegetation. Humid western movement causes the relative high precipitation on the coastal line. The sunshine hour rate shows the highest value in the Dead Sea area; it can be more than 3200 hours a year.

Close to 20 per cent of the country’s territory is arable land; farming and irrigation is available on a little bit less than 50 per cent of this area. Due to the forest demolition, grazing and soil degradation the forest rate does not gain the tierce of the total surface of Israel. Most of the forest areas are located on the Mountains of Galilee, southward the vegetation is persistently decreasing and scrubs reveal Judea’s bleak hills. In the oases of the Negev desert only small palm groves represent forests. The tree density and height is substantially lower than the European average. (Figure 8)

Typical kinds of trees are cedar, oak, pines, cypress, palm, eucalyptus and secondary under wood types. In the Medi-terranean range terra rossa, at the bottom of valleys redzina, in the Jordan Rift Valley volcanic type and in the Negev desert (except the northern belt) desert and semi desert soils are significant.

Figure 8 Surface coverage of Israel

Social factor

The country had come to existence by the UN General Assembly Resolution 181 on 11.29.1947. The country is a republic; the capital is – by the Jerusalem Law 7– Jerusalem with about 800 thousand citizens. The Jewish and Islamic religions’ pilgrim places also located in Jerusalem and the city’s capital status depends on long conciliations. The UN and most of the countries around the world refused to recognize Jerusalem as the capital; that is why several

7 The Jerusalem Law pronounced Jerusalem as the indivisible capital of the country. This decision contravened the UN defined status of the city.
embassies and other representative offices are located in other cities like Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv performs other important functions too, among other things this is the country’s cultural, educational and industrial center. The country’s population is - in the absence of exact census data and the hostilities generated non determinable Arab emigrant mass size – an estimated 7,300,000 capita. The population density – after Lebanon – is the second highest in the Middle East area. Most of the population lives in cities, but the nomad style of living is also practiced; the urbanization rate is over 90 per cent. The territory is divided into 6 administrative and 3 other regions (West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights). (Figure 9)

From 1967 Israel has occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank which were assigned for the Palestinian people by the UN. The majority of the 1.1 million Gaza Strip residents escaped from the First Arab-Israeli War zone; in addition half of these people still live in refugee camps and vegetate on aids provided by the UN and other countries. On the West Bank one third of the 2 million citizens are fugitive and their unemployment rate is very high because of the absence of labour opportunities. To prevent of Arabic terrorist attacks Israel set up a barbed wire fence around the Palestine border, high walls toward the populated areas and marked out secured zones in the Jewish districts on the West Bank. The Israeli armed forces try to keep out the terrorists by means of frequently located secure points on the Palestinian areas. From 2005 the Palestinian Authority is responsible for the security on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, but the high number of Israeli security control points makes the daily life and movement of the Palestinian citizens difficult, for example complicates the access to workplaces, educational and medical institutes. Serious tension between the two parties was generated by the settlement of Israeli families in the Palestinian regions and especially the continuous building of subdivisions in Jerusalem which is pronounced as the capital of the Palestinian nation.

The county’s population is relatively for its territory. The population density is much higher on the northern part than in the Negev desert. The rate of the different age groups is ideal, because the size of the low age group is approximately triple of the third age group.
Besides the Hebrew nationality only the Arab population is important. The rate of the Jewish residents significantly changed in the last century on the present area of Israel. In Palestine at the beginning of the 20th century the Hebrews proportion rate just exceeded 5%; at the establishment of the state it was over 30%; then as an effect of the successive wars, Jewish immigration wave and Arab emigration the rate changed it to 75% for today. The natural fertility rate is different in the relation of Jewish and Arab population which is now disadvantageous for Israelis. For the compensation of this difference the Government of Israel supports the immigration of Jewish persons and families. Several reasons complicate the integration of the new settlers, like the different origin, identity, education and traditions. Many times the only common connection between the people is the religion, which results in long time resolution of evolving conflicts. There are much bigger Jewish minorities in the world than the population of Israel, the largest of these is located in the United States of America.

By the religious distribution the Jewish denomination is dominant and its rate is the same as the minority rate. The official language is Hebrew, but Arabic and English are also important. The missing knowledge of prime Hebrew language makes the assimilation of immigrants harder and only the younger generation regards it as their native language.

The state education standard is excellent; the illiteracy is the lowest in the area. The structure of the educational institutes follows the European standards. The elementary education is obligatory between 5 and 16 years of age. The infrastructural and tutorial quality of education is usually lower in the mostly Arab populated regions. The number of citizens with university degree is high; their rate is 26 per cent of the total number of employees which is the 3rd highest in the world. Communication between the Jewish and Arabic population is difficult caused by the fact that generally few Jewish people speak Arabic and know the Arabic culture, but most of the Arabs speak Hebrew or English. In recent years teaching Arabic has started in Jewish schools to help better understanding of each other and dissolving the existing stereotypes against Arabs.

The healthcare system is well organized in the Jewish populated cities, but generally has problems in the Arab settlements, significantly in the Gaza Strip. The doctors rate is 352/100.000 capita (www.who.int/2007), which is the same as that of the most developed European countries. The lack of drinking and sanitary water causes heavy problems for the Arabs, because the water distribution is not equal. The situation is the worst in the Gaza Strip, which is blockaded both from the mainland and on the coastal line too by the State of Israel to prevent the weapon transportation and smuggling for Palestine armed organizations from abroad. The lack of water is also increasing because of the
damage of the water supply system caused by the wars and armed conflicts of the last several decades.

Economy

Nowadays the Gross Domestic Product of the country is the highest in the area. The official currency is the New Shekel (ILS). Despite the natural capabilities the agriculture is well developed. The number of workers is low in this sector, but their GDP proportional productivity is half as big as would be justifiable with their number.

The agricultural production has two types: the Kibbutz\(^8\) and the Moshav\(^9\). When the first settlers arrived the Kibbutz was the organizational formation of land cultivation and settlement protection. Nowadays this formation is losing weight in the domestic income production. On the northern part of the country early vegetables, many kinds of fruit, oranges, in the Negev desert dates are produced by this type of organizations. The agricultural sector can produce only less than half of the cereal needs of the country. Important farm products are wheat, barley, corn, lentil, potato, vegetables, fruit, grapes, fig, soy, sunflower, sugar beet, cotton and tobacco. The vegetables and fruit are exportable.

Because of the climate irrigation is particularly important; the minimal precipitation necessary for agriculture is only present on the northern hills and mountains. The water volume is scarce; moreover increased evaporation, water pollution and the high salt concentrate in the last section of River Jordan generate serious challenge in providing water for the citizens. The complete water consumption is under government surveillance. Israel was the first country where artificial precipitation was enhanced. Israel devotes serious attention on economizing water consumption, to clean and re-use drainage and to improve trickle irrigation. To provide the water needs Israel invaded the Syrian Golan Heights to keeps under control one of River Jordan’s fountains. Several conceptions were made for the water supply of the northern regions, but only a canal connecting Lake Tiberias and the north Negev desert was completed. The water amount’s distribution is not equal amongst Jewish and Arab nations, the Hebrew farmers use much more than the Palestinians and the citizens of the invaded Palestine regions. Beside developed agriculture stock farming is also significant. Unlike other Middle-East countries the industrial poultry and meat,

\(^8\) A formation of agricultural production. The community uses their own appliances to cultivate the state owned lands, and the products sale is common. The community caters for the child rearing and the settlement protection. The formation extended its activity on processing plants at first, later on industrial plants and tourism too. Nowadays the number of Kibbutz communities is decreasing, mostly by privatization.

\(^9\) Another formation of agricultural production. The lands of the community are separated to equal areas and cultivated by individually. The products sale is common and the distribution of incomes based on the added labor. The farms are not saleable and resizable.
in the Arabic regions goat and sheep breeding is dominant. The sea fishing is also important for the country.

Israel has one of the world’s most developed, high-tech economy, which was created on an area with undeveloped infrastructure. Until 1967 the funds of the industrial development came from the German redemption, in line with this and later from developed countries (especially from the USA) and from the Jewish diaspora. The country has no notable mineral assets, but phosphate, potassium, salt, magnesium-bromide are mined. The most important industrial sectors are metal-, textile- and food processing, airplane-, military equipment-, electronics- and computer industry. Diamond cutting is world famous, 25 per cent of the country’s total export comes from selling brilliants, 50 per cent of the import is raw diamond buying. There are fossil energy sources on the area of Israel, but its exploitation is not intensive and the country is dependent on energy export. Though the surrounding countries have large energy resources the political tensions between these and Israel inhibit the import. That is why the country has to import crude oil and natural gas from far, non Arab countries. In 2010 in the Mediterranean Sea – 90 km from the Israeli coast – natural gas fields were found which beside fulfilling domestic needs also make export possible. The area contains crude oil too, which can help to decrease Israel’s energy dependency.

Domestic energy supply covers 80 per cent of the country’s total needs. From the renewing energy sources the solar based production is very high level, mostly all of the buildings have solar cells which fulfill hot water demands. There are two nuclear power plants in Israel. Several natural, historic and religious resources attract tourists and generate high income. (Figure 10)

**Figure 10 The economic structure and employment of Israel**

The railway system is located on the northern and central regions; its density and quality meet the modern expectations in the area. The port of Eilat’s railway connection is under planning in the Negev desert region. The present track is of normal gauge, partly double, non-electrified. High speed lines (160 km/h) are under construction. The international railway connection has stopped, the restart of the one time famous Orient Express between London and Cairo is uncertain. The road quality is fair; the clearway network density is high. New highways are under construction. Increasing road transportation has negative effects on efficiency and on the environment. River Jordan and the smaller
rivers are not suitable for water transportation, while seaports are busy. Figure 11 shows the transportation network of Israel.

There are 48 airports in the country, 5 from these are suitable for international service.

The pipeline transportation’s main element is the line connection of Haifa and Eilat which carries crude oil to the oil refineries of Haifa from the seaport.

Wired telecommunication line service is available in the whole country, but its importance is decreasing while the number of cell phones is triple of the wired devices’. The use of internet is the highest in the area.

In summary natural capabilities are disadvantageous for agricultural production. The water consumption has reached its productivity maximum and it cannot be further improved. The water amount is only partially sufficient for citizens, irrigation and industries.

The territory is not a danger zone for earthquakes.

The Jewish population’s increasing dynamics are lower than Arabs; the government tries to correct this with the support of childbirth and inviting immigrants. The invaded areas’ Arab citizens limited involvement in social, economical and cultural activity complicates the possibility for symbiosis, the government system construction on the Palestine regions, the development of economy and the normal every day life. Other special problems are the future of Arab emigrants living in neighbouring countries, the creation of conditions for their return and the normalization of diplomacy with these countries.

Although the natural capabilities are not so fair the country’s agriculture is mostly able to produce the population’s needs. The limited size of arable land and the growing water needs of irrigation cause difficulties in the primary sector.

The export capability of the developed industrial sector makes the required import provisions possible. The industry mainly presents technology, high level know-how and products with low material needs on the world market. Expectedly from 2010 the country will ensure its energy needs from its own crude oil and mineral gas sources. The GDP per capita value is three-five times higher than that of the surrounding countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Israel 05. 14. 1948.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute</td>
<td>degree minute [°']</td>
<td>31 30 N 34 45 E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Israel 05. 14. 1948.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative</td>
<td>E-L-J-S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area expansion km²</td>
<td>20 770</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries km</td>
<td>1 017 / 273</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest point m</td>
<td>Har Meron 1 208</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest point m</td>
<td>Dead Sea -408</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>River Jordan, Yarmouk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precipitation mm</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital city n/a</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population capita</td>
<td>7 473 052</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density capita/km²</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population %</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnics %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion %</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age groups %</td>
<td>28 / 62 / 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy year</td>
<td>81 / 79 / 83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing / decreasing %</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 / 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/national defence %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,4 / 7,3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economical factors</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP national Bill. $</td>
<td>217,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP / capita $</td>
<td>29 500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP increasing %</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Arable land %</td>
<td>15,45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irrigated area km²</td>
<td>1,940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic structure %</td>
<td>3 / 32 / 65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment %</td>
<td>2 / 16 / 82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment %</td>
<td>6,4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation %</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation, telecommunication</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airport pieces</td>
<td>48 / 30 / 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway km</td>
<td>949 / 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road km</td>
<td>18 096 / 146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterway km</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Wired telephone pieces</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cell phone pieces</td>
<td>9,022</td>
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### Table 1: Basic data of Israel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Israel 05. 14. 1948.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet users</td>
<td>Million capita</td>
<td>4,525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Basically Table 1 content is based on the CIA Factbook (04.01.2011) data, but it also contains information from different publications. Explanation of the contents:

- In header: the country’s independence date;
- Relative position: first letter of neighbour countries’ names;
- Boundaries: length of land and coastal boundaries;
- Age groups: rates of different age groups (0-14 / 15-64 / 65+);
- Life expectancy: in years of total population/men/women
- Illiteracy: rates of illiteracy of men/women;
- Economic structure: national GDP value share in three basic sectors (primary, secondary, tertiary)
- Employment: employees share in three basic sectors (primary, secondary, tertiary)
- Airports: number of airports (all / hard surface / longer than 3000 m runway);
- Railway: length of railway tracks (all / electrified);
- Road: length of roads (all / paved);

**Bibliography**

1. BALLA, Zs. (szerk.), 2005: Világatlasz. Geographia Kiadó, Budapest;
2. BERNEK, Á. (szerk.), 2002: A globális világ politikai földrajza. Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest;
CHINESE–AFRICAN RELATIONS, NEW EMERGING ACTORS AND THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Introduction: Africa on the rise

Africa is undoubtedly on the rise at least, as far as the interests of the big(ger) powers are concerned. I also share the view that it is not going to be a new type of “colonisation” this time, but the start of a real new era for Africa. To me, this is more important than gaining even new markets for countries of the North. Obviously, there are developed countries that are rather interested in Africa’s development, which in addition, surely can mean benefits for them, too, but their main concern is still how Africa can be helped and supported in its efforts to develop. From a political science point of view, I am intrigued by the rise of “new”, emerging powers and the dynamics of the transnational global scene, in particular, when I think of the competition among China, India, the USA, the European Union and others on African soil. What for? There are many reasons to consider for the sake of understanding this new dynamics.
As Hyden argues, “emerging powers like China, India and Brazil and also the Gulf states are interested in the continent’s resources in new ways. Its unused land attracts investments in agriculture to feed people both in Africa and in the countries making these investments. With regard to its minerals and oil, the scenario looks like a new scramble for Africa.” (Hyden, 2011: 8) African states still struggle with managing themselves, countries of the continent are poor even if we take note of and consider the performance of a number of African economies and the average growth rates of Africa as such\(^{10}\), and the question is ever so important: can development be driven from within, and can the involvement of external forces/stakeholders reach the level of the individuals and their communities so that there will be “society-wide repercussions”? (Hyden, 1989: 194)

All of these are even more interesting if we think of the “Beijing Consensus” coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo (2004) as an alternative\(^{11}\) to the “Washington,” or even “post-Washington consensus”. We should rather agree with Deborah Brautigam (2009), who points out that China’s government-guided approach is attractive to developing countries, although it is not “one identifiable model”, but “a variety of experiences”. (Brautigam, 2009: 16)

**African failures – Asian alternatives – New dynamics**

In general terms, in order to accelerate development, countries of the South formulated strategies, which by strengthening internal markets and extending external market access tried to induce dynamism in the economic sector. Already in the 1960s certain countries of different parts of the African continent formed regional alliances for supporting intraregional trade. In East Africa, for instance, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania launched the East African Community (EAC) in 1967, which due to a number of factors after its first decade gradually disappeared from the long-term thinking of the national strategies of its members as it happened in many cases of similar initiatives. Today, however, we see the re-assessed and re-valued ways forward that have been taken by different entities in the same regions. Among these the EAC is an exemplary model to re-establish itself for the sake of its members as a new and competitive force at play both in the African and the global contexts.

\(^{10}\) With its 6% GDP growth rate in 2007, then, the 5.1% in 2008 Africa performed an outstanding development pace (in macro terms) in the world. This fell to 2% in 2009, and as the African Union pointed out in a decisive statement in May 2009, “agriculture will prove the world’s poorest continent’s best chance of pulling itself from poverty”; therefore, the AU urged for more investment in Africa’s agriculture industries. (Malone, 2009)

\(^{11}\) Alternative’ in the sense of development philosophy, and basically, as far as the model is concerned. It is highly unlikely that China’s model can be presented as a real alternative outside China, but at the same time we can witness the spread of attraction to the Chinese model across African nations (and other states of the Global South in other continents).
In our ever globalising world of transnational interactions and cobweb-like interdependent and interconnected relations (drawing upon Burton 1972), it seems that North–South relations are being overarched and “superseded by South–East (Martin 2008), even, Africa–East, alliances” (Shaw, 2010: 13). As also argued by Cheru and Obi (2010), it is clearly visible in world politics and the global economy that “North–South relations are being superseded by the South–East and emerging Africa Gulf Asia triangular relations, with profound implications for Africa’s development” (Cheru – Obi, 2010: 1).

Today, we can witness the rise of the Asian model(s) (even in other parts of the world, such as in Latin-America, we could mention the Brazilian model, too, together with others deriving from the Global South), and it might happen that at a certain point Africa will choose from the solutions/help/contributions offered by the EU, the USA and others, coming more from the rather technologically advanced parts of the globe. To be able to act like this, Africa needs to “(re-)define itself” and to formulate its own developmental thinking about what it thinks is good for itself.

The investigation of the transnational global arena and the processes of globalisation with a focus on the changing roles of the state in today’s transnational society interwoven with all state and non-state actors seems highly topical. The “triangular relations” mark one of the most current aggregations of processes, transformations and areas of this transnational system, and it is worth attempting to map related or generated dynamics and their characteristics, as well as the alternative solutions they offer in the course of the years ahead. In addition, it is also of importance to watch how the rising Asian powers can use and utilise in a sophisticated way the common heritage of the “third way of politics” dated back to the 1950s and the 1955 Bandung Conference. Non-alignment still matters in our global system, at least as far as China (and obviously India, too) uses the principles in its rhetoric as part of its policy towards Africa. It is also interesting to take into account the historic heritage of the NAM and the implications of its existing alliance today.

All of these reserve importance not only for the U.S. or the EU, but also for Hungary, Hungarian foreign policy and external economic co-operation policy thinking as long as Hungary, as an EU member-state, strategic partner of the U.S., for instance, in Trans-Atlantic co-operation is an active participant of the joint EU–AU Africa-strategy and the European development policy though more opportunities it should grab than it leaves for other actors. Today, Hungary

12 I have a three-year research project on these issues under the title “Afro-Asian Relations in a Changing Global Context”.

27
has duties with ACP\textsuperscript{13} countries, parallel to which, as a result of the new dynamics on African soil, has numerous ‘open fields’ across Africa to enter into.

\textit{Strategies for the African state: How to handle growing differentiation?}

The African state, in the eyes of many, is considered as “failed stated”, which has increasingly been unstable, insecure and fragile either we look at the sub-national or the transnational spaces. We witness an emerging new inertia system of the African state developments and that of development in general terms within the system. I would not call this as another attempt to foster a New International Economic Order again, but would certainly connect it with the potential of the rise of a NIEO in the coming decades.

In particular, we need to point out that there is an increased differentiation among countries of Africa: a growing differentiation between successful and unsuccessful countries on the continent. The implications of this growing gap are too early to fully grasp but a few things already appear as signs of what may happen in the longer run. One issue concerns the sanctity of African borders. The principle that the continent’s colonial borders should not be altered (\textit{uti possidetis}) has been put to test in the Horn of Africa as a result of the virtual collapse of Somalia, as well as with the referendum that made possible for Southern Sudan to emerge as a new state. The fear in the African context is that such secession will become a precedent for others to follow, as we could witness with the recent events in Tunisia, then, in Egypt, offering a push for others to get swirled even into regime changes.

Another issue is how the outside world will respond to this growing differentiation. Will donors and investors favour the successful countries and abandon the others? Donors like investors want to see that their money produces results whether in public goods and services or in profit. It is tempting for them to favour countries that are politically stable and show a reasonable respect for the rule of law. Such a preference would most likely lead to an even greater difference between emerging and failing economies in Africa. The continent would have its own rich and poor states. Donor governments, however, cannot completely abandon the failing states. They have not only a moral but also a political responsibility to intervene to protect people whose government is unable to do so. Humanitarian assistance will absorb a good amount of money in these cases.

We need to understand that each country, whether China, India, Brazil, or for that matter Japan, and not missing the US and the EU, is bound to first and

\textsuperscript{13} Asian, Caribbean and Pacific group of states, including 79 countries at present, from the developing regions of the globe.
foremost operate in its own national interests. Thus, one needs to ask whether what may be good for China is also good for Africa (Asche, 2008: 168). This is the question that needs to be answered first of all by the Africans themselves. What African governments want from the emerging and powerful (and rich!) actors is clearly seen in most of the cases: unconditional support in exchange of their natural resources, concessions over their resources, mainly. Here is the fear of a far too short-sighted African approach: fast money in an easy way, but what about the strategic resources in the long run? Following Brautigam’s analysis, we need to be cautious about China’s engagement in Africa, as opposed to the generally constructed view Chinese “are undoubtedly interested in gaining access to Africa’s petroleum, minerals, and other natural resources but there is little evidence that aid is offered exclusively, or even primarily, for that purpose [...] and although it is popularly believed that aid comes [from the Chinese] with «no strings attached,« economic engagement usually does come with conditions, some of it even (indirectly) governance-related”. (Brautigam, 2009: 21) All in all, strategic approach is badly needed from the African side. African actors, both on an individual, a regional and a continent-wide basis (African Union) must develop their own China, India, Brazil, Japan, etc. strategies.

Many think China presents a substantial danger to Africa. This is because the extremely cheap Chinese products mean competition for African localities, which seek to pierce into international markets. After a highly successful year of trade and investments in 2007, China needs to consider potential drawbacks as some African partners might get frustrated by a popular sense of exploitation by the Asian power in the very near future. This could involve people losing jobs as a result of an even cheaper labour force, the shortage of skilled labour, or limited mobility of workers, and if internal (national) labour regulations stay restrictive rather than competitive, the costs of running a business will stay high. Although Broadman suggests, “the African sectors that face more internal competition not only attract more FDI from China and India but also eventually become more effective at penetrating Asian and other markets” (Broadman 2008: 104), this issue must be first analysed from an African point of view, not from a World Bank office far from the real needs and practices of the African peoples themselves. The jury is still out on the issue whether the increased presence of Chinese capital and labour is a boon or a bane for Africa.

In the entire African development paradigm the role of the new social forces that are produced by globalisation must not be neglected. Africa’s middle class is still relatively small and weak but its role and influence is increasing. Its members want to see more rather than less democracy. They want respect for the rule of law and a more predictable economic environment. They will be as active as any in trying to get governments to achieve this. It is likely, therefore, that domestic forces may increasingly take over the role as “guardians of
democracy” that Western donors have seen themselves performing in the past. In addition to the more macro-lens investigation of the external forces, it is always desirable to look at these domestic forces at play, too. This acknowledgement of the role that domestic social forces play is especially important to highlight in the new global context where there is a temptation of analysts to favour external factors as explanatory variables. It can in fact be argued that the global fosters the local; that understanding Africa calls for more rather than less attention to local and domestic factors.

**China in Africa**

Since the Bandung Conference of 1955, and especially during the postcolonial era “China has been involved on the continent since it started investing there [...] [and] the scale and pace of trade and investment flows between Africa and [...] China are exceptional” (Broadman, 2008: 95). China established various platforms and signed many agreements that serve the fostering of Sino–African co-operation. Among these the Forum on China–Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) that came into existence in 2000, needs to be mentioned first.

As a response to enhanced economic globalisation, joint intentions were channelled into FOCAC on the basis of “equal negotiation, enhancing understanding, increasing consensus, strengthening friendship and promoting cooperation.” Such co-operation is undoubtedly favoured by all parties: on the one hand, China’s economic growth of around 10% is tied to its hunger for

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15 About the creation of the Forum and its history since its foundation read more: http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/China-Africa/82047.htm

16 According to officially announced statistics, as reported by Richard York of Asia Economy Watch (11 February 2008), the GDP of China “shot to almost 11.4% in the last year and came to about 24.66 trillion Yuan which is $3.42 trillion. [...] The statistics also shows that the fourth biggest economy of the world achieved the distinction of double digit growth for the fifth year” (York, 2008). As predicted by the Economist.com, “China’s current-account surplus will remain substantial during the forecast period [of 2008–09], owing mostly to the huge trade surplus. The surplus on the current account will fall to 10.6% and 10% of GDP in 2008 and 2009 respectively.” Read more from: http://www.economist.com/countries/china/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Forecast

As for the real outcome since the economic crises and further predictions for the coming year, we can see first of all that the economy slowed down from 11.4% of 2007 to 9.6% in 2008 and to 8.7% in 2009. According to Chinability, a sharp increase can be recognised in the GDP during the reform period starting off from 1978. See more at: http://www.chinability.com/GDP.htm

As Carsten A. Holz underlines: “Extrapolating past real GDP growth rates into the future, the size of the Chinese economy surpasses that of the U.S. in purchasing power terms between 2012 and 2015; by 2025, China is likely to be the world's largest economic power by almost any measure” (Holz, 2005). Downloaded on 12 November 2010 from: http://129.3.20.41/eps/dev/papers/0512/0512002.
resources¿, most of which can be found on the African continent; on the other, African countries badly need foreign investors and partners who do not pressurize them while offering financial help (aid), and in this respect, China is an ideal “friend”. As opposed to the sometimes harsh conditionallities and former Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, China has been implementing its policies along the lines of a different philosophy: it does not dictate and does not tie aid programmes or loans to whether or not the given country in need of support complies with democratic requirements or market liberalization policies, and all in all, proven by a number of experts, such as Brautigam (2009), “China’s aid does not seem to be particularly »toxic«; the Chinese do not seem to make governance worse” (Brautigam, 2009: 21). On the basis of peaceful co-existence and the heritage of Bandung, China, as ‘master of ceremony’, has been playing the game in a clever way, much wiser than other influential actors on the inter-national scene, like the US or the EU. This is proven when, for example, export figures are compared: “Africa’s exports to China increased at an annual rate of 48 percent between 2000 and 2005, two and half times as fast as the rate of the region’s exports to the United States and four times as fast as the rate of its exports to the European Union over the same period” (Broadman, 2008: 95).

It is understandable that African leaders favour China’s judgement-free political approach after having been fed up with the West always telling them how they can best reform their countries (de Burgh 2007: 70). This behaviour and approach of China toward Africa certainly pays off for the Asian giant. Using the language of the Bandung conference and the NAM, and Beijing stresses that “its African policy was [always] motivated by the desire to expend on the ‘spirit of Bandung’ by emphasising key principles of the Third World movement: mutual respect…; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference…; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful co-existence” (Mensah, 2010: 98). To stay frank and objective, there is surely one “unavoidable conditionality” though, which is that African states accept and adhere to the “one China policy” principle (Ibid).

Although China has been primarily representing its stance by relying on ‘soft power’ and it “vehemently denies that it harbours any ambitions to become a Superpower, [it] has attempted to advance itself as a global player beyond its immediate geographical confines” (Taylor, 2006: 197). China has systematically worked a lot to present itself as the leader of the developing world, and its geo-strategic motivations are clearly seen to become the strongest economy in the world in the near future. Although its strategy for Africa is based upon its drive for energy- and resource-security, as Helmut Asche (2008) points out, there are other motivations behind the Chinese “economic whirlwind”, like, for instance assuring agricultural supplies for itself (Asche, 2008: 167). The case of Tanzania

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17 These include among others: oil, aluminium, iron ore, copper and nickel.
is an appropriate illustration of how many factors enter into China’s relations with African countries. I take the Tanzanian example as I have been researching on Tanzanian state development and the East African Community since 2000, and most of my field work has been attached to this part of the African realm.

**The Chinese in Tanzania**

Bilateral co-operation was launched right at the creation of the federation between former Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. Prior to this, China established diplomatic relations with Tanganyika in December 1961, and with Zanzibar in December 1963 officially recognising the new independent political actors of the bipolar international arena.\(^1\) In 1965 *The Treaty of Friendship Between the People’s Republic of China and the United Republic of Tanzania* was signed. These “obligatory »friendship« agreements that typified China’s relationships with African countries in that era [were] followed by more detailed arrangements on development projects, technical assistance, and limited state-managed trade” (Chege, 2008: 22). By the 1970s Tanzania had accelerated co-operation with China and “had probably developed more extensive ties with that country than with any other non-African state” (Bailey, 1975: 39). The base for such a pace is again easily found around the ideology of non-alignment, strongly advocated by Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere himself, too.

In order to accelerate development, countries of the South formulated strategies which by strengthening internal markets and extending external market access tried to induce dynamism in the economic sector. Already in the 1960s certain countries in different parts of the African continent formed regional alliances for supporting intra-regional trade. In East Africa, for instance, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania launched the East African Community (EAC), which due to a number of factors after its first decade gradually disappeared from the long-term thinking of the national strategies of its members as also happened in many other similar initiatives.\(^2\)

As Fage and Tordoff point out, “the process of industrialisation […] had unanimous limits […], as only a few states had such a large population that could provide a sufficient internal market. In most countries this market could operate only some smaller, secondary industries” (Fage – Tordoff, 2004: 426). The former colonizing powers knew it well that it was necessary to bring the

\(^1\) On the other side, Tanganyika “became the tenth African state to recognise the People’s Republic of China, and the first to do so within a few days of independence” (Bailey, 1975: 39).

colonized territories under alliances, larger political and economic units so that their markets produce the profit they expected. With the newly independent African states leaving these alliances the number of functioning markets with a proper volume of trade drastically dropped. The problems worsened when the oil price explosion hit the weak economies of the African nations in the 1970s because they “had to pay the more developed countries more for capital goods and manufactured products, which they heavily relied on for their own development. [...] [Parallel to this,] due to the global economic crisis, the industrially more developed countries bought less raw materials from the Third World” (Ibid. 427). All these processes have led to a swiftly vertical debt spiral which has ruined almost all the developing countries – except for the Arab states which became rich exactly because of oil. By the 1980s and 1990s “according to almost all indicators it has been obvious that [...] Africa was on the decline even compared with its performance from previous times” (Bür, 2005: 2).

Tanzania’s chosen path, i.e. the ujamaa20 way of development and the country’s explicit support for the liberation of Southern Africa, “exacerbated the growing hostility between Tanzania and the West and led to the need to secure new sources of external assistance” (Bailey, 1975: 40). In this respect, China immediately and with growing intensity offered partnership, and provided the aid Tanzania was in need of.

The first phase of Tanzanian–Chinese co-operation was centred on obtaining aid from the Asian ‘brother’, as seen from the African side. The customary scheme included the construction of factories, a stadium, and first and foremost a railway of 1,860 kilometres connecting Zambia with the Indian Ocean. After the Aswan and Volta Dams, the third most expensive aid project for China happened to be the “Tazara” (Tanzania-Zambia Railway), or the Uhuru (Freedom) Railway. “The Tazara was being financed with an interest-free loan from China that [was set to] be repayable over a period of 30 years from 1983. [It] was made on a joint basis to the Tanzanian and Zambian Governments and [would] be repayable in equal shares” (Bailey, 1975: 46 based upon The Financial Times, 23 October 1973). Today, although the project has been hampered by poor management, this railway has an enormous development potential as it provides the route and the tool at the same time for regional transport: up to 2006 it carried 23 million tons of goods and 37 million people (not mentioning the total travel time of 37 hours along the entire rail). The railway project did not only help China step into the Tanzanian market, but opened up numerous other channels for investment, trade and other types of projects in the country and beyond, in the East African Community. Land (1968)

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20 Nyerere’s Socialist ideology and programme based on ‘brotherhood’ and ‘familyhood’ (coming from the Swahili word), including the forced villagisation of people planned to be leading to a new African model of development.
was definitely right, when he argued that China has increased its presence in all sectors on a continent desperate for change.

As for the present-day situation, many people say that “low-cost goods from China fit economies like that of Tanzania well. Goods […] are low-quality and sometimes fake, but they are creating new micro-enterprise opportunities for entrepreneurial Africans” (Barclay, 2008). The low quality of many goods, however, also has its negative side. “African customers are also beginning to experience the ugly side of trading with China. […] In October 2007, counterfeit electrical equipment from China caused fatal electrical fires in Dar es Salaam […] [or to mention another area,] ‘the Chinese medicines are making people sick’,” according to a Congolese woman (Ibid). Analyzing any Sino–African bilateral relationship is complicated we may agree with Large (2008) arguing for a cautious behaviour when approaching the ‘China–Africa issue’, as we should also take into account China’s “vulnerability and dependence rather than power”, citing also Breslin (2005) on this subject. If this issue is put in the broader context of Afro–Asian relations, and referring just to the Asian markets, it is clear that “the opening up of China’s economic space and the transparent success of the Asian NIEs in upgrading and restructuring their indigenous production sectors have combined to deepen the economic interdependence between the nations” (Wang, 2002: 190). Gradual interconnectedness and complex interdependence among countries of the South is ever so vivid, and the China–Africa relations are also evident of this direction.

**Indians in Africa and the Delhi Process**

Compared with the Chinese presence in Africa, it is worth looking at the context of the historic ties between Africa and the other Asian giant, India. Mazrui (1978 and 1995) begins his chapter on Indian–African relations with the importance of Mahatma Gandhi, who “quite early in his life […] saw nonviolent resistance as a method that would be well suited to Africans as well as Indians. In 1924, Gandhi said that if the black people ‘caught the spirit of the Indian movement their progress must be rapid’” (Mazrui, 1995: 85). Much prior to Gandhi’s statement, Indo–African relations had started to take shape mainly in the form of bilateral trade, and since the early 18th century, when Seyyid Said, the Sultan of Oman transported his capital from Muscat to the island of Zanzibar, thus, created a new junction of international trade with the Swahili coast via the Indian Ocean. Up until the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964, throughout the entire 19th century Indian traders were the most exclusive partners of the Sultan of Zanzibar, and the number of Indian immigrants to East Africa had grown. In terms of becoming able to explore the ‘Indian thread’ in Africa we need to take into account that, as Makai (1961) argues, it was a natural opportunity for interregional trade because East Africa was abundant
with precious metals, gold, copper, iron ore, for which Indian and Chinese spices, porcelain and silk could be exchanged. India’s engagement with Africa was further shaped and took a new turn following decolonisation (Bhattacharyya, 2010: 65). If Gandhi contributed “passive resistance to one school of African thought, Nehru contributed nonalignment to almost all African countries” (Mazrui, 1995: 85). So, as Bhattacharyya (2010) rightly points out, there existed an “ideological affiliation” between India and Africa for a long time, which then became evident in the “anti-racism and anti-colonialism agenda of the NAM”. Beyond that, as President Nyerere strongly underlined at the 4th G77 Ministerial Summit in 1979 solidarity must be strengthened by co-operation among countries of the South (‘South–South’ co-operation), and the need for a new economic order in the international arena was righteously demanded by the less advanced countries of the Global South.

India today is a very pragmatic actor in Africa. It also established its high-level forum when it launched the Africa–India Forum Summit in April 2008 in New Delhi. In February 2008 the Indian government announced that it would increase the amount of the total Indian aid framework by 60% in the coming years, and at the India–Africa Project Partnership Forum (March 2008) “150 projects worth US$11 billion were discussed and the EXIM Bank of India extended US$30 million in credit to finance Indian exports to Africa” (Bhattacharyya, 2010: 70). In every movement of India one thing is clearly seen: the involvement of the Indian Diaspora living in African countries. From this angle, if we compare India’s approach toward Africa with the ‘Chinese way’ it is unanimously argued that India follows a different path. India believes in African partnership in a different way as it wants to sew its centuries-long threads into the common drape of Indo–African co-operation so that it stays mutually beneficial for all parties involved. It is undoubtedly true, however, that India also heavily needs natural resources and raw materials for its emerging economy. Therefore, one cannot be naïve to forget about its real motivations. As opposed to China, though, while India also gets engaged with infrastructure building projects, it is interested in “training African personnel rather than bringing in its own” for such activities (Ibid. 71). India can sophisticatedly utilise the principles of Bandung and can draw upon the heritage of the NAM, which in the case of India definitely supports the argument that there is need for non-alignment in our global world today we should call it a ‘need for South–South co-operation’. Third-way politics, or politics of the former Third World, the present-day Global South, has successfully influenced the thematic setting of the global agenda in the first years of the new millennium, too. Today North–

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21 Today China manages the Forum on China–Africa Co-operation, India the Africa–India Forum Summit, South Korea the Africa–Korea Forum, and as the oldest of all such initiatives, Japan the Tokyo Conference on African Development (TICAD). Having built upon the results and achievements of the first TICADs, Indonesia and Malaysia also joined the ‘Asian club’ as they had held the first two Asia–Africa Forums in 1994 and 1997 respectively.
South relations and the issues connected with the development of countries of the South have become one of the main inertia systems of our global world, and in formulating potential answers to global challenges, it is unimaginable that “Southern views and demands”, for example, the opinions and suggestions put forward by the non-aligned, are not taken into account per se. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that there is a need, ever increasing, for non-alignment in the sense of alliance formation and concerted efforts (Tarrósy, 2006), and coupled with what Jazić proposes, “a fight for multilateralism, the central role of the UN and its Millennium programmes [...] make the existence of the NAM no less necessary than before” (Jazić, 2005: 66). With this, Bhattacharya (2010) also agrees when he adds that the NAM is “being replaced by more pragmatic groupings, such as the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC),” and many more. But India’s apparent competition with China in Africa (Sinha, 2010) because competition for resources, markets and influence is not a question has been extended to other new emerging actors, out of which Brazil needs to get sufficient attention.

**Brazil’s giant steps on African soil**

Brazil with its unquestionable aspiration for global power status similarly to other regional powers of the Global South is also emerging as a significant aid donor, not only as a ‘pure’ investor in certain African countries. This is especially important for a continent which has for so long been marginalised on to the very peripheries of the world. Brazil is yet another alternative for Africa’s development. When we look beyond mere bilateral co-operation, Brazil has been very active in triangular and multidimensional activities. President Lula in his two terms heavily pursued a very ambitious foreign policy agenda for his country, which created a “new sense of dynamism” (Seabra, 2010) not only in Brazilian diplomacy, but in the global arena.²² This is even more understandable if again we take on the omnipotent competition that is inevitably driving all actors into partnerships and other forms of collaboration. The emergence of the three NIEs (China, India, Brazil) “as competitors to Europe on the African continent has jeopardized ‘old’ Europe’s historical and socio-economic and political influence” (Aning, 2010: 153). As the European Union recognised the threat of losing ground, it immediately (at the summit of 9 December 2007 in Lisbon) declared that obviously together with its African partners “In order to ensure coherence and complementary with the work of other international actors, including emerging partners, Africa and the EU recognise the need to broaden their cooperation with third partners through enhanced tripartite dialogue. Similarly, both parties recognise the importance of triangular

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²² In this respect, see Besenyő (2010) for Lula’s 2010 African safari at: http://www.regiment.hu/hirek/kulfoldi_hirek/novekvo_brazil_erdeklodes_afrikaban
cooperation for the development of the two continents” (Point No. 54). Although, as stated in the official document, “triangular cooperation refers to the implementation of a project for the development of an African country with the technical involvement of another African country and with financial and/or other input from the EU side, or vice versa,” naturally, the existing partnerships of a ‘third kind’, i.e. in the context of Chinese–African or Indian–African partnerships, it has become ever so important for the EU to stay close to Africa, and Aning is right in saying that, for instance, the “China–Africa relationship has definitely given greater political leverage to Africa in the Africa–EU dialogue” (Aning, 2010: 153-154).

Concerning Brazil’s increased presence in Africa, in the last few years “South–South dialogue” has guided the extension of its network on the continent. President Lula himself managed to visit 25 African countries during his two terms in office, and even Brazil launched an international TV station broadcasting to 49 African nations (Seabra, 2010: 52). Talking recently with Japanese officials from TICAD they revealed that the Latin-American lead player is an interesting partner for other actors (such as for Japan, in particular, as regards its Diaspora in Brazil) for other triangular co-operations. One of the best examples would be the integrated regional development model in Nacala, Mozambique, pushed forward by the Japanese government and aid agency, JICA. Africans can again have a choice for taking a different development path/opportunity (from that of the Western-driven model that has led to such a large number of failures for Africa), and as long as Brazil explicitly portray itself as a player “who will be able to put forward new ideas” (Ibid. 57), African actors can really choose.

In each case, be that the Chinese, the Indian or the Brazilian, for Africa only the question that was exposed in the introduction remains: what will be the “society-wide repercussions”. The new dynamics created by the new emerging actors will be promoting real change only if the development they launch or strengthen reach out to the local levels of societies at large across the African continent.

Some concluding remarks

South–South trade led by China and increasingly by India and Brazil too can offer an opportunity for Africa to grab better positions in the global market. China, for obvious reasons, will continue strengthening its positions on the continent so that very soon it can become the leading power in the geopolitical context of Asian-African trade. Already in 1996 Henry Kissinger predicted that out of all the great or potentially great powers it was China that will show upward tendency in terms of economic and political developments (Kissinger
As László Bárdi observed in an interview in 2008, China is a country, which “in one generation will turn into the leading power of the world in all respect, the one that cannot be beaten in the spirit of sportsmanship.”

South–South co-operation which is thematically moderated by China in light of the principles of Bandung reserves mutual interests. Since the days of Zhou Enlai, Chinese leaders have repeatedly said that their program is not a form of charity but based on mutual benefit (Brautigam and Gaye 2007). This co-operative framework under the auspices of the non-aligned countries renders positive results for China, which has been working hard on a stockpile of energy resources, mainly oil reserves, so that in the future it can feed its economy without problems. However, in keeping resources in store China wants to behave in a normal way and “does not want to rapidly increase its energy import for the sake of not creating too much political anxiety. To mitigate such fears, it attempts to make import agreements with a number of different countries” (Kulcsár, 2007: 210).

From Africa’s point of view the picture is more complex, as there are pros and cons, benefits and dangers embedded in the continent’s co-operation with the Asian giant, and the other emerging players. Chinese involvement in Africa’s development is undoubtedly good for Africa as it involves debt cancellation, Foreign Direct Investment and private sector development. As Gaye underlines, “it offers also an alternative route to African countries, [...] [which] may further reduce the already damaged legitimacy of institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund” (Brautigam and Gaye 2007). Critical voices, including Gaye’s, frequently echo the negative aspect of Sino–African relations that is China gains while Africa loses. It has now grabbed huge national resources while dumping cheap industrial manufactured products on the continent (Ibid). It is therefore in the very interest of Africa to make proper decisions. “If Africa does not set its house in order first, there is no way it will achieve anything. [...] Development begins at home” (Ibid). This is the reason why South African President Thabo Mbeki’s thoughts about a new “self-definition” for Africa must be taken into account. Africa deserves more and Africa wants more, therefore, as President Mbeki underlined in a lecture held at the University of Havana in 2001, the world including China should help Africa find its “self-definition”, something that is designed by the Africans themselves: “the ultimate conquest is Africa’s conquest of itself” (Mazrui, 1995: 89).

All of the new emerging actors and their relations need to be taken seriously, not just individually for their own sake, but rather in wider contexts. The China–Africa ties should be looked at from within the broader context of Afro–Asian relations in a comparative approach; the Brazil–Africa relations from within the Latin–American–African system of relationships, etc. In addition, all the bi-, tri- and multilateral types of South–South and North–South
co-operation need to be analyzed in the global arena as such for they hold implications for the entire system.

References


THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF TURKEY’S EU-ACCESSION: STABILIZER OR RISK?

Turkey’s way to the European Union

Turkey holds a unique place in the considerations of the European Union: unique for its geostrategic position; unique for the unprecedented technical difficulties its integration would pose; unique for the length and torturous process of its membership negotiations.

Turkey has made countless tries to join the European Union in the past. The country is member of all the other European organizations but the question about a full EU membership has always been controversial. However during the last year great steps forward were made.

A long and difficult journey started on October 3, 2005. Turkey’s accession talks will put Ankara’s EU bid, as well as the EU’s role and identity, into a new perspective. Ten years down the road, Turkey will be firmly anchored in the highest standards of governance. The reforms that led to the opening of accession negotiations have already dramatically upgraded Turkey’s democratic and economic credentials.

The EU representatives assert that the speed and ultimate fate of the accession negotiations will be determined by how well Turkey adopts the EU’s rules and regulations. If adopting EU laws were the only issue, Turkey could surprise even the most hard-headed pessimists. Yet it is painfully obvious that the accession talks will not be immune to distracting influences. But to become a member, Turkey must meet three basic conditions, known as the Copenhagen Criteria.

From the very beginning it became clear that accession will require drastic reform in Turkey:

1. On the level of political security: Turkey must create stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for minorities.
2. On the level of **social-economic security**: economically, the EU expects Turkey to create a functioning market economy. Turkey must also adopt the entire body of EU laws, known as the *acquis communautaire*, and the social issue requires Turkey to reform itself drastically to adopt, implement, and enforce the EU’s values and legislation.

3. On the **security level**: in Turkey, national security is not perceived in a narrow sense of military action against invasion, but is a more comprehensive concept of safeguarding the nation and the state, i.e. the Republic. At the same time Turkey has to act as a stabilising factor of the region.

4. On the **religion level- islamism vs. secularism**: especially the obstacles placed in the way of Turkish membership to the EU, and argues that they are both encouraging Turkish nationalism and threatening Turkey's constitutional pillars of secularism and national indivisibility.

Although it is one said that Turkey is “*too big, too poor, and too Muslim*” to join the EU. Its size, its GDP per capita, and its religion should not be the main stumbling blocks on the road to accession. It is more the way Turkey will deal with these political, economic, legal and security issues that will be decisive.

*The political issue*

Turkey’s membership would build one of the strongest bridges between Europe and the Muslim world. On this way *Turkey could set a positive example for democratization*. Among other things, this would enable the EU to shape developments in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Ankara’s accession would also promote multiculturalism as an integral part of the EU’s identity. This would put the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in a different light. Turkey has its own strong views on international issues. Its inclusion in CFSP could raise some internal disputes, especially if Ankara is perceived as a Trojan horse for American interests. On the other hand, inclusion of the 800,000-strong Turkish army – Europe’s largest – would strengthen the EU’s defence capabilities. Through its strategic location and good ties with neighbouring Middle Eastern countries, Turkey could set a positive example for democratization in the region and could greatly contribute to the EU’s security objectives.

But in spite of the probable positive example of democratisation there are still **political obstacles** to EU membership concern Turkey's domestic and foreign policies. Because the European body prides itself on being an association of democracies, the 1980 military coup--in a country enjoying associate
status--was a severe shock. The harshness of repression under the military regime further disturbed the EC. The EC responded by freezing relations with Turkey and suspending economic aid. A related body, the Council of Europe, also expelled Turkey from its parliamentary assembly. The restoration of civilian rule gradually helped to improve Turkey's image.

In 1985 Germany's prime minister signalled the EC's readiness to resume dialogue with Turkey by accepting an invitation to visit Ankara. The following year, the EC restored economic aid and permitted Turkey to reoccupy its seats in European deliberative councils. Nevertheless, frequent veiled threats by Turkey's senior military officers of future interventions if politicians "misbehaved" did not inspire confidence in Europe that democracy had taken permanent root in Turkey. As late as 1995, some Europeans remained apprehensive about the possibility of another military coup, a concern that was shared by various Turkish politicians

EU members have also expressed reservations about Turkey's human rights record. Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, two human rights monitoring organizations supported by the EU, have reported the persistence of practices such as arbitrary arrests, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture in prisons, and censorship.

The Turkish Human Rights Association, itself subject to harassment and intimidation tactics, has prepared detailed chronologies and lists of human rights abuses, including the destruction of entire villages without due process, and has circulated these reports widely in Europe. The documented reports of human rights abuses, like the coup rumors, sustained questions about Turkey's qualifications to join a collective body of countries that have striven to achieve uniform standards for protecting citizen rights.

In terms of foreign policy, the main obstacle to EU membership remains the unresolved issues between Turkey and EU member Greece. The most serious issue between the two countries is their dispute over the island of Cyprus, which dates back to 1974.

At that time, Turkish troops occupied the north-eastern part of the island to protect the Turkish minority (20 percent of the population), which felt threatened by the Greek majority's proposals for unification with Greece. Years of negotiations have failed to resolve a stalemate based on the de facto partition of Cyprus into a Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south, a division that continues to be enforced by a Turkish force estimated at 25,000 troops in early 1995. Following the November 1983 declaration of independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus--a government recognized only by Turkey in early 1995--Greece persuaded fellow EU members that progress on settling the dispute over Cyprus should be a prerequisite to accepting Turkey as a full member.. Despite
Ankara's position that such an obvious political condition was not appropriate for an economic association, once the EC agreed in 1990 to consider an application for membership from Cyprus, diplomatic efforts aimed at convincing individual EC members to veto the condition became futile. Since 1990 Turkey has supported UN-mediated talks between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders that are aimed at devising procedures for the island's reunification. As of January 1995, these intermittent discussions had made little progress, and the prospects for a resolution of the Cyprus problem appeared dim.

Equally as serious as the Cyprus issue is Turkey's dispute with Greece over territorial rights and interests in the Aegean Sea.

Although both Greece and Turkey are de jure allies in NATO, their conflicting claims brought them to the brink of war in 1986 and 1987. A fundamental source of contention is exploration rights to minerals, primarily oil, beneath the Aegean Sea. International law recognizes the right of a country to explore the mineral wealth on its own continental shelf. Greece and Turkey, however, have been unable to agree on what constitutes the Aegean continental shelf. Turkey defines the Aegean shelf as a natural prolongation of the Anatolian coast, whereas Greece claims that every one of the more than 2,000 of its islands in the Aegean has its own shelf. The issue is complicated further by Greece's claim to the territorial waters surrounding its islands. Turkey rejected Greece's attempts to extend its six-nautical-mile territorial claim around each island to twelve nautical miles on grounds that such a move would enable Greece to control 71 percent, rather than 43 percent, of the Aegean. Thus, it would be impossible for Turkish ships to reach the Mediterranean Sea without crossing Greek waters.

The issue of the right to control the airspace over the Aegean appears similarly intractable. Greece, which was granted control of air and sea operations over the entire Aegean region by various NATO agreements, closed the Aegean air corridors during the 1974 Cyprus crisis and only reopened them early in 1980 as part of the compromise arrangement for Greek reintegration into NATO.

The economic issue

The principal economic objections to Turkish membership centre on the relative underdevelopment of Turkey's economy compared to the economies of EC/EU members and Turkey's high rate of population growth. The latter issue is perceived as a potentially serious problem because of free labour movement among EU members and the fact that Turkey's already large population is expected to surpass that of Germany--the most populous EU member--by 2010.
Closely related to the concern about there being too many Turkish workers for too few jobs is the social problem of integrating those workers into European culture. Throughout Western Europe, the early 1990s witnessed a rise in anti-immigrant feeling directed primarily against Muslim workers from North Africa and Turkey. For the most part, EU governments have not developed policies to combat this resurgence of prejudice.

**The security issue**

The *security objections* are very controversial. In order to analyze this issue it is necessary to divide it into different areas, like external and internal sides of this question. This differentiation is only because of didactic reasons, since the both sides of security cannot be separated from each other.

**External Security Concerns**

*The military security*

The European Military Strategy (2003) points out the priorities of the European Union on the areas of security. The strategy mentions among the „key threats” the instability of the Middle East region. The reduction of these instability is one of the main importance of the Union. This kind of instability is connected to the phenomenon that security challenges of the XXI. century, is more due to internal anarchic affairs than conflicts among countries. Problems like this are terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, and failure of states. The Middle East area is referring to lot of internal and intrastate conflicts. Since the Middle East would be located in critical closeness to the European Union, creating of stability as the main stability priority of the European Union.

In the case of Union’s membership the influence sphere of the Union would be extended to the areas of Caucasus and also to the Near East. The important geostrategic location of Turkey revaluated its position. The first Iraq war and the Balkan crisis made it clear that turkey and the European Union have common interests. In the European-American relationship Turkey’s membership would turn the security balance in favour of European Union.

*Turkey's Participation in NATO*

Despite rapid changes in the European security environment that have replaced the NATO-Warsaw Pact\(^23\) confrontation with a less definable set of

\(^{23}\) Turkey entered NATO on 1952. During the postwar era, Turkey's foremost ally has been the United States. Because of Turkey's strategic location in the Middle East, its proximity to the Soviet Union's military installations and test sites, and its control of the Black Sea straits, military ties with the United States were a crucial factor in the East-West confrontation
missions for the alliance, Turkey remains a strong partisan of the NATO linkage. Turkish participation gives the country a voice in major strategic decisions by Western democracies and a framework for multilateral cooperation in matters critical to its own security. Nevertheless, with NATO strategy based on the management of multidimensional threats rather than deterrence of the now-defunct Soviet Union, and with the admission of former members of the Warsaw Pact into a partnership relation with NATO, the importance of Turkey to European security has become less obvious. From a Turkish perspective, the protection of Turkey's eastern borders demands a continued high level of NATO involvement. In the shifting European security order, however, Turkey's geostrategic position could become a liability, potentially exposing the alliance to military action in an area where its commitments are ill defined.

The "official" assessment of Turkey's role within the NATO

In general, Turkey is from the beginning on, an integral part of NATO, an alliance, the linchpin of transatlantic ties and Euro-Atlantic Security. In the post-Cold War era, military threats of a conventional nature have diminished to a considerable extent. Yet, on the other hand, non-traditional, asymmetric security risks and threats, such as terrorism, regional instabilities, separatist micro and ethnic nationalism, fundamentalism, organized crime, drug and human trafficking, mass migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means and cyber-terror have dominated the strategic landscape.

Today terrorism constitutes one of the gravest challenges to individual nations as well as to NATO itself. It is obvious that the international community cannot defeat terrorism without unwavering determination and close international cooperation.

The development of capabilities for effective and swift response to crises is at the core of transformation efforts within NATO. In recognition of the need to adapt itself to post Cold war realities, NATO has for some time been undergoing a comprehensive transformation process. The Partnership for Peace Program, Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO-Russia Council and NATO-Ukraine Commission, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative are concrete examples to this end. NATO’s open door policy and its collaboration with other international organizations such as the UN, OSCE and the EU have been remarkable.

24 In the mid-1990s, Turkey allocated a mechanized infantry division consisting of one mechanized brigade and one armoured brigade, as well as one combat engineering company, to the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force formed as part of NATO's restructuring. One commando brigade was earmarked for the southern multinational division, along with brigades from Italy and Greece. These forces remain under national command at their home bases until released to NATO.

25 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US and the more recent attacks in various parts of the world including in London, Madrid and Istanbul have clearly demonstrated that terrorism has gained global proportions.
While the nature of risks and threats, as well as the methods that need to be employed in countering them have changed, the core objective, and indeed main function of the Alliance, namely collective defence, remains unaltered. Given the nature of her geo-strategic location and the prevailing global security conditions, Turkey is obliged to maintain a realistic deterrence capability.

Turkey and the Soviet Union

Throughout the Cold War, Turkey's security situation was shaped by the country's vulnerability to Soviet military strength. It was obliged to contend with the threat of twenty divisions of Soviet land forces close to the common border of more than 500 kilometres in the Transcaucasian region of northern Turkey. Turkey's heavily populated areas were within easy range of Soviet fighter aircraft and bombers; Soviet naval vessels and submarines were well positioned to dominate the Black Sea.

For Turkey, perhaps the most important consequence of the 1991 break-up of the Soviet Union was that it no longer shares a border with Russia and that the risk of conflict with the Russians has greatly receded. Although buffered by other new nations in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions, Russia remains a compelling presence in the minds of Turkish military planners. With Moscow increasingly willing to intervene in conflicts near Turkey's borders, concern has grown that a resurgent Russian nationalism might seek pretexts to gain control of former republics of the Soviet Union. Russia has repositioned to its southern flank some of the ground weapons withdrawn from Central Europe under the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990. Although the treaty placed a ceiling on the number of tanks, armoured vehicles, and artillery pieces that could be redeployed to the North Caucasus Military District, the Russians have exceeded this limit, citing concerns over instability in their border regions.

The appearance of several newly independent nations at Turkey's borders, however, has resulted in a less settled security environment because Turkey now feels a greater potential threat from other powers in the area such as Greece, Syria, and Iraq.

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26 Turkey currently maintains the largest armed forces among the European allies and is only second to the USA within NATO. As of August 2006, a total of 3500 Turkish troops participate in NATO, UN or EU-led operations.

27 Turkish suspicion of Soviet motives had historical roots in the efforts of imperial Russia to extend its influence beyond the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean was linked tactically and logistically to the Soviet Black Sea fleet. Transit of the Turkish-controlled Bosphorus was essential to the projection of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean.
Close to Turkey's north-eastern border, three former republics of the Soviet Union--Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan--are beset by dissidence and fighting. Turkey has historical, cultural, religious, and linguistic ties with Azerbaijan and supported Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia. From the Turkish perspective, Armenia committed aggression against Azerbaijan by seizing the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which is inhabited mostly by ethnic Armenians. Russia issued veiled warnings against Turkish involvement in the Armenian situation, which could pit Turkey against Russia. Turkey has ruled out the use of force, wary of a wider conflict between Christians and Muslims in the region.

**Dissolution of the Soviet Union**

For Turkey the practical consequence of the Soviet Union's demise was the replacement of one large, powerful, and generally predictable neighbour with five smaller near neighbours characterized by domestic instability and troubling foreign policies.

In Transcaucasia and Central Asia, regions where Turkey is most keen to project its influence, Ankara has tended to defer to Moscow whenever such a course seems prudent. Turkey's efforts to make its presence felt in nearby Transcaucasia have been limited not so much by Russia as by the political realities that emerged in Transcaucasia itself after December 1991. All three new countries in the region--Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia--share land borders with Turkey; thus political and economic leaders view them as natural partners²⁸ for trade and development projects.

Turkey's policy in Central Asia has proved more successful than its Transcaucasian policy. As with Azerbaijan, a feeling of pan-Turkic solidarity has prompted Turkish interest in expanding ties with the countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.²⁹

Subsequently, Turkey concluded numerous cultural, economic, and technical aid agreements with the Central Asian states, including non-Turkic Tajikistan. Turkey also sponsored full membership for the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan in the Economic Cooperation Organization, a regional trade pact whose original members were Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. In practice,

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²⁸ Both President Özal's Motherland Party and Prime Minister Demirel's True Path Party embraced the idea of expanding ties with Azerbaijan, an oil-producing country whose people speak a Turkic language closely related to Anatolian Turkish.

²⁹ In April 1992, in his first year as prime minister, Demirel travelled to the region to promote Turkey as a political and developmental model for the Central Asian states. He explicitly represented Turkey not only as a successful example of what an independent Turkic country could achieve but also as a more appropriate model than the Islamic alternative offered by Iran, which he perceived as Turkey's main rival for influence in the region.
however, Turkey lacks adequate economic resources to play the pivotal role in Central Asia to which it aspires.

Because Iran also has insufficient capital for aid to and investment in the region, the anticipated rivalry between Iran and Turkey had failed by the mid-1990s to develop into a serious contest. Turkey recognized that Russia, rather than Turkey or Iran, had emerged as the dominant political force in Central Asia, and that this situation would prevail indefinitely. Nevertheless, the new countries have professed friendship toward Turkey and welcomed its overtures. In response, Turkey has reoriented its policies to focus on strengthening bilateral cultural ties and encouraging Turkish private entrepreneurs to invest in the region. As of early 1995, Turkey enjoyed close diplomatic relations with the four Turkic republics of Central Asia and good relations with Persian-speaking Tajikistan.

**Middle Eastern Conflicts**

Despite its location, Turkey generally has been successful in pursuing a policy of non-interference and non-involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts. For instance, Turkey refrained from supporting either belligerent in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. Although both sides violated Turkish airspace, Turkey took no defensive action and sought to mediate an end to hostilities.

When the coalition air strikes on Iraq were launched in January 1991, ninety-six United States aircraft and several British bombers operated from the United States air base at Incirlik, refuelling at Batman, a base about 150 kilometres from the Iraqi border. Sorties continued from Incirlik until the cease-fire on February 28, 1991, without provoking retaliation from Saddam Husayn.

The major consequence of the Persian Gulf War from the standpoint of Turkish security was the uprising of the Kurds in northern Iraq and the exodus of Kurds toward Turkish territory to escape Saddam Husayn's brutal suppression of the rebellion. Turkey was decidedly reluctant to accept the Kurds as refugees, considering them a potential destabilizing factor in its struggle with domestic Kurdish dissidents.30

The Iraqi government's loss of control over Iraqi Kurdistan and elections in the area in May 1992 produced what was in effect an autonomous Kurdish government. Although Turkey permitted the lifeline to the Iraqi Kurdish enclave to originate on its territory, the Turks feared what they saw as the emerging outlines of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq. For this reason,  

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30 As an alternative, Turkey supported the UN-approved Operation Provide Comfort, which distributed relief and set up a safe haven in northern Iraq whose security was guaranteed by a coalition force of 2,000 soldiers from five countries. Incirlik served as the base for a rapid deployment of air forces to enforce a no-fly zone in the region.
Turkey resisted any international action that could lead to Iraq's dismemberment and thus endanger the regional status quo.

**Military Cooperation with the United States**

In accordance with bilateral defence arrangements under NATO auspices, the United States has developed and maintained several major military installations on Turkish bases.

No United States combat forces are based in Turkey, but elements of two United States Air Force fighter squadrons based in Italy are rotated periodically to Incirlik—the West's farthest forward-based tactical combat aircraft in the eastern Mediterranean. Çigli, a Turkish air base north of Izmir, is used by United States Air Force units in connection with NATO exercises. Three bases in eastern Turkey—at Erzurum, Batman, and Mus—were upgraded following a 1982 agreement to make them available for forward deployment of United States tactical aircraft under conditions of a NATO alert. Aircraft operating from them could cover the entire Turkish-Iranian-Transcaucasian border region without aerial refuelling.

Of particular significance are several electronic intelligence posts considered vital for monitoring Russian weapons and Moscow's compliance with strategic arms limitation agreements. 31

Air Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), first negotiated in 1969 and renewed numerous times, consolidated various bilateral accords governing the United States military presence in Turkey.

As a result of its 1988 renegotiation, the agreement is now known as the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA). Under the DECA, the number of United States personnel, including dependents, in Turkey—which had reached a peak of 25,000 in 1968—was reduced to 16,000 in 1970 and 9,000 by 1980. In 1991 the total was slightly above 10,000. Since that year, nearly all of the communications and naval facilities have been closed. In late 1994, United States personnel remained only at the air stations at Incirlik, Ankara, and Çigli, the intelligence posts at Pirinçlik and Belbasi, and a communications station at Karatas, near Incirlik. The number of United States personnel had been reduced to about 4,000.

Military assistance has been an intrinsic feature of the defence relationship between Turkey and the United States.

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31 A long-range radar system has been established at Pirinçlik, near Diyarbakir, to monitor Russian missile testing. At Belbasi, near Ankara, nuclear testing can be monitored by means of seismic data collection.
At the insistence of Congress, the appropriation of military funds for Greece and Turkey has for many years been on a seven-to-ten ratio. The Turkish government regards the aid formula as inequitable given that Turkey has a population about six times that of Greece, has correspondingly heavier NATO commitments, and is host to many NATO and United States military facilities. In 1994 the United States Congress held back 10 percent of the funds appropriated for Turkey until the Department of State could verify improvement of Turkey's human rights record and progress on confidence-building measures in Cyprus. Turkey considered this interference in its internal affairs and made no effort to have the funds restored.

Turkey's limited economic resources, juxtaposed against its heavy NATO obligation to contain Soviet power in the eastern Mediterranean, made such support indispensable until the Soviet threat receded in the late 1980s. 32

Turkey nevertheless has been the third largest recipient of United States military aid, after Israel and Egypt. Despite the end of the Soviet threat, Turkey's military needs during the Persian Gulf crisis resulted in a rapid rising of the level of grant aid.

Internal Security Concerns

Since the late 1960s, Turkey has been plagued by recurrent political violence. Radical groups responsible for terrorism have included movements of both leftist and rightist orientation, as well as ethnic and religious extremists. By far the most serious source of violence since the mid-1980s has been the Kurdish separatist insurgency, which by the mid-1990s had nearly assumed the character of a civil war in the south-eastern area of the country bordering Syria and Iraq. During the 1970s, various political groups--particularly ones on the left--used violence in the hope that civil disorder and the consequent suppression by the state might lead to revolution.

Even after civilian rule was restored in 1983, the continuation of martial law in certain areas, the expansion of police powers, and legal constraints on political movements dampened politically inspired violence.33 The uprising of Kurds in northern Iraq after the Persian Gulf War focused attention on the condition of Kurds in general; the PKK used the occasion to intensify its military operations in the Kurdish region of south-eastern Turkey.

32 Between 1950 and 1991, the United States provided military assistance valued at US$9.4 billion, of which about US$6.1 billion was in grant form and US$3.3 billion was on a concessional loan basis.
33 Terrorists incidents continued to occur in urban areas, but these were for the most part individually targeted bombings and assassinations, including attacks on United States installations and personnel. The number of such incidents peaked at seventy-five in 1991, most of them attributed to leftist protests against Turkey's strategic role in the international coalition against Iraq.
Religious interests-islamism vs. secularism

Turkey officially has been a secular state since 1924. Atatürk viewed attachment to religion as an impediment to modernization and imposed rigorous restrictions on the practice of Islam. As the government gradually became more tolerant of religious expression, both public observance of religious festivals and mosque construction increased. In addition, there was a resurgence of voluntary religious associations, including the *tarikatlar*\(^{34}\) Prior to 1970, however, religion was not a political issue.

The 1980 coup only temporarily interrupted the trend toward increased religious observance.

Initially, the military regime arrested Erbakan and other MSP leaders and put them on trial for politically exploiting religion in violation of Turkish law. However, the senior officers, although committed to secularism, wanted to use religion as a counter to socialist and Marxist ideologies and thus refrained from interfering with the *tarikatlar* and other voluntary religious associations. Furthermore, the generals approved an article in the 1982 constitution mandating compulsory religious instruction in all schools. When political parties were allowed to form in 1983, Özal's Motherland Party welcomed a large group of former MSP members, who probably were attracted to the party because Özal and some of his relatives had belonged to the MSP in the 1970s.

In 1987 the military had become persuaded that what it called "Islamic fundamentalism" was a potentially serious threat to its vision of Kemalism. The Welfare Party disassociated itself from violent attacks by both organized and unorganized religious fanatics, but such attacks increased in both frequency and severity in the 1990s.

Radical Islamic activism – sometimes described as fundamentalism – has been the source of some terrorism, in particular the murders of journalists, politicians, and academics who were outspoken defenders of Turkish secularism. Several Islamic groups have claimed responsibility for these deaths, among them the Islamic Movement Organization, about which little is known. Another obscure group, composed of local Islamists linked to the Iranian government, has targeted external enemies of Iran. The most sensational attack occurred in July 1993, when a mob leaving Friday congregational prayers in the central Anatolian city of Sivas firebombed a hotel where Turkey's internationally renowned author, self-proclaimed atheist Aziz Nesin, and dozens of other writers were staying while

\(^{34}\) tarikat (pl., tarikatlar) A Sufi order or lodge, usually headed by a teacher or master known as a seyh, in which devotees undertake a path of instruction toward spiritual perfection.
attending a cultural festival. Although Nesin escaped harm, thirty-seven persons were killed and 100 injured in that incident. Several weeks before the attack, Nesin's newspaper, Aydinlik, had published translated excerpts of British author Salman Rushdie's controversial 1988 novel, *The Satanic Verses*, which many Muslim religious leaders had condemned as blasphemous. Following publication of the excerpts, the newspaper's offices in Istanbul and other cities were attacked by groups of Islamic militants.

Turkey's religious revival has foreign policy implications because the tarikatlar tend to link with religious groups in other Muslim countries. Saudi Arabia, for example, has been an important source of the extensive financial support that has enabled the tarikatlar to proselytize and to operate charitable programs that enhance their political influence.

Islam lacks the equivalent of the Christian churches' organizations, bodies which can be clearly separated from the state. Lacking a church as a visible organ, Turks cannot understand what exactly it is that must be separated from the state. According to the Constitution, the Turkish Republic must be separated from the predominant Sunni sharia. An individual is free to observe religious practice in private life, but is forbidden to show it in state organizations. However, many Muslims find it simply impossible to hide their religion in state-controlled spaces. As a result, Turkey's rigid secularism is now facing a crisis.

The tension between secularism and democracy has been continuous in Turkey ever since the decision of the state founder, Mustafa-Kemal Ataturk, to separate religious activities from state activities. The constitutional principle of secularism (laiklik) is a very rigid one that requires individuals to be neutral in their public activities. This secularism has traditionally been espoused most strongly by the urban elite and defended by the military, but it now faces a serious challenge. When it came to power in 2002, the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP)'s position was that in its first five years of government it would not embark on any re-Islamization of the country's laws. This is because in Turkey at present the military and the judiciary are the only stable bodies protecting the constitution. Which ever party is governing Turkey at the time also condemns warnings from the military as threats against democracy.

Turkey's political system is more open than those of most Middle Eastern states, and to a large extent it has been able to accommodate Muslim political expression while marginalizing its radical elements. Nevertheless, radical Muslim groups are considered a threat to the secular political establishment. Although a link with the Iranian government has not been proven, Iranian mullahs are believed to give support and encouragement to extremist Muslims.
**Stabilizer or security risk?**

After describing the main areas of obstacles against Turkey’s EU accession it will be focused on the question of security. The present study is an attempt to elaborate the question, what kind of security challenges are being posed on the European Union by the accession process and the future membership of Turkey? Our study started from the five areas, which are concern the current political, economic, security and religion questions. This makes it possible to be able to give a proper answer to the hypothetic question. The EU’s security environment has been in a rapid change, since it was established. However it can be noted that one of the biggest transformations is happening in front of our eyes in form of the Turkish accession process to the EU.

Through the different -areas based, multidiscipline study was presented, whether or not the Turkey’s approach to the European integration poses a direct or an indirect security concern at the EU. Because of handling the different areas separately, the paper describes the Turkish “threat” on military, political, economic, and societal areas independently. The security sectors can only be separated hypothetically, and in real they interpedently influence one another.

The German minister of foreign affairs stated: „I know there are many uncertainties in Europe at the present time, but the prospect of Turkish membership, though obviously some time in the future, I think will be important for Europe and for its security” … Turkey in EU may 'boost security” 35

“I was previously one of those people who were 51 % in favour of Turkey's accession and 49 % beset by doubts. I have fundamentally changed my position following the attacks of September 11th. Since then it has become ever clearer that European integration also has a strategic dimension.” -continued Joschka Fisher.

In the discussion about a Turkish EU-membership the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer has been in the forefront promoting a membership, therefore we have chosen the quotation above to discuss some of the security issues that have been brought to light.

But what is this strategic dimension? A strategic dimension against what? What is this new “enemy”? What role does this give Turkey? Fishers’ statement above sums up the new concerns that have emerged in a rather satisfactory way. As mentioned before, the EU cooperation began as pragmatic project in order to make balance in the historic dimension. However, after the fall of the Berlin

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wall in 989 a completely new threat emerged in Afghanistan. This was no military threat as none of the west’s military might has been affected by the new terror wave. This is not really a military war as there is no singular state that can be called guilty; this is a war against a new “invisible” enemy. The terrorist group (Al-Qaeda) had declared a war driven by a totalitarian ideology. And this is a danger towards the west’s’ open society and way of life; Europe needs to unite in a new way as “We Europeans have to ask if we can grow close enough together to bring our weight to bear. One must also view the debate on Turkey in this light.”

A Turkish membership is essential in this” new” unification as” narrow visions of Europe simply do not work any more. They do not enable our continent to achieve the necessary strategic dimension. And that is indispensable.” Turkey has emerged as one of the leading actors in the fight against global terrorism. Turkey rigorously supported the international coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, when it became clear that the September 11 attacks had originated from Afghanistan.

The events of September 11 have proven that Turkey is strategically important, not only for the Americans but also for the Europeans. Turkey has therefore taken advantage of this opportunity in order to boost up relations with the U.S. and Europe by emphasizing its importance as a pro-Western power in such a critical context.

There is no doubt that even if the EU separates itself from the Middle East by oceans, it has a clear interest of being influential in the region, and will not be able to avoid that at any rate, even if the involvement is quite reluctant. The Middle East is at the core of the unions’ problem spots.

The Middle East profoundly affects the EU with its oil, terrorism, migration, human trafficking, narcotics, arms proliferation, etc. At the present, the EU is affected by problems originating from the Middle East, but it lacks the means to deal with them. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a typical example. Even though the EU allocates vast resources to this region, and others for that matter, the EU has difficulty in obtaining results. It has been unable to attain a role in the Middle East on par with the US. Neither in terms of impact, nor in prestige, has the EU raised to the status that their effort warrants. On the other hand, the September 11 attacks and the Iraq War clearly proofs that Middle Eastern events are going to affect Europe, just as they do with the rest of the world. A Turkish membership may grant the EU the desired means and the power to affect the region.

**The geopolitical advantage**

36 Fisher in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 06.03.2004
Turkey has always played an important role when it comes to global security politics. Turkey has always seen itself as a part of Europe, that is the reason that Turkey, despite its Islamic heritage, has stayed out of the Middle Eastern conflict, in fear of being regarded as a Middle Eastern country.

During the cold war Turkey played an active role on the allied side with membership in NATO, OECD and the council of Europe. Its geographical position made it strategically important. With the end of the cold war Turkey’s international importance began to fade, though it continued to play an important role during the gulf war. But this was in no way near it former importance, but more of a logistic importance. The Kurdish question played here also an important but somewhat different role. But this changed fundamentally after the 9/11 attacks and the second war in Iraq.

A Turkish membership would truly generate the region a lot making it a more ”heavy weight” player in the international system. From a security perspective Turkeys military might is of substantial size, this would make the union as a whole a lot more dominant.

The security political gains of a Turkish membership are substantial. Turkey would be a unifying link between Europe and Asia. Sending two clear messages to the world; the European Union is not a wealthy Christian club and that a secular Islamic country can implement democracy in the western sense.

Also Turkey, as the only secular and democratic Islamic country in the region, can, as mentioned, contribute to the war against international terrorism. Turkey is the pillar of NATO’s south east defence system. The countries surrounding Turkey supply 60 percent of the natural gas and petroleum demand of Europe. The importance of Turkey, with regard to security and defence policy, has been apparent in several crisis situations such as the September 11 attacks and the Iraq war. In consideration of the new political objective and the security concerns of the EU, Turkey is vital in terms of providing stability in the regions of the Eastern- Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasus. These are regions were the European Union has been criticized for a lacking involvement.

The strongest factor in favour of Turkey’s membership is its unique geo-strategic position. It is virtually impossible to define Turkey as belonging to one region or continent: it is an Asian, European, Middle Eastern, Caucasian, Balkan and Caspian country. For this very reason, many of the most pressing matters in international affair are directly linked to Turkey as can be seen by a wide variety of issues such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the stabilisation of the Balkans, the Palestinian question, as well as energy. Equally, given its pivotal location,
Turkey is undoubtedly an ideal launch pad for any military action in the Middle East. It is indeed problematic for Europe and the US to take any action in the region without at least tacit Turkish support and assistance. The refusal of the Turkish authorities to allow US forces to open up a northern front to the 2003 Iraq war did hamper coalition efforts, and while it may not have dealt a critical blow to the campaign, it was undoubtedly a diplomatic setback.

Enlargement was the EU’s immediate post Cold War policy towards the former communist countries in an attempt to foster a wider pan European security community predicated on the basis of shared values and principles. Enlargement policy is therefore most fundamentally concerned with extending the EU’s internal and external security. The logic advanced argues that by tying states firmly into European institutional, political and economic structures, security threats will be negated. This is also the logic which underscores the EU’s alternative policy to Enlargement, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP – an umbrella policy instrument which aims to direct a coherent policy towards fostering favourable relations in the wider European Neighbourhood – although not offering membership, still aims to establish economic and social ties with European institutions.

**Energy security**

While Turkey’s importance for the trans-Atlantic security structure in the Cold War era was linked to its geostrategic role for NATO, the US and the EU now see Ankara as a key ally in energy policy.

Turkey occupies an ideal geographic location for energy supplies, as a gateway between the oil- and gas-rich former Soviet countries and South-eastern Europe, and between the Black Sea region and the Middle East.

However, Turkey’s strategic significance in energy security has risen in recent years also because of Russia’s assertive energy policy in the context of US-Russian competition in Eastern Europe, the Caspian region and Central Asia. This has become even more evident since the 15-17 August Eurasian Economic Community summit held in Sochi, on the Black Sea, which gathered together Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Moscow agreed with Minsk and Astana to create a customs union, while another project involves a common market.

As a result, Russia seems to have gained the upper hand in Central Asia, and at the same time, Moscow’s recent gas deal with Algeria likely will increase Europe’s dependence upon Russian gas.

Turkey’s independence from Russian-dominated energy markets is consequently an important asset for Europe. London, together with Washington,
actively promoted the construction and commercial launch of the recently inaugurated Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, whose geopolitical significance has been often interpreted as basically anti-Russian.

However, in recent years, Russia’s relationship with Turkey has featured a complex combination of political competition (mainly in Central Asia) and economic cooperation. Generally speaking, Moscow’s relations with Ankara have become friendlier, and Russia has even been courting Turkey to engage in more extensive collaboration in the energy field.

Hence, the American diplomacy recently warned Ankara to work with the US-EU combine so as not to allow Russia to play a monopolist role in Europe’s energy supplies. Moscow, however, maintains that energy cooperation with Turkey is “inevitable,” and that nobody can prevent the two players from effectively coordinating their energy strategies.

It was told that “the US and EU should not think that there will be an absolute alternative between Russia or Turkey: at a time of globalization and economic interdependence, the answer to Western energy needs is rather Russia and Turkey”.

According to Ankara “favourably sees itself as a major energy hub to Southern Europe.”

Turkey’s energy cooperation will not be limited to Russia. Azerbaijan and Iran will also play a major role. British Petroleum (BP) will soon complete the South Caucasus pipeline linking the Azeri offshore field of Shah Deniz to Erzurum in Turkey; the Nabucco project, a planned pipeline linking northern Iran to Europe through the Caspian and Turkey, also has a good chance of being approved. Hence, Turkey will not only guarantee its own energy security, but also will be able to redistribute gas to Italy and even to Israel in the future.

As reminded: “Turkey and Greece are already building a 300-kilometer connector that will be finished by the end of the year and will make it possible to deliver gas to Italy.”

Being well aware of its strategic role in energy security, Turkey seems eager to take full advantage of it and does not appear overly concerned by US and EU anxieties over Russia. Rather than a context marked by rigid alternatives and fierce Turkish-Russian competition, the future is most likely to bring a more complex game in which cooperation and competition will coexist, with regional players opting for flexible strategies to suit their political and economic needs.

*American involvement*
The United States have always advocated a Turkish membership, in the past America expressed this outline quite clearly, and as America is the only remaining superpower in the international system we need to characterize its impact in this process.

The American stance in the EU-Turkey question was very evident at 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul. But it has proven difficult for the Americans to support Turkey and thereby inflicting actual changes in the unions’ policies, without jeopardizing relations with its states. One might call it a double edged sword, as American lobbying efforts are greatly appreciated in Ankara, some European leaders regard the US efforts as an interference with Europe’s internal affairs Jacques Chirac has been one of the main critics of the US involvement, saying that America should mind their own business. America has though tuned downed their lobbying efforts because they realize that this might hurt the transatlantic relations even more.

The American support is largely driven by strategic concerns, particularly a desire to see Turkey firmly integrated to the West at a time when the Greater Middle East have become a key U.S. strategic priority. The financial costs of Turkish membership and its impact on EU institutions are viewed in Washington as secondary issues.

In the recent years transatlantic relations has not been on par with those just a couple of years ago, but a Turkish membership might not all be all that good for The United States. The Turkish membership in the EU could change the nature of U.S.-Turkish relations.

As a Turkey integrated into the EU will be a more "European" Turkey one which will have to act in conjunction with its new European identity. This would inevitably affect the nature of U.S.-Turkish relations. The US failure lies not so much in the ineffectiveness of many of its military actions, as in its underestimation of the difficulties of building a secular nation-state in the Muslim world.

Defence alliances in particular could be affected. The U.S. is the largest supplier of goods and services to Turkey. Once in the EU, however, Turkey will come under increased pressure to buy European weaponry, as been the case in many of the new eastern European members. Thus over time, Turkey is likely to broaden its defence relationships with other European suppliers.

The US failure lies not so much in the ineffectiveness of many of its military actions, as in its underestimation of the difficulties of building a secular nation-state in the Muslim world.
**Turkey as a US Security Partner**

In the future Turkey is likely to be drawn more heavily into the Middle East by the Kurdish issue, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the fallout from the crisis in Lebanon. Given its growing equities in the Middle East, as well as the current strains in U.S.–Turkish relations, Turkey will be even more reluctant to allow the United States to use its bases in the future, particularly the air base at Incirlik, to undertake combat operations in the Middle East.

Moreover, given the importance of the Kurdish issue for Turkish security, Turkey has strong reasons to pursue good ties with Iran and Syria, both of which share Turkey’s desire to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. Turkey’s growing energy ties with Iran have reinforced interest in that particular relationship. Thus, Turkey is unlikely to support U.S. policies aimed at isolating Iran and Syria or overthrowing the regimes in either country.

While it does not perceive an existential threat from a nuclear-armed Iran, Ankara fears that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could destabilize the Gulf region. However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government is strongly opposed to a military strike against Tehran, which it believes could further destabilize the region. Thus, the United States could not count on the use of Turkish bases in any military operation against Iran. Indeed, such a strike could provoke a serious crisis in U.S.–Turkish relations and significantly exacerbate current strains with Ankara.

In the near term, however, the most important source of potential discord between the United States and Turkey is likely to be over how to deal with the terrorist attacks the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) conducts from sanctuaries in northern Iraq.

Ankara does not want to see a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq because that could lead to greater sectarian violence and draw in other outside powers especially Iran and Syria, but possibly also Saudi Arabia. However, Turkey is adamantly opposed to increased deployment of U.S. troops in northern Iraq.

Turkey has essentially three options for countering the Iranian nuclear challenge:

- expand cooperation on missile defence with the United States and Israel;
- beef up its conventional capabilities, especially medium-range missiles;

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37 Source: RAND Corporation report Thursday, April 10, 2008
• develop its own nuclear capability.

The third of these would clearly be a last resort. It would only be undertaken if there were a serious deterioration of Turkey’s security situation, i.e., if relations with the United States seriously deteriorated and if NATO’s security guarantees no longer appeared credible. But given Turkey’s current difficulties with Washington and Brussels – as well as the growing strength of nationalism in Turkey of late – the nuclear option cannot be entirely excluded.

The prospect that Iran may develop nuclear weapons is likely to heighten Turkish interest in missile defence. However, current U.S. plans to deploy elements of a missile-defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic are designed to provide protection against long-range missile threats from Iran and North Korea. They exclude Turkey and parts of southern Europe. Therefore, as it shapes its approach to missile defence in the coming decade, the United States also needs to consider how this deployment will affect Turkish security. Otherwise, current plans – which leave Turkey exposed – could exacerbate Turkish security concerns and generate new strains in U.S.–Turkish relations.

**Turkey-EU and -U.S. Relations: The Way Ahead?**

As a result of the disproportionate reaction against the threat of terrorism, the U.S. had to face a serious image and confidence problem in most parts of the world. According to surveys, the U.S. is the first country who is being perceived as a threat to world security. The new president of the U.S., Barack Obama, who diagnosed this problem appropriately, appeared on the scene with a new world vision and won an important victory. The Obama administration seems to focus on repairing the bad image of the U.S. following the Bush term. For this reason, we expect a new transformation from the security and threat based U.S. foreign policy towards freedom, democracy, and human rights based point of view.

In parallel with the change in U.S.’ moral values, an improvement may be anticipated regarding the relations with the EU. As is known, in the Bush term, the U.S. was complaining for not sufficiently acquiring support from its European counterparts. On the contrary, the EU leaders accused the U.S. of acting unilaterally and claimed that it did not respect universal values; consequently, this endangered the “moral values platform” which would favour cooperation. Actually, in Obama’s term, the U.S. and the EU may take the necessary steps to meet at this essential point.

Undoubtedly, the issue is also crucial for both Turkey-U.S. and Turkey-EU relations. Since the end of the Cold War, perhaps this is the first time that the foreign goals of the US and Turkey have fallen along the same lines. Obama’s visit to Turkey and his speech in the parliament constitute historical
opportunities for Turkey. Besides, the EU’s increase of the common denominator with the U.S. is an important advantage regarding Turkey’s membership. EU leaders’ and U.S.’ displays of cooperation beyond all forecasts can be assessed as encouraging developments for Turkey.

It was argued that Turkey is confronting a dilemma between democratization and maintaining the core state principles of indivisibility and secularism. Turkish Islamists have sincerely adopted and skilfully used Western values and standards such as liberalism and democracy. The secularists, meanwhile, have lost their progressive profile. In previous decades Western values such as democracy and human rights have been demanded of the Turkish nation as conditions for its economic and political development.

However, at a time when the Turkish Republic is facing both internal and external threats, further implementing Western standards threatens the unity of the state. Any reduction in state unity directly weakens Turkey's strategic power in the Middle East. In fact, Islamists from the Maghreb to South East Asia, who previously regarded Turkey as an enemy of Islamic law, are now expecting the Islamist-reformist government to push ahead with constitutional reforms.

At recent AKP meetings, enthusiastic young party supporters have taken to chanting „we are the Ottomans“. Such behaviour suggests that the party is encouraging its supporters in the ambition to build a leading Muslim state. For the Turkish Islamist mainstream, the Ottoman Empire is a positive symbol of Turkish ambition. Of course, they have no intention of annexing territory in the Balkans, but joining the EU has a symbolic significance as a westward thrust of Islamic revival. The AKP government's dogged pursuit of accession talks with the EU despite all manner of insults from EU member states makes sense if the AKP has the strategic objective of EU membership as a symbolic resurgence of the Islamic state in Europe.

Turkey has two options: to allow Islamization in accordance with the „national will", or to protect secularism through judicial procedure or military intervention. It is hard to see a compromise solution. In democratic countries, political issues should be discussed in parliament and not in the court room. The present chaotic situation in the Middle East is the result of parliamentary decisions in the West including the EU member states. Even today, the EU does not understand what is needed for stabilization of the region.

Turkey’s strategic involvement is also critical in combating the proliferation of non-traditional security threats in the post 9/11 security environment. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) outlined a renewed rationale for Europe’s security policy, proposing a wide-reaching definition of the security threats faced by the EU. The biggest problems facing Europe are
terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, ethnic conflicts, border disputes and energy. Issues such as migration and immigration have also become securitised in the contemporary security environment. Of all these issues, perhaps energy is the most pressing in today’s environment. Turkey is not only a vital energy hub but is also a base and secure intermediary for EU energy supplies travelling from the Caspian and Middle East to European users. The question of Europe’s energy dependence simply cannot be ignored following Russia’s military action in Georgia. Turkey can play a crucial role in helping EU states secure their supplies and avert a European energy crisis and its security implications.

It has been assumed that there is no other visible and favourable political orientation or serious strategic alternatives for Turkey other than its full participation in the EU. After all, the EU is viewed as the foremost international organisation which can guarantee Turkey’s economic development and political stability. This would seem, however, a little complacent. Turkey’s long strategic alignment with the West has been informed by Kemalist foreign policy guidelines of regional non-involvement and strategic engagement with the West. Turkey itself has begun to search for alternatives to its Western dominated foreign policy. Chief Foreign Policy Advisor has formulated a doctrine of ‘Strategic Depth’ which proposes that Turkey should not be dependent on any single actor and should therefore actively seek to balance its relationships and alliances in order to maintain optimal independence and leverage on the global stage. If spurned by the West, there is a real possibility that Turkey could reach out to other significant regional actors such as Iran and Russia. In fact, recent economic and energy deals between these countries signal tentative beginnings towards a more formalised alignment.

Although the strategic, political and economic dimensions of Turkey’s EU membership have been anything but insignificant, the surrounding debate has primarily been a proxy for debates about the future vision of the EU itself, constantly framed in terms of what exactly it means to be a European state. The EU itself has professed its aim to become a truly global actor. One cannot deny the geopolitical legitimacy which Turkish membership would add to the EU and it would be a crucial step forward towards achieving a more prominent and credible role as an international actor. Turkish membership can serve the EU’s self interests as well as extending the EU’s security community. The perceived security risks generated by Turkish membership are arguably risks which the EU must face; with or without Turkey, the EU member-state.

Conclusions

Although Turkey’s pivotal geostrategic proximity to conflict zones is a primary factor in cost-benefit analysis of Turkish membership, one should not
ignore the potential of Turkey to act as a powerful paradigm to the wider Muslim world.

The EU will have to confront security risks associated with the war against terrorism and other non-traditional security threats, with or without Turkey as a member.

Ultimately, Turkish membership can serve the EU’s self interests, extending the EU’s security community and enhancing the geopolitical legitimacy of the EU as a global security actor.

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Summary

In 2000 the monopoly of the so-called state language examination was abolished and a new ministerial decree introduced the system of accreditation. According to the decree, the testing centres completing the accreditation process successfully obtain the right to conduct language examinations and issue language examination certificates which are recognized everywhere in Hungary.

The testers of the Testing Centre of the National Defence University have participated in the development and accreditation of two military language examination systems: the ARMA bilingual military language examinations (which was accredited in 2001) and the NATO STANAG 6001 monolingual military language examinations (accredited in 2005.)

The basic problem is to develop tests which are valid and reliable, which have a beneficial backwash effect on teaching, and which are practical. This paper presents how we do it at our language testing centre.

Introduction

Some general information about the testing systems in Hungary

The real change in the Hungarian language examination system took place in 2000. This was the year when the monopoly of the so-called state language examination was abolished and a new ministerial decree introduced the system of accreditation. This new system rendered possible the operation of different language examination systems and testing centres in Hungary. According to the decree, the testing centres completing the accreditation process successfully obtain the right to conduct language examinations and issue language examination certificates which are recognized everywhere in Hungary.

At present there are 22 accredited language examination centres in Hungary, which conduct 37 different types of language examinations. 19 of them are bilingual and the rest are monolingual systems. Interestingly, almost half of the accredited systems are specialized language examinations, for example, military language examinations, business language examinations, diplomacy language examinations, etc.

All these centres work under the supervision of two bodies: the Accreditation Centre and the Accreditation Board, the former is in charge of the administrative control, while the latter is responsible for the quality control of the examination centres.
The Language Examination Accreditation Centre and the Accreditation Board, coordinate, monitor and supervise the work of the accredited testing centres. The supervisory bodies hold meetings and briefings for the centres on a regular basis and every second year they conduct an exhaustive review of each testing centre. During the review process the Accreditation Board examines whether the centres operate in compliance with the standards of accreditation. (The accreditation is not a right obtained for an unlimited time period. It should be extended every second year and it can be withdrawn or suspended at any time if a violation of the standards is detected and proved.) The representatives of the Board come to the centres, meet the testers and administrators, visit some oral and writing examinations, check the documents and the marked papers and the review process ends for the testing centre with an evaluation report from the Board, which usually includes several ideas and suggestions for improvement.

**The Testing Centre of Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University** was established in 2001 and since then the testers of the Centre have participated in the development and accreditation of two military language examination systems: the ARMA bilingual military language examinations and the NATO STANAG 6001 monolingual military language examinations.

When preparing the examination tasks for the accreditation, we had to pay very careful attention to the language needs of Hungarian officers and NCOs. In the sample tasks that we presented to the Hungarian Accreditation Board we were supposed to provide a detailed explanation for the introduction/inclusion of each exam task: we had to explain to the accreditation board why we decided to use that particular task and how it is related to the language needs of Hungarian officers or NCOs.

Therefore a careful research preceded the compilation of the examination tasks in all 3 levels:

− we conducted interviews with officers and NCOs, many of whom former students of the university’s language institute, who had returned from foreign assignments. We got feedback from them, they described for us the most typical situations in which they had to use the language during their everyday work abroad, they told us which skills were the most necessary for them, what language problems they had to face etc.

− we also studied some job descriptions of soldiers serving in NATO positions.

− In 2001, two teachers from the National Defence University got the opportunity to travel to Brussels and conduct interviews with the Hungarian officers and NCOs serving at the NATO headquarters at that time. These interviews gave us more insight into the tasks and language problems of officers and NCOs.
On the basis of all these, we identified the most typical language tasks on the particular levels and we kept all this in mind during the task selection process.

**Reliability of the STANAG Exams**

1. To make our exam more reliable we test the candidate's ability in more than one way.
   - Grammatical knowledge is tested by the multiple-choice test, guided composition and oral exam;
   - Communication is checked by oral conversation, giving opinions and guided composition;
   - Reading skills are tested by reading comprehension tasks;
   - Listening skills are tested by listening comprehension tasks and during oral exams.

We employ both receptive and productive tasks to test the four skills.

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2. All of our tasks are controlled. This means that during oral exams examiners have the questions they have to ask so that the examinee will perform nearly in the same way at any examination board.

   In the written exam the compositions are guided.

   We restrict the freedom of candidates because the greater the restrictions imposed on the candidates, the more directly comparable the performances of different candidates will be.

3. It is very important to write unambiguous items. The candidate should not be presented with items with unclear meanings or to which there is an acceptable answer which the test writer didn't think about, or to which there is more than one acceptable answer.

   For this reason, we always ask our colleagues to moderate the new items and find alternative interpretations to the ones intended.

   We also try to pretest the new items on a group of people comparable to those for whom the test is prepared.

4. It is essential to provide clear and explicit instructions both in written exams, indicating the time allowed, the score, the length of the task and oral exams informing candidates about the tasks they will have to do. Weak candidates especially often misinterpret what they are asked to do.
5. We ensure that tests are well laid out and perfectly legible.

6. We expect candidates to be familiar with the format and testing techniques employed in the STANAG exams and have provided all relevant information on task types, scoring, time, and topics on the university website. Additionally, practice tests are freely available.

7. We take great care to ensure ideal conditions for exam administration. The written exam is always organised in a 100-seat hall, which is very quiet and well lit. There are 5 or 6 trained invigilators present during the exam. (1 invigilator/20 candidates)

The listening exams always take place in language laboratories.

8. Scorer reliability is essential to test reliability. Therefore we regularly train our examiners how to use our marking guides. Scoring of the multiple-choice test is the most objective as there can be only one correct answer. The marking guide is very detailed. The set of symbols for correcting grammar, vocabulary, style, etc. are also compulsory for every marker. Each test is double marked. Before handing in the corrected works, markers have to discuss the points they didn't agree on.

We also enclose a questionnaire for markers as to whether the marking guide has worked well or not.

9. We identify our candidates by numbers, not names. So the marker (rater) does not know whose work he or she is correcting.

We try to ensure the reliability of the STANAG exam system on the basis of three elements:

- observance of the regulations for the conduct of examinations;
- continuous pretesting and renewal of items;
- continuous training and observing of testers.

The following block diagram illustrates the procedure of conducting our exams.
Diagram of organising exams

Start

Announcement of examination session (deadline for application)

Distribution of application forms, information about the conditions of application

Application for the exam

Collecting application forms

Sorting applicants according to the language and level

Languages  Levels

Only oral exam?

YES

ORGANIZATION OF THE WRITTEN EXAM
- Assurance of examination rooms
- Preparing test records
- Selection of invigilators
- Compilation of written test
- Selecting markers

NO

Contracts for:
- preparing items;
- invigilation;
- correcting tests

CORRECTING WRITTEN TASKS
- deadline - 20 days
- Coding examinees’ names

ADMINISTRATION
- scoring declaring the results

1 oral

2 written

3 failed

Application forms, checks, sample tasks
Information on notice board and on website
Application form, two envelopes, cheque

Entering data into the computer

Filling in test records
- Checking exams
- checking test records and correction of written tests

on the board of the Testing Centre

Start
The diagram describes organised activity, based on disciplined work and unified principles. The purpose is to decide in as wide spectrum as possible, in the most reliable way, whether a candidate's knowledge meets the requirements of the exam or not. The biggest part of the process though can ensure only the suitability of the measuring means. The real measurement, testing, namely the reliability of performance in an exam situation that is the correlation between real knowledge and the result of the exam, also depends on scorers' subjectivity. The key task is to ensure that the measuring of knowledge is always based on the same criteria. What does that mean? Usage of control means which are independent of the procedure itself, which are able to judge the validity of the test, evaluation of the testers, and to demonstrate possible mistakes in an objective way. This control means is statistics, which indicate unforeseen problems in the examination process in an objective way, on the basis of test results.

The applied procedure goes to two groups. On the one hand, the multiple-choice tests are measured by so-called scale analyses, on the other hand, the partial scores and the final scores are measured by ANOVA Analyses of Variance. In the interest of the reliability of our examination system, we carry out statistical analyses after each session and we use the results of the analyses in the preparation of the following exam.

Here are several types of information that our Testing Centre collects and analyses in order to decide whether the test was satisfactory. The statistician who works for the institution reports the relevant statistics and interprets the figures. The results indicate whether different parts of the test were performing as intended and, if not, where the major problem areas seem to be. This quantitative statistical information is combined with qualitative feedback collected from administrators, candidates, and examiners.

Conclusion

The first thing that testers have to be clear about is the purpose of testing in any particular situation. The basic problem is to develop tests which are valid and reliable, which have a beneficial backwash effect on teaching, and which are practical.

They are designed to test the ability of students with different language training backgrounds. The content of a proficiency test is not based on the content or objectives of language courses. Rather, it is based on a specification of what candidates have to be able to do in the language in order to be considered proficient. Proficient means having sufficient command of the language for a particular purpose.
The purpose of the STANAG military language test is to prove that candidates have sufficient proficiency and are ready **linguistically** to perform their job in the target situation. (for example to decide whether the candidate is able to work in NATO peacekeeping missions.)

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**EU-ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA
AT THE BEGINNING OF 2011**

**Introduction**

The civil war raging on and off in the Eastern African state of Somalia since the ousting of the country’s last president, Siad Barre in January 1991, is arguably one of the most complex and – as of yet - inextricable conflict in the world. The international community – United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), European Union (EU), neighboring states, etc. – has on more than occasion attempted to bring peace to the country, so far, without success. Currently, however, there is an increased awareness of the problems of Somalia, partly because of the piracy activity emanating from the country. Because of the threats to international shipping and the possibility of Somalia acting as a safe haven for terrorists and Islamist radicals, there is an increased readiness and willingness, especially on part of the EU, to stabilize the country and helping to solve some of its problems. The current paper, thus, gives first a short overview of the country’s history up to this date. In the second part, we examine the work and goals of the EU’s training mission to Somalia (EUTM). In the third and final part, we take a look at the anti-piracy efforts of the European Union (EUNAVFOR-ATALANTA).
History of Somalia and the current situation in the country

The Somali Republic gained independence on 1 July 1960. Somalia was formed by the union of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. A socialist state was established following a coup led by Major General Muhammad Siad Barre in 1969. Rebel forces finally ousted the Barre regime in 1991, but turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy ensued. Somalia has been without a stable central government ever since Barre fled the country in 1991. Subsequent fighting among rival faction leaders resulted in the killing, dislocation, and starvation of thousands of Somalis and led the United Nations to intervene militarily. In 1992, responding to the political chaos and humanitarian disaster in Somalia, the United States and other nations launched peacekeeping operations to create an environment in which assistance could be delivered to the Somali people. By March 1993, the potential for mass starvation in Somalia had been overcome, but the security situation remained fragile. On 3 October 1993, US troops received significant causalities (19 dead over 80 others wounded) in a battle with Somali gunmen. When the United States and the UN withdrew their forces from Somalia, in 1994 and 1995 respectively, order still had not been restored. Conflict between rival warlords and their factions continued throughout the 1990s. No stable government emerged to take control of the country. A transitional government was formed in 2000, but soon lost power. Somaliland and Puntland, two regions in the north broke away from the country and set up regional, semi-autonomous governments. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States began to take a more active role in Somalia's affairs, fearing that the country had become a haven for terrorists. Other Western governments hoped to bring stability to Somalia for similar reasons. In January 2004, representatives of the Somali society – with the mediation of the United Nations (UN) and the sub-regional organization IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) – reached a power-sharing agreement after talks in Kenya. This agreement called for a 275-member parliament, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed. This was the 14th attempt at a government since 1991. The head of the new government became the former warlord Abdullahi Yusuf.

The TFG, however, never became operational in Somalia, partly because it was suspected by the Somalis as the proxy of Ethiopia, Somalia’s old foe. During 2006, a new force emerged in Somalia instead of the hapless TFG, which controlled only about 10% of the country: the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU was a group of sharia courts who united themselves to form a rival administration to the TFG of Somalia, with current president Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as head of the ICU. The Islamic movement's growing power base and militancy led to an increasingly open warfare between the Islamists and other factions, including the TFG. Moreover, the ICU obtained the support of
Ethiopia's rival, Eritrea and foreign mujahidin, and declared jihad against Ethiopia. To counter this threat, Ethiopia – with the backing of Washington – crossed the border to Somalia and attacked the Islamists. By January 2007, the Ethiopian government had claimed victory over the ICU, which had effectively been dispersed. In its place, a militant rebel group, generally called al-Shabaab, continued to fight against the TFG and Ethiopian forces. To help the TFG in order to establish security, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) was called into life. The AMISOM is currently authorized to deploy as many as 12,000 peacekeepers to the country. (As of March 2011, 8300 soldiers from Uganda and Burundi have been deployed.) In December 2008, Ethiopian soldiers withdrew from Somalia, leaving behind only the AMISOM contingent of several thousand troops to help the new and fragile coalition government, which was formed in the neighbouring Djibouti following the resignation of President Abdullahi Yusuf in the December 2008.

The new government is headed by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former head of the ICU. Following Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia, the southern half of the country rapidly fell into the hands of radical Islamist rebels, of whom the most organized is the al-Shabaab, which has pledged loyalty with, and has contacts to, al-Qaida. The rebels quickly routed the government and AU troops in several key provinces, establishing sharia law in areas under their control. In May 2009, the rebels attacked the capital city of Mogadishu, capturing most of the city but failing to overthrow the government, which maintained control over a few square kilometres of the city. On July 11 2010, the al-Shabaab carried out suicide bombings against crowds watching a screening of the final match of the 2010 FIFA World Cup at two locations in Kampala, Uganda. The bombings left 74 dead and 70 injured and constituted the first attack of al-Shabaab outside of Somalia. According to an al-Shabaab spokesman, the bombings were in retaliation for Uganda’s part in AMISOM.

As of March 2011, the al-Shabaab and other Islamist are in charge in most parts of Somalia. Nevertheless, the TFG, bolstered by AMISOM troops, chalked up some notable successes in Mogadishu. An al-Shabaab offensive in August and September 2010 was aimed at taking control of the capital but failed dismally. Some 700 al-Shabaab fighters were killed and many more wounded. Across most of the city, AU troops pushed back al-Shabaab positions by as much as a kilometre. The presidential palace remains within range of al-Shabaab fire, but the port - under regular attack six months ago - has not been hit by a mortar since October 2010.38 Thanks to further offensives, AMISOM and TFG troops now had control of seven districts in the capital, leaving six contested and three under rebel control. Moreover, forces loyal to the TFG have made inroads

38 „Sending the boys home”, The Economist, 18 December 2010
in the countryside as well: for example, they have captured the strategically important Bulo Hawo town near the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders.\(^{39}\)

It would be premature, however, to underestimate the strength of the al-Shabaab. The radical militia still controls about 80% of the countryside, including Kismayo, the second biggest city, and the half of Mogadishu. The rebels are extremely well-motivated and, because of the constant fighting against Ethiopian, AMISOM and TFG troops in the last couple of years, have a lot of experience, especially in urban warfare. The recent successes by AMISOM can be probably explained by the inner problems of the al-Shabaab. According to insiders, a group of al-Shabaab commanders, mainly from south-central Somalia, led by Mukhtar Robow, feel marginalized by Ahmed Godane, his deputy, from the northern Somaliland region and foreign jihadist fighters (Pakistanis, Afghans, Algerians, etc.) who support him. It seems also, that the goal of the two factions is different: the more moderate, “Somali” faction favors talks to resolve their differences with the TFG and also want aid agencies to greatly expand their area of operations, currently very limited by insecurity. The more radical, “international jihadist” factions shuns negotiations, and wants to establish a radical Islamist caliphate in Somalia, from where to spread the revolution to other states in the region, and, ultimately, to the world. These divisions between the al-Shabaab - always a heterogeneous group - could be the reason for the current success of AMISOM.

**EUTM**

Analysts agree that it will be impossible to counter al-Shabaab by foreign troops alone. The European Union has therefore decided to set up a military mission to contribute to training of Somali security forces. In its decision of 19 February 2010, the Council stated the goals of the European Union Training Mission Somalia (EUTM) as follows: “In particular, the objective of the EU military mission shall be to contribute to a comprehensive and sustainable perspective for the development of the Somali security sector by strengthening the Somali security forces through the provision of specific military training, of 2 000 Somali recruits up to and including platoon level, including appropriate modular and specialised training for officers and non-commissioned officers.”\(^{40}\) The training of the first batch of the Somali security forces has started in the beginning of May 2010. This mission takes place in Uganda: the training camp is in the west of the country, in Bihanga, while the headquarters of the mission is in the capital, Kampala.

\(^{39}\) “Somalia: Government captures al-Shabab militia bases”, *BBC*, 7 March 2011

Most of the approximately 1000 recruits are undergoing basic military training from Ugandan instructors, but 330 have been selected as having officer, or non-commissioned officer, potential. They are receiving specialist instruction from the approximately 150 EU trainers coming from 14 EU countries on the base. Specialist topics include medical knowledge, communication, land-mine and improvised explosive device detection and so forth. In recognition of the importance attached to the mission by the wider international community, the United States is offering support by providing uniforms and other equipment for the Somalis, transport from Somalia to Uganda and salaries for recruits - US$600 in total for the six months of the training course - as well as continued payment after they return to Mogadishu.

The recruits were vetted by the TFG in Mogadishu, with the support of American officials. The recruits supposedly represent a cross-section of the Somali clans, however, “the selection process favours certain clans, especially the Abgal. Because recruits are provided by the TFG, and some elements of the training now occur in Mogadishu, self-governing regional enclaves have largely refused to participate.” According to an observer, at the beginning of the training process in Bihanga, the recruits were only socializing within their respective clans. After a couple of weeks, however, the recruits began to mix with fellow Somalis from other clans, in line with one of he goals of EUTM, which is to foster a sense of brotherhood, cooperation and “Somaliness” among the recruits. In order to prevent the recruits from desertion once back in Mogadishu, the troops will get a substantial salary financed by the international community as well as decent living conditions in the al-Jazeera military camp built by the Americans. Every recruit had his fingerprint taken and iris scanned, to be able to identify and track him once back in Mogadishu.

Although the training program went mostly without problems, there were complaints by recruits about language problems, poor diet, insensitivity and rough practices of Ugandan instructors. The complete lack of basic military training and weapon-handling capabilities by some of the recruits was reportedly surprising for some EU-trainers, who thought that in a militarized society like the Somali, everybody has at least some basic military skills. The first batch of 902 trainees, including 276 non-commissioned officers and some twenty young officers, was scheduled to return to Mogadishu on 19 February 2011, to undergo two to three months of reintegration training by AMISOM, as well as some advanced training. The hope is that, with the new EUTM troops, AMISOM will

43 Personal interview, EU officer, Kampala, November 2010
be able to occupy and pacify the whole of Mogadishu, and, later on, the whole of Somalia.

**EUNAVFOR-ATALANTA**

Operation Atalanta (formally European Union Naval Force Somalia – EUNAVFOR) is a current naval military operation undertaken by the European Union in the Horn of Africa. Operation Atalanta is the European Union’s first naval operation and it currently operates under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1950 (2010). The aim of the mission is (1) the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia and (2) the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, as well as the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. The third goal (3) is to monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. “The operation which was scheduled for an initial period of twelve months (until 13 December 2009) has now been extended by the council until December 2012. The common funding for the operation amounted to EUR 8.4 million for 2010 and EUR 7.8 million for 2011. The force size fluctuates according to the monsoon seasons, which determine the level of piracy. It typically consists of 5 to 10 Surface Combatants, 1 to 2 Auxiliary ship and 2 to 4 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft. Including land-based personnel, EU NAVFOR consists of a total of around 2,000 military personnel.”

Until December 2010, 26 countries had brought some kind of contribution to the operation. The way to contribute (headquarter staff, warship, aircraft, etc), the contribution period and frequency have differed from one country to another:

- 13 EU Member States have provided an operational contribution to EU NAVFOR, either with ships, with maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, or with Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD) team. This includes France, Spain, Germany, Greece, Sweden, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom (also hosting the EUNAVFOR Operational headquarters), Portugal, Luxembourg, Malta and Estonia.

- 9 other EU Member States have participated in the effort providing military staff to work at the EU NAVFOR Operational Headquarters (Northwood – UK) or onboard units. These are Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Ireland and Finland.

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4 non EU Member States, Norway, Croatia, Ukraine and Montenegro have so far also brought their contribution to EU NAVFOR. Norway has also provided an operational contribution with a warship regularly deploying in the area of operation.

Currently (February 2011), three French, one Spanish, one German, one Finnish, one British and one Italian warship are taking part in the EUNAVFOR mission.

The results of EUNAVFOR-ATALANTA are, at best, mixed. On the positive side, since escorts began in late 2007, not a single ship carrying WFP food to ports in Somalia has been attacked by pirates. Under the EUNAVFOR-ATALANTA operation, WFP has delivered more than 480,000 metric tons of food into Somalia through Mogadishu, Merka, Bossaso, Berbera ports. Thus, the EUNAVFOR-ATALANTA has clearly achieved its first (and probably most important) goal of protecting the vessels of the WFP delivering food aid to Somalia.

The results on the second goal, namely the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, are less spectacular. Indeed, despite of the mission, pirate attacks on ships worldwide hit a seven year high in 2010 and a record number of crew were taken hostage, mostly because of Somali pirate activity. There were 445 actual and attempted pirate attacks on ships around the world in 2010, the vast majority of them off the Somali coast. According to a report by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), ocean-going pirates inflicted between $7-billion (U.S.) and $12-billion in damage on the global economy in 2010.

While it is true, that the number of attacks in the Gulf of Aden dropped by half because of better patrolling, this only means that Somali pirates struck further away. The changing pattern of attacks has been clear: “initially, almost all the attacks were in the calm, target-rich waters of the Gulf of Aden—a passage for 20% of the world’s commercial shipping. When anti-piracy naval flotillas began arriving in force a couple of years ago, the pirates quickly worked out ways to roam farther by using “mother ships”, often powerful deep-sea fishing vessels seized earlier, as floating bases for their fast skiffs. With no government willing or able to stop them, the pirates found they could operate with impunity, refining a simple but devastatingly effective business model… In March last year an attack took place 975 nautical miles south of Haradheere.

close to Madagascar; and in April the pirates struck 1,300 nautical miles east of Haradheere, nearer the coast of India than Somalia…By using bigger and better equipped mother ships, pirates can often stay at sea for more than a month at a time, launching a series of raids. They also use more sophisticated equipment, such a GPS tracking devices and radar, to stalk their prey.”

It suffices to look at current data to see that, two and a half years after its inception, the EU mission has not achieved its second goal. In February 2011, Somali pirates have attacked 13 ships, according to data provided by EUNAVFOR. Of the 13 attacks, seven were successful, an astonishingly high rate. In the four weeks to March 28, 24 attacks occurred, of which only one was successful. Still, it is clear, that EUNAVFOR has not achieved its second stated goal to protect vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, as well as to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. According to an analyst, “the most effective way to end piracy off the Horn of Africa would be to restore effective government to Somalia. The pirates, like their bandit counterparts on land, thrive as a result of the political chaos in the country… Some of the pirates are former fishermen, put out of work by overfishing, illegal toxic dumping in Somali waters, and the virtual collapse of commerce in the country. It would be nice to help them find other less risky work. Perhaps some could be enlisted in a proper Somali Coast Guard.”

As things stand, the resources spent on the ATALANTA mission could and should be used rather to help rebuild the Somali state. Otherwise, the EU risks wasting its money on a mission, which deals only with the consequence of a problem (piracy), and not with the problem itself (state failure in Somalia).

CONSULTATION

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INSTITUTIONAL EFFORTS OF THE AFRICAN UNION AGAINST DRUG AND RELATED CRIMES AS SECURITY THREATS IN THE WEST AFRICAN SUBREGION

“It is an open secret that West Africa is under the onslaught of drug traffickers” stated Dr. Mamadou Tangara, head of the Gambian diplomacy at the general debate of the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

The minister’s position statement was not a real surprise for most of the Africanists or regional security experts, as since the mid-90s, in West Africa, trafficking in hard drugs has become a booming business, with increasingly serious side effect [Felbab-Brown, 2010 and Marján, 2010]. Although the production and consumption of cannabis and other soft drugs has always been present to some extent [Odejide, Laniel 2006], the introduction and industrial transhipment of hard drugs (mostly heroin and cocaine) from outside the region has required the necessary complicity of local actors and has had a significant detrimental impact on society [Bayart et al., 1999 and Ellis, 2009].

In 2008 at a high-level conference on drug trafficking in Praia (Cape Verde), the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) warned that "West Africa is at risk of becoming an epicentre for drug trafficking and the crime and corruption associated with it". According to seizure data at least 50 tons of cocaine from the Andean countries are transiting West Africa every year, heading north where they are worth almost 2 billion USD on the streets of European cities. Most cocaine entering Africa from South America makes landfall around Guinea-Bissau in the north and Ghana in the south. The seizures have doubled every year for the past three years: from 1,323 kilograms in 2005, to 3,161 in 2006, to 6,458 in 2007.

The high ranking UN executive underlined that transnational organised crime and international drug trafficking have become a major threat not only to

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50 Minister of Foreign Affairs and Gambians Abroad
51 27 September 2010.
the states of the western coast, but to the entire continent and to international peace and security. In a number of African countries, drugs, crime and corruption continue to undermine development efforts of the international community. High levels of income inequality, a high proportion of youth in the population, – many of whom are orphaned and marginalised –, high rates of urbanisation, low levels of criminal justice resources, firearms proliferation, wars and civil conflicts [Besenyö, 2008], as well as weak controls over criminal activities, leave Africa vulnerable to organised crime, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, money-laundering and corruption [Klautschnig, 2009 and Migdal, 1998]. In particular, Africa is increasingly being used to trans-ship and stockpile illicit drugs

Easy money has a corruptive effect on youth, with a get-rich-quick message and a devaluation of traditional values which have always kept these societies cohesive and united [Shehu, 2005]. The associated violence increasingly threatens people’s daily lives. The exporting and laundering of the resulting dirty money destroys hundreds of legitimate small businesses. Drug abuse and addiction find their way onto the streets of these vulnerable coastal and inland states, taking a terrible toll on families, education and social cohesion.

Information from the UNODC compared with that from sources in African Union member states indicate that cannabis is generally regarded as the most problematic illicit drug in Africa, where an estimated 8% of the population use cannabis, accounting an estimated 64% of the demand for treatment of drug abuse. At the Heads of National Law Enforcement Agencies of AU (HONLEA) meeting, concern was expressed about the emergence of cannabis with a higher Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content, a development that requires close attention. Available information suggests that cannabis abuse is continuing to increase in Africa. The widespread abuse of cannabis by children is of particular concern; in some countries, children at the tender ages of 7-10 years are reportedly smoking cannabis.

Cocaine abuse appears to be rising in Africa, particularly along emerging cocaine trafficking routes in West and Southern Africa [Lewis 2010, Neal]. Data on treatment for drug abuse in South Africa show a strong increase in cocaine-related treatment between 1998 and 2008, fluctuating between 11 % and 25 % of total treatment demand in different provinces. Since 2005, West Africa has increasingly been used as a transit area for cocaine consignments bound for Europe and, to a lesser extent, North America. According to UNODC, cocaine worth an estimated 1 billion USD continues to be trafficked through Africa each

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54 Workshop organized by Council of Geopolitics, Budapest, Hungary (8 May, 2008)
55 12-16 October 2009, Windhoek, Namibia
Evidence suggests that some degree of processing of cocaine has been taking place in West Africa.

In the case of The Gambia, cannabis abuse is a major public health problem not only in the small narrow country but other parts of West Africa as well [Reno, 2000]. According to a recently published research [Rolfe, Tang et al. 1993], the rise in the incidence of psychotic illness reflects the increased background use of cannabis by the local population. A case-control study was performed to determine the association between psychosis and cannabis abuse in The Gambia and the importance of other risk factors. Out of 210 patients admitted to the case-control study, at least 38% were positive compared with 12% of matched non-psychotic control subjects.

Heroin abuse also appears to be increasing in Africa, being the drug most commonly abused in Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. Rwanda and Seychelles have also reported an increase in the abuse of heroin [Beckerleg, Telfer, Hundt 2005]. The drug continues to enter the continent mainly through East Africa, which have been identified as both destination and transit countries; moreover, trafficking in and abuse of heroin have recently increased. Most of the heroin seized had been transported by passengers on commercial flights arriving at or departing from the international airports of Addis Ababa and Nairobi; both airports provide flight connections between West Africa and heroin-manufacturing countries in South-West and South-East Asia. From West Africa, heroin is frequently smuggled into Europe and North America. Heroin is also smuggled by sea and through postal and courier services [Maertens, 2010].

Between 1.4 million and 4 million persons in Africa are estimated to have abused amphetamine-type stimulants at least once over the past 12 months. Nigeria and South Africa have reported the highest annual prevalence rates of abuse of such stimulants. Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Sierra Leone and several other African countries have also reported the abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants; however, no reliable quantitative estimates have been available in recent years.

The illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances remains limited to countries in Southern and East Africa, where those substances are also abused. The abuse of over-the-counter and prescription medicines continues to be a problem in many African countries. An average of 30 laboratories illicitly manufacturing drugs are dismantled every year in South Africa.

There is an increase in trafficking and diversion of precursor chemicals through African countries emphasising the need for technical cooperation in this field. The International Narcotics Control Board Pre-Export Notification Online...
(PEN Online) system enables countries to identify, prevent the diversion of and seize suspicious shipments of precursors.

An increasing number of criminals are using the Internet as a medium to exchange information on drugs or production methods [Ellis, 2009], and to offer advice on where and how to obtain precursor chemicals and equipment for the production of synthetic drugs.

**Plan of Action of the African Union**

In January 2008, the AU Executive Council in its Decision EX.CL/Dec.385 (XII) endorsed the decisions of the Third Session of the African Union Conference of Ministers of Drugs Control and Crime Prevention (CAMDCCP3) held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 03-07 December 2007, and called on the Member States to renew their commitment to the fight against the scourge of drug abuse and trafficking and related crimes.

The Council urged the governments to fully implement the Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012) in collaboration with stakeholders; and to submit progress reports to the AU Commission every two years.

While they also called on the international community to assist African countries in developing and/or implementing appropriate national and regional strategies to combat illicit drugs and crime, it also requested the AU Commission and regional economic communities (RECs), in collaboration with relevant partners, to follow-up on and monitor the implementation of the Plan of Action and report to the AU policy organs every two years.

Since the Third Session of the AU Conference of Ministers in Charge of Drug Control and Crime Prevention, in December 2007, reported cases of drug trafficking had been on the increase, with revenue generated from illicit activities even distorting some economies and destabilising some African countries. The Continent continued to be a major transport point for cocaine being smuggled from Latin America to Europe, and heroin from Afghanistan to Europe and North America. Moreover, worrisome trends in the spreading of drug abuse in all communities on the Continent were observed.

Two years later, in January 2009, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Governments at the Twelfth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, in their decision Assembly/AU/Dec.239 (XII) recognised that drug trafficking has become a major challenge to security and governance in Africa and called upon all Member States to join in the fight against drug trafficking in all regions of the Continent and requested the Commission, in collaboration with the UN, its Specialized Agency on Drug Control (UNODC), as well as ECOWAS and other
Regional Economic Communities, to intensify the fight against drug trafficking in Africa.

In the same year, the Department of Social Affairs (DSA), AU Commission, responsible for coordination of the implementation of the AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012), commenced a joint project with the UNODC to effectively manage the implementation of the AU Plan of Action. In the same year, an inter-departmental mechanism was initiated at the Commission to co-ordinate efforts in the fight against drugs and crime. An updated Memorandum of Understanding with INTERPOL was developed, and meetings were held with the US State Department’s Security Division to further galvanize cooperation with international partners. In addition, an expert in drug control from the DSA participated at the Africa-South-America Summit, in September 2009, where a paragraph on collaboration with regard to the trafficking of cocaine was included in the Summit Declaration. A variety of measures for collaboration with South American authorities were suggested which will be followed up through the appropriate structures. Late in 2009, the Department of Peace and Security led a mission to Guinea Bissau, as requested by the Assembly at its Extra-Ordinary Session in August 2009, Sirte, Libya. The Department of Social Affairs was also invited to assess the drug control situation in Guinea Bissau.

During the last year, the AU Commission (AUC) strengthened its human resources capacity significantly in the DSA to implement the AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012). The Senior Drug Control Officer assumed duties in February 2010, and the Head of Division, Social Welfare, Vulnerable Groups, Drug Control and Crime Prevention, in September 2010. The Programme Manager for the joint UNODC/AUC project and two project staff were appointed in the DSA since May 2010, and the Project Management Unit is fully functional.

Under the AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012)”, the African Union Commission has strengthened its cooperation in the areas of drug control and crime prevention over the past two years with relevant international organisations, such as INTERPOL and UNODC, the European Union (within the framework of the Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership), South America and the United States of America.

The Plan of Action has seven priority areas, including policy formulation, enhanced collaboration, joint institutional capacity, programme integration into development strategies, capacity building, training and the promotion of sport and culture in the service of social development to combat drugs and crime.
The efforts of the AU Commission to coordinate the implementation of the mentioned priority areas were greatly complemented by the strategic partnership between the Commission and UNODC, which resulted in the joint AUC/UNODC project, "Support to the implementation of the AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012)" conducted since 2009. The main objective of the project is to enhance the institutional capacity of the AU Commission to implement the African Union Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012) by monitoring, promoting, and coordinating continent-wide progress towards the overall goals of the Plan of Action.

The joint project has significant achievements: a Programme Manager, Finance Officer and Administrative Assistant have been recruited at the AUC under the mentioned project. To further support the AUC, RECs and AU Member States, UNODC furthermore employed a Crime Prevention Expert at their office in Addis Ababa in August 2010.

Since the thematic priorities of the Plan of Action are covered by several AUC Departments, an AUPA inter-departmental coordination mechanism was established in 2009 to ensure coordination. Members of the mechanism include, besides the Department for Social Affairs, the Departments of Political Affairs, Economic Affairs, Peace and Security, as well as offices dealing with civil society organizations and external relations. The Commissioner of Social Affairs acts as the convener of the mechanism.

To further enhance understanding of the dynamics of drugs and crime for policy-making purposes, the DSA is in the process of having drugs and crime indicators incorporated in a recently established statistical data base at the Commission, in addition to hosting a site for all matters related to the Plan of Action.

On 16 June 2009, the Commission launched its campaign against Trafficking in Human Beings (AU.COMMIT). Among others, the campaign advocates for the implementation of the Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children (2007). As a follow up to the launch event, the Department of Social Affairs, AUC, ECOWAS, and international partners organised a regional launch of the AU.COMMIT campaign in West Africa, as well as a regional workshop on the operationalising the Ouagadougou Action Plan against trafficking in human beings, on 24-26 March 2010. The workshop investigated effective ways of networking, coordination and cooperation among Member States, RECs and partners to address trafficking in human beings in Africa in a more strategic and programmatic manner.
The AUC participated in the 52nd and 53rd sessions of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in March 2009, and March 2010, respectively. At both occasions, Steering Committee meetings for the AUC/UNODC project were held on the fringes of the CND Sessions. AUC supported, and participated in the donor conference for the implementation of the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime, which took place on 03 December 2009, in Vienna, Austria, as this Plan would support the implementation of the AU Plan of Action.

**Regional efforts**

By the late 1990s, ECOWAS had fully realized the deleterious effects and debilitating impact of this complex threat to the stability and economic development of the region, especially on its integration programme, and developed a Regional Plan of Action, which aimed at providing the necessary framework for national efforts and actions against the drug problem. The ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, at its 21st Summit on 30-31 October 1998 in Abuja, issued a declaration titled: “Community Flame Ceremony – the Fight against Drugs”.

Other decisions of the authority on drug control include resolution A/RES.2/8/97 relating to Prevention and Control of Drug Abuse in West Africa; Recommendation C/98 on the establishment of a Regional Fund for Financing of Drug Control activities in West Africa; Decision A/DEC.8/10/98 on the establishment of a Regional Fund for Financing of Drug Control activities; and Decision A/DEC.9/12/99 establishing the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA). In December 2008, the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the ECOWAS approved a Regional Framework and Action Plan on Combating Drugs and Organised Crime in West Africa. Already, the UNODC, in collaboration with the ECOWAS Commission has produced a project document for action.

Despite all this, however, operationally, not much has taken place. On the contrary, things have gotten progressively worse [Shehu, 2009]. Due to strong anti-drugs and anti-laundering measures taken in other regions of the world (Central America, Andean Countries, Caribbean, Central Asia, the Balkans), traffickers have sought out new routes in order to get their illicit product to market. With saturated markets and ample supply to North America [Ellis, 2009], the South American Cartels have developed new lucrative markets for their cocaine in Europe, while the demand for heroin from the East has increased slightly in North America. Heroin is now also being grown and produced in the Americas for export worldwide. According to the INTERPOL data East Africa has also become a key entry area for southwest Asian heroin destined for

markets in East and South Africa. These areas are supplied by East and West African trafficking organizations as well as southwest Asian criminal groups operating out of India and Afghanistan. These organizations rely to a large extent on commercial air, using both human couriers as well as air freight to conceal heroin consignments. However, moving all this produce to market requires reliable midway transit points; after using the less controlled Brazil-southern African routes, essentially via Angola, Namibia, South Africa and the Congo river basin for a while, the traffickers have now taken direct aim at West Africa, where geography, social conditions and weak anti-drug response capacity allow the quasi-free transit of drugs to market [Pham, 2008].

The trafficking routes through West Africa are well known by now. The goal is to reach European shores as quickly and efficiently as possible – which means Portugal, Spain, Italy, the Balkans and the Mediterranean coast. However, direct flights and container shipments to major ports of entry make the control of traffickers much more complex. The methods are also very well known: mules, shipping containers, mixed in with petroleum products (like plastics), hidden in live animals, flown in small aircraft, shipped in humanitarian-look consignments, using ambulance-cars to name but a few. Furthermore, the disruption caused by the numerous natural disasters over the past few years has also facilitated the traffickers’ job, since law enforcement has been otherwise occupied. All West African countries are increasingly being used as transit routes, particularly those closest to the goal, those most defenceless security-wise and those most unstable internally [Reno, 2000].

With regard to all of these aspects, ECOWAS adopted a sub-regional action plan on drug trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse in 2008 and endorsed an operational plan to combat drug trafficking and related organized crime, including a mechanism for monitoring and evaluation.

**National programmes**

A number of African countries have established or are in the process of establishing integrated national programmes57 to combat drug trafficking, drug abuse and associated transnational organized crime. The programmes, which development have been supported by UNODC in partnership with national authorities, tackle a variety of issues such as capacity-building in law enforcement, drug supply and demand reduction, treatment for drug abusers, criminal justice, regional cooperation and activities to counter money-

57 Following adoption of a Regional action plan for the entire West Africa subregion in December 2008, each member state develops its National integrated Programme (NIP). Currently the regional assist in implementing NIP in Mali, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Togo, Ghana, Burkina-Faso
laundering. Good examples of these are currently implemented in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Mali.

In April 2009, UNODC, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs of the UN Secretariat, the United Nations Office for West Africa and INTERPOL launched a joint programme\textsuperscript{58} to build national and regional law enforcement capacity including in the areas of drug interdiction, forensics, intelligence, border management, money-laundering and criminal justice. One of the key elements of the programme is the establishment of specialized units to counter transnational crime, initially in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Apart from the efforts by the AU Commission through the Africa-South America structures, and to further strengthen transatlantic cooperation between Latin American and West African drug law enforcement agencies, ECOWAS member States participated in the Nineteenth Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Latin America and the Caribbean\textsuperscript{59}, held on Isla Margarita, Venezuela, in September 2009. Drug law enforcement agencies of Latin American and West African countries subsequently signed a memorandum of understanding to promote the joint investigation of specific cases at a meeting organized by UNODC in Bogota, Colombia, in November 2009.

\textit{Challenges for the future}

Most subregional countries lack effective systems for monitoring drug abuse and are therefore unable to gather sufficient data on the extent and patterns of drug abuse or to carry out accurate assessments of prevalence rates. (One of the few continuous systematic monitoring systems for drug abuse on the continent is operational in South Africa, the South African Community Epidemiology Network on Drug Use (SACENDU). It collates treatment demand data from treatment centres and psychiatric hospitals and seizure data from law enforcement agencies. The same regular collation of at least data from psychiatric hospitals and police sources can easily be conducted in AU Member States and submitted to either focal points at RECs or to the Commission directly.

It should be noted that treatment and rehabilitation programmes are largely still in their infancy stages in Africa [Affinnih, 2002]. There is an urgent need to increase the provision of treatment and rehabilitation services for those who abuse drugs or are drug dependent, in order to curtail the market for illicit

\textsuperscript{58} \url{http://www.uneca.org/coda/unodc/JointProgrammeWA.pdf}

\textsuperscript{59} \url{http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/honlac/HONLAC-2009-19/Report_E.pdf}
drugs. National medical facilities for such treatment and rehabilitation are often seriously inadequate or non-existent. Frequently, only small numbers of drug dependent persons can be accommodated in psychiatric wards of general hospitals [Pela, 1986]. Treatment and rehabilitation of drug-dependent persons in Africa often depend on assistance provided by relevant international organizations and non-governmental organizations. As a starting point, the public primary health care system and hospitals in Member States should accommodate drug abusers for detoxification purposes and not turn them away on the grounds of a self-inflicted disease, which often happens [Parry, 2005].

Lack of cooperation and coordination exits between domestic and international law enforcement agencies, and often results in information on drug trafficking suspects, vessels, vehicles and aircraft being spread in an uncoordinated manner among authorities, leading to delays in accessing information of operational importance.

Many law enforcement agencies in Africa have inadequate resources with which to train and equip staff for effective drug law enforcement\.\(^60\).

Controlled deliveries to identify persons behind trafficking networks are still not common operational practice among African law enforcement agencies, however through the mobility and anonymity they provide, cyber-technologies are offering new assistance to criminals and creating new offences that challenge existing legislation. Many law enforcement agencies do not have the knowledge, training or technology to recover evidence or data from transmission or storage devices such as mobile phones and personal computers. In addition, it is difficult for national legislation to keep up with the necessary changes and amendments needed to support the investigation, prosecution and conviction of offenders where evidence of criminal activity is captured in cyber-technology.

In addition to the above there is limited forensic capacity in AU Member States to conduct various analyses on confiscated drugs. In this regard, there are excellent examples of regional cooperation, and cooperation between member states to assist others in analysing drugs seized. However, sustaining and re-training experts for forensic facilities in member states have become a huge challenge, as specially trained staff who have gained expertise are often recruited by the private sector.

\textit{Conclusion}

\(^{60}\) http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/focus/drugs-and-crime-holding-back-development-africa
The trafficking of narcotics through the West Africa region is increasing and threatens to undermine the stability and security in the region. In recent years, West Africa has become a hub for cocaine trafficking as airplanes and ships loaded with narcotics are coming from Latin America into airfields and ports that often lack law enforcement resources and are vulnerable to corruption. These shipments are divided into smaller loads and sent to Europe via a variety of means to include commercial flights, maritime traffic, and even traditional overland caravan routes. As a result, an estimated 2 billion USD a year in cocaine at wholesale level prices flows into the European Union and cocaine consumption across Europe is on the rise, even doubling in some nations [Decorte et al. 2010].

The situation in West Africa is a threat to stability and security in the region as the drugs and drug money flowing through the area disrupt often fragile state institutions, weak governments, broken economies, under-resourced law enforcement agencies, and threaten to produce narco-states [Ferrett and Vulliamy, 2008].

In order to prevent the formation of a region of lawlessness, instability, and corruption, the international community, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and particularly the African Union all have included in their agendas the issue of establishing a solid foundation for state institutions and criminal justice agencies in order to bolster the rule of law in the West African region.

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“We have come to seek Christians and spices,” said the first Portuguese to land at Calicut. The remark became a household word, even though the order of priority changed more than once during the day-to-day practice of 16th century colonization. What in fact were those spices, the actual inducements behind Vasco da Gama’s voyage? In the main they were plants indigenous to Asia, although some were animal products or a mixture of the two. They might serve various purposes, either in their natural form or after processing but in most cases, spices meant fragrant and medicinal substances used as seasonings, stimulants, narcotics, and even dyes. The only spice to become popular on a mass scale in Europe was a pepper, while the rest remained luxuries. That applies to cloves, nutmeg, cinnamon and ginger, all important in volume terms and serving to enhance the pleasures of the table throughout Europe. Betelnut, sandalwood, benzoin and aloe continued in the Old World to be ingredients in remedies and perfumes for the wealthy.

Spice consumption – commercial revolution

The reason why pepper became popular in Europe as a spice was not a change in consumer tastes or any such whim but a simpler one. The human diet to this day is based upon animal and vegetable proteins, and in medieval Europe, the proportions and quantities were determined by a very simple mechanism. When winter set in, much of the livestock would be killed for lack of fodder, and after that there would only be salted or smoked meat to vary the vegetable diet until the spring or summer. Preserving methods were very crude, of course, and victuals which had been stored a long time or transported a long distance almost cried out for pepper.

So the use of it began to spread in the 13th century as a way of masking the loss of flavour or the stink of rotting meat.

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61 In certain terms the title of this essay could be named „Old issues – old and new bibliography”, so it’s a revisited version of a chapter of my book published in Hungarian: Tengerek tengelye – Ibér terjeszkedés az Atlantikumban a 15-16.században, Budapest, Mundus, 2006.

One can trace a steady expansion of European spice consumption geographically and in terms of the groups in society consuming them. The redistribution of them in Europe was in the hands of Venetian and Genoese merchants, and as the market expanded, the continent was crossed by an increasingly dense network of spice roads and the branches off them, known initially as Oriental or Levantine, and later as traditional routes. But these roads were travelled by a great many other things of value besides spices as consumer goods. They spread the forerunners of such banking tools as letters of credit and the discounting of bills. One might even say that spices turned traffic into trade and then trade into commerce. One major development for society as a whole where the capitalist methods which the “shareholding syndicates” of the Italian trading companies began to use. Although these companies performed a highly complex task, they managed to satisfy the overlapping demands of capital, commercial expertise and shipment. There were constant complaints about the exorbitant cost of spices, but the price of goods arriving by so intricate a route, by sea, then land, and then sea and/or land again, had to be high. For a spice grown in India would first travel overland to a gathering point and then be shipped up the Red Sea or Persian Gulf by Moslem or other local traders. The destination in the Arab world would be Alexandria or Cairo (or Aleppo, Jaffa etc.), but that was only the first leg of the journey, Venetian or Genoese galleons would then take the shipments on towards the European consumers.

The Ottoman Empire expanded both in Europe and the Indies in 15th and 16th centuries, and some historians took the now obsolete view that this expansion alone disrupted the spice trade to an extent capable of explaining why the new Portuguese route developed. Certainly the prices were sent up the “hand of the Turks” when the Ottomans annexed important parts of the Mameluke Empire weakened it, but the rise was only temporary and the route and the route was never cut. It is nearer the truth to say merely that the new Portuguese route round the Cape of Good Hope was just profitable as the route of their Italian rivals and at the same time far simpler. Although the duration and mileage were greater, the distance between the producer and the consuming market was shortened in the sense that the scene of production was brought, by non-commercial means, into the sphere of Portuguese control.

63 See the chapters 4,5, and 6 of the 3th volume of the gigantic Vitorino Magalhães Godinho’s work *Os descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial* (Portuguese Discoveries and the world-market)? Lisbon, Editorial Presença, 1981, pp. 7-134, we found all the topics regarding the itinerary, cashflow and volume of this commerce, presented in interaction with the Portuguese innovations.


Commercial networks – military back-ground

One Indian historian has described the development of the Indies after the 16\textsuperscript{th} century as an age of “dominance” – relative dominance – by the European maritime powers.\textsuperscript{66} The statement is worth examining in several respects. What does “dominance” really mean, and what did the relative dominance amount to?

One finds quite a few other, similar epithets qualifying and passing a value judgement on the Viceroyalty of India, which was the Portuguese Empire’s centre of gravity. The power of the Portuguese has been called thalassocracy, for instance. This term’s emphasis on the scene of Portuguese dominion, narrows it down, but it captures the essence of it and is certainly valid. The vast extent of the geographical and historical region we call the Indies and its civilizations with millions of inhabitants (India, China, Japan) meant that the Europeans could rule out in advance exercising any territorial, land-based dominion. But the sea provided an alternative means of penetrating into the region, followings a series of cumulative advances in techniques, materials and culture, proceeding in and from several directions, from the 13\textsuperscript{th} century onwards. The culmination of them was the development of the caravel, the \textit{nao} and other types of vessel. These made long sea voyages and long-distance trading possible from Europe’s “balcony looking on the sea”, where the social conditions too gave a fair wind to the ships by providing the incentives for those who sailed in them.

The same century almost brought about contact in the direction between the two most populous parts of the world- the Mediterranean and the China/India region- in which the roles might have been reversed. For the voyages of the Chinese Admiral Cheng-Ho took him to the shores of East Africa, and had he rounded the Cape of Good Hope, a radically different chain of historical events might have ensued. Just imagine a Chinese fleet sailing one day into a European port, Lisbon let us say, in order to spread their religion and trade peacefully! From a historical point of view, China veered between policies of openness and isolation, but the phase of openness came to an end, to no small extent because of the invasion of the Mongols and other uncivilized peoples of the steppes. So China, as it closed its doors on the world did not take the idea of reaching Europe seriously, any more than we do now. To stick with the facts, even if there were some commercial and economic considerations in the minds of more than one maritime province in South China, at variance with the ideas at the centre, and even if there was significant measure of technical development,

the social consequences of these factors (and so the other effects) failed to ensue.\footnote{See W.W. Rockhill: “Notes on the Relations and Trade of China with Eastern Archipelago and the Coast of the Indian Ocean during the fourteenth century” In: T’oung Pao, IV, Part II. Leiden, 1915, to the global character and focuses of world demography see Pierre Chaunu’s, L’ expansion européenne du XIII au XIV siècle, Paris, Presse Universitaires de France, 1969, and for the consequences Roderich Ptak’ work ”The Fujianese, Ryukyuans and Portuguese (c.1511 to 1540s): Allies or competitors?” In: Anais de História de Além-Mar, Vol III, 2002, pp.447-467, p. 447.}

The Portuguese penetration into the region was assisted by the combined effects of other circumstances favourable from the European point of view. An examination of the forms of state which developed historically on the Indian subcontinent reveals two ethnic and religious patterns, and the overlapping of them tended to divide the power between several centres. Apart from the Mogul Empire in the North, one rarely finds major states forming in the most important places from the European point of view: in Hindustan, on the Deccan peninsula, and most of all on the Cannary and Malabar coasts. Even such empires as Vijayanagar (Bisnaga to the Portuguese) were only loose confederations of rajs, which were sometimes at odds with each other. There were cases of Hindu trading centres functioning on Moslem territory and vice versa.\footnote{For a general overview of Portuguese expansion in Asia see A. Sanjay Subramanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700. A political and Economic History, London and New York, 1993.} Elsewhere, commerce (and coastal defence, which partly derived from it) was declared indifferent, just as it was in Hungary under the nobility in the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries.

The third major cultural zone of the Indies in the broader sense was Japan, where the conditions were no less chaotic. Japan in the 16\textsuperscript{th} century was the “land of wars”, and the power of the emperor was opposed by such destructive forces that the new centres of power and rule cancelled each other out. And it was the firearms introduced by the Europeans that made a bloody civil war out the strife so reminiscent of the feudal anarchy of the European Middle Ages.\footnote{João Paulo Oliveira e Costa: A descoberta da civilização japonesa pelos Portugueses, Instituto Cultural de Macau, Instituto de História de Além-mar, 1995.}

In connection with firearms, it is worth noting that Asia’s defeat in the maritime competition cannot simply be explained away by saying its vessels were smaller. That it not even true, because in the conflict between the invaders and the conquered, the “tall ships” were not always opposed by canoes or sampans, they might encounter junks similar in size to themselves. But the ships of the European fleets displayed the advantages of both merchantmen and men-of-war, while the same could certainly not be said of their Asian counterparts. In any case there were only a few handful of battles where one can assume the
sides were fairly equal, for instance at the several sieges of Diu, or when the combined Turkish, Egyptian and Gujarati fleet was deployed there in 1509.70

**Challenge and response**

Some historians, working on a “challenge and response” theory, have ascribed the success of the Europeans to a will to win, and the defeat of the Asians to their half-hearted resistance, but that is true only to a small extent. It is worth making a distinction here between empires and local kingdoms, or from another angle, between civilizations and local cultures. A large animal may be bitten by a horse-fly, which is unpleasant, but if the animal gets used to the horsefly, it may cease to notice it or brush it away. Even so, the animal is still a higher mammal and the horsefly just an insect. To some extent that may be how the Asian civilizations felt. Laying aside that analogy (which is not apt in every respect) but remaining in the animal kingdom, there may have been the kind of fortunate symbiosis one finds between the zebu and the bird that cleans it of parasites, which is certainly a very useful occupation. Trade between China and Japan, for example, was becoming impossible because of the wako pirates. Tradition has it that the foundation of Macao in 1554 (the first instance in Chinese history of an extra-territorial concession being granted) was allowed on condition that the area round the mouth of the Pearl River was cleared of pirates. The local authorities also realized that they had as much of an interest in regulating the transit trade between China and Japan as the Portuguese who were engaged in it, and who had mainly resorted to smuggling to obtain the Japanese silver bullion they needed for the spice trade.71

**The *Estado da Índia* – structure and instruments**

But however one looks at these relation, one notices plenty of aggressive forms built upon superior power, although these were mainly used against the smaller “kingdoms”, neither Vasco da Gama nor Francisco de Almeida on his first voyage had any compunction about bombarding independent East African city-states that were unwilling to trade or cooperate. The great viceroys of the Portuguese in the period of establishment-Almeida (1505-1508) and Alfonso de Albuquerque (1509-1515)- made even more frequent use of force in establishing what came to be known as the Estado da India. Here one should note that only in the narrower sense did this denote the Indian subcontinent to the Portuguese, in

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70 In strategic way of thinking was similar the caravans and caravela’s competition in the Atlantic area in the XVth Century at the West-African coast. For modern implications, and for the Sahel region’s decline see János Besenyő: *Western Sahara*, Publikon Publishers, Pécs, 2009,

a broader sense is covered the hinterland of the East African coast, the East Indies and even the Far East. Almeida did little more than devise a plan which Albuquerque put into practice, of occupying the strategic points from which the whole spice trade could be controlled and made out of bounds to other European nations on the “closed-seas” principle. Albuquerque was not only the man to elaborate the principles of colonization, but a politician a warrior. To borrow the apt, if somewhat exaggerated phrase of Luis Filipe Thomaz, he was a viceroy whose seat of government was the tossing deck of his flagship. The destination of Vasco da Gama’s first voyage was among the first Hindu states in India where the Portuguese managed to build a trading station and fortress. Nor did the limited compliance of the ruler of Calicut, the Samorim (or Samor raja), suffice to prevent a succession of Malabar coastal states under Calicut’s overlordship being opened up by the Portuguese in one form or another. A frequent method—used in Cannanore’s case, for instance—was to promise support for a break with Calicut. Almeida built a fort at Cannanore in 1509 to protect an existing trading station, and the first colonial hospital was set up there as well. The good relation had been established back in 1500 by Pedro Álvares Cabral, and the town’s practical value as one of the best harbours for the trade in pepper and other spices was soon realized in practice. Nor is the qualification in practice fortuitous, for Marco Polo had brought news in 1290 of Cannanore as a major city in the fabled, spice-scented land of India.

In Cochin (the raj of Katchi), the Portuguese actually found the Christians they had ostensibly come to seek, but that did not stop them referring to Travancore, the kingdom in which this major port was simply as a Pepper Kingdom. The largely Nestorian “Thomas Christians” were only organized to some extent. Although they had their own bishop since AD 350, Cochin, like Cannanore, had gradually come under the sway of the Samorim. All this was sufficient precedent and reason first for Vasco da Gama to set up a modest store there, and then for Albuquerque, on his first voyage to India, to build a fortress in 1503, and even for Almeida to make in the first, temporary seat of government for the Estado da India, before the capture of Goa.

The Portuguese began to visit the port of Baticala (Batkai) in the kingdom of Onor as early as 1505, hardly seven years after the first voyage, and they

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73 For a general introduction see Luis Filipe Barreto Lavrar o mar, Os Portugueses e a Ásia, c. 1480-1630, CNCDP, Lisbon, 2000, and K.S. Mathew, op.cit.
75 For the capital of the Vice-Royalty see: Catarina Madeira Santos: Goa é a chave toda a Índia. Perfil político da capital do Estado da Índia (1505-1570), CNCDP, Lisbon, 1999
noticed that it was the biggest port in India for importing warhorses from Persia. When they had a chance to build a fortress in, nor as well in 1511, the Portuguese managed to short-circuit a very important and profitable trade. After that they all but monopolized the import and export of horses in the Indies, which was one of the biggest businesses of the period.76

These examples show that almost everywhere the use of force in commerce coincided with the service of new local interests which altered the local conditions. Nor does that apply only to the Hindu Malabhar Coast examples could be given from Moslem areas like Gujarat or the coasts of Oman. The method is early uniform and schematic, which did not make it any less effective, even in the 1520s and 1530s. As we shall see, the military tasks of conquest were timeless, for one of the main ideas of the Portuguese crown was that some at least of the precious metal required to sustain the spice trade should be raised by the Estado da India itself. The plunder, ransom or tax arising out of the system of “vassaldom” or subjugation, was as much a part of the commercially motivated conquest as all the much more effective means necessary for trading.77

The two great buying centres for Portugal’s Indian spice trade became Cochin and Coulau on the Malabhar Coast, and so they remained. But in time this trade, which had been so profitable to start with, began to run up against some special problems that hampered, or at least harmed it. There was a loss involved in the very fact that the pepper ripened in March to May, but a normally annual Portuguese fleets arrived and departed again in October and December, as the prevailing winds depended on the big monsoon in summer and the lesser monsoon in winter. So the factory itself, the purchasing point for the spices, had to take the form of the fortified defensive position, a casa forte, unless there was a fort beside it, because the spices bought needed defending as well as storing, lest other traders divert the cargoes to the traditional routes, either locally or beyond the Indies. It often required efforts by the third theatre of colonialism, the church, to ensure peaceful coexistence between fortress and factory. For there was no small temptation for the methods and the means to expropriate each other, and that let more than once to a conflict which placed the trading system in jeopardy.78

For that reason, a royal decree was issued in 1505 to control the imports of spices into Portugal and the exporting of precious metals to the Indies. Export of copper and silver bullion and imports of pepper became a royal monopoly.

76 See: António do Carmo Azevedo, “Diu, the parsi connection” and Capt.D. Jena, „Portuguese-Gujarat Trade” In: Mare Liberum, nº 9, Julho 1995, CNCDP, Lisbon, pp. 31-40 and 149-156.
The crown devised, an ingenious way of dulling the huge appetite of the armsbearing Portuguese for the riches of the spice trade, and even giving them an incentive to sustain the system of royal monopoly. The economic and fiscal policy-makers of today could not have turned more cleverly to historical traditions than their colleagues did in the 16th century. During the Reconquista, when the Arabs were being chased out of the Iberian Peninsula, a miles or warrior, by his right of conquest, was allowed to keep as plunder a fifth of the goods he had “freed”. This magic fifth was met with also by the soldiers serving in India, or rather it was not. The so-called quintalada was the fifth of a soldier’s pay which he did not actually see, but he was entitled to commission the feitor or agent who headed the spice factory and looked after the business of the crown to buy spices the value of it on his behalf, in this way the crown killed two birds with one stone. It left the principle of the monopoly inviolate, bit it provided a flexible system for reconciling the interests of the treasury and the troops. And it did so in a remarkable way, since is raised the volume of spices exported from the Indies merely be diverting the offsetting precious metal from other expenditure. With this handling right, the crown managed to reduce the inevitable private smuggling of spices, while increasing its “profit making capacity” from sales on the European market, and in effect socializing it.

Inter-regional goals and mare clausum

According to the graphic analogy drawn by Vitorino Magalhães Godinho one of the greatest Portuguese economic historians of the time, the spice trade of the Indies can be compared to a huge pump for precious metals. The Portuguese would normally obtain the spices they wanted in exchange for precious metals, usually in the form of coin. But the Portuguese real or cruzado often had to be changed into the larin in Persia, the rupee of the Moguls in India or even the tanga in China before it could be used to pay for the spices. This in itself required active trading efforts. A quarter of the price of the seasonal spices, usually stipulated in commercial contracts, had to be paid in copper and three-quarters in gold or silver, or in special cases other goods. The opportunity presented by the latter case was another big incentive for the Portuguese to develop their trade within the region and quite an early stage, and gain control over those running the trade in certain articles like sought-after textiles and luxury goods. What they set out to do, in fact was to reorganize the earlier trade routes in the Indies, and one method they developed quite soon was the so-called cartaz system. The cartaz, safe-conduct certificate, was not a Portuguese invention; the word comes from the Arabic (kirtas). The cartaz worked like the navigation certificate issued by the Allies in the Second World War, showing which ports a ship was leaving and heading for, what cargo it carried (some...
times itemized), what course it was taking and two its passengers were. It sanctioned the voyage and guaranteed its safety. The certificate was not free, of course. It had to be bought, and it was an eminently effective way of keeping track of trade in the area. It also proved very effective for defending political and economic interests through global exercise of non-military control.\footnote{See: Luís Filipe Reis Thomaz “Precedents and parallels of the Portuguese cartaz system” In: The Portuguese, Indian Ocean and European Bridgeheads: Festschrift in Honour of Prof. K. S. Mattew, ed. Pius Malekandathi et ali Fundação Oriente, Lisbon, pp. 67-85}

But only with the occupation of Malacca in 1511 did the Portuguese trading empire in the Indies become really effective and comprehensive in its extent and its system. To use a modern expression, Malacca in the early 16\textsuperscript{th} century can be aptly described as an international port, as almost all the goods, products, wares and wealth of the East passed through it. That in itself could explain why the Portuguese wanted it, but as we shall see, there was a great deal more involved. Malacca’s strategic position, controlling all the trade between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, since it possessed the Sunda Strait as well, meant that all the regional and inter-regional trade routes passed through it. Malacca traded with the whole Malay peninsula and with China and Japan, and from the West’s point of view it was one of the main redistribution markets for spices. It was undoubtedly the second of these circumstances that prompted the Portuguese to act swiftly. It was realized quite early on that the Malabar Coast was only the production market for pepper, cloves, ginger and other spices \textit{in part}, and far \textit{from the sole} redistribution market. If the Portuguese aspired to supply the whole of Europe profitably through the distribution points of Lisbon, Bruges and Antwerp, it was essential for them to be close to \textit{all} the production and \textit{both} the main distribution centres in the area. Once this had been realized, Malacca’s fate was sealed. Hardly two years after the city was first reached by Lopes de Sequeira, Albuquerque laid siege to it. The stones of the mosques were used for the Famosa (famous) fortress, whose captain was given wide powers to govern the city of Malacca, and initially to control its trade as well. This dual commercial and military function was quite justified, for Portuguese control over the Straits of Malacca closed the sea route between Malay archipelago and the Moluccas (or Spice Islands) to most Chinese and Indian traders. Nor was the outcome of the move confined by any means to the effect on spice prices of eliminating the competition. A range of new opportunities opened up. Apart from giving them control over the axis of trade between China and South Asia, possession of Malacca brought the Portuguese closer to global control of trade (including the spice trade) in the \textit{whole} of the Indies. They had finally reached the place where the cloves grew.\footnote{Manuel Lobato: \textit{Política e Comércio dos Portugueses na Insulíndia (1575-1605)}, Macau, IPOR, 1999. For a precedents see: Luís Filipe Reis Thomaz: Maluco e Malaca, separtum In: Actas do Colóquio Luso-Espanhol de História Ultramarina, 1975, Lisboa, pp. 22-48.}


**The Spice Islands**

The discovery of the Moluccas tied in directly with occupation of Malacca. To shouts of “On in the name of St James!” (a battle cry which can probably be traced back to the period of the Reconquista), Albuquerque launched his first assault on Malacca on St James’s Day, July 25, 1511, and the city fell on August 10. Just a couple of months later, in November of that year, three ships commanded by Antonio de Abreu set out to discover the Spice Islands. Almost a year later, at the end of 1512, Abreu arrived back in his nau, the *Sabaia*, with a valuable cargo he had loaded in the Banda Islands. However, it was not the *Sabaia*, but the *Santa Catarina*, commanded by Francisco Serrão, that discovered the Spice Islands almost accidentally after two shipwrecks. The Moluccas in a narrower sense consist of five islands, and the ones important to the subject of this book are not the larger ones (Halmahera, Batjan or Makyan) but two tiny islands, Ternate and Tidore. Serrão established such friendly relations with the ruler of Ternate that they even died together: involved in an intrigue, they were both poisoned at once by their rivals. Callous though it may sound, it was not their deaths, but the establishment of contacts that was important. For Antonio de Miranda and Tristão de Meneses arrived back from their travels to the Moluccas with letters in which a string of local potentates offered to let the Portuguese build the fort that would ensure a permanent presence. In 1520, the Brito brothers set sail from Lisbon with written orders from the king to begin building as quickly as possible what was to be the fort of São João de Ternate, the island eventually chosen.82

**Magellan - the Spanish reaction**

A detour must be made to explain the haste. Had it not been for the circumnavigation of the globe by Fernando de Magalhães (Magellan), we should probably have forgotten the Moluccas and their spices by now, and there would be no sense in discussing the political and diplomatic storm raised by that famous voyage.83

As in the earlier case of Columbus, there is no need for profound comments or value judgements about the obscure sides of Magalhães’s life or those which have been touched up by his biographers and tempted historians with their dramatic qualities to indulge in literary flights.84 To cut the story as short as possible, the world celebrates in Magalhães (1480-1521) a navigator whose purpose was probably far more prosaic than the awe with which we piously remember him as a cultural hero. The conclusion drawn by historians of

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82 See Luis Filipe Reis Thomaz, *Early Portuguese Malaca*, Macau, IPM, 1999
83 See Actas do VII Simpósio de História Marítima 24 a 26 de Outubro de 2001, *Fernão de Magalhães A sua viagem no Pacífico Antecedentes e consequentes*, Lisbon, 2002
84 From the ever green Stefan Zweig: *Magellan*, to *Over the Edge of the World* of Laurence Bergreen
science and civilization is that Magalhães, with his circumnavigation, proved to his contemporaries in the most graphic and practical way that the Earth is round, thereby confirmed the heliocentric concept of the universe, and showed that the great oceans between the continents could be crossed. But behind all that one can certainly sense the allure of the smell of spices. And the allure of the Spice Islands, about which João de Barros a chronicler of the time, moralized as follows: "After all, these islands, so our people say, are evil hotbeds of all kinds, and there is only one good thing about them: cloves. And cloves are good only insofar as they are the creation of God’s for as a material thing which our people have slaved so much to obtain, they are certainly the fruits of discord. And as such one can certainly say they are a greater trap than gold."

Magalhães was 25 when he first sailed the Eastern seas with Almeida’s fleet in 1505. No reflection on his own experience is extended by saying that he is thought to have known two people who were seriously involved with the Moluccas. The two acquaintances, or possible acquaintances, were Sequeira and Francisco Serrão, and more importantly, his information on the Spice Islands was not fanciful, but very specific indeed. Nor did Magalhães’s earlier career lack the other ingredient for making him the great navigator of the next decade: grueling years as a sailor on the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic in 1513, after his return from the Portuguese Indies. Magalhães appeared first in Lisbon and then in Azamor in Africa, where he was involved in degrading disputes while in charge of distributing plunder. He managed to clear himself, but the king turned against him, and this was certainly the moment when the isolated mariner devised his grandiose plan for proving his worth under the flag of Spain. Arriving in Seville in 1517, Magalhães achieved his aim more quickly than Columbus, whose earlier success along with Magalhães’s luck and shrewd choice of partners, must have helped to decide the Council of the Indies in favour of his plan. According to some, the real originator of the scheme was the cosmographer Rui Faleiro, another who though is feasible to reach the Spice Islands and the riches for which Lisbon was so envied by crossing the Tordesillas line and keeping within the Spanish sphere of influence. In September 1519 came the sailing of an armada with a crew of 265, of which one single ship, the Victoria, returned with 18 men to the port of San Lucar de Barrameda on September 6, 1522. However, the Victoria was loaded with spices, and her name no less symbolic than the fact that her last captain, Sebastian del Cano, replaced the more familiar heraldic devices of the Old World on his coat-of-arms with a clove.

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The voyage brought a succession of disasters and triumphs to which Shakespeare could have done justice, for the drama of it includes enough properties and characters for more than one play. Let us take the ships one by one, intrigue was aboard the San Antonio her crew mutinied, deserted and returned to Europe. The Santiago was sunk by Fate and the Conception by sacrifice, when her crew scuttled her on the voyage home, to distract the attention of the Portuguese. And let us look more closely at the destinies of the crew. One was hanged for mutiny, and another two were cast off on a deserted shore for the same crime. But daily life itself meted out a succession of punishments; hunger, thirst and scurvy which decimated the sailors. Yet others met a violent death in battle. Of the officers, Magalhães was murdered on the “Isle of Thieves” (in the Marianas) on April 7, 1521. Not long after, Barbosa was killed by the arrows of the natives, while Serrão was captured by them, and his shipmates did not even attempt to ransom by him. But the voyage had its triumphs as well as its victims. After calling at the Canaries, the ships reached the shores of South America on December 8, 1519. Following the coastline, they arrived on March 31, 1520 at San Júlian, near the mouth of the future Strait of Magellan, where they spent the winter. Magalhães discovered the passage, and in November 1520 the pioneering four-month crossing of the Pacific began. The culmination of the expedition came in March 1521 with de discovery of the route to the spices for the Spanish crown. The only ship to return, the Victoria, rounded the Cape of Good Hope on May 18, 1522, revictualled at the Cape Verde Islands, and having completed her mission sailed into home waters.

But no mention has been made so far of the fifth ship, the Trinidad, whose fate was sealed on the islands of Ternate, in April 1522, her crew, down to 23 men, was taken prisoner by Antonio Brito, who had arrived with the specific purpose of building a fort to frustrate the purposes of the Spaniards. Brito met little resistance when he impounded the cargo in the king’s name, and he was saved the trouble of sinking the decrepit ship by a storm which sank it for him. Although Brito acted in the customary way, he did not know he was obeying the wishes of the king, John III, almost to the letter. For the Portuguese monarch, on hearing the news that a Spanish ship had returned laden from the Spice Islands he had occupied, immediately dressed a letter to Emperor Charles V protesting energetically and demanding the confiscation of the spices and the punishment of the crew. Not long afterwards, advised by his scientific counselors, he ordered his diplomats to start negotiations. Again he was

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87 For the legal arguments of the Spaniards see Primitivo Mariño Gomes “L’ Espagne et l’Orient au debut du XVIème siècle” Un outré droit que dans l’Americque” In: Mare Liberum, nº 13, 1997, pp.83-93.
88 For the nautical aspects see Cte Carlos Etayo Elizondo, “Méritos de Fernão de Magalhães en su famoso viaje” In: Actas do VII Simpósio de História Marítima 24 a 26 de Outubro de 2001, Fernão de Magalhães A sua viagem no Pacífico Antecedentes e consequentes, Lisbon, 2002, pp. 71-125
encouraged by the theoretical arguments of astronomers and mathematicians, the practical advice of experienced mariners, the artifice of lawyers and the negotiating skills of diplomats to seek a satisfactory solution to the Spanish-Portuguese rivalry in competition rather than conflict. Talks took place at Badajoz and Elvas, and although they failed completely to reach agreement, they are not uninstructional.\textsuperscript{89}

\textit{Dividing the World – the first Jalta}

The Treaty of Tordesillas, in 1494, set out to divide the conquests of the Spanish and Portuguese kings \textit{in the Atlantic} by drawing a line “from pole to pole”. By 1512, when the Magalhães-Faleiro plan was conceived, the pragmatic argument must have occurred the both sides that this Atlantic semicircle could not be interpreted as a complete circle elsewhere in the world, dividing the globe into two hemispheres and areas of supremacy. As we have seen in the case of the Atlantic, there were not inconsiderable practical and technical obstacles to drawing this line in real life. To project it onto the Pacific Ocean, using the known and accepted methods and principles, only compounded the difficulties.

The main problem remained to define the coordinates of a particular geographical location, as the inaccuracies could only have been eliminated by a principle of calculation which had yet to be discovered. Nor was it easier to say how many leagues (or sea miles of the time) qualled a degree of longitude at the Equator. For understandable reasons, the Portuguese, “seeking much land for few degrees”, favoured a meridian conversation rate of 17\textsuperscript{th} leagues, Hernando Colon, the expert on the Spanish-Castilian side, obeyed similar considerations when proposing a rate of 162/3 leagues-more generally accepted at the time, but even less accurate that the Portuguese proposal.\textsuperscript{90} The ambiguities of the Treaty of Tordesillas projected other conflicts onto the Pacific Ocean. The biggest question of all when drawing the meridian was where to measure the 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands from. The Portuguese understandably preferred to measure from the easternmost island of Fogo. But Castile was no less convinced and indeed confident that it was in the right than Magalhães is shown to have been by the not as on the map which Brito took from the \textit{Trinidad}: Magalhães’s geographical knowledge corresponded with his conviction that he had taken islands belonging to the Spanish-Castilian sphere of influence into the rightful possession of his “chosen-king”.


So it is presumably not by accident that the Portuguese side tended to advance arguments of a legal, rather than a navigational or cartographical nature. After all, the latter would have placed not only the Moluccas but even Malacca in jeopardy if the Spanish calculations were accepted. The Portuguese fell back on the argument of the legal method and nature of possessions, which would mean the other side had to prove the illegality of the Portuguese annexations, which did not seem an easy task.\footnote{See: Isabel Barquinho, “O Tratado de Tordesilhas e a questão das Molucas” In: Mare Liberum, nº 8, 1994, pp. 9-28.}

The conflict in the Spice Islands continued and worsened until the negotiations broke down altogether. Tidore—though less of by the Portuguese since it was the adversary of Ternate, which had been elevated in the meantime to the rank of a vassal state—hastened to load up the Castilian ships which later arrived. The determination of the Portuguese king to prevent any trespassing in his trading areas was then imposed by force of arms in 1529 by Captain Jorge de Meneses.

Agreement was reached in Zaragoza in April of the same year\footnote{Mario Hernandez Sanchez-Barba, “Losx Convenios de Zaragoza” In: I. Colóquio Luso-Espanhol de História Ultramarina, 1973, Valladolid, pp. 179-185.}, even though it was a temporary one and belied the earlier expectations. One side had to lose prestige, in exchange for hefty compensation, and that was Castilian Spain, which “sold” the Moluccas for 350,000 gold ducats to the Portuguese crown. All rights of activity, dominion and possession there became Portugal’s including those of navigations and trade. More importantly, however, \textit{de jure} validity was gained in this region as well to what was effectively a “demarcations line” from pole to pole, running 297,5 miles east of the Moluccas. A “Tordesillas Counterline” had been drawn. That meant the “Iberian America” born of, the rivalry in the Atlantic was joined by an “Iberian Asia” in which Portuguese and Spanish-Castilian interests could both be asserted. The Iberian rivalry had become global, and the known world was effectively partitioned for the first time.
THE STATE OF THE ART IN POLICY-ORIENTED STATE FAILURE DIAGNOSTICS: A SELECTIVE REVIEW

Introduction

The article provides a brief overview of the state-of-the-art in research on state failure. In the first section it outlines why the field as such emerged, as a distinct research agenda of its own, during the 1990s. In the second section the article outlines a “diagnostics scheme” that may aid in universally/mechanically forecasting state failure events, even while this approach does not substitute for case-by-case qualitative analysis and area-specific expertise where acute crises (may or do) emerge. The third and final section offers modest counsel for policy-making vis-à-vis failing and failed states.

Why there is talk of state failure and failed states

The concept of „state failure” and „failed states” became prominent in the 1990s as a result of several intertwined processes. For the sake of transparency and parsimony, four of the pivotal trends/variables playing into this are pointed out below, with the context resulting from their interaction abbreviated as IODIN from hereon: IODIN marks a context in which state failure events are hard to ignore.

1) International Organization. The Cold War ended, and with it the traditional hegemony of those speaking for state/national security was further weakened within the general security discourse. The notion of „human security” gained in popularity, largely reflecting pressures, within the West, to modernize and democratize the notion of „national security”. “Security” has thus become a potentially catch-all term for all things concerning individuals’ safety and security, within the national borders and possibly even beyond them. The latter consideration (“even beyond national borders”) is important as it highlights how the democratization of security was meant by some to entail its provision across the globe, to all human beings, as evenly as possible. Soon, this revolutionary/emancipatory tendency in the security discourse led to calls for humanitarian intervention on the part of the Western academic, expert and

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93 By this we do not imply international organizations such as the UN or NATO, but the organization of the international system, as in the title of the renowned journal „International Organization”.
decision-making elites within which this discourse had been embedded. A sort of good/responsible global governance was now also considered possible and necessary, with the obstacle of Cold War power structures gone for good, as it seemed.

2) Destructivity. The Cold War ended, and partly related to this, partly as a result of idiosyncratic processes, the number of intra-state conflicts rose (up approximately till the mid-1990s). Some of these conflicts took place in regions of interest to the West, for example in the former Yugoslavia. The fighting that ensued signalled a fundamental breakdown of order to some and led them to contemplate whether states and the interstate system as such were bound to fatally decay over the coming period.

3) Interconnectivity. Media continued to globalize in reach/accessibility over the 1990s, and global interconnectivity further increased as a result of the spread of the internet. Faraway conflicts’ moral significance was brought home to many via powerful television images that made intra-state conflicts impossible to ignore for Western policy-makers even if they would have wished to disregard them.

4) Negative externality. With the globalization and the intensification of the world-wide flow of ideas and (both legal and illegal) trade, services, financial transfers, and, importantly, travelling or migrating human beings, aided by the transformation of International Organization, an interdependent web of interests gradually came to permeate relationships within a globality of power relationships — all of this in what more and more resembled a global neighbourhood. The destructive external impact of armed conflict and instability in various forms led to the emergence and in some cases the critical aggravation of threats such as global terrorism, illicit trafficking including the trade in narcotics, mass refugee flows, and other sources of concern. To this, concerns over weak statehood, associated with the steady outflow of masses of economic ex-migrants and poor public health conditions, were also added. This provided a security rationale for making intra-state conflicts and weak statehood issues of global governance that needed to be managed for the common interest of all.

Over time, related concerns extended to underdevelopment, and with somewhat

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increasing donor interest, multilateral organizations such as the World Bank embarked on a technocratic program of global assistance to comprehensively address what they termed “state fragility”, and bad governance, as factors among the root causes of instability and insecurity — moving toward what some term the “security-development nexus”.  

To a surprising extent, while points #1-3 (“IODI”) enjoyed consensus within the West very early on, point #4 (that is, “N”) started informing the agenda of world politics mostly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. There had been developments, trends, and events before that could have alarmed experts and decision-makers to the need to look at state failure from a global security point of view, but up till then the overriding feature of the discourse had been a consideration of the problem rather as a humanitarian challenge.

With this shift has come a concern that the hitherto welcome forces of globalization were producing a profoundly dark outcome: a shadow globalization threatening to either reverse or destroy the achievements of a globalizing, individual-human-rights- and market-economy-based human civilization. The earlier state-building agenda gained in importance as the perceived stakes had grown, albeit an air of desperation may have been sensed behind this from the post-9/11 outset.

Worse was to come thereafter, mostly as a result of the experience developing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Especially the latter state-building undertaking, taking place at the intersection of three macro-regions, Central Asia, South Asia, and the broader Middle East, in a land beset by war for over three decades by the time of writing this, appears to have invalidated the expectation that good intentions and a decent amount of resources may transform conflict-struck and under- or undeveloped trouble-spots into well-integrated systems of good governance. As a result, a program which may be dubbed “narrow-spectrum state-building” seems to have been adopted in some circles, with a focus on security sector reform in order to build local capacities to contain globally menacing conditions.

The current discourse, as of 2011, is one of emphasizing the limits of Western capacities and capabilities, in a context of re-arranging, albeit fundamentally interdependent, power relationships. This is compounded by sensibly increasing scepticism of the conventional Western wisdom about governance assistance and what it can achieve, including growing acceptance of the fact that ill-conceived advice can do more harm than good.  

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99 For a very sceptical position, consult Easterly, William: „The White Man’s Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good”. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. To an extent also relevant here, and sufficiently widely cited to thus reckon as a
removed from the original discourse and its assumptions of good-willing Western omnipotence. “IODIN” – *that the transformed International Organization is conducive to destructive conflicts taking on significance in an interconnected global neighbourhood through negative externalities* – does not allow for significantly scaling down existing Western commitments, but it makes it imperative to try and lobby non-Western powers for more responsible stakeholder-ship in managing global challenges, and to consider new undertakings with careful regard to their sustainability in terms of the resources that are necessary.

*When one sees a failed state, how to know it?*

In a sense, trying to enumerate universal criteria of what may constitute “failed statehood” may be missing the point. Failure has always been that in the eye of the beholder first of all, resting, as it is, on a binary coding of those “failed” and “fine”. Decision-makers are decision-makers because they not only choose between different policy options, but often frame and define decision-making problems themselves. To a certain extent, this arbitrariness may even be condoned from an analytical perspective as *sui generis* or peculiar constellations of conditions in various locales across the globe do indeed call for refined political judgment.

Nevertheless on the part of decision-makers there does, in reality, exist a demand for parsimonious, universal advice from the social sciences (if only to indirectly inform their eventual judgment).

Moreover, a universal, mechanical approach to identifying state failure may be valid in that it may better capture the essence of what is at stake in general when state failure occurs, even if it may get judgment regarding some individual cases spectacularly wrong. To understand the pros and cons related to this better, consider the following example. Selecting only one indicator, such as the “uncontrolled cross-border flow of migrants”, as a measure of a state’s control over its own borders, will be a universally relevant indicator of state strength and territorial control. Its relevance is not diminished by the fact that countries such as the United States or Spain may seem to do badly as a result of applying this measure, contradicting the otherwise generally positive perceptions regarding these countries’ overall stability. This is the potential downside of a universal/mechanical approach to analysis; however, applying only case-by-case qualitative judgment may also be unfortunate, as it would leave us without a truly universal definition of the problem at hand, and would also require constantly updated, well-informed judgment regarding most regions and states in the world.

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For a compromise between the latter and a fully mechanical, single-indicator approach, the use of a combination of complex or composite indices in a multi-track configuration may be recommended. This may sound complicated but in reality it does not demand more than the consideration of various existing datasets that are available, compiled with regularity by different institutions.

Using input from multiple sources is useful given the fuzzy character of the failed state concept. Various different aspects of what is generally understood by the concept may be relevant depending on the kind of interests and challenges one is looking to address, or in other words: based on what one happens to problematize from one’s peculiar point of view.

A possible abstract categorization of different concerns is put forward by the Center for Global Development: the consideration of three distinct kinds of “gaps” or deficiencies in key dimensions of statehood and governance, namely security, legitimacy, and capacity gaps. The three concepts are in some overlap and they are clearly interrelated, yet it seems practical to think of them separately at least in certain contexts.

A more practical approach may be to depart from an abstract, scholarly point of view, and study “challenged statehood” from the point of view of different institutional stakeholders who have developed a multitude of analytical tools that are in wide circulation today. These are characterized by ontological and methodological diversity of a potentially beneficial kind. They conceptualize sources of concern differently and employ different metrics to measure them.

What follows here is an arbitrary selection of the existing approaches, but its aim is to present a sufficiently comprehensive overview; one that makes sense as a whole, and not only as a compilation of unrelated components.

These components, both individually and added together, are potential “pre-event” indicators that can inform a mechanical approach to forecasting: the diagnostic task involved in using them is akin to identifying the potential for certain medical conditions developing in a set of patients on whom only a limited number of tests can be run, to determine only a few of their characteristics.

For a simple checklist, the article proposes the ETHER-AMIC scheme. The abbreviation invented here stands for Ethnically Heterogeneous, Rectangular, Autocratic, Mismanaged, Corrupt countries.

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The input that may be used to associate values to the components of this abstract scheme in individual cases may include (although in some dimensions of measurement other options are also available) Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski’s two key variables for determining “state artificiality”— (i) state boundaries’ relation to the territorial spread of ethnic groups, and (ii) the fractal dimension of these borders — as well as Freedom House’s democracy scores, World Bank governance indicators and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index scores.\textsuperscript{101}

State artificiality is reflective of a state’s structural opportunity structure. Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski find especially state boundaries’ impact on ethnic groups (in essence, whether state borders represent artificial dividing lines that are conducive to frustration and political instability) closely related to development indicators, but their measure of state borders’ fractal dimension (how rectangular/squiggly states’ borders are) seems an equally interesting choice of variable. In tandem, the two variables (“PARTITIONED” and “FRACTAL”) problematize the following obviously interesting set of countries: “Chad, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guatemala, Jordan, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Pakistan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe”.\textsuperscript{102}

The next three variables denoted in the ETHER-AMIC formula are focused essentially on state formation: that is, the state’s own record, with an obviously fundamental impact on a state’s chances of survival. These are second-tier variables, as the above variables, for example “PARTITIONED”, may stochastically impact on a government’s room for maneuver in managing political freedoms, as well as on its subjects’ tolerance for its governance (in terms of legitimacy).

While the three governance-related variables certainly do not capture all aspects of state-society relations, they may offer a preliminary diagnosis of sorts that can then be effectively complemented by case-by-case qualitative analysis. Freedom House scores may be a useful way, albeit not an exclusive one, of measuring democracy and political freedoms, or the lack thereof. World Bank


\textsuperscript{102} List of countries from Alesina, Easterly, Matuszeski, 2010, page 18. A comment: one obvious weakness of the approach focusing on fractal dimension is that this variable cannot be applied in the case of island states (and such states have also seen unstable periods recently, for instance in Fiji or in the Solomon Islands.
governance indicators may reflect how well a country fares in institutionally adapting to a turbulent world economy and, at times, equally turbulent internal politics. Finally, Transparency International’s CPI index may be reflective of how much the state is able to control its own actions and how much state agents fall in line for the smooth operation of state institutions.

Having thus established states’ structural and governance-related chances of survival, we may have the sort of diagnostic capability that allows for quick preliminary judgment. This will not provide miraculous predictive powers. To the contrary, the conclusions generated may seem trivial rather than real insight in some cases, and they may even seem obviously wrong in others, as noted before.

The value of this kind of diagnostic tool for an analyst or a decision-maker lies in the following:

(1) in the capability to quickly come to a raw first call on blindspot countries, regarding which rapidly mobilizable area-specific expertise is lacking. For example, these may be in close vicinity to an active crisis zone where their possibly significant predisposal to be infected by instability may need to be assessed;

(2) in the opportunity that there exists to observe macro-trends in light of the data assembled, and thus in the ability to conclude whether risk in general is elevated or decreased over a certain period of time (for example if the group of ETHER-AMIC countries expands or contracts);

(3) in the ability to devise policies with special regard to the countries at risk identified by the ETHER-AMIC diagnostic scheme (or by any other similar analytical tool for that matter). Mechanical forecasting is indispensable in long-term policy-planning, for example in prioritization.

If one wants to have more insight to better prepare for specific challenges, for example for counter-terrorist interventions, in line with a more national-security-oriented approach to the challenge of state failure, in addition to the above, one also needs actor-specific theories that may tell us something meaningful about terrorist organizations’ behavior. Again, to indicate but two options that are available, without a catch-all overview, David Kilcullen’s book, *The Accidental Guerrilla*,\(^{103}\) attempted to offer a portrayal of typically conducive societal conditions in which a jihadist organization such as al-Qaida may thrive. A similar, but altogether perhaps better alternative approach is outlined in a

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RAND study on the subject which identified a mix of limited government reach (as opposed to completely lacking reach) and the chance to access useful infrastructure, among other important variables, as conditions particularly conducive to terrorist organizations appearing, setting up base, and operating from governance-challenged states.\footnote{“Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks”. Multiple authors, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2007.}

As a final addition to the diagnostics approach presented above – watching out for cases when ETHER-AMIC is added to IODIN – one may also consider looking at “post-event” indicators. The past record of “state failure events” (whatever an analyst may define as such) may generally indicate a lasting trauma that can result in the recurrence of state ailments and state failure; just as in the case of the study of armed conflict it is a general empirical finding that conflicts frequently recommence or reappear transformed. One possible example of this kind of approach is that of the now defunct State Failure Task Force (commissioned by then-US Vice President Al Gore, funded by the US Central Intelligence Agency) which in the 1990s produced a dataset of state failure events, carefully assembled in line with pre-determined “event thresholds” and “event magnitude scales”. The one downside of this quantitatively strong research project, besides that it unfortunately ended in its original form, was that its conceptualization of different categories of “state failure events” was arguably imperfect: neither mutually exclusive nor comprehensive, with the individual categories conceptually troubling and fuzzy in nature. Bearing in mind that perfect categorization may be “a bridge too far because it does not exist” in this particular field, the task force’s categories of “adverse regime changes”, “revolutionary and ethnic wars”, and “politicides and genocides” were to some degree useful to consider in fact.\footnote{“State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings.” By Goldstone, Jack A. et al., September 30, 2000, accessed at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/SFTF%20Phase%20III%20Report%20Final.pdf, accessed on 14 October 2007.}

What to do?

In the place of fully collapsed state institutions and fragmented authority structures, “state-rebuilding” may aim at reestablishing order. Where one may wish to assist the fledgling institutions of a new state, as in South Sudan, the common term “state-building” may just happen to be an accurate term for the task at hand. Ironically, what is most often implied by state-building is actually “state reform”; the attempt from the part of external actors to constructively contribute to a partly naturally occurring process of state formation in different locales, aiding different beneficiaries. For example, the European Union is mostly involved in security-sector-reform, election assistance and rule-of-law missions of this type, even while it is there as a participant in more
comprehensive state-building undertakings as well, for example in Afghanistan – present in such cases at the side of a host of other actors, including for example the UN and the NATO.

Even if one only focuses on the task of state reform, it requires a puzzling diversity of tasks. This may include quite robust endeavours, such as DDR programs, security and justice sector reform, institution-building and extensive technical assistance along with budget support, development aid and support to civil society. A whole-of-government approach may be inevitable.

Besides these more visible efforts, very often tasks related to state-building begin with mediation: as state-building/state reform interventions are inevitably political in nature. They cannot be regarded as technocratic programs to the inevitably realized benefit of all: they thus require the negotiation of a multitude of potentially contentious issues and interests with multiple stakeholders. This mediated process ought not entail giving in to whatever local power brokers happen to agree on, but it cannot entail a top-down imposition, either, of what the external state-building party considers politically feasible or normatively appropriate.

It is the latter aspect of state-building/state reform interventions that shows that often less may be more, and slow (and gradual) may be faster, for the sake of fostering truly positive change. At the same time, this moderating counsel ought not imply what is often suggested by sceptics in the wake of the challenges faced in Afghanistan: that we ought to comprehensively retreat from endeavours of the kind outlined above.

Constructive alternatives may nevertheless be contemplated. Structural adjustments, not of single national economies, but of the interdependent world economy as such, through more constructive manipulation of trade and investment regimes, timely and well-executed development cooperation, extensive mediation support in the service of conflict prevention, adequately backed up by all means of statecraft on the part of powerful actors, and other beneficial tools, may be of use so that there be less of a need for the kind of state-building interventions that really challenge the will and the resources of Western states. All of the tools enumerated here may be applied specifically with the aim of improving the prospects of the ETHER-AMIC group of countries, or other countries at risk. In fact, similar approaches are already in place: directed for example at Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, Low Income Countries, or African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, to remind the reader of but a few of comparable existing policy initiatives.

Conclusions
Diagnosing the likelihood of state failure events with a universal/mechanical approach is a well developed trade. In addition, a huge number of experts, think tanks and academic institutions work on qualitative, area-specific analysis. To such an extent, that – as it was concluded during policy discussions held as part of the review of the EU’s Gothenburg program for the prevention of violent conflict, where this author participated\(^{106}\) – “early warning is no longer an issue”. Information is available. The question is what action to generate from the available information, and the challenge is to find out about this in a timely manner.

The existing analytical tools continue to be relevant and will fundamentally pertain to national security policies of Western states, even with the coming of a post-Western era, and beyond the belief in Western omnipotence, on which liberal interventionism initially rested.

\(^{106}\) At an „academic retreat” held at the Hungarian Institute for International Affairs (HIIA), during Hungary’s Presidency of the European Union, on 27 January 2011.
ECONOMY OF WESTERN SAHARA

In this article I’d like to share some information about the economy of Western Sahara. The Western Sahara is a disputed mass of land which was formerly under the Spanish empire and was called Spanish Sahara. After the Spanish left it underwent a long and still continuing spell of dispute as to its governing body. In 1975 an international court of justice granted Western Sahara, previously a Spanish Overseas Province, self-determination. Unfortunately, King Hassan of Morocco sent 350,000 people to take control of the territory. Initially partitioned by Morocco and Mauritania, it came fully under Moroccan control in 1979. Morocco has yet to comply with UN demands for the territory's complete release.

There are a lot of argument are the locals can afford to pay their bills, if they can reach independence from Morocco. Some researcher say that without Moroccans money, the saharawis can’t survive, but others say that they can manage it. I don’t know the proper answer, but I try to give as many information as I could.

The country of Western Sahara lies to the north west of the African continent next to the northern region of the Atlantic Ocean. The countries that are neighbours of the Western Sahara are Mauritania, Algeria and Morocco. Being desert land, the Western Sahara is mostly sandy rocky and flat. However, there are places where the land ascends forming small hills and also some high mountain. Due to the scarcity of rainfall, the land is primarily not arable. The only arable land is the oases that dot the vast desert.

Comprising mainly of desert, Western Sahara is arid in nature. The desert is dry and extremely hot, with little or no rainfall through long stretches of the year. However, since Western Sahara also has a long coast line, dense fogs and heavy dew result from the incoming cold currents from the ocean. Given that the demography of the Western Sahara comprises mainly of arid and desert land, date palms and few other fruit types are to be found. However, even these are concentrated mainly in the oases. The rest of the flora is the desert variety of 107Janos Besenyő: Western Sahara. pp. 86
109H.T. Norris: The arab conquest of the Western Sahara. pp. 2
sparse shrubs and cactuses. The list of fauna in Western Sahara is made up of camels, sheep and goats.

In the North West corner of Africa phosphate deposits were discovered in the 1960s by the Spanish and their exploitation was launched by the Moroccan Government. These reserves provide one of the best qualities of phosphate of 80% purity, and significant revenues to Morocco, which had been among the first phosphate producers and sellers of the world. After the USA it was Morocco where the largest amount of phosphate (22 million metric tons) was produced in 2002. The mines in Western Sahara are important for Morocco also because the conveyor system between the mines and seaports makes transportation extremely cost effective. Phosphate from mines in Khourigba, Morocco, is transported to ports by rail making production more costly than that in Western Sahara.

Mines in Morocco and Western Sahara are supervised by the OCP (Office Cherifien des Phosphates), which is responsible for everything from operating mines to market research and sale. However, 30% of the proprietary rights of mines still belong to Spanish companies. Annual phosphate production in the Sahara region is around 2 million metric tons only and the reserves allow continuous and profitable mining for several more decades.

The map below shows Moroccan and Saharan phosphate reserves.

![Map of Moroccan and Saharan phosphate reserves](source)

*Source: Philip A. Szczesniak; The Mineral Industries of Morocco and Western Sahara, 2002.*

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111 John Damis: Conflict in Northwest Africa-The Western Sahara Dispute. pp. 50-79.

According to the latest research findings Western Sahara is extremely rich in minerals, particularly in iron ore, uranium, natural gas and oil. Under seafloor of the coastal waters several American and French companies (Kerr-McGee and Total Fina Elf) conducted oil research and their findings indicate rich reserves off the coasts of Western Sahara. However, oil production was impossible to launch because of the objections of Polisario and several other organisations. Companies expect the settlement of problems related to the territories and plan to start oil production only afterwards. Nevertheless, as a result of the lobby activities of several Norwegian human right organisations and those of economic factors Norwegian company Skagen Vest, financially involved in Kerr-McGee company sold its shares (2003) since it had no intention even to provide indirect support to Moroccan efforts aimed at oil production in the Sahara. The firm was the biggest Norwegian shareholder of the company through its 100,000 shares. In his press release one of the company CEOs Kristian Falnes explained the decision with the too risky policy of the American company. That is why his company sold the too risky shares with minimum profit. The current value of the shares is over 30 million Norwegian Crowns. Naturally, this did not shatter Kerr-McGee Company. Its employees continue working in Western Sahara in spite of the fact that exploitation of natural reserves in territories occupied by another state is prohibited by international law.

One thing is for sure, the Norwegian Support Committee for Western Sahara (NSCWS) has threatened all companies attempting to conduct oil research or production in Western Sahara with Moroccan license with economic boycott and political measures (including negative press campaigns). This organisation has already inflicted fairly serious moral and economic damage to Norwegian TGS-NOPEC oil research company, which has made several research drills off the Western Sahara coast. Hundreds of newspaper articles were published, radio and TV reports were broadcast on the company generating a rather negative PR and inflicting economic damage.

To make the situation even more complex Polisario has also offered oil concessions to another consortium (British-Australian Fusion Oil&Gas) therefore only after the settlement of the rule over the disputed territory the winner of the competition for the oil production in the region can be announced.

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113 Claes Olsson: The Western Sahara Conflict. The Role of Natural Resources in Decolonization. p. 20.
114 Claes Olsson: The Western Sahara Conflict. The Role of Natural Resources in Decolonization. p. 18.
116 Claes Olsson: The Western Sahara Conflict. The Role of Natural Resources in Decolonization. p. 20.
Moreover, the coastal waters comprise one of the richest in fish areas in the world and fishing right is also disputed by the opposing parties.\(^{117}\) Spanish and Moroccan ships were confiscated by Polisario guerrillas several times when those had no license from them. When in December 2002 a tanker sank at the Spanish coast a lot of Spanish fishermen lost their jobs due to water pollution. Both the Moroccan Government and the Polisario proposed the fishermen to use the territorial waters for fishing. Moroccans also have major revenues from fishing and processing sea fish.\(^{118}\)

Fishing off the Sahara coast has always been a major industry off the Sahara coast line although fishing has been conducted in coastal waters.\(^{119}\) Local fishermen using small fishing boats (dories) built by themselves usually went for 2-3 day long trips to catch shrimps, mussels, and various kinds of fish (sardine, mackerel, tuna, dolphin, etc.). Algae, kelps, and seaweeds were also harvested for catering and other purposes. In fact local people ventured to the ocean only in the spring and summer months while during the stormy winter period they did some other jobs.

Until 1914 the right to large scale fishing belonged to Spanish, French, and Portuguese companies and only after the first fish processing factory was founded by the Spanish was the catch bought from local fishermen who started exploring areas farther off the coast in order to have a better living. The real development began in 1927 when a shipyard was established by the Spanish, where 16-24 metre long trawlers were manufactured by mostly local workers. Those ships had no storage rooms yet that would have allowed to keep fish alive therefore those trawlers were unfit for longer fishing trips although the processing of the catch began right on board.

Not until the occupation of Western Sahara did local people develop fishing industry as they were happy with opportunities provided by the Spanish. Naturally, in the early 1960s more and more foreign fishing boats (Norwegian, Italian, Danish, French, etc.) started to arrive into the region although they were kept away from their privileged areas by the Spanish for a while.

Changes took place when Morocco occupied the territories and it was realised that one of the richest fisheries is off the Sahara coasts. At first Moroccan fishermen used only small boats (korb) without engine, in the shallow coastal waters.

On a boat usually 12 fishermen worked using mostly dragnets and hook-traps. By the late 1970s the majority of boats had been equipped with 25HP engines, which made work much easier.

It is fairly difficult to provide exact figures on the number of boats. The ones below are from Moroccan registers:

- 3,600 boats in 1983
- 4,130 boats in 1984
- 4,930 boats in 1985
- 5,370 boats in 1988
- 5,380 boats in 1992
- 8,000 boats

Nearly 75% of these boats were concentrated in the Atlantic coast and the remaining 25% in the Mediterranean. In fact, the number of boats grew significantly in the 1980s when in several regions profitable octopus fishing (Octopus vulgaris) could be conducted. Plastic containers tied to concrete blocs are placed on the seafloor and these traps are checked every 2-3 days on the average. Such traps are planted in 100 metres from the coast line but some of them can be as far as 30 kilometres – from a few metres’ depth to as much as 20 metres. Some ships regularly check nearly 3,000 octopus traps a week and make good profit although this is a seasonal job only. The same fishermen use lobster traps and several kilometre long hook traps planted along the routes of migratory fish schools. Collecting sponge and algae is also their business, which are sold either on local market places or to food companies (alga Agar-Agar).

Moroccan State fishing fleet has four types of vessels:

1. Small fishing boats (doires, korb, etc.) catching mainly schools of sardine, sardella, or mackerel near the surface. The boats have 15-25-strong crews using 250-400-metre long and 40-50-metre deep nets. The boats start work in the afternoons or evenings and finish next morning.

In 1927 there were only 27 such boats under Moroccan flag operating between Tangier and El Jadida. After World War 2, however, rich fisheries were discovered in the region of Safi, Essaouira and Agadir making the number of fishing boats increase to 180 in a short time.

Local waters rapidly exhausted thus after the occupation of Western Sahara Moroccan fishermen relocated their centre of activities to the ports of Tan-Tan and Laayoune (El-Aaiun). There was a steady increase in the number

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120 Mohammed Baddyr: Introduction of pots as new fishing technique for Octopus vulgaris in Agadir. p. 96.
of trawlers and in 1975 the fleet counted 269 boats. In 1997, however, there were merely 323 boats of such types since the Government intended to reduce their number and supported the commissioning of modern boats.

The ageing small boat fleet is some 40 years old and since shipyards manufacturing such vessels were closed down there was only repair and maintenance work done on those boats.

In the second type fall more up-to-date motor vessels which use trawl nets along the coastline. On the boats 10-15-strong crews work starting from around 2 in the morning and returning to port late afternoon. Some of these boats are capable of cruising as long as a week and is equipped with freezers to store the catch. However, such boats can only operate over sandy seafloor and lower their nets twice a day (each takes 3-5 hours). Currently there are 331 such boats in the Moroccan fishing fleet 80 % of which operate off the Sahara coasts.

This is the group of small (8-10-metre-long) motor boats capable of spending about 3 days in the open sea. These boats were first built in the 1930s and they were designed for catching fish farther off the coast line. Due to specific requirements the boats with 13-14-strong crews are equipped with freezers allowing such boats to keep their catch fresh. Currently the Moroccan fishing fleet has 920 boats 96 % of which operate along the Atlantic coast line (primarily off the Sahara coast).

In the fourth (mixed) category fall all those boats that use both types of nets. Currently the Moroccan fishing fleet has 56 of such boats.

Officially the state-run fishing fleet was established as late as 1972 and 4 big fishing ships were stationed in the port of Las Palmas. After former Spanish Sahara with its fish-rich coastal waters were taken by Morocco the Government submitted its first project on exploiting fisheries. In the framework of the programme fishermen were provided long-term subsidised loans to assist them with buying boats and foreign ships were banned from a 120-kilometre-wide zone off the coast.121

In 1981 fishing was one of the top industries of Moroccan economy therefore Ministry of Fishing Industry was established and plans to build new seaports and food factories for processing fish in the Sahara region was approved.122

The Moroccan fishing fleet stationed mostly in foreign ports (Las Palmas, Abidjan and Dakar) between 1972 and 1986 then in reconstructed seaports of Agadir, Tan-tan, and Laayoun.

Most of the catch of the fleet (87%) comes from the Sahara region during the 4-6-week-long fishing season. Most of these ships are modern, equipped with radar, sonar, freezers, and other technologies allowing continuous fishing and processing of catch simultaneously.

Most of the catch consists of small, so called mass fish (sardine, sardella, mackerel, etc.). In 1950 the annual Moroccan catch was only 110,800 tons and later it increased to 485,500 tons a year. 85% of small fish is sardine (Sardinia pilchardus) and mackerel is the second most frequent type. 90% of the mackerel catch is made up by common mackerel (Scomber japonicus) while the amount of Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) is insignificant since its habitats are located more to the south.

The amount of catch significantly increased: while in the 1960s it was merely 4,100 tons a year this amount grew to 14,000 tons per year in the 1990s. The amount of various kinds of octopus was some 24,000 tons a year.123

Also 12,000 tons of different sorts of lobsters, shrimp, and mussels (black mussel, oyster, ec.) were caught and sold annually.

European Community and other countries lobby in Morocco for licences of fishing in the region.124 Exercising fishing rights is a delicate issue and triggered several conflicts between Moroccan authorities and ships under foreign flags. Thanks to their more advanced technology foreign ships return home with more catch than locals. This becomes clear when analysing data e.g. those in 1990 when Moroccan ships caught 402,200 tons while foreign fishermen caught 998,400 tons. These are only the official statistics, which do not include illegal fishing, which is very frequent in the region.125 Spanish fishing fleets caught 255,000 tons of fish making up 65% of the Moroccan catch. This may be the cause why fishing in territorial waters was limited or banned for Spanish ships several times by the Moroccan Government. Fishing boats violating the prohibition were forced to local ports, where they were confiscated.126

126 Jose Maria Magone: Contemporary Spanish Politics. p. 223.
The following figure shows fisheries off the Moroccan coast lines and seaports.

![Map of Morocco showing fisheries and seaports]

*Source: Mohammed Baddyr-Sylvie Guenette; The Fisheries off the Atlantic coast of Morocco 1950-1997*

Naturally, it is not only Moroccan fishermen who do fishing in these waters as both the Besides fishing industry sea transportation, including seaports (Layoune, Dakhla), was also top priority in the development policy, partly in the framework of agreements with Senegal. The heads of the two governments – Mohamed VI and President of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade – concluded an agreement at the French-Africa Summit in Paris in February 2002 on the establishment of a new transportation company.

Since there are grave ethnic conflicts between Senegal and Mauritania, which was regarded as a supporter of Polisario in the region, triggering several armed clashes Moroccans provide a comprehensive economic and political support to Senegal.\(^{127}\) A clear sign of economic relations is the fact that after Senegalese air company Air Afrique had gone bankrupt, new national air company Air Senegal was established with Moroccan support. Royal Air Moroc is the majority owner of the company (51 %). Common projects include the building of a Dakar– Morocco highway across occupied Sahara region. By now Senegal has become the most loyal ally of the Moroccan Government in Africa,

\(^{127}\) Toby Shelley: Endgame in the Western Sahara. p. 42.
which is very important for Morocco as the majority of Western African countries recognised SADR, the Government of Western Sahara, created by Polisario.\textsuperscript{128}

Windy and barren desert may seem valueless nevertheless Moroccan Government and the University of Kassel, Germany, elaborated a joint project on the utilisation of wind energy. Scientists have discovered that Southern Morocco – including occupied Western Sahara regions – is the windiest area of the world. Since the majority of the relatively small population is city dweller the population density is extremely low and there cannot be any obstacles to constructing wind farms as opposed to Europe, where higher population density causes various problems (opposition of local population, etc.).

The project was named “Desert Wind”. According to University of Kassel Mr Gregor Czisch wind energy is a potential source of energy for the next generation and in the Sahara energy can be produced at a much lower price than the energy purchase price in Germany. At Sahara wind farms energy can be produced at mere 4.5 cents per kilowatt while the cheapest option in Germany is at 6.5 cents a kilowatt. Moroccan scientist Khalid Benhamou, involved in the project states that along the roughly 2,000 km long coastline some 2-4 Megawatts of energy can be produced on a square kilometre. Accordingly, the annual production on average can be more than 1,000 terrawatts which is half of the EU energy consumption. The implementation of the project would begin in Tarfaya but in Western Sahara wind farms could be constructed only after the final settlement of disputed Sahara territories. The programme can offer extremely tempting economic opportunities for the participants.\textsuperscript{129}

Another seemingly bizarre but very profitable field of economy is the area of sand dunes in some 250 kilometres from Tarfaya. However strange it may seem, Spanish Government pays good money for the fine sand delivered from this area to the beaches of the Canary Islands. Several ships leave the port of Laayoune and sell their loads, which are valueless for the local people, to companies in tourist industry.\textsuperscript{130}

Agriculture in the area is minimal: arable lands and oases, where fruit (dates) and some vegetable production is dominant, make up a mere 5 %. Another 19 % of the region is suitable for pasturage of camels, sheep, and goats, done mainly by nomads.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{128} www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/w Sahara
\textsuperscript{130} Toby Shelley: Endgame in the Western Sahara. p. 78.
\textsuperscript{131} Henri N. Le Houéron; Pastoralism (presentation at the scientific conference Studies of the Interaction of Climate and Society, 2000)
Another significant part of the population is involved in handcraft and home industry. Using semi-precious stones and remains of stones of animals beautiful jewellery is made which is sold mainly to tourists. Silverworks and leather-craft are also traditional trades. Although living standards in the occupied territories are well below that in Morocco still it is higher than of people in Polisario-controlled territories. Nowadays tourism began to develop, however, due to the unsettled status quo organised tourism industry could emerge only in the territories occupied by Morocco. Nevertheless, some “adventurers” take the risk to venture into the so called “free territories”. The majority of foreign investors come from France and Spain because both historic and economic relations between these firms and Western Sahara remained.

In accordance with the provisions of the current ceasefire agreement Morocco is not allowed to build roads or exploit the natural resources of the country until the final settlement of the status quo.

This provision of the agreement is, however, frequently ignored – for example in the Guerguerat region near the Mauritanian border a road was built with the involvement of the armed forces and the construction of fishing villages is also in progress along the Western Sahara coastline. To date 6 such villages had been built and in the 2002 regional budget resources for another 6 settlements were earmarked.

The reason is that in the seas rich in fish some 160,000 Moroccan fishermen work temporarily who stay on the Western Sahara coast during the fishing season as they are unable to make a living in Morocco. In spite of their merely USD 7 a day wage they support their families in Morocco. Besides the existing fish processing factories (Layoune and Dakhla) operating at full capacity further factories are planned to be built.

As the above data clearly indicate Morocco gained significant economic opportunities through the occupation of Western Sahara. For this and some other reasons (nationalism, Berber separatist movements, etc.) it does not intend to return the area to the SADR. Therefore local inhabitants can expect only partial autonomy within Morocco as the Moroccan armed forces will never withdraw from Western Sahara voluntarily.

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132 Toby Shelley: Endgame in the Western Sahara. p. 94.
134 Claes Olsson: The Western Sahara Conflict. The Role of Natural Resources in Decolonization. p. 20.
135 Toby Shelley: Endgame in the Western Sahara. p. 75.
136 Toby Shelley: Endgame in the Western Sahara. pp. 92-93.
137 www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/wsahara
PEDAGOGIC METHODOLOGY OF PREPARING FOR EXTRAORDINARY SITUATIONS

The word pedagogy covers a complex concept which partly means the theory of training and on the other hand the practical ways of an applied science. The idea of pedagogy does not only mean education at school but stands for every kind of situation in which some new type of knowledge is taught. Today the idea of “life long learning” is infiltrated in common thinking. For this reason the significance of pedagogy manifests not only in traditional education but even in everyday life.

The examination of pedagogic methods should start with clarifying essential questions. One of the most important of them is to define who is going to be taught of what. The determination of the target audience is also a vital element, since concerning the methodology there can be major a difference between teaching of juveniles or adults. It is also an important question that how long the adults can be taught. According to János Tóth the development of personality in case of older adults is accomplished. As pedagogy plays a major role in personality development, the above mentioned statement cannot be ignored.

Before choosing the elements of the method, we should analyze the environment, the situation and the participants in a complex way.

Furthermore I would like to discuss some possible ways of preparing for extraordinary situations mainly concentrating on the field of law enforcement.

Dealing with extraordinary situation is a typical feature of law enforcement such as police, home defence force, national security services, catastrophe defence etc. It can be generally ascertained that the staff of these organizations often have to face extraordinary situations (emergency cases, deviant behaviour, threatening etc.) for which some of them may not be well prepared. Since the above mentioned organizations usually handle different kind of situations, it is difficult to phrase general principles for the methodology of preparation. Nevertheless, it is clear that the success of preparation partly lies in reviewing, modelling and analyzing the possible situations which can occur during the work. Besides, we should be aware of the fact that there are different kinds of people working on each selected area with different age, experience, personality and ability features. When compiling a training plan these elements must be dealt with.
The staff of the above mentioned organizations can easily meet such kind of situations which they are not accustomed to, therefore it can cause deep stress to them. The conception of preparing for extraordinary situations should correlate with the compilation of selection methods. It is an important aspect whether the future member of the staff of a certain area possesses skills, abilities, personality features for being able to cope with unusual, unknown or even dangerous situations. Certainly, there are many different kinds of working areas within these organizations as well, so it isn’t necessary for all of them to have a staff with the same skills. A well-compiled selection method based on evaluation of the different kind of working areas is able to match the future staff members with the appropriate working area.

The preparation training is important not only for the new members but for the experienced ones as well. In their case we should lay bigger emphasis on the refresher course. The training itself is a constant procedure including more phases and levels and is also having horizontal and vertical dimensions, therefore building up a well fitted and complex training system can be quite time-consuming.

When developing a training system generally the further aspects need to be evaluated thoroughly:

- The features of the whole organization
- Within the organization the characteristics of the selected working area
- The activity and function of the selected working area
- The different kinds of working procedures
- The possible extraordinary situations’ characteristics for the selected working area
- The scope of activities of the certain staff members
- The possible risk factors of the selected working activity
- Case studies
- The necessary competencies, skills, personality features connected with certain working activities
- The degree of physical and psychological preparedness of the selected staff members
- The age, experience and professional improvement of those members who are involved in the evaluated task

After having thoroughly studied the selected working area we are able to compile a multidimensional matrix which helps to match the certain scope of activities with the necessary competencies, skills, abilities, personality features and training methods. The more detailed is our matrix, the more complex can be our training plan.
The further introduced matrix stands for just a simple example of evaluation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of activity, scope of activities</th>
<th>Skills, knowledge and competencies necessary for accomplishing the task</th>
<th>Possible extraordinary, special situations which may happen during the working activity</th>
<th>Necessary preparations, trainings for the fulfillment of the certain tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investigator</td>
<td>Communication skills</td>
<td>To communicate with very different kinds of people (possible aggression, deviant behaviour, assault etc.)</td>
<td>Study of theory of communication, communicational strategies, behavioural communication etc..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological knowledge</td>
<td>Interrogation, needs of influence, persuasion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Study of theory of psychology, technics of reasoning and negotiation, manipulational strategies etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ability of coping with stress</td>
<td>Facing deviant behaviour, the danger of physical injury, the need of using weapons etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tactical training, study of dealing with deviant behaviour, self-defense training, weapon training etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation and analysis abilities</td>
<td>Information gathering in different environment, matching the different pieces of information</td>
<td></td>
<td>Study of methods and procedures of information collection etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, legal etc. knowledge</td>
<td>Everyday working situations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lecture on specific subject matters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using this method it is possible to compile matrixes for different kinds of working activities or even for a certain task (e.g. an extraordinary mission), which further on may help to develop targeted preparational trainings. When it became clear that who is going to be taught of what, then the next step is to choose the training methods.

In my view one of the most effective way of preparation for extraordinary situations is simulation training (field-work). The goal of these kinds of training methods is to involve the trainee in real life situations but within a protected and screened environment. While discharging the predetermined mission, on the one
hand the trainee will be able to perceive his/her own reactions, on the other hand, the observers can evaluate the quality of execution and survey the level of the skills. It is necessary to involve certain experts – such as professionals, psychologists etc. – in this training, who are capable of giving an objective and thorough evaluation of the trainees’ strengths and weaknesses. On the basis of these feedbacks, it becomes possible to draw the orientation of additional development. However, it is true that there is no perfect way of preparation for extraordinary situations, but throughout developing certain skills and competencies, the risk of reacting wrong and endangering one another in such situations may be effectively reduced. This kind of training is based on continuous practising, therefore it is quite time-consuming and costly, but the deliberation of possible advantages shows that it is worth expending time and sources on it.

As an example furthermore I would like to present a certain training method which has been successfully used for the preparation not only for the members of law enforcement organizations but also for other ones discharging special services.

Under the aegis of the International Training and Civilian Crisis Management Center a so called ‘tactical training’ unit works. The method was developed by a group of experts including a well-known Hungarian criminal psychologist. The training takes place in the so called tactical house, which consists of different premises suitable for practising different kinds of simulated missions. The training can be easily designed for the procurer organization’s demand through a prediscussion session. During a consultation between the tactical trainers and the certain organization’s representatives every detail of the tactical training can be discussed including the number of the trainees, the goal of the training, the characteristics of the simulated situation etc. The training itself fulfills two kinds of requirements. Partly it makes possible for the trainers and the trainees to evaluate the ways of solutions, on the other hand it gives a real-life experience for the trainees, which helps them to see their own limits and to gain experience of great value without having actually injured.

During a certain tactical training session the involved experts not only examine the trainees’ abilities of evolving the actual task, but they are able to measure the physical changes at the same time since each of the trainees is wearing a pulse measurement device and there is also a videorecording process taking place. With the help of these the trainers can give a thorough feedback including the trainees physical and psychological ways of reacting. In this tactical house a lot of different kinds of situations can be simulated such as covert information gathering, hostage taking, capturing, robbery etc. Consequently it can be effectively used for the preparation of the staff of law
enforcement organizations as well. (Certainly, this tactical training method can also be designed for civil services’ trainings e.g. banks etc.).

In the course of evaluation the involved trainee and his/her own commander receives a complete feedback of the trainees’ strengths and weaknesses, including the possible further directions of development.

The tactical training can be applied in any phase of preparation and there is a chance to repeat it over and over either with similar situations or with different ones. With the repetition the development of the trainee can be easily followed. According to the opinion and experience of experts the preparation for extraordinary situations cannot be effective by applying only theoretical studies. One needs to have such kind of “real” experience which can help to cope with stress causing situations and to deepen self-knowledge.

Concerning the method of preparation for extraordinary situations there are other kinds of trainings which may be effective. For example the communication and psychological trainings mean a very effective way of preparations. Almost all of the law enforcement organizations apply psychologists who can be trained to be able to lead such kind of practical training sessions. The essence of that kinds of trainings is that the participants can put themselves to the test throughout various simulated situations. Besides, through practice and experience their personality and skills may develop as well and they become to be able to react preparedly in real situations.

To sum up, it is obvious that every kind of education should be based on a well deliberated and structured training conception, which includes the evaluation of the environmental and personal elements. Concerning the method of preparation for extraordinary situations the major principles besides the above mentioned ones are the evaluation of the scope of activities, competencies and risks. Keeping these principles in view, it may help to create a competence based, effective and appropriate training plan for all kinds of claims.

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ARE HUNGARIAN HOSPITALS ABLE TO MANAGE TERROR ACTS, BOMB THREATS?

Resume

Are Hungarian hospitals prepared for the treatment of the terror acts? How is it possible to make bomb alerts integrated in the hospital disaster plan more effectively in life situations? It is possible to make stimulation tests in hospitals? In my essay I am looking for the answers to these questions, looking in to the plans developed by Western States for the cases of threats of public danger.

Introduction

Hospitals are part of the critical infrastructure and are incredibly vulnerable. Unexpected events may hinder the functioning of institutions, causing severe damage and loss of asset value and quality of service. Every hospital should be prepared for such incidents with well developed plans and strategies. This is regulated by law of: 29/2000 (30. October) issued by Ministry of Health. This rule also provides a detailed list of requirements necessary in causes of emergency.

In this article, I am looking for an answer about how the Hungarian hospitals are prepared for these disasters and impacts resulting from human reactions towards these acts of terrorism and bomb threat. Is it possible to eliminate harmful effects of these events thought adequate preparations? An organization that is prepared for unexpected events can reduce damage. How can a conscious institute leader prepare for preventive actions? The hospital can be an ideal target for a bomber, because a lot of civilians are taken care of and are open 24 hours a day, seven days a week. According to the Terrorist Prevention Centre (TEK) in Hungary there is no terrorist threat, but the menace has increased somewhat in recent years. The hospitals have to be prepared for every possibility, because the security is not static something is safe today may not be safe tomorrow.

138Terror threats has increases in Hungary- Nőtt Magyarország Terror fenyegetettsége http://www.napiaszonline.hu/aktualis/magyarorszag_terrorfenyegetettsge_nott_26607 (Download time: 2011.04.11.)
The hospitals have tight financial resources, and with little financial expenditure they have to make within the framework of the disaster plan, or separately plans for plans for "bomb threaten" and terror acts. Also various scenarios have to work out in order to ensure continuity of medical care. Parts of preventive action include training of medical and security staff and introduction of stimulation exercises. It is indispensable to check the plans made for terrorist acts with trainings.

For this article I have consulted with some hospital security, work safety and fire prevention experts. Found good ideas from English special literature, and integrated my professional experience as well. During my work I found limited information regarding the existing disaster plans of hospitals, because citing their safety the institutions did not hand them out. In my essay, I present terror cases happened at foreign hospitals and deal with the number of known bomb threats at Hungarian hospitals. At the end of my article, I summarize the responses to my questions.

In my essay, I do not dedicate any space to terrorist attacks caused by cyber, chemical, biologic-, and mass destruction weapons (CBMV). The detailed presentation of various types of terrorism would require an another article.

**The concept of critical infrastructure**

I find it important to present in my essay the definition of critical infrastructure which the hospitals are part of. According to the European Council Directive 2008/114/EC the critical infrastructure is composed of devices systems, or parts of systems which can be found on the territory of member states and which are essential for providing the vital social functions, health, and security, economic and social welfare. The disruption or destruction of any of these device systems, or parts of systems could lead to important consequences due to the lack of supplying the vital functions.

The directive divided the critical infrastructure in nine different groups:

1. Energy facilities and networks
2. Communications and Information Technology
3. Finance
4. **Health care (hospitals)**, health care and blood supply facilities, laboratories and Pharmaceuticals, search and rescue, emergency services)
5. Food
6. Water supply
7. Transport
8. Production storage and transport of hazardous materials
9. State Infrastructure

The critical infrastructure is threatened and at risk of terrorist threat, which require an immediate response action plans. Therefore prevention plans should be prepared. On International level, the NATO (EAPC (SCEPC) D (2003) 15) and the European Union (COM (2006) 786 and COM (2006) 787) also developed the concept of critical infrastructure protection, and regulatory approach.

The European Union Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (EPCIP) adjusted the interruption or loss of the infrastructural functioning to the size and severity of the possible consequence.

Hungary has created and adopted the National Green Paper (NGP-NKIV) by Government Resolution. According to the Green Paper that critical infrastructure are considered the networks, resources, services, supplies, physical and information technology systems, equipment, tools and components whose functioning failure, disruption, loss or destruction, could have directly or indirectly, temporarily or on long-term severe impact on the citizens' economic, and social welfare, public health, public safety, national security, the economy and the functioning of the government. The Green Paper divides the critical infrastructure in sectors:

I. Energy
II. Information communication
III. Transport
IV. Water
V. Food
VI. Health care – Hospital
VII. Finance
VIII. Industry
IX. Law and order - Government-
X. Public defence

NGP lists the possible dangers in three main groups with priority on terrorism, as basic principle. It highlights the "acts of terrorism and its

139 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection

140 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2008/114/EC

141 2080/2008. (VI. 30.) Korm. határozat a Kritikus Infrastruktúra Védelem Nemzeti Programjáról
instruments, and related acts (explosives, misuse of firearms...)". The Green Paper emphasises the need for an appropriate security level in order to reduce risks to an acceptable minimum level. It also emphasises raising attention communication and effectuating regular trainings because it makes the implementation of the plans more effective. The experience and information transfer between agencies, regions, and countries is also very important in prevention.

**Terrorism**

In my thesis I will not profusely discuss terrorism because there exist wide literature on the subject.

There is no clear definition for terrorism. According to United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against people or property, the intimidation of the government, the civil population or any segment and coercion for political purposes and to promote social goals.¹⁴² The UN says: “crimes which aim with a political purpose to arise terror in the general public, group of people, or in individuals (…)”¹⁴³

Terrorism uses violence for the purpose of achieving socio-political goals through fear. So, they struggle to achieve their goals by violent means (explosion, armed violence, etc.). Generally terrorists are committed to more violent acts do this in a pre-planned manner.¹⁴⁴ A very important peculiarity is creating panic, fear and that the victims are civilians most of the time. Acts of terrorism are to justify any idea or ideology, or to nominate a political objective, which is also expected to be supported by the public or at least a part of the society. The characteristic of terror offences is destabilization of the social and political conditions, or creating a mass fear of panic. Committing such an act carries the risk of developing a disaster. Hospitals may be at increased risk of terrorist attacks.¹⁴⁵

The terrorists commit ordinary crimes such as threaten people's lives or physical integrity causing public danger, vehicle joyriding, hampering basic

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¹⁴⁵Katasztrófavédelmi Tudományos Egyesület: Terrorizmus http://www.katasztrofa.hu/kat_csop_003.htm (Download time: 2011.03.25.)
services, etc. Previously listed threats are considered terrorist acts too.\footnote{Biztonságpolitikai szemle: Mi a terrorizmus? \url{http://biztpol.corvinusembassy.com/?module=corvinak&module_id=4&cid=32} (Download time: 2011.03.27.)} This list is introduced in the Hungarian Criminal Code (Criminal Code Section 261.).

However, it is important to distinguish terrorists from ordinary criminals. Motivations and goals are different. Anyone who wants to acquire property, or injuries people because of offences, acts because of selfish reasons, wants to achieve no psychological effect. He does not convey any message for the State Government, and does not want to influence public opinion. The insane bomber mainly takes somebody hostage or shoots because of personal reasons. The terrorists have political intentions and want to achieve a violent and psychological effect and may have an organization back. His aim is to spread terror and by mains of it to influence society. The person who threatens with bomb usually has personal reasons to create panic so that I would describe him as an ordinary criminal but not a terrorist.

The explosion in one of the most commonly used instrument of terror, induces a great panic, has a significant, spectacular impact and it is difficult to prevent. However, each institution must expect and be prepared for such situations. A bomb threat is designed to create panic.

Every public danger (bomb) threat call has to be taken seriously and should be treated as if it were true.\footnote{See more in: MICHEL A. Pascal: Hospital Security and Safety. Aspen System Corporation, Rockville, Maryland 1977. p.3., p.111.} The vulnerability of the institution is real and requires constant readiness. These calls may be very common, and their motivation is to enforce or cause malfunction. The special method of defence shall be determined according to the nature of received information.

Actually the terrorist act involves more risk factors, such as fire, bomb threats, and property destruction, hostage-taking. These can be regarded as independent risk factors, which can be traced back on different motives, and they are displayed in the deeds.\footnote{BESENYŐ János - DEÁK Gabriella: A biztonság új aspektusai: A kórházi személyzet biztonsága - A kórházi erőszakos cselekedetek megelőzése. A MH ÖHP Tudományos Tanácsának Kiadványa. Székesfehérvár. 2010. p. 29.}

In Western countries plans were drown up for the threat of public danger that I briefly introduce in the following section.

**Terror acts against hospitals**

I cannot discuss this topic without pointing out that I write about a very real problem even if experts consider terrorism only as a potential threat in
Hungary. In our country a bomb threat against hospitals is more likely to occur. In the following chapter I present some terrorist attacks against foreign hospitals.

14/06/1995 Chechnya

1. Figure. Hospital attack in Chechnya

In the bloodiest years of Chechen war an attack took place near the border of Chechnya. On 14th June 1995 Chechen armed forces occupied the whole city of Bugyonnovszk. Almost 1500 civilian hostages were caught by the militants led by Shamil Basaev. The hostages were detained for six months in the hospital and city health care. After six-month of awaiting the Russian troops besieged the city and the hospital. 129 people died and 500 people were wounded in the attack. 18 of them died later due to injuries.

2/08/2003 Mozdok

On the evening 02.08 2003 in Mozdok belonging in the Northern Ossetian Land (Russia), two suicide bombers draw a track loaded with explosives against a military hospital. The 100 kg. TNT detonation destroyed the building completely. In the explosion 42 people were killed and 78 were injured.

04/11/2005 Iraq

In Iraq a bomb killed 30 people in a hospital courtyard. Because of the good security system the bomber was not able to get into the hospital.

16/04/2010 Pakistan

Source: http://en.rian.ru/photolents/20100618/159475084_2.html (Download time: 2011.03.21.)

Elfogták a bugyonnovszki csecsen támadás egy résztvevőjét http://index.hu/kulfold/bugy9042/ (Download time: 2011.04.11.)

A kórház igazgatóját is felelősségre vonják a Mozdoki tragédia miatt http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20030802akorhaz.html (Download time:2011.03.25.)

The Sunday Times: 30 die in bomb attack on Iraq hospital http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article596165.ece (Download time: 2011.03.27.)
At least eight people were killed and 35 people injured in a bomb blast, which occurred in a hospital in the south-western Pakistani city of Quetta. Gunfire could be heard after the explosion of the civil hospital. Two policemen and a local television cameraman were among the casualties. The bomber detonated the explosives-filled jacket.

06/08/2010 Istanbul

In Istanbul a bomb exploded in front of a hospital, precisely at the arrival of police. 15 people were injured.

06/01/2010. Pakistan: Lahore

Five people including three policemen were shot when four bombers wearing police uniforms rushed into the Jinnah Hospital emergency department late in the evening. They wanted to save or kill a fellow patient who was injured in another attack. The bombers could not be apprehended they escaped.

The threat of explosion is very common in all hospitals so that I shall only detail a few Hungarian cases presented which are summarized in tabular form below. Since 2000 we know only the bomb threat reports made by media the Statistics of Uniform Crime Investigation and Prosecution – ENYÚBS* – does not include them. The police do not have cumulative statistics which includes threats of public danger. Therefore I could only rely on the data revealed by the media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Evacuation</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19/09/2008</td>
<td>Budapest Public Institutions[^156]</td>
<td>difficult to judge the intention</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no explosion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/07/2009</td>
<td>Hospital of Makó[^157]</td>
<td>patient's escape</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no explosion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/11/2009</td>
<td>Hajdú–Bihar Megyei Kenézy Hospital[^158]</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>partial</td>
<td>no explosion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


[^154]: Merénylet a kórház előtt [http://hirek.myrss.hu/hir/292889/merenylet-a-korhaz-elott](http://hirek.myrss.hu/hir/292889/merenylet-a-korhaz-elott) (Download time: 2011.03.28.)


[^156]: Egységes Nyomozóhatósági és Ügyészségi Bűnügyi Statisztika

[^157]: Nehezen megítélhető a bombával fenyegető valódi szándéka [http://belfold.ma.hu/tart/cikk/a/0/23967/1/belfold/Nehezen_megitelheto_a_bombaval_fenyegeto_valodi_szandeka](http://belfold.ma.hu/tart/cikk/a/0/23967/1/belfold/Nehezen_megitelheto_a_bombaval_fenyegeto_valodi_szandeka) (Download time: 2011.04.01.)

[^158]: Bombariadó volt a Kenézyben [http://www.eszaon.hu/kek_hirek/Bombariado_volt_a_Kenezyben/18689/](http://www.eszaon.hu/kek_hirek/Bombariado_volt_a_Kenezyben/18689/) (Download time: 2011.04.01.)
I. Table. Hungary explosive threat cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Hospital</th>
<th>He had to aim to become a patient of hospital</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>No explosion</th>
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</thead>
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<td>31/10/2010</td>
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<td>He had to aim to become a patient of hospital</td>
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<td>no explosion</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nagykállói Hospital</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no explosion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/03/2011</td>
<td>Mosómagyaróvári Karolina Hospital</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no explosion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Plans for bomb threats

I made the following section with a couple of security organizer and OSH (work safety) specialists from the rural and metropolitan hospitals who presented the current situation in this field. I also formulated criticism and suggestions in some parts.

In Hungarian hospitals a detailed plan for bomb threat is worked up only in exceptional cases. The response and preparedness plan is inserted into the disaster plan. The fire safety plan of the institutions includes the evacuation plans prepared for specific departments or buildings. No explicit instructions are made for bomb threat and other terrorist acts. These are included in action plan for the policing of crime and noticing detection of suspicious people.

The hospital dispatchers have to complete a dispatcher course where they learn how to keep talking the threatening person, to record his voice. More hospital has several phone lines and the threat call is not received by the security services but central dispatch centre, and precious minutes get lost. The dispatch centres also notify the police. The police is to decide what group to send out, experts from Terrorist Prevention Centre, or commando groups, in cases in hostage-taking event crisis negotiator. The police give instructions for action by phone until they're arrive. The security service is mainly in the second line; they mainly secure the location and help police work. The staff is inadequately trained about how to behave in case of the bomb threats how to reassure the patients and to assist in a possible evacuation. The evacuation time is assets by certain calculations. I recommend for example the calculations of Ing. Frank György from his book about bomb threats in the shopping centres. I would

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159 Kettős bombariadó a Nagykállói kórházban http://www.fn.hu/baleset_bunugy/20101031/kettos_bombariado_nagykalloai_korhazban/ (Download time: 2011.04.01.)

160 Bombariadó a Nagykanizsai kórházban http://www.kanizsa.neplap.net/node/1641

161 Vaklármának bizonyult a bombariadó http://www.kisalfold.hu/mosonmagyarovari_hirek/vaklarmanak_bizonyult_a_korhazi_bombariado/2209164/ (Download time: 2011.04.01.)

162 Source: prepared by the author

also emphasize here the existence of practice. I would find it important that the institutions have enough amount of wheelchairs, stretchers, because in a state of panic shortage of tools could lead to conflicts; for example which patients to move out first if there are not enough wheelchairs. In my experience, in a normal workday there is a shortage of wheelchairs necessary for everyday care. For a gurney there are necessary 2 staff members and in best case one nurse has to deal with 2-3 immobile patients during a day shift while the number of immobile patient is much higher during night shift. When making the plan it is important to know the number of hospital beds, the number of beds in intensive therapy department, and how many patients are ambulant. The bomb threats plan is similar to fire alarm evacuation but cannot be the same.

The security experts must help the bomb experts because they know which object belongs to the hospital. In my opinion, it would be important to involve the medical staff, because they know which objects are of everyday use, or which objects belong to patients. Everything must be made with authority supervising. No one can sniff without directions, independently! At a bomb research it is important to exclude closed areas or those monitored by cameras, since this will save time for researchers. In most hospital cars are monitored but the contents of the trunk is not controlled. During the daytime evacuation has to deal with visitors who can be up to 10 people for one patient. In the prevention plans for bomb threat you have to count with the number of visitors, and with the fact that they move faster than the patients. The use of the word bomb during an evacuation should be avoided because it can result in a higher state of panic than in a case of fire alarm. The physicians on duty have a key position at the evacuation, then should know which patients are immobile or ambulant. Then have a great responsibility is such situations, since then will be in charge of the department. But how many doctors on duty can remember from 50 to 100 patients as well? Unfortunately, sometimes a doctor on duty is responsible for more than one department. Involving the nurses is also crucial, because they are higher in number and familiar with the patients. A possible solution would be to place a board in a central location with the patient's initials (to avoid violation of privacy rights) and mark them with different colours for e.g.: immobile patients with red, so the number of patients who need help could be easily counted. By looking at the veracity of the threat the police determine the partial of complete evacuation. During the search of the buildings no entry is permitted in the hospitals with the exception of emergency cases. The collaboration of different authorities is essential to eradicate terrorism. Among the collaborations methods communication and information exchange is very important

The 29/2000 law issue by the Ministry of Health describes the requirements of a disaster plan in detail, but a plan for bomb threat is not

included. A well planned, structured strategy is worthless if besides the security personnel the health care staff is not trained to deal with bomb threats. Trainings have to imitate realistic conditions. The effective education also requires practical training. (See Figure 2, 3.) Thus we can develop the skills and knowledge necessary for practice and improve them.

2. Figure. Patient transport-training

3. Figure. Interesting patient transport - fast but safe?

Is difficult or impossible to achieve a simulation training at the hospital or it is possible by the participations of some departments. A surgical team, a patient under surgery intervention cannot be removed from the institute, or patients who need intensive therapy, and depend on the machines are cumbersome to carry. The training involving ambulant patients needs a very careful coordination because during the security alert, during the evacuation the security personnel have to be very careful of the safeguarding. A solution for practice would be a simulated institutional training without patients, not in hospital, and over the working hours. The practice could be a compulsory course organized by the professional chambers, giving credits.

Making an educational film would be appropriate since so many people learn in visual way and would learn the methods used in emergency situations better by the film.

The American and British hospitals carried out simulation trainings. They gain experiences, and measure the evacuation time of the hospital. According the experiences there is bad communication towards the healthcare staff, so that they do not know when and what to do, and who proposes the evacuation, as result there were congestions in the staircases, they and delays in patient

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166 CSOMOR- HAJDÚ
evacuations. Domestic experts should take into account the experiences of these simulations and include them in their plans.\textsuperscript{167}

The western hospitals have detailed plans for a public danger threat. A great emphasis is given to logistics, communication and information. Plans for bomb alerts of American hospitals schematically include:

- Prevention;
- Establishing contact with public authorities;
- The receiving of threat (what to do in this situation, call centre -dispatcher etc.);
- Bomb Search;
- Ensure the environment;
- The evacuation of the building;
- Emergency removal;
- Documentation of the threat.\textsuperscript{168}

I do not detail more about Western Countries bomb threat plans, as all hospitals have to develop their own plans for bomb threats depending on their number of patients, the property of the buildings, and their surroundings.

**Characterization of mass panic**

It is necessary to take in account when preparing a terror-bomb threat plan the emotions associated with panic during a possible evacuation. The typical reason for panic situations is trap feeling from where everyone has equal chances to escape. In this situation the individual feels that the presence of involved partners is an obstacle during the escape and he will not get help from them. Instead of cooperation competition occurs where the stake is the participants’ life. In panic you cannot expect any cooperation, because this situation of the trap, fear makes conscious thinking impossible, introverted, and self-centred behaviour becomes dominant. This form of behaviour is spreading fast, and makes it impossible for some stoic-sane people to make a difference in the crowd. To prevent the spread of panic it would be important to find at the beginning some people who are relatively well known, can organize, manage, so are able to influence the people around them.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{167} HANCOCK, Charles-JONHSON, W. Chris: Thinking the unthinkable. Exposing the Vulnerabilities in the NHS Response to coordinated terrorism actions http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/NHS_terrorism.pdf (Download time: 2011. 04.15.)


\textsuperscript{169} ZOLTÁN Ferenc tú. alezredes: Csarnok jellegű bevásárló központokban keletkezett tüzesetek pszichológiája http://www.zmne.hu/tanszekek/vegyi/docs/fiatkut/pdf/Zoltan_05_01.pdf (Download time: 2011.04.10.)
The features of escape panic could be summarized as following:

- people are trying to move or are moving significantly faster than normal;
- they begin to hustle;
- the motion in a narrowing road or a particular passage becomes uncoordinated;
- blockage can be observed at exits and congestion occurs, passing becomes uncoordinated;
- in the crowded mass the physical actions are added together, causing dangerous pressure;
- the further escape is slowed down by fallen or injured people, who constitute a hindrance;
- people are willing to take mass behaviour, doing the same as the others;
- the extra exits often evade the attention of refugees, or are not properly exploited.

**Summary, conclusion**

In my article I presented and insisted on the fact that it would be necessary for all hospitals to have a preparedness plan for terrorist attacks and bomb threats prevention, whose effectiveness is demonstrated by the simulation trainings. The hospital is a special institute with immobile patients; therefore its evacuation needs special plans.

Involving the medical personnel in training exercises as well as further trainings are also necessary. Last but not least it is important to teach health care professionals how to treat panic because they are among the patients, and they

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170 A menekülési pánik In Fizikai Szemle L évfoly. 10. szám

represent a greater number than the security staff. The terrorism is the highest level of violence and all the institutions within the critical infrastructure have to be prepared for the potential risk.

We could see from chapter number fourth, that in many countries the hospitals have been targets of terrorist attacks (mostly in conflict zones), and number of bomb threats in Hungary are not negligible. Therefore, well-planned preventive strategies are needed in all hospitals. These strategies will also support the work of law enforcement agencies, and hospital professionals could assume more responsibility in solving such critical periods. The interviews with hospital security organizer experts revealed that many hospitals are not prepared for terrorist attacks, acts of terrorism, and there is a lack of good plans, exercised scenarios.

That hospital management carries out a good work who thinks about secure future and protects the values patients and staff of the institute. This includes the continuous training of employees, testing theoretical knowledge, simulation training, and preparation of precise action plan and scenarios.

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14. Nehezen megítélhető a bombával fenyegető valódi szándéka http://belfold.ma.hu/tart/cikk/a/0/23967/1/belfold/Nehezen_megitelheto_a_bombaval_fenyegeto_valodi_szandeka (Download time: 2011.04.01.)


16. Terror threats has increases in Hungary- Nőtt magyarország Terror fenyegetettsége http://www.napiaszonline.hu/aktualis/magyarorszagterrorfenyegetettsge_nott_26607 (Download time: 2011.04.11.)


18. The Sunday Times: 30 die in bomb attack on Iraq hospital http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article596165.ece (Download time: 2011.03.27.)

This study deals with the recruitment-, training and further vocational training systems for drivers planning to work in the area of personal and property protection.

The theoretical and practical syllabus integrates, according to the national laws, social norms, customs and traditions, those elements of the domestic and international practice which ensure the effective preparation for real-life situations.

Introduction

My study gives an overview of the recruitment, training and refresher training system for drivers who work or intend to work in the area of personal and property protection and who are inevitably involved in normal road traffic in the course of their job. The nature of their work demands that they meet extraordinary situations beyond the everyday dangers of normal road traffic.

Based on more than ten years of service as the head of military training subdivision at the Dignitary Protection Service (Republic Guard Regiment) and on the several years of teaching experience in military training I have managed to create a training and refresher training system for drivers, which contributes to the efficient and safe work of the drivers who work in the field of transport and shipping control and who have to carry out special duties.

Compiling both the theoretical and practical curriculum I aimed at integrating those elements of national and international practise based on national laws, social norms, customs and traditions, which can ensure the effective preparation for real-life situations.
The goal, system and area of preparation

After getting a driving license one needs to have years of practice to become able to handle the equipment of the vehicles efficiently and spontaneously. The experience based knowledge can only be attained over a number of years. Without supervision and guided practice the proper decision mechanisms, manoeuvres and algorithms used in emergency cases (skidding etc.) cannot be acquired. Most drivers usually don’t know the limits of their vehicles and their own limitations.

For this reason self-education is not enough, professional training is needed. The essential condition for safe and high quality discharging of duties is to have an up-to-date, regular and well-compiled training system and for the knowledge and skill of experienced personnel to be passed on to the trainees.

The training is a requirement based activity which can be interpreted as an output regulation. The activities of the drivers who carry out special duties need to be known, and with this knowledge we can develop a training system which includes the method and requirement of practice and the testing process as well.

The aim of preparation

a. To achieve this the drivers need to receive the necessary legal, technical, communicational and defence tactical knowledge to make them able to evaluate, plan and carry out their duties.

b. The drivers should be able to handle their vehicles professionally and to discharge the proper algorithms automatically.

The system of the training

This training system is for professional drivers with appropriate experience. During the training they will be prepared for those special tasks and situations which can occur in transport and shipping control. Every job has a specific theoretical knowledge system which has its own unique characteristics. Gaining this knowledge is an obvious condition of suitability. The training system must be planned so that it would be effective from the time of admission to the end of the period of their employment. Generally every kind of training should reflect the characteristics of Life Long Learning.

Driving is a functional activity which can be learned through practice supported by the existence of theoretical knowledge. For this reason the training is mainly based on practice.
The areas of training

Trainees need to meet the admission requirements in order to participate in subsequent training. During the admission process their suitability for the work is established since it includes an evaluation of their particular skills and competencies. Those applicants who show themselves beforehand to be suitable and keen to work as professional drivers in certain key areas, will be accepted on to the training course. In addition there will be further supervised vocational training for professional drivers who have already worked in these areas in order to refresh their theoretical and practical knowledge.

A. Admission process

The purpose of the admission process is to evaluate the applicants’ medical, psychological physical etc. suitability and to test their proficiency in knowledge of their vehicles.

a. testing theoretical knowledge
   Basically this includes testing the applicant’s knowledge of the rules of the road.

b. testing practical skills
   This tests the applicant’s knowledge of his/her vehicles and driving ability. During the driving test the examiner evaluates the applicants’:
   - control over the vehicle
   - vehicle understanding
   - driving awareness
   - the level of defensive driving
   - sense of locality and local knowledge
It is in the light of these tests that the suitability of the applicants for their future duties can be gauged.

B. Training

An important aspect of the training process will focus on the relevant regulations and will prepare the professional drivers for carrying out the most dangerous duties in the field of transport and shipping control.

Until they are not fully prepared in this way they will not be allowed to carry out special duties but only general ones.

The period of preparation for special duties will normally take at least one year. The hereby presented training system includes the aspects of that. However this may vary depending on the rate of development of the particular trainees.

The educational areas of the training

- Theoretical training
  - Knowledge of law
  - Technical knowledge
  - Communication knowledge
  - Defensive tactical knowledge

- Practical training
  - Driving technical training
    - Own base
    - Training lane
    - Without distinctive signals
    - With the use of distinctive signals
  - Traffic technical training
    - One vehicle
    - More vehicles
    - Delegational column

a) Theoretical training

The theoretical programme will comprise:
- Knowledge of laws in connection with the certain scope of activities.
- Technical knowledge which is necessary for the safe, economic and professional operation of the vehicles e.g.: ABS, ASR, ESP, Tempomat, GPS, other special devices etc.
- The basic knowledge of radio-engineering, radio-electronic circulation and communicational code system associated with their special duties
- Defense-tactical knowledge related to emergency cases

b) Practical training

The major part of the training is practical which and can be divided into the following two areas: driving technical and traffic technical training methods. Basically the traffic technical training must be preceded by the driving technical training. Traffic technical means the connection between the driver and his/her vehicle and the environment in which they occupy a key position. Driving technical (the control over the vehicle) means the specific driving skills and sensomotoric abilities needed.

Driving technical training

The driver continuously receives information from his/her surroundings upon which he/she evaluates, decides, responds and generates reactions. The reactions consist of sense-organic ones (seeing, hearing) and cognitional ones (acceleration, body position etc.) The drivers react appropriately to these stimuli with the help of their previous experience and imprinted recollections.

There are 3 factors needed for learning the forms of acting and motion:
- building up conditioned reflex
- sensomotoric coordination
- dynamic stereotypes based on the harmonization of conditioned reflex and sensomotoric coordination

The evolved conditioned reflex, algorithms, activity chains ensure that the driver will be able to react confidently. These abilities can be taught and can be learnt, until an appropriate level of facility is reached. However knowledge based on experience can only be maintained at the required level by continuous practice and training.

The aim of the driving technical training is:
- to develop the proper activity chains, algorithms and driving technical skills
- to practice the confident, conditioned reflex based activities used in emergency cases
to learn the appropriate behaviour in the case of emergency situations without endangering personnel and traffic safety in different road conditions

The final goal of the training is to ensure that the driver gets acquainted with the physical limits of the vehicle which cannot be exceeded without losing the control over the vehicle.

The content of the driving technical training

The training takes place in 2 different locations under different driving conditions. One of these is a flat area of at least 300x40 metres covered in asphalt(own base). The other is a synthetic resin covered driving lane which can be moistened to replicate wet conditions (the existence of this kind of location depends on the infrastructural possibilities).

The common characteristic of the above mentioned locations is that they are closed to traffic so they are safe for practising. The drivers can fully concentrate therefore on learning the necessary driving skills.

There is however a major distinction between the two locations. On the asphalt covered lane (either wet or dry) on the own base the drivers can practice with relatively high speed (50-150 km/h) in vehicles taken out traffic. On the other (constantly moistened synthetic resin covered) lane the drivers practice with relatively low speed (20-70 km/h) in those vehicles which are actually used for special duties. Both training possibilities mean valuable knowledge and experience is acquired by the drivers and due to the two different ways of practising they can achieve complex knowledge which increases their ability to deal with a wide range of situations.

Concerning the variable sticking factors (between the wheels and the ground) the drivers will be able to discover:

- the effects of under- and over-steering of the vehicles
- the coherence between the speed and the behaviour of the vehicle
- the effects of the inbuilt stabilization- and anti-blocking systems
- the phenomenon of aquaplaning
- the differences derive from the vehicles distinct wheel-engineering system.

The elements of learning and practising of driving techniques suitable for keeping the vehicle under control are the followings:
- within the car: setting the seats, proper gripping of the steering-wheel etc.
- manoeuvre with the vehicle in between the buoys
- braking techniques
- dodging methods
- regaining the control over a skidding vehicle
- swerving techniques

Besides practising these skills the drivers, considering the nature of their work, must learn certain defence-tactical techniques as well which they can apply in extraordinary situations occurring in transport and shipping control. Bearing in mind the drivers will often work in cooperation with police motorcyclists, the way of moving in defence formations which will include several vehicles, is taught collectively. All these above mentioned exercises must be practised with relatively high speed (50-150 km/h) depending on the nature of the task and on the proficiency of the driver.

**Traffic technical training**

The acquired driving technical skills allow the drivers to divide their attention and to adapt themselves to the environment. The vehicular thinking is an important element of traffic technique. There are certain types of information needed from the driving environment (such as traffic signals, the anticipated movement of other vehicles, sudden reactions) in order to develop good vehicular thinking. The driver needs to have a particular traffic awareness which enables him/her to select the important environmental information so as to act in the right way. Driving involves a complex combination of activities needing a strong awareness of cause and effect. In view of this keen foresight in driving is important since a momentary act may determine future results.

The highest level of safe traffic technical execution is the so-called defensive driving method which fulfils all the requirements which were mentioned above. When driving, avoidance and keeping out of dangerous situations offers the best protection.

*The aim of traffic technical training*

In addition to teaching the above mentioned driving skills the drivers also needs to develop a keen sense of location and location knowledge.

*The content of traffic technical training*
This kind of training can be divided into 2 major areas: the first is the practice of the using of distinctive signals, the second involves practising without using distinctive signals. First of all drivers learn the rules of using distinctive signals with one vehicle. After that drivers will practice it with 2-4 vehicles and motorcycles moving together. Finally they learn to move within a complete column of vehicles.

C. Further vocational training

Drivers discharging special duties must attend annual vocational courses until the end of the period of their employment in order to keep their knowledge fresh. The process used for these trainings is similar to that already introduced. The whole team of professional drivers must attend a theoretical and practical vocational training once a year.

The theoretical areas of further vocational training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical training</th>
<th>Practical training</th>
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<tr>
<td>Knowledge of laws</td>
<td>Driving Technical training</td>
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<td>Technical knowledge</td>
<td>Traffic technical training</td>
</tr>
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<td>Communicational knowledge</td>
<td>Own base</td>
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<td>Defensetactical knowledge</td>
<td>training lane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One vehicle</td>
<td>More vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More vehicles</td>
<td>More vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without motorcyclists</td>
<td>Without motorcyclists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In cooperation with motorcyclists</td>
<td>In cooperation with motorcyclists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With the use of distinctive signals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delegational column</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The theoretical part of that vocational training reviews the actual modification in the law, the technical developments reviews the changing of defences-tactical methods etc. The vocational training covers that 2 different types of practising methods which have been mentioned before. As for the driving technical vocational training there is no significant difference in the syllabus compared to the previously mentioned preparational driving technical training. However the practice of the traffic technical methods with one and two vehicles
is eliminated from the vocational traffic technical training course because at that level the drivers will already have appropriate knowledge.

The practising of moving in delegation columns using distinctive signals on the other hand is compulsory for everybody, because this can be only be learnt and drilled by practising together.

Summary

The training system here presented covers all of those areas connected to the special conditions relevant to transport and shipping control and therefore aims to ensure the proper preparation of professional drivers. Although the drivers who undergo this training system may not reach total competence, at least every attempt made to try and ensure that they will react appropriately in any likely situations.

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Éva Ladányi

THE COPT ORTHODOX CHURCH

Introduction

Recently we read a lot about the revolutions in the Middle East and Muslim majority. In this context only very few articles deals with the Egyptian Copts, who is the largest minority in Egypt.

The upcoming visit of Pope Shenouda III. also giving the topicality of this issue: Who are the Copts?

History

The Copts are the native Egyptian Christians, a major ethno religious group in Egypt. The Coptic Orthodox Church having believed in miaphysitism.172

The name

The term of “Copts” is equivalent to the word “Egyptians”. The name derives from the Arabic Qibt, an abbreviation of the Greek “Άιγυπτος”; this in turn is a derivation of “Ha-ka-Ptah” (House of the Spirit of Ptah). From the Arab conquest till today, this phrase refers to the Christian Egyptians (including traditional Coptic Orthodox as well as members of the Coptic Protestant/Evangelical/ and Catholic communities) to distinguish them from the native Muslims.

172 There is a Christological form of the Oriental Orthodox Churches. Miaphysitism holds that in the one person of Jesus Christ, Divinity and Humanity are united in one or single nature, the two being united without separation, without confusion, and without alteration.
The origin

The Copts as the successors of the ancient Egyptians are defined as the modern sons of the Pharaohs.\textsuperscript{173}

The history of Christian Egypt begins with the traditions of the visit of the Holy Family to Egypt, which were circulated to fulfill the Old Testament prophecy,\textsuperscript{174} and came from the New Testament: “Out of Egypt I called My Son”.\textsuperscript{175} Egyptians converted from polytheism to Christianity in the first century A.D. under the evangelism of St. Mark. In Alexandria he preached and suffered martyrdom. The theology of the great Alexandrian doctors of the church: Pantinos, Origen, Dionesisos, Athanasius etc. has had a profound influence on the development of Christian thought. Both the eremitical and coenobitic forms of monasticism had their origin in Egypt.

At the same time, Coptic Christianity went through numerous trials and afflictions.\textsuperscript{176}

In 641 A.D., Muslim-Arabs invaded Egypt and began a long process of cultural and ethnic assimilation, converting, intermarrying with, and absorbing large segments of the Egyptian population into the Arab-Islamic culture.\textsuperscript{177}

The Coptic Language

The scribes of Pharaonic Egypt used hieroglyphic characters to write. The hieroglyphs were partly phonetic and partly descriptive. Later, an abridged cursive form of writing known as Hieratic was introduced. The third form was used for secular purposes only and became known as Demotic. Following the conquest of Egypt by Alexander the Great, Greek became the official language until well the Arab conquest in 640.

The Coptic language was the Egyptian vernacular language expressed in Greek characters with the addition of seven letters to represent those sound that were unknown to the Greeks. These letters were taken over from Demotic.

Coptic has six dialects:

1. Sa’idic,
2. Bohairic,
3. Fayyumic,

\textsuperscript{173} MALATY, Tadros Y.: Coptic Ortodox Church
\textsuperscript{174} Hos. 11:1
\textsuperscript{175} Matt.2:12-23
\textsuperscript{176} MEINARDUS, Otto F.A.: Two thousand Years of Coptic Christianity
\textsuperscript{177} http://www.copts.com 2007.06.01
4. Akhmimic
5. Subakhmimic.
6. Oxyrhynchite

Today the Bohairic is in use as a liturgical language.¹⁷⁸

**Coptic religion**

The Coptic Orthodox Church based upon the Bible. Her doctrine is not changed from the early Christian era. The Principle of the Coptic Church is no contradiction between the Bible and Tradition. The liturgical prayers of the Coptic Orthodox Church are full of spirituality and contemplation.

Now she uses three liturgies:

1. The Liturgy of St Basil the Great
2. The Liturgy of St Gregory
3. The Liturgy of St Cyril

The order of praying, readings and the change in different seasonal and annual rites in the Coptic Orthodox Church is all set according to the Coptic calendar originally the old Egyptian calendar.¹⁷⁹

**The calendar of the Coptic Orthodox Church**

Brefly, the Coptic calendar is made of 365 days, divided into 13 months; there are 30 days in the first 12 months and 5 days (6 days in a leap year i.e. every 4 years) in the last month.

It is the Pharaonic calendar. The Copts started it on the year 284. A.D. On Memorial Day where Diocletian sat on the throne of the Roman Empire. A great number of Copts were martyred in the period of his reign, which is why it was considered the starting point of the Coptic calendar. The names of the Coptic months are: Tut, Babah, hatur, Kiakh, Tubah, Amshir, Baramhat, Baramudah, Bashans, Baounah, Abib, Misrah, the small month or Nissieh.¹⁸⁰

For Copts, time itself is sanctified. Throughout the year, religious holidays follow one another in a sustained rhythm the recalls the days of the pharaohs: there are feast days of the Lord, the Mother of God and all the saints and

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¹⁷⁹ The Holy Kholagy
¹⁸⁰ TADROS, Y. M.: Dictionary of Church Terms
martyrs. Some are related to Middle Eastern or Egyptian sites; many have a great deal of local color.

**The current situation of the Copt Orthodox Church**

Living in a country of Muslim majority, the size of the population of Copts is a continuously disputed matter. The population of Egypt is about 83 million people of which 8-10 million (approximately 10%) people are Copt.

**Diaspora**

One of the important phenomena of the modern Egyptian society in general, and the Copts in particular, since the mid sixties in the last century, is the exodus of large numbers for immigration abroad. The Egyptian government realized the importance of these Egyptians, their talents and capabilities, and established a new ministry to strengthen the relation between them and their homeland. H.H. Pope Shenouda III. is taking care of them and dealing with their affairs in person. He spends much effort to support them spirituality, in ordaining priests for every church they establish, realizing the missionary role of these churches and their witnessing to the orthodox faith and thought outside Egypt.

Outside of Egypt and Sudan, the largest Copt Orthodox diasporas population is in US and Canada (approximately 200,000 people). Smaller communities are found in Europe (Italy, Austria, France, UK and Germany etc.) and Australia. Minor communities are reported from Jordan, Kuwait and Libya. In Hungary are living a small community (approx. 100 family) The Hungarian Copt Orthodox Church start his work in 2006.

The capacity of the present church buildings and the number of clergymen in these countries is considered to be much lower than the need of people, because of the unexpected immigration movement which is still continuing.

**Summary**

As a minority, the Copts are unique. The Egyptian Census of 1897 reported the percentage of Non-Muslims in Urban provinces as 14.7% (13.2% Christians, 1.4% Jews). The Egyptian census of 1986 reported the percentage of Non-Muslims in Urban provinces as 6.1% (5.7% Christians, 0% Jews). The decline in the Jewish representation is interpreted through the creation of the state of Israel, and the subsequent emigration of the Egyptian Jews. But there is no explanation for 55% decline in the percentage of Christians in Egypt except
the Egyptian censuses held after 1952 have been politicized to under-representative the Christian population.

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During the first twenty-five years of independence, the African state was largely driven from within by the ambition to establish political order in a world where national sovereignty over issues of development was not in question. National development plans provided a sense of economic and political direction. Government control of development was taken for granted. Countries in southern Africa which were still in the process of struggling for national independence were aiming at this type of system. External powers were involved but typically on terms set by the domestic policies of the African countries. Donors offered foreign aid without setting political conditions to their contributions. The two super powers – USSR and USA – got involved but – again – in response to initiatives or demands by African leaders. The African regimes, autocratic and bureaucratic as they were, remained intact. When change took place, what typically happened was change of control of the state as a result of a military coup or – in a few instances – the natural death or voluntary retirement of the head of state.

The next twenty-five years have been characterized by a different dynamic. Thanks to a number of factors, market liberalization, the emergence of a new information technology, and growing African migration both within the continent and to other regions of the world, the African state is no longer insulated from external influences, and what is more, these external influences have become increasingly important in shaping the behaviour of the state and its direction. Donors now set the conditions for Africa’s development by virtue of its insistence on adherence to the Millennium Development Goals and, even more importantly, the good governance agenda. African economies are also increasingly integrated into a global economy in which they are exposed to new constraints but also new opportunities. Foreign investors not the least in the mineral sector play an important role but so does an emerging African bourgeoisie with the ambition to get rich without relying on public funds. African countries are also realizing the value of trade and greater interaction among themselves. The social differentiation that has historically made national development meaningful in other regions of the worlds is – at long last –
beginning to make a difference. Africa is still lagging behind in the information technology sector especially with regard to the use of computers, although no one wishes to underestimate the positive influence that the mobile phone has had in connecting people and facilitating financial transactions.

Our present-day global system is inevitably under transformation along the lines of the new dynamics generated by the emerging powers on African soil and in the Gulf regions. It is unanimously seen that South-South and South-(Far) East co-operations attract and at the same time deserve more attention from the different stakeholders of the global arena. In this respect Africa is “on the rise” – the question is whether African actors can develop capacities and positions to be able to decide which directions to take for long-term development.

It is no longer possible to rule an African country without taking into consideration these new factors and how the state can adapt to the challenges and opportunities associated with the new global context. Experience to date suggests that African countries have made considerable progress against severe odds – having started way behind other regions – but it is also evident that they still have a long way to go. Another feature of the trend in the last twenty-five years is the increased number of states that have broken down in the process of interacting with the new global forces. These breakdowns have not included just the change of power at the pinnacle of the state but also a breakdown of the regime, leading to civil war.

The main thesis or theme of this volume, therefore, is that more is at stake today than in the past: not only control of the state but also the nature of the regime. The domestic values of how to rule the new nation were not really challenged in the first twenty-five years, but since then these values are no longer uncontested. Some African countries have adjusted to this new situation and managed to adapt principles of governance to the new situation, but others have found it more difficult. In the most extreme cases, the regime has gone down with the state. Following such a breakdown it has become necessary to reconstruct the state and the regime on new foundations. Most African countries have managed to get themselves out of such post-conflict situations, but in the case of Somalia, a new political order seems faint.

The purpose of this volume is clearly seen: to trace some of the more important features of the role of the state in Africa since independence with a view to highlighting the difference between the past and the present and drawing conclusions with reference to what might be expected in the future. It is not possible to address all the issues that are relevant to the subject matter but those selected for attention here are representative and indicative enough to make it possible to draw some more general conclusions about the development trends
on the continent. Although politics features prominently and a good number of the contributors are political scientists the volume brings in expertise from other disciplines and its ambition is to be multi- if not interdisciplinary in orientation. It is a volume that lends itself well to classroom use in the social sciences, including development studies, and hopefully may serve as a reference also for analysts in the field of development.

Following an Introduction along the lines indicated above, the book is organized around three clusters of issues: (1) the new forces at play, (2) breakdowns and transitions, and (3) new trends within Africa. The substantive and empirical part of the book will be followed by a Conclusion. Each chapter has been selected on either or all of the following grounds: (a) fresh field research and new data, (b) significance of the issues to the theme of the book, and (c) bringing Africanist research in Central Europe to a wider audience.

The authors are primarily scholars from Central Europe, but include a select number of others. All were participants in the International Conference, held at Pecs University on May 27–28, 2010 with the title “Africa: 1960-2010-2060 – A Century Revisited: What Next?”

The editors of the book:

Istvan Tarrosy is a Lecturer and Assistant Professor in Politics at the University of Pecs and manages its new Africa Research Centre. Lorand Szabo teaches History at the same university and is in the process of finishing his Ph.D. focusing on the Congo Free State in the beginning of the 20th Century. Goran Hyden is Distinguished Professor Emeritus in Political Science at the University of Florida and an Africanist with close to fifty years of research and teaching experience in Africa.

Dr. Ferenc Póka

“WESTERN BALKANS (BUDAPEST, 2010)”

Western Balkans is an authoritative English-language collection of Hungarian research papers published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary in cooperation with the Scientific Council of the Military Security Office of the Republic of Hungary. Edited by two creative professionals, Norbert Pap and István Kobolka, the book contains valuable contributions by recognised authors.

Committed advocates of the advancement and Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans, particularly the Western Balkans, of the reconciliation between
the nations in the region, and of the developing, extending and deepening relations between Hungary and this region will thoroughly enjoy the book, which proves with scientific means and analyses that these goals are reasonable and coincide with European and Hungarian interests. At the same time, it naturally presents the great amount of efforts that the countries and peoples in the region must make to meet all integration requirements. Also, it is fair to hope that the book will contribute to allaying some concerns about the region's future integration and the European Union's enlargement there.

A major value of the book is its comprehensive coverage. Specifically, it analyses the natural environment, and the geological, climatic and aquatic characteristics. It seeks to give a meaningful explanation of the way the geopolitical concept of Western Balkans arose together with all historical and geographical precedents: it gives an overview of the region’s existence as an 'outlying area' of Greek civilisation, the regional effects of the Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman Empire and of political processes in the Modern Age. A special chapter analyses its role and existence in the former Yugoslavian states and within the system of international relations from 1991 to 2010.

Whenever a new political category such as this is created there are apparent needs and attempts to formulate and specify its contents, and in this way the book also adds to the existing results of international scholarship as well. It makes the valid claim that after an imperial period, the area is now heading towards its most extreme fragmentation; it is even safe to assert that it has already reached that stage. In the period of the former large and integrative empires, mainly during Ottoman rule, nations were born much later than in Western and even Central Europe. As a counteraction of the Yugoslavian interlude, the need for autonomy became omnipotent and a dominant course of politics and action.

We are well aware that national existence gave rise to independent states in the wake of the region’s wars which claimed a regrettable number of severe human and financial sacrifices, and the lack of coincidence between national and state borders has also remained a source of tension. Complex ethnic relations and the ambitions of nation-states for overlapping territories can still touch off debates as such aspirations can only come to full completion to the detriment of another nation. Admittedly, the papers in the book make the valid and substantiated claim that even after wartime suffering and failures, the intention to restrict controversies to a political context is gaining momentum and has become common to every country in the region. Still, in the light of the historical precedents, the chapter which analyses the military capacities with a wealth of detail, also in political terms, and which could hence be regarded as a gap-filler, is an especially esteemed contribution.
The chapter on the relations with Hungary obviously has a major relevance for Hungarian readers with an interest in the region but it will hopefully be appealing for other nations, too. The book reflects Hungary’s intention to build and develop relations, which has been confirmed by successive political regimes. The book seeks to give an insightful explanation of Hungary’s special orientation to and interest in the area in terms of history, politics, economy, geopolitics and national policy. As a token of the consensual nature of Hungarian foreign policy’s orientation in this direction, the mainstream political forces in Parliament agree that relations with the region are a priority; indeed, this main direction in the building of foreign relations is accepted and approved by Hungary’s public opinion. In other words, the Western Balkans is a consensual element in Hungarian foreign policy, indeed a permanent element in its common accord since the political changes. The latest testimony of that is the unity of Parliament, the Government, the President of the Republic, and all political parties on the recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state.

In the historical recent past, the turn in foreign policy towards the Balkans, encouraged by Foreign Minister Gyula Andrássy during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, has come to be a major historical precedent for foreign policy in present-day Hungary. A key element of that model is the system of economic relations. Given the limitations of space, a chapter of the book provides a valuable introduction in the topic with a great deal of data.

It is a truism that high quality and standards in education are prerequisites and means for preserving competitiveness and achieving socio-economic prosperity. For this reason, the chapter on the educational systems, capitalising on the relevant literature available in the region, is an especially valuable contribution.

Another study in the book describes ethnic relations, past and present. The claims about the emergence of nationhood and the ambitions of nation-states clearly indicate that this topic is also delicate in political terms. A real breakthrough and a token of sincere reconciliation between the nations will be the lack of such reference in the reviews of similar books. Until then, much work and self-examination will be expected of regional and international politicians, and mostly local peoples keen on reconciliation.

By contrast, researchers must perform correct analyses with a range of evidence, to support their ideas on local ethnic relations. The region has accumulated far too much negative historical experience regardless, when science became the hand servant of politics or, on the contrary, when it served as a springboard for policies and politicians that brought about deterioration. Thus, the only way for a researcher looking at the region with responsibility and
scientific commitment is to reveal the truth as best as possible by exploring, assessing and comparing the positions of all affected parties with his or her results or with those of international scholarship. Much of this chapter in the book was written according to these principles. It cannot, and should not, decide on the legitimacy and illegitimacy of the various 'great' national and territorial aspirations which are only feasible to the detriment of others under the ethnic conditions of the Western Balkans. The 'order of arrival' in a particular area cannot be grounds and justification for a modern national policy, the treatment of national minorities, and for asserting or curbing their rights, which is why correct scientific research must replace 'origin myths' in the service of political goals.

Given its scientific excellence, the book can responsibly be recommended to readers and experts interested in the historical, political, economic and ethnic relations of the Western Balkans. Rather than an exhaustive synthesis, the book should be regarded as an easy-to-read and useful primer which encourages, and offers a good starting point for, further thinking. Its publication date serves a purpose, as representatives of the Hungarian party to political negotiations have often repeated that our foreign policy and academia are capable of generating an added value for the issue. Hopefully, evidence of such claims will include this English-language book. This is especially timely during Hungary’s term of the European Union Presidency. The next stage of EU enlargement will cover this region, as has been pointed out for the region several times by the Union’s historic documents. In its own way, the book hopes to contribute to its achievement.