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Responsible Publisher: László Domján Director General of the MSO of the Republic of Hungary

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Make-up editor: Marianna Juth
Seat: Budapest
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Postal address: Scientific Board of the MSO of the Republic of Hungary
1885 Budapest, POB.: 25
Telephone: 0036 1 236-5111 / 24-301, 24-304
E-mail: msoscience@kbh.gov.hu
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- We are expecting mainly studies elaborating or analysing topics regarding home defence and national security. The manuscripts are requested to be sent to the secretary of the Scientific Board or one of the members of the Editorial Board typed - also on CD - with one and a half interline spacing, indicating name, post, rank, address and telephone-number of the author.

- The volume of the article, study or writing should not exceed one sheet (21-23 typed sides).

- We will not keep the articles, which are not published, but on request of the author we will send them back.
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Dear Reader!

The challenges of our time demand us to constantly renew and efficiently adapt to the tasks of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces and at the same time preserve our achievements and the traditions of our profession.

This process has been given a new impetus on 1 July, when the modern, competency-based, more cost-effective establishment table that enables the basic function of the Military Security Office in a complex way came into force and the expectations and the principles regarding the national security work were redefined.

The work of the Office must always be characterized by abiding and supervising the abidance of the law, professionalism, commitment, accuracy, willingness to help the work of military leaders and commanders and last but not least pro-activity. In order to meet these expectations our scientific publications, public and confidential issues of the Tradecraft Review and their versions in English, the professional scientific publications and their forums play an essential role. These publications contribute to the high-level fulfilment of our tasks publishing articles, studies, professional experiences and views on national security activity.

I am encouraging you, the co-operating colleagues at the military and the security services and everyone interested, to share your thoughts with us to be published on the pages of our publications.

My colleagues and I hope that our readers will share and support the principles described above.

László Domján Brigadier General
Director General
DEFENCE ECONOMY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Defence economy is an integral part of the national economy. In the European Union, however, the examination of the issues of defence economy got under way only after the Treaty of Maastricht with the unfolding of the work of Panel II, dealing with foreign and security policy issues. The author of this article examines and presents the defence economy of the EU through the main policies of the Union. Parallel with the coordination activities of policies of the EU economy, it is also practical to examine the agreements reached at the formal and informal agreements of defence ministers, as the consequences of these agreements often manifest themselves in the decisions and activities in the defence economy of the nations themselves.

In the past decades global competition has undergone a sharp increase, and despite the fact that this seems to have come to a halt today, all economic analysts agree that the economic poles of the world are re-shifting.

Table 1. The place of the EU in international economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>World %-a</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>World %-a</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>World %-a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (million people)</td>
<td>6400</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>7,2</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>4,6</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>2,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (billion euro)</td>
<td>32 700</td>
<td>10 215</td>
<td>31,2</td>
<td>9440</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3750</td>
<td>12,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The major economic blocks face different challenges. The United States has no major problem with growth or unemployment, but with the increasing twin deficit which is increasingly unmanageable. That the dollar continues to decline is a serious concern. By comparison, the European Union is export sensitive, internal demand is insufficient, growth is weak, unemployment is high, the number of active wage earners is low, (a symptom common to all
aging societies). And then the Japanese economy is stagnating, and they do not seem to see a way out. The Chinese economy is taking massive strides, yet it has to be prevented from over-heating (the growth of the economy needs to be restrained).

The re-shifting of the economic power positions has a serious impact on the foreign and security policy of the European Union, its economic policy. The two of course are interrelated and that is why it is valid to examine the defence economy as well.

Defence economy is an integral part of the national economy of the member states. It was already proven ages ago that defence economy, individual performance, the economic output of the whole economy, and the security of the region are mutually interrelated, and jointly impact the growth of the economy. We are still waiting for the emergence within the EU economy of a due diligence scrutinizing it from the perspective of defence economy. This study – on the basis of the major economic policies of the EU – seeks to shed light on the defence economy of the Union.

The defence economy of the European Union, on the one hand, can be conceptualised in a broader context than the sum total of the defence economies of the nations. It can also be interpreted as a multi-dimensional system. Its development and organisation is defined not only by political will (the common foreign and security policy of the EU, the European security and defence policy, the national security strategies of the member states, etc.) but also through the trans-national defence corporations, corporate giants, and the regional integration organisations.

At the same time the defence economy of the European Union is a narrower category and since it is not an independent part of the EU's economic policies, it can only be examined or identified from the parts and effects of its policies.

It is undeniable that the defence policy of the EU is an integral part of the economy of the Union, and the European defence industry market is more and more an integrated facet of the EU's single market. The characteristic trend of all economic processes also holds true for the defence industry market, and that is that it is shifting from an industrial society to an information society, which means that the defence industrial market is also becoming global in its reach.

Defence markets are expanding both in terms of geography, and in terms of goods and services. Competitiveness is continually increasing within this market as well, as new competitive situations come into being, and the result is that the better informed actors will be able to take up a more favourable position in the market-place.
1. **The European Union and security**

After the enlargement of the European Union in May 2004, the development of the common foreign and security policy, and the ambitious development of European security in its defence policy have been given special emphasis.

Most of the challenges of the EU security policy and economic policy overlap. Although most of them are not of a military nature, their solution will probably provide answers in defence terms as well. Let us then list the important challenges and the related costs:

- international terrorism – *the costs of defence against terrorism*;
- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – *the prevention of their spread, and the costs of verification*;
- regional conflicts – *the costs of peace making and peace keeping*;
- the internal security of the Union (organised crime, corruption, smuggling of drugs, weapons and human smuggling) – *customs and tax control, the costs of crime prevention*;
- migration – border control, *lawful residency requirements, the costs of employment*;
- unstable regions outside the borders of the Union (or inside it if the multi-speed European development model is realised in coming years) – *the costs of assistance, support and policies of cohesion*;
- the energy security of the Union – *peace and qualified supply for a certain period, the costs of keeping a reserve*;
- the economic and political impact of climate change – *the development of the organisational elements of unified action, the costs of adaptation to altered conditions*.

The response to the above challenges will continually shape the security and economic policies of the EU.

The Eastern-European countries are moving swiftly to integrate with the rest of Europe. But it is questionable whether they can keep up with these changes to the required extent. Their attitude to foreign and security policy is sometimes reminiscent of the period prior to their accession. The inhabitants of the region find it difficult to understand that it is no longer the defence of the area, but the defence of interests that is the guiding principle of modern security policy. If we accept the fact that the pollution of the environment, the spread of drugs, or migration are issues of intense relevance for security policy, then it shall also be conceded that defence against them is not primarily a task within
the boundaries of one country alone. The primary interest is to eliminate the underlying reasons, regardless of where the actual reasons can be located.

This change of attitude to security policy is reflected in the development of attitudes to defence economy as well.

Given the fact that there is no one common economic policy across the entire EU – since that would only be possible if it were a political union - the economic room for manoeuvring within the EU, and its defence economy ramifications, is restricted to the coordination of economic policies.

The basis of economic-political coordination are constituted by political resolutions passed at the summit of the European Council, which contain the most important short-term economic political goals and requirements. Based on them, and using the recommendation of the Committee, the Council of the European Union (and within that ECOFIN, the unit which consists of the ministers of economy and finance) elaborates and accepts, via a qualified majority, the comprehensive economic guidelines for the economic policy of the Union.

On examining the issues of the defence economy – apart from the general economic political coordination – the formal and informal meetings of the defence ministers (eg. the ministerial level meeting of the Board of the European Defence Agency) shall also be mentioned. The consequences resulting from the coordination processes at these meetings often manifest themselves in defence economy related decisions and activities of the constituent nations themselves.

The economic-political coordination of the EU also extends to countries which have not yet joined the Economic and Monetary Union. It encompasses all national economic trends including those of the defence economy as well as economic policies, which may then have an impact on the financial processes or the workings of the single market.

The European Union in its economic-political activities, and in the coordination related to its defence economy, relies on three groups of activities:

- the joint assessment of the economic and security situation and prospects of the day, drafting the “future vision” (economic political forecast, security political predictions, etc.);
- agreement on the relevant economic policies (common economic, security political strategies);
- the readiness of the a member states to take the relevant economic political, defence economic measures at their own national (the coordination of the national strategies).
This coordination at the level of the EU now raises several problems. One of them is the lack or unregulated character of coordination between the different organs of the EU.

The economic coordination at the EU level cannot deal with the structural problems that arise because laws governing economic relations do not manifest themselves and make their impacts upon defence economic processes in a uniform way. There are differences between the developed and the less developed countries, between small and big countries, between countries with different social-political traditions and situations. And in the newly acceded countries the insufficient level of coordination of strategies - whether economic, political, foreign policy, security - raises other kinds of problems.

In Hungary the coordination of sectorial strategies is still occasional, and it often does not work well. Besides, there is no responsible at government-level for oversight within the system of state administration for examining the strategies, decisions and short- and long-term consequences (laws and regulations) made in the different ministries for their impact upon the defence economy. This is the reason the entire national economy is beholden to a small but powerful group and their interests. Such was the case with the Hungarian decision of 2005 not to join the European Defence Agency (EDA) system which regulates the market of military supplies. And so Hungary fell foul with the majority of the Union because of a mistaken idea of acquiring economic advantage, which we have been able to partly rectify as a result of the defence minister subsequently signing the relevant basic agreement of the EDA member states.

The European Defence Agency was created with the joint decision of the Council of Ministers on 12 July, 2004 with the following objective:

- to improve the defence capability of the EU, especially in the area of crisis management;
- to promote the cooperation in the area of armaments within the Union;
- to strengthen the defence industry of the EU, and its technological bases, and to create the competitive European defence supply market;
- to support research in order to strengthen the European defence industry and its technological potential;

On the basis of the above the topical tasks of the Agency are:

- to develop a comprehensive and systematic approach with regard to the European security and defence policy needs, and their fulfilment;
- to promote the defence supply cooperation among the EU member states;
- to participate in the development of the European defence industry, and in its general restructuring;
- to support European defence related research and technologies bearing in mind the European policy priorities;
- to participate – in close cooperation with the Committee – in the development of an internationally competitive market of defence supplies.

The comparative advantage of the Agency is that it can simultaneously deal with all the above areas, and note and respond to the synergies that arise from among them all.

2. **The major economic policies of the EU, and their defence economy aspects**

2.1. *The customs and tax policy of the EU*

The first spectacular result of the European Economic Community was the realisation of the customs union (1 June, 1968), described in section 23. of the Treaty of Rome in the following way: “The Community is based on customs union, which extends to the whole trade of goods, and which includes the ban on import and export duties, and the ban on similar fees among the member states, and the acceptance of a unified customs tariff against third countries.”

With regard to the products and services of the defence industry, the free flow of goods has not been completely realised as a result of the customs union. Part of the reason for this is the obstacles outside the domain of customs duties still existing in trade among the member states (internal economy, technical restrictions, industry security regulations). The other reason is that the member states often make use of the opportunity in section 296 of the Treaty of Rome, which says that they are not obliged to consider community legislation when it comes to national security issues.

Parallel with the unfolding of the free movement of goods within the EU, the role of customs checks developed in the supervision and maintenance of transparency of the arms trade. The system of rules that is in place in the customs procedures of troop movements is also somewhat different from the basic rules in the customs procedures and customs control of the EU. Most of the member states have a special organisation for customs control of the cross border movements of the military organisations, which periodically coordinate their activities, and develop their regulatory systems. (In Hungary this task is
within the mandate of the Ministry of Defence Logistics and Development Agency, which in its work cooperates with the national and regional customs organs).

The European Union has no common tax policy, but the guidelines for taxation encourage the member states to harmonise their tax policy, and to avoid double taxation. In terms of harmonising its tax policies with respect to defence industry products, the EU is further ahead in terms of its taxation principles and practice than for other products.

2.2. The internal market policy of the EU

The European Union (prior to that the Common Market) has often been described as the “country of the four freedoms" the country of the free flow of goods, people, services, and capital. At the basis of the Community's operation are these four freedoms, understood as economic rights. Their assertion is ensured by the internal market. All these rights of freedom have undergone some changes in the past fifty years, their content has continuously broadened as they gained more ground. The internal market developed parallel with the development of these four economic rights. The development of the integration of the European economy can be broken down to three dominant phases:

- the common market (from 1957);
- the internal market (from 1987)
- the internal single market.

It is true that the above phases – compared to each other – indicate increasingly higher levels of economic integration, but they do not completely displace each other. Instead – while the internal market dominates – all three phases cover existing processes. The market of defence equipment and services is an integral part of the European market. However, before the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) it was a taboo subject within the organisations of the EU. The development of the second pillar (common foreign and security policy), of the three-pillar EU arising from the Treaty, signalled the beginning of the examination of the elements of the defence market, and the coordination of the defence market activities.

The objectives of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) included: the protection of common values, independence and integrity of the EU; the strengthening of its security; the preservation of its peace; and the strengthening of international security. These are integral to the second pillar, and were fulfilled differently from the other two pillars. The common foreign and security policy saw the emergence of a common decision making, organisational unit and system of means suggesting that the Community is moving into the background.
Certainly it often gives rise to conflicts, like, for example, the conflict between the Community and the European Defence Agency during the development of the regulators for the defence market (whose scope of authority is it and whose scope of action should be widened or narrowed?).

The common foreign and security policy – based on principles defined by the European Council – is realised in the form of accepted common strategies, common positions, and joint actions.

2.3. The transformation of the European defence market

The defence industry output of the world is continually decreasing, a fact that is especially true of the European countries. This is an obvious consequence of the decrease in defence expenditure, coinciding with the increased competition in trade for defence industry products. Trade in defence industry products is taking place under increasingly stricter control. Without verifying the origin and the end user of the product, it is practically impossible to trade on the European defence market.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. The dominant weapons exporters of the world</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 1 June, 2006 a new era started in the European Union in the field of defence procurements. It is hoped that such a market regulating system as introduced will on the one hand, make the European defence industry market more homogeneous, and on the other hand contribute to making the regulations and expectations regarding the operation of the defence market come closer to the general principles regulating the internal market of the EU.

Through the development of the regulatory system of the defence market, the member states want to achieve the following objectives:

- the transparency of the defence procurements and sales;
• the increase of the market competition in the area of defence supplies;
• more favourable market price;
• the extension of business opportunities for the defence industry companies;
• the strengthening of the global competitiveness of the European defence industry.

The new market framework is a voluntary, inter-governmental regulatory system, which has been elaborated and operated by the European Defence Agency. The basis of its operation is the “defence public procurement ethical code” approved by the defence ministers in November 2005. This ethical code covers those defence supply procurements, which the governments – in compliance with section 296. of the EC treaty – withdraw from the rules of the EU public procurement, and which, therefore, do not involve any cross-border competition.

The operation of this system is assisted by the “code of established practices for the procurement chain” also approved by the defence ministers. The aim of this code is the extension of the advantages of the bigger competition to the smaller companies, which cannot directly bid in a major military supply tender, but they can appear as sub-contractors. These principles are developed at consultations between the European Defence Agency and the representatives of the European defence industry. In the elaboration process, EDA made use of the competition policy recommendations and preferences of the EU that improve the competitive position of the small- and medium-sized enterprises.

The ethical code obliges the signatory member states to provide fair and equal opportunities to the greatest possible extent, right from the beginning of the public procurement procedures of the defence supplies, and for all suppliers in such a way that they develop transparent and objective criteria for the awarding of the contracts. They undertake to advertise the procurement opportunities on the new electronic advertising platform, which is available on the website of EDA (http://www.edaeuropa.eu/ebbweb). The code covers those defence industry and service contracts, whose net value exceeds one million euro. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy – also chairman of the board of EDA – said that “if we want to maintain a defence technological and industry base in Europe that is competitive worldwide, we simply have to join our efforts and resources”.

The European Defence Agency – for the mutual transparency of the procurements and the mutual accountability of the member states – also operates a reporting and monitoring mechanism, as part of which they collect data about
the contracts, and make the countries accountable for their tenders for defence supply.

In compliance with this new regulatory system the member states voluntarily and mutually open their defence markets to each other, thus creating economic competition for the supplier companies on the European defence supply market (European Defence Equipment Market – EDEM).

### 2.4. Common European research policy

Unfortunately the Treaty of Rome did not create a sufficient legal basis for the development and implementation of a common research policy, though just after WW II it was already increasingly obvious that Europe was in a somewhat disadvantaged position from a technological and economic standpoint relative to the United States and Japan. As a result of the economic analyses, needs were conceptualised and eventually raised to a policy level, and, in recent times, the demand for a common research policy. Finally the Single European Act (1987) created the legal foundation for the development of the common research policy and thus of the framework and various phases which has served the implementation of the research policy for some years.

The community research is not a substitute for the research activity of member states, but an addition to it. The most important task of the framework programmes – though to a limited degree our own research programmes have been financed from them – is to create conditions for European level cooperation linking the research capacities available in the research institutes and universities of the member states. Therefore a significant portion of its budget is spent on research conducted in cooperation in such fields of science which are of key importance from the perspective of technological-technical development.

Today the implementation of the 7. framework programme (FP7) is in progress. The objective of the EU 7. Research Framework programme (2007–2013) is to improve competitiveness and to stimulate the growth of the economy through research and with the means of technological development. The Lisbon Agenda strategy puts knowledge and innovation into the focus of economic development, and in the realisation of this – according to the Barcelona Objective – Europe should spend more on research. The member states are expected to increase their research spending until 2010 and on average this should be 3 % of the GDP of the member states. In the FP7 period the Union will increase its research spending by 75 % compared to the FP6 period.

The 7. Research Framework programme, and the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) shall be realised in a complimentary
way – in conjunction with local efforts – in our region. The FP7 contains four chapters:

- **Cooperation** – in the field of trans-national cooperation – targets the research of topics important for policies;
- **Ideas** supports basic research, based on the initiative of the research community, but proposed by the European Research Council,
- **People** supports the training and professional career development of researchers;
- **Capacities** increases research and innovation capacities in Europe.

In addition to the individual programme “Capacities” aims to implement the 7. Research Framework Programme and continue the activities in the earlier framework programme. It also contains important novel elements as well. Out of its programmes, “Regional knowledge” and “Research potential” support European researches at a regional level. These two programmes are expressly supposed to serve the research and technological development activities of the regions, but certainly the institutions in the regions also dealing with research and / or enterprise development can also apply as their nominal right to participate in all the activities of the framework programme.

In the programme of the 7. Research Framework, defence economy considerations already appear, and the framework amount that can be spent on security research has grown significantly.

### 2.4.1. Expenses on defence R+D in the EU

The sum of money spent on defence research and associated technological expenses in the countries of the European Union increased in 2006 compared to the sum that was registered for the previous year. The 2.3 billion euro spent on defence R+D amounts to about 1.25 % of the entire defence budgets of member states (the figure was 1.19 % in 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The sum of the whole defence expenses</th>
<th>200 billion euro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence expenses in percentage of the GDP</td>
<td>1.63 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence expenses in percentage of the government budget</td>
<td>3.81 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The per capita defence expenses</td>
<td>406 euro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a big difference between the national defence research and technological expenses of the EU member states. 93.1 % of the defence research expenses are provided by the six biggest spending states.
Out of the whole defence research and technological outlays in 2006, the member states spent 88 % on national research and technological projects. Only 12.3 % of the defence R+D expenses of the EU-member states has been spent on common development (with the participation of at least one more country). Within this the expenses spent on the so-called “European programmes” amount to only 9.0–10.8 %. According to the European Defence Agency this is obviously insufficient for the maintenance of Europe’s future technological and industrial basis, and in addition to the R+D programmes carried out on a national basis, the expenses to be spent on European R+D programmes will have to increase in future.

"We can no longer decide only on a national basis on the means, relying on our own national research-development programmes and procurements. The document accepted today correctly says that this approach has become economically untenable, and cannot be accepted either in the world of operations with the participation of several nations from an operational point of view. It is very important that our governments should make the order of priorities together. We have to define together which capabilities will receive priority, which are the most important technologies and industries for our future, the ones that we will have to further develop and preserve in Europe”. These were the words of Javier Solana, head of the EDA, referring to the plan for the common development of capabilities, which is the sequel to the Long Term Vision published last autumn.

2.4.2. Defence Industry in the European Union

Previously there was no single European defence industry. However, attempts to unify such enterprise within the framework of the then operating and effective Western-European Armament Group (WEAG) began about a decade ago. The role of WEAG decreased as the EU was enlarged and as the activity of the second pillar was unfolding, and this process led to WEAG finally discontinuing its activities in 2005. The major part of its activity was integrated into the European Defence Agency (EDA) established in 2005.

At the meeting of EDA’s governing body, the defence ministers of the EU-member states accepted the strategy of creating the integrated and competitive defence technological and industry base (EDTIB), which will perform a basic role for the security and defence policy of the continent.
With the coordination and combination of common defence procurement requirements, the strategy's objective is to base the European defence industry on the expected operational requirements of the armies in the future, and to enable them to speedily apply the most modern technologies, and hence make the production competitive both inside and outside of Europe. This requires a higher level of co-operation and specialisation at all levels of the supply chain, and if that can be achieved it will prevent our continent from being so technologically dependent upon companies from outside Europe. But at the same time, the aim is not to build a "fortress Europe" either, and the effort should not completely exclude the possibility of cooperation with, and import from, overseas companies.

The strategic action plan, accepted by the ministers provides, among other things, for the extension of the European supply base with small- and medium-sized enterprises, for the increase in the security of the provision of defence supplies among the member states, for a significant decrease in red tape, for the reviewing of offset deals, for making the state subsidies of the defence industry companies transparent to ensure equal conditions for competition, and for the harmonisation of the cooperation projects, in particular for research and technological cooperation.

The participants also agreed that the EDTIB shall be more closely linked to the wider European non-defence objective technological and industry base. In addition to what has been said, the creation of a new base for the European defence technological and industry is also beneficial from an economic perspective, since the planned investments will create jobs, provide export opportunities and introduce "cutting edge" technologies.
The experts of EDA expect the agreement to accelerate the reorganisation of the European defence industry – generating an annual turnover of 30 billion euros. Currently it may be rather fragmented because of the national restrictions and as a result of the reorganisation bigger and more competitive companies will come into being.

The ministers supported the new European enterprise for pilotless aircraft which will be central to the EDA’s research programmes in the next two years. The objective is to integrate such air vehicles into regular air traffic. According to the plans, pilotless planes and civilian planes will be flying together in the integrated air space by 2012, and this means that in addition to their current military and security purpose they will also acquire commercial purposes, and thereby contribute further to the objectives of ESDP. EDA wants a 500,000 euro budge to cover the preliminary studies for the project.

At the same meeting, the ministers also signed an agreement for a 55 million euro research-technological common development programme to develop a force protection capability.

As the national armament directors of the member states put it, the gist of the European technological and industry base can be encapsulated in three Cs: capability-based, competent, and competitive.

2.5. The transportation policy of the EU

Transparent borders and accessible transportation have thus far provided unprecedented mobility for Europeans. The goods are transported quickly and efficiently from the factories, in one country, to consumers, who are often located in another. The European Union has contributed to this process with
opening the national markets for competition, and with the elimination of physical and technical barriers that hamper free movements. But current transportation habits and the pace of growth cannot be maintained.

The fast, efficient and cheap movement of people and goods is basic to the EU's aim of a dynamic economy and a coherent society. The transportation sector provides 10% of the wealth of the EU when this is measured in terms of its GDP, and this amounts to some 1000 billion euro annually, and the creation of over ten million jobs.

The elimination of the barriers in the way of cross-border trade and transportation increased the volume of long-distance goods and passenger traffic. This phenomenon repeats itself now in the wake of the enlargement of 2004, generating significant increase between the new and the old member states, primarily in the area of road goods transportation.

The continuous increase in mobility puts a huge burden on the transportation systems. The congestion on roads and in airports increase air pollution, and according to estimates add another 60% to the fuel consumption of the EU.

Though several aspects of transportation policy are within the ambit of national government authority, there are also good reasons why that the single European market should give rise to a single transportation infrastructure. In the past ten years the EU has opened the national transportation market for competition across the Union, primarily in road and railway transportation, and to a smaller degree in the railway sector as well. As a result of this freight transportation vehicles can fulfil orders not only in the country of their registration, and this means that they no longer have to return to their native country empty from international trips.

The liberalisation of air traffic has brought with it greater competition and lower prices, and enhanced the communication between more member states. In March 2003 the first package of measures aiming at the liberalisation of the railway infrastructure became effective, thus opening competition for 70-80% of the main lines of railway freight transportation.

The EU also encourages greater transportation infrastructural programmes, so-called trans-European networks (TEN). Among the priority TEN-programmes are the following:

- the programme developing the river navigation of the European continent, with special emphasis on the development of navigability of the Danube, the Rhine and the Main;
• the programme aiming at regulating traffic on the busy navigation routes at the shores of the EU;
• the development of several Northern-Southern and Eastern-Western railway lines.

In the EU, 44 % of goods transportation takes place on roads, with 41 % via of short-haul sea transportation, 8 % via railways, and 4 % through inland water transportation. A key component of all sustainable transportation policies is the change from road goods and freight transportation to less polluting forms of transport. The other component is the capability of integrating the different transportation modes (road-railway, sea-railway or railway-flight).

However desirable it may be, a democratic market economy like the EU cannot prescribe the changes from the road to the railway, and neither can the governments make it compulsory. The desired objective can best be achieved with encouragement, as with targeted investments in transportation modes which take the burden from the congested road transport sector, or with such payment systems which reflect the real costs of the use of the roads, and which encourage the users to “naturally” change from road transport to other modes. The objective would be that when people and goods have far to travel to reach their destinations, they should increasingly use the railway system instead of the roads, and railway should completely replace some short-haul air routes.

In air transportation the unavoidable capacity extension of airports shall go hand in hand with such new regulations that decrease the noise caused by aeroplanes and the emission of pollutants. In the framework of the March 2006 security measures, the European Committee published for the first time the list of those 92 air companies which cannot operate passenger and freight transportation lines that arrive at EU airports and depart from them. The majority of the air companies are headquartered in Africa.

In a White Book published in 2001, the Committee set up objectives for the different sectors, some of which are being implemented. For instance, in June 2004 the Council of Ministers came to an agreement on increasing, from eight to nine hours, the obligatory daily resting time of the drivers of heavy lorries. They also agreed to restrict the weekly driving hours to 56. This is part of a further programme, which would halve the number of fatal accidents by 2010. At present they claim over 40 000 human lives every year.

The other objectives of the White Book are:

• To reverse the decrease in the weight of passenger and freight transportation by rail. The average speed of freight trains in the EU is
18 km/hour. The railway shall increase speed and its service level to be able to attract freight transportation from the road sector.

- To decrease delays of aeroplanes with the development of a European integrated flight control system.
- To spend more on transportation by sea and on inland waters, and improve on port services and security requirements on the sea.
- To increase the opportunity for intermodal transportation for greater efficiency, less congestion, lower prices, and cleaner air; to introduce an integrated ticket and luggage handling system for passengers using several modes of transport.

After the review of the transportation policy in June 2006 the European Committee – for the short-term it is using the framework of the action plan – is setting the following objectives: an increase in competitiveness for the railways, the development of a policy regulating ports, the development of intelligent transportation systems, the introduction of infrastructure access fees, the increase in the production of bio-fuels, and the elaboration of methods to alleviate urban congestion.

The new guidelines came into being as a result of the technical-economic analyses, and during the different consultations – organised by the Committee – with the interested parties, nevertheless they are only a starting point to be supplemented by new measures prepared by all interested parties and supported by impact studies. The dialogue with the parties referred to is of decisive importance for the success of the community policy.

The new transportation network taking shape within the EU will have an impact on the areas of security policy as well, and therefore it is important that the committees of the EU in charge of military, defence, political and defence economic planning should also take a position on these issues.

The new guidelines build on previous policies, and they strive to open and interconnect the markets, to maintain sustainable mobility, stressing that the competitiveness of the European industries and the welfare of our societies must be ensured. Their main objectives are to facilitate efficient mobility, and the security and protection of the environment and all European citizens.

In this context the Committee intends in the next few years to propose a series of action plans on important issues to do with transportation policy. These include urban transportation, logistics, environment friendly driving systems and the common European sea area. In addition the Committee will continue the development of the intelligent transportation systems (Galileo, SESAR, ERTMS), and will make further efforts in the area of innovation and research.
The direct connection between military transportation and the transportation policy of the EU arises in several areas. The common development of the transportation networks from the perspective of military developments is not only a security political issue, but is a daily requirement as well. The military planning organs of the EU, and the European Defence Agency are continually examining this area. The nations, however, have not yet examined the impact of the EU transportation policy guidelines on military transportation, just as they have not completed the coordination of their own national regulations. In Hungary one of the basic documents of military traffic and transportation is the Public Procurement Act.

The strongly centralised public procurement system is rather inflexible, meaning that in the case of *ad hoc* tasks (e.g., the unplanned transportation of troops abroad on the basis of government decisions) the deadlines in the Act and in the regulations are not in line with the time given for the execution of the task.

In many cases, individual assessment or exemption from the PPA can be of help in the execution of such tasks, as happened in the case of setting up, transporting, and repatriating the Hungarian contingent sent to Iraq and Afganistan.

But with an increase in the number of our foreign missions arising from Hungary’s membership in EU/NATO, the transportation of the troops to the site and also their repatriation takes place with the vehicles of other nations (on the sea, by air). Certainly, we have to pay for the use of these vehicles, and the price is almost always more favourable than the market price. Despite this – as the costs involved exceed to a great extent the national value limit for (public) procurements – the law requires (public) procurement procedures. As *military*
organisations cannot compete on the market, they only appear among the bidders if they had been previously contacted on account of the given task. Bearing in mind the opportunities, the procurement of the services can take place within the framework of cooperation based on international contracts. The permission for such arrangements is given with the approval of the defence minister.

2.6. The energy policy of the EU

Since the industrial revolution, the energy sector has been the biggest branch of industry in the world, the basic branch of industry of consumer welfare, and – at the same time – has become its number one risk factor.

The energy sector can be broken down to three distinct branches: primary energy production; the transformation of energy; the supply of energy.

The objective of the European Union’s long-term energy policy is to ensure the welfare of its citizens and the proper operation of the economy, undisturbed access to energy products for all consumers on the market (private and industrial), at affordable prices, while paying attention to environmental considerations and shifting towards sustainable growth.

The basic principles of the EU’s energy policy can be listed as:

- Decreasing dependence, vulnerability;
- Ensuring cost effectiveness;
- Complying with the requirements of sustainable development;
- Encouraging the use of renewable energy resources.

The problems facing the EU’s energy policy:

- Security of supply;
- Competitiveness of the energy markets;
- Protection of the environment.

In the past 30 years, the context of the European energy supply policy has changed. This has come about due to political, environmental and economic reasons, and also because of developments in the energy market. For example, the Enlargement of the EU, climate change and market liberalisation. At the same time, the European energy supply policies face various physical, economic and environmental risks. The EU consumes more and more energy, and imports an increasing amount of its energy needs as well.
The production within the community cannot cover the energy needs of the Union. Without an active, common energy policy, the EU will not be able to fulfil its long-term economic strategic plans, and will increasingly depend on imports.

As the Green Book of the European Committee, “Towards a safe European energy supply strategy” (November 2000) suggests, if no measures are taken, within 20 to 30 years the Union will import 70% of its energy needs, as opposed to the current 50%. This dependence will impact all sectors of the economy.

Certainly the availability of energy supplies plays a dominant role in the defence economy as well. The member states of the EU therefore give priority to the energy supply of defence, and the energy supply and security in qualified periods. This manifests itself both in the very careful planning of the safety of supply and in the development of special rules of creating energy reserves.

The Union faces hard choices regarding its supply from external sources. A new kind of partnership will be necessary with the energy producers (Russia, Algeria, the countries of the Caspian Basin, and the OPEC countries), and with the "transit countries" (e.g. Ukraine). The Union has already created a close partnership with Russia, and has found new suppliers through new networks. The Union, at the same time, shall be able to use and modernise the existing supply networks. The renewable energy resources and energy efficiency shall be supported, and the best possible answer shall be given to the sensitive issue of finding a role for nuclear energy within the enlarged Union. In any case, the EU
shall give *preference to the less polluting energy resources*. The market of electrical energy, and of natural gas shall be integrated to a greater extent to enable a more efficient operation of the system. The Green Book highlights the frameworks of the secure European energy supply strategy.

In line with this strategy:

- The development of the internal market of energy, with special emphasis on electricity and natural gas, shall be continued.
- The Union shall create a new balance *regarding its supply policy through a clear shift towards a demand policy*. Within the Community there is only a small margin for manoeuvring to increase the supply side. The chances of increasing demand, however, are more promising.
- The Green Book *calls for a real change in consumer behaviour*. It highlights the role of taxation in driving demand towards a better regulated consumption for a better protection of the environment. The Book *supports taxation and financial skimmings*, with a view to punishing the hazardous environmental impact of energy.
- The key to the change to be triggered on the supply side is the development of the *new and renewable energy resources* (including bio energy resources). It is an objective to double their share in the supply of energy, from 6 % to 12 %, and the increase of their share in the production of electric energy: from 14 % to 22 % by 2010.
- The future of *nuclear energy* – in terms of the safety of supply – is uncertain. Several factors will influence its share: the Kyoto Process, competitiveness, its acceptance by the general public, the problem of pollution, and the issue of safety in the acceding countries.
- The import of oil and natural gas is on the increase, and more solid mechanisms are required for storing *strategic stocks*, and for predicting the new import routes.

The resources to be used for developing energy safety is increasing year by year with the infrastructural developments of the EU.

**Table 4. Infrastructural development in the EU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million euro</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Telecommunications</th>
<th>Energy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. *The possible directions of development of the European Union’s defence economy*
The strengthening of the common foreign and security policy is a firm policy objective of the EU, which – in my view – will have a decisive effect on the cooperation in defence economy among the European nations as well.

Both the European Defence Agency and the European Committee are working on making the economic regulators, provisions, and recommendations in most of the areas of defence economy consistent with the general rules of the EU (the public procurement of defence products and services, market regulators, technical standards etc.).

It is likely that the EU will see the national authority and use of funds for the defence economy transferred to come under the ambit of community authority (common R+D programmes, defence developments, procurements, etc.).

The scope of authority and activity of the European Defence Agency will thus be extended.

There is strong intention on part of the member states to eliminate the fragmented character of the defence industry.

Certainly all these are not separate trends of development. The future of the European Union’s defence economy depends on the future of the EU’s economy. This, however, depends on policy.

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ORGANISED CRIME IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

What causes crime?

By extension, organised crime in Africa may be viewed as part of the consolidation of the African state in the post-colonial era. The intersection of the African state and organised crime depends on the interaction of various social forces within and outside the national-state. The nature and extent of organised crime will depend on the degree to which the government can deter it through projecting a credible monopoly on violence, while providing disincentives to participate in such activity by making available an equitable share of public economic and social services.

Scientists, associated with the UN, different research institutes and the World Bank have begun to explore the causes of crime, including violent and organised criminality. The most significant underlying cause of violent crime (that is, homicide and robbery) is inequality.[2] Most countries that have economically liberalised have increase inequality, which suggests that failing intervention, crime in turn will continue to increase. Measures may include a range of government-led programmes from educational to social security safety nets.

The present study is an attempt to locate the organised crime phenomenon within the context of national, regional, and international systems of political, economic and social governance. It is considered what is the role of governmental and international institutions, and non-state actors, in promoting or curbing organised crime.

What is organised crime?

There is no universal definition of organised crime; different national and regional jurisdiction use divergent criteria. The most common definition is outlined by the “Palermo Conventional”[3], as follows:

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Organised criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established pursuant to this Convention, in order to obtain, directly, or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”

Using the Palermo Convention definition, most small-scale illicit mining and trading activity would not constitute organised crime. Even if the groups involved had some form of structural organisation, the activity itself may not be considered a serious offence: many people involved eke out a meagre living on the margins of society. In some countries rebel movements and warlords control the extraction of natural resources and illicit trade. Illegitimate governments may also fund their war machinery through the exploitation of natural resources or illegal trade.

Is the latter groups and the middlemen who trade in contravention of national and international law who are the main focus of this study. The nature impact of illicit mining and trade and the responses of authorities will be also considered.

Organised Crime

There has been much debate on the nature and causes of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-Cold War period. Attention has focused, in particular, on the degree to which natural resources such as diamonds, oil or hardwoods have been imported in funding military activity.

Although the role of commodities in the financing of African wars is now widely accepted, few policy alternatives that look at the relationship between organised criminal networks and conflicts have been identified, analysed and debated. This includes a lack of focus on the extent to which criminal networks, and insurgency groups in particular, can be defined less as ideologically-driven organisations with clear political aims and more as criminal operations aimed at profit.

The connection between organised crime and conflict is of critical importance. Criminal networks have played a key role in linking combatants with suppliers, even though the parties seldom interact with their business partners because of the role of ‘middle men’. The difficulty of understanding the connection between war and crime in Africa compounded by the fact that those involved seldom structure their operations through hierarchical criminal groups, with clear leadership and ranking structures. Rather, it is increasingly recognised that the nature of organised crime on the continent more closely
resembles that of complex networks of key individuals opposed to structural hierarchies.

The importance of tracing such criminal networks and their connections to war in sub-Saharan Africa lies not only in the immediate requirement of undercutting supplies to insurgency groups, but in securing viable post-war societies.

It is clear that once conflicts have ended, criminal networks that were established to supply their requirements do not simply disappear, but turn to other activities in pursuit to profit. This is particularly serious in that criminal networks have the ability to penetrate peacekeeping forces and undermine attempts at rebuilding conflict-torn societies.

Thus, understanding the connection between criminal networks and war in sub-Saharan Africa essential not only to put a halt to conflicts, but also to ensure that efforts at post conflict governance and peace-building are successful.

While detecting the causes of crime, researchers – associated with the World Bank and the UN – have named inequality as the most significant underlying cause of violent crimes. Should inequality increase, the crime-rate will continue to grow. In countries, where liberalism influenced decision-makers, social maintenance and services and institutions suffered serious financial cutbacks. And so did the sphere of education. In other words: besides the gap on the “outside” (the gap between the economically developed and the less developed countries) there is a gap “inside” (between the rich and the poor of every given nation). The poor suffer from lack of health-care, and their descendants will also suffer the same fate because they lack access to high education.

**Distinguishing between organise and conventional crime**

The main question is discussing the concept of organised crime is why and how it should be distinguished from ordinary criminal activity. The tacit assumption is that the more organised crime, the greater the potential threat to the security and integrity of the nation-state and the global order. Organised crime groups engaged in prohibited or illegal trade cause social damage, undermines fair competition and distorts markets. Their wealth allows them to bribe civil servants or influence political processes at the highest levels of government. Where it is necessary for their survival or to enhance profits, they may establish alternative centres of power (‘underworld governments’) or challenge the state’s monopoly of violence and legitimacy. Given the technological revolution and increased global movement of people and goods,
these groups are able to establish the linkages to build their economic, social and political influence internationally.

**Approaches to Understanding Organised Crime**

Many scholars have focused on categorised conditions that produce specific manifestations of organised crime. There are several approaches to understanding this broader context.

- **Political** explanations suggest that poorly governed countries (weak states) and authoritarian regimes are most vulnerable to organised crime, the former because such states are incapable of effecting policy interventions to curb it and the latter because they facilitate the nexus between political and criminal power.

- **Economic** models explain the growth of organised crime in terms of market demand and the supply of certain commodities and services. They focus on the regulatory controls that may increase or curtail it.

- **Social** models consider organised crime within a societal matrix, frequently emphasising ethnic, religious or cultural relationships. Finally, the
  
  - “strategic-” or “risk-management” approach postulates that organised crime networks will locate themselves in countries where they can operate with minimal risk. Low risk environment would include those with high levels of corruption of public officials and other enabling attributes.

**State Plunder and Organised Crime**

For generations most of the Africans have lived in countries rich in natural resources, which have been appropriated to serve the interests of colonial powers insurgents, the political elite and multinational companies. Very little of the profit has been used for the benefit of the local population. Since independence, state corruption has reportedly earned millions of dollars for the political and military elite, and some of this systematic looting of state assets would now fall squarely within the definition of organised crime, as outlined in the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime signed in November 2000.

Most of countries that have undergone civil war experienced prolonged episodes of conflict beforehand. The causes included economic decline,
inequitable distribution of resources, political repression and the exclusion of some groups from political processes.

Organised crime networks took advantage of the gap created between different social strata and the corruption related to it, became so pervasive within government that the state structures could themselves be regarded as criminal.

State criminality/corruption took many forms, including:[4]

- extortion of commission on foreign loans and large contracts (for example, arms contracts);
- over invoicing of development projects to provide kickbacks for government officials;
- creation of state monopolies on exports and imported commodities, which allowed funds to be siphoned off by state officials and collaborators;
- the use of exchange rate differentials to bring funds into government or the central bank, which are then disbursed to the favoured;
- preferential rates for forex allowed for high-ranking officials;
- sale of state assets at low prices to private individuals, who then lease them back to government for a fee;
- waivers of tax and customs exemptions on imports and exports for well-connected individuals and companies;
- direct theft of government revenues; and
- registration of ‘ghost’ state workers, whose would be paid into the accounts of state officials.

Causes of Civil Wars: Motive or Opportunity

Within the discourse about the causes and nature of civil wars in Africa, several approaches to the relationship between civil wars and organised crime focus on the nature of the national state, the rebel movement, civil society and globalisation.

The outbreak of civil war is usually[5] regarded as a response to political, social or economic injustice. This has been frequently associated with race, ethnicity or religious grievance. Scientific viewpoint focused attention on the

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[5] civil war is defined as an internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat death per year, with each side suffering at least 5% of these causalitites.
roles of organised crime networks play in exploiting natural resources, participating in illicit trade and contributing to the war coffers of the belligerent parties.

Civil wars are more likely to occur if the protagonists have access to finance from primary commodities (such as oil or diamonds) or external funding from oversees-based members of a national Diaspora, or from a foreign state. Favourable geography and terrain may also encourage a rebellion. Experts found ‘no evidence that the level of grievance is an important influence on civil war’. By its nature, however, violent conflict will generate new subjective grievances.

**Civil Wars and Organised Crime**

There are different views about modern internal wars and organised crime. Because the ‘new wars’ frequently rely on violence for private gain, some scholars suggest that the traditional distinction between civil wars (usually defined as violence within states or organised political groups) and organised crime has become blurred, if not irrelevant. Many of these wars, it is argued, are motivated by economic predation rather than political, ethnic or regional grievances.

The connection between organised crime and civil war is of critical importance. Criminal networks have played a key role in linking combatants with suppliers, even though the parties seldom interact with their business partners because of the role of ‘middle men’. The difficulty of understanding the connection between war and crime in Africa is compounded by the fact that those involved seldom structure their operations through hierarchical criminal groups, with clear leadership and ranking structures. Rather, it is increasingly recognised that the nature of organised crime on the continent more closely resembles that of complex networks of key individuals as opposed to structures hierarchies.

Civil war exemplifies a type of conflict that has been characterised as a ‘new form of warfare for the 21st century. Unlike conventional inter-state wars, which were highly regulated, the so called ‘new war’ involves a more complex set of circumstances.\(^6\)

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• It includes a wider variety of actors (regular troops, warlords, militias, rebels and civilians). Some of the military and quasi-military groups may enjoy considerable autonomy from their command centre and are prone to fragmentation.

• It largely relies on explorative forms of financing (for example, illegal trading, informal taxation and the diversion of humanitarian assistance) rather than the political sponsorship common during the Cold War era. The protagonists may become reliant on insecurity, rather than their stated military objective of pacification, to ensure their economic viability.

• The outcome of partial destruction of the state concurrent with the privatisation of security and violence, the impoverishment of the majority and increased disrespects for institutions of governance.

Today’s warlords, governments and non-state actors alike make use of global financial and commodity markets to transform control over natural resources into war fighting capacity. Private sector activity consists of a series of transactions, which is often combining the perfectly legal and legitimate with the thoroughly illegal and illicit. More often, than not, the borders between these categories are ill defined.

The criminalised transactions can be defined as follows:

• trade in illicit (stolen) commodities;
• unregulated import or export practices (smuggling);
• the misrepresentation of blending of conflict commodities;
• the diversion of legally obtained revenues (theft);
• the illicit financial dealings (arbitrage and money laundering); and
• the involvement of criminal organisation(s).
More attention should be placed on other forms of illicit (and even legal) trade. Drug trafficking, counterfeiting, piracy and other forms of organise crime fuel many conflicts.

**Democracy, the free market and civil war**

Although African leaders in countries richly endowed with natural resources enjoy the wealth arising from them, they may do little to protect those resources. Systematic underinvestment in the security infrastructure of the state not only presents a political risks, but also carries the danger that the source of the country’s prosperity will make it more vulnerable to attack.

In the short term, it is argued, democratisation can increase the risk of civil war by 68 %.\(^8\) Transitional regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies over the long term. Democracies are also more effective in managing ethnic and other differences.

State that are economically open are associated with higher growth and therefore more stable political systems, despite evidence that free market policies increase inequality between the rich and the poor.

**Case Study: South Africa**

Despite its superior political governance, however, South Africa has a high incidence of conventional and organised crime. Researchers argue that South Africa has a more serious problem with organised crime than many of its neighbours and other countries on the continent. Neighbours such as Botswana and Mozambique attribute much of their organised crime activity to South African crime networks, although there are no reliable comparative statistics on organised crime on the African continent to test this hypothesis.

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\(^8\) The boundaries between legal and illicit economic activity are blurred, due to the lack of regulation of exports and imports across jurisdictions. It is estimated that in 1999 about 505 of European imported timber was illegal and between 4% and 20% of diamond imports worldwide were illicit. In the developed world few states have enacted legislation banning the import of illegal or 'conflict' items. Since 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, financial controls have been improved and it is now coming to light that senior political figures in many countries such as former President Sani Abacha of Nigeria, have used prominent banks to launder the proceeds of illicit activity or corruption. Banks in Switzerland and US have handed back funds, amounting to $500 million and 149 million, respectively, illegally obtained by Abacha. Data published by the Norwegian based Institute for Applied International Studies Research Group (FAFO). FAFO Report 380, March 2002, p.1.

\(^8\) Fearon J & D Laitin, 'Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war,’ American Political Science Review, 97, 1, 2003, pp.75-90
In 2005, South Africa had ratios respectively of 40.3 murders and 272.2 armed robberies per 100,000 population\(^9\) and the reports of the United Nations office on Drugs and Crime suggest that South Africa has among the highest aggravated robbery rates in the world. The South African Police Service estimates that about 17% of organise crime networks in South Africa operate across regional borders. In addition, the southern African region has an armed robbery rate second only to South America.

A possible explanation for the high rate of organised crime in South Africa is that it shares many attributes of other countries on the continent, with high rates of poverty and inequality, a fragmented, racially based society and relatively weak criminal justice system. Furthermore, South Africa is the dominant economic power in the region, if not on the continent, and has developed financial infrastructure that makes it than attractive prospect for organised crime networks inside and beyond its borders.

Crime networks are attracted to countries with markets for illicit goods, an infrastructure to facilitate the movement of goods, and a modern economic system that facilitates money transfers. Such an environment where the risk of prosecution is low offers good cost-benefit ratios.

The social legacy of the apartheid system continues of plague relations between segments of South African society and colours their relations with the state. One-third of the south Africans admit that they know someone who lives off the proceeds of crime; indeed in some communities, organised crime and its leaders may provide an alternative, sub-state, system or status, organisation and social assistance. Leading criminals (as distinct from the ‘foot-soldiers’) may promote an ideology that attempts to legitimise their activity. A grasp of the relationship between organised crime networks, the state and the broader society is essential to an understanding of the motivations of crime actors, who may see organised crime and related corruption as a ‘legitimate’ activity that bridges the gap between state welfare service and individual or community needs.

**“Favourable” Conditions for the Growth of Organised Crime**

This study has highlighted, in general that while the scope of organised crime may have grown substantially in the past 15 years, some form of illicit activity was prevalent in these states for much of the independence phase. This phenomenon was directly linked to the way in which many states evolved after decolonisation (and also to the consequences of colonisation).

Studying economy and social life of the different African countries a number of common underlying conditions emerge for the growth of organised crime. They include:

- criminalisation of the state and politics, and the prevalence of corruption, mean that to a varying degree organised crime groups enjoy influence with government officials. In some countries they may be inextricably linked to the political hierarchy;

- the non-inclusive nature of the political system in many African states has encouraged the proliferation of rebel movements, which of necessity established their own parallel economies and fed into organised criminal networks to sustain their cause;

- urban biased economic policies have caused higher rates of and high rates of migration within countries and regions, notably to resource-rich areas.

- the absence of inconsistent application of economic regulation in the private sector drives smaller local companies out of the formal economy and makes larger business reliant on political influence (or state capture) to circumvent a wide range of informal and formal obstacles to doing business. These range from cleaning goods at customs to obtaining preferential access to contracts;

- growing poverty and inequality in the civilian population and among disaffected demobilised soldiers fuel dependence on the ‘war economy’ as a survival strategy, given that they have few non criminal means of making a living;

- the nature of social organisation within a society suffering from poor governance, where loyalty to the family or kinship group is more probable than is allegiance to the state (family and kinship groups may avoid any interaction with the state and involve themselves in illicit activity or trade, including cross-border trade);

- demand for African natural resources and other commodities in the developed world and the dependence of African countries on imports from the former, has made illicit trade in these goods very lucrative; and

- a global legal regime that places few restrains on illicit trade, and the nature and organisation of international law enforcement agencies (which makes it difficult to share information and prosecute flexible criminal networks operating in several countries), have helped to reduce risk for criminal groups.
Recommendations for National Governments

In making recommendations to reduce the operations of organised criminal networks in institutionally and politically weak countries, it is important to recognise first, that there is a multiplicity of actors that feed into the cycle of war and organised crime. They range from political elites, to rebel movements and warlords, the elites of neighbouring countries, international criminal networks and businesses, and multinational enterprises.

Some of the policy challenges for African states relate to problems of defining organised crime. Many of the countries attitudes do not have particular legislation to combat organised crime. Where they do, they apply different definitions of organised crime. The UN Palermo Convention provides a very broad definition of an organised crime in different contexts. There is a need for those African countries that have drafted definitions and implemented legislation, to share best practices with other states on the continent.

State dysfunction may benefit a political and military elite; indeed its continuing dysfunction may be a conscious strategy to promote sectional interests. The socio economic profile of organised crime networks in Africa indicates that they are drawn largely from the ranks of national elites or market dominant minorities. It is the foot soldiers whom poverty may lure into organised crime.

Dr. Horváth Pál (Ph.D) B.G. (ret.)

THE DEVELOPMENT TREND OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA AND ITS INTERCONNECTION WITH TERRORISM

In his study „Clash of Civilizations” Huntington writes that the battle of civilizations is determined by now not only by the strengthening of ideological and religious differences but also by the decreasing possibilities of cooperation. The Western solution schemes aiming to bridge the differences between the Islamic and western social structure have failed so far, and the efforts to implement the democratic rights have caused not only the accentuation of
cultural differences but also the increased radicalism within Islamic societies. As far as the sites of present-day armed confrontations are concerned, it is noticeable that the western civilization forces are carrying out armed attacks on the traditionally Islamic territories to realize their own strategic goals and the Islamic forces are defending their interests on their own territories under asymmetric balance of forces and warfare conditions. The Islamic actions carried out outside of the own territory are unjustified and considered by the international community as acts of terrorism.

The military intervention of western countries may force the Islamic countries to form an „united front” that can impede the realization of the mutually advantageous, peaceful and temporary arrangements concerning the crisis situations of the present. It is even more important to avoid the large-scale confrontation of civilizations and the outbreak of a worldwide religious war. Despite the fact that military power relations are favorable for the West, total victory cannot be guaranteed in the 21st century.

The main threats for Western democracies are the international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which can be connected to the Islamic/Arabic states. By now it is obvious, that these main concerns and threats cannot be prevented by an armed intervention. For this reason, it is of high importance to enlarge a cooperation procedure that could limit the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism and would lead to the establishment of an Islamic constitutional form, which, on the basis of mutual advantages will be ready to cooperate with the international democratic community.

This aim can be achieved mainly by limiting the influence of the so called fundamentalist organizations on the basis of international law, by narrowing their possibilities in international cooperation, by eliminating the material/financial support in order to minimize their possibilities of political influence.

The Western democratic countries are threatened, due to their location and the historic past, mainly by the radical organizations with Islamic fundamental basis, which are active in the countries of the Middle East and are expanding in the African countries. As a consequence of the increasing activity of fundamentalist organizations, the central authority and the controlling role of the state power weakens. This mobile and unstable internal situation creates favorable conditions for terrorism and dilutes the means for defeating terror organizations. More simply, even an autocratic system (like in Saudi Arabia or Libya) would better serve the security of the region than a semi-democratic, weak authority. The activities of the Islamic organizations are hindering the efforts for a more secure world.
The transition of the role of Islam

With the collapse of the bipolar world, the conflict of great powers came to an end, but with the political and security vacuum, the already existing great economic and social problems came into prominence. It became more and more obvious that in the Arabic and Islamic world, both the liberal and the socialist model have failed. At the same time the global trends, which have restructured the balance of forces have more and more undermined the unity of the weak societies and increased the discrepancies between the various social strata. The Islam, also becoming a political force by its activity, commenced to fill in the ideological gap.

Some political groups acting in the name of Islam are committing acts of violence and terrorism, in order to achieve their political goals similarly to other radical organizations, and have terrified European public opinion. After the end of the cold war, it seemed for a short while that terrorist organizations also will disappear similarly to the supporting left-oriented organizations. But in the nineties, a wave of terror started on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea. Some Muslim organizations committed terrorist acts in the name and under the slogans of Islam, that were political acts in disguise of religion. Such ideas of Islam attracted supporters mainly among the youth of countries facing demographic difficulties. This period was marked by the Islamic fundamentalism of Iran, where a theocratic authority structure was established and the religion, as an ideology became the organizational social force.

But it has to be declared very clearly that Islam is not equal to terrorism. The Islam was for centuries the defining element of the everyday life of Muslim communities and their policy as well. The Islamic societies conserved former social structures and with the exception of Turkey, the state and the religion were not separated from each other. The Islamic/Arabic states were less affected by social development than democracies. This situation might suggest that Islamic societies are stagnating on a „lower” level of social development; however Islam itself does not hinder the progress of social development. The method of using religion by the political elite for its own purposes is another question.

In most of the Islamic countries the separation of state and religion has not taken place until now. Moreover, Iran produced a contrary process when the democratic transformation, initiated by the shah, was replaced by Khomeini’s system. In some Islamic countries the jurisdiction is still based on Islamic law, the Sharia.
Since the late 1920’s the spread of Islam provided ideological basis for different political movements. This process accelerated and strengthened at the end of the 20th century. Demographic indexes of Islamic countries demonstrate that every second child born in the 21st century will be the citizen of an Islamic country thus forming one pole of the bipolar world. However, this way Islam is not a united political force or military alliance therefore it cannot meet the requirements of bipolarity.

Reasons can be traced back to the fragmentation and discordance of the Islamic world. In addition, there is no central power, which possesses the necessary economic and technological assets to be able to develop military capabilities to threaten global stability and international status quo. Iran can be the first such power in the future, especially if it acquires nuclear weapons. But as far as military capabilities are concerned, it has to be taken into account however, that Iran will take steps to acquire the leading role though it continues to remain a medium-sized power. The rivalry between Iranian and Turkish social system will define, which country shall take the lead. It’s possible that a competitive social model based on Islam will evolve in the next decade, maybe similarly to the Afghan example, where the supremacy of Islamic ethic and tradition dominates.

Nowadays, Islamic countries not yet mean a threat to western democracies, due to their strong dependence on industrial and military technologies of the more developed countries. In addition, Islamic states cannot ignore the effects of globalization either.

As a matter of fact, governments of Islamic countries are usually sympathetic towards the west moreover, some of them like Turkey, Egypt and Saudi-Arabia can be considered as allies. The political experience shows, that even in countries where radical organizations attained to power, resistance against the west has not grown significantly, though this fact is of course not announced publicly.

The political features added to Islam constitute a risk for western states, since they threaten their free access to energy or natural resources. Most of the world’s oil and natural gas resources and the main transportation routes can be found in these countries or on seas controlled by them. Denying free access to these resources and the economic, political and strategic importance of oil will expectedly cause conflicts or tensions in the future.

Another part of the problem is that approximately 20 million Muslims live in European countries. Groups with Islamic slogans or even radical organizations that sometimes carry out terror attacks in the name of Islam, can
influence these people. Moreover, emerging conflicts in their homeland can have an impact on these communities and they are apt to cooperate with Islamic extremists.

Second and third generation immigrants are easy to influence therefore receiving countries need extreme sensibility to handle them. We only have to remember the bombings in London committed by British citizens of Islamic origin.

Preachers operating in religious schools, madrasses can play a leading role in sustaining and spreading Western Islamic radicalism. Attending foreign religious schools disguised as humanitarian institutions can cause the same effect. The European examples illustrate, that failures committed in Islamic countries can be detrimental, like in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The threat against local Muslim residents can escalate to a serious security and political risk, possibly causing armed conflicts.

**Contradiction of Islam in Europe**

The European security can be affected by the Islam on two fronts: on the first hand, it is the Islamic threat; on the other hand, there are the already mentioned strategic, political and economic interests. Political relationships are already characterized by uncertainty since the West judges Islamic countries by its own values. If one of these countries is taken from the good category into the bad as Iran, Iraq or Libya, the West becomes hesitant.

*The dilemma of the West is dual:*

- To support the democratic progress and institutional reforms thus facilitating the predominance of human rights. Despite admitting that radical changes are necessary, most European governments would not welcome Islam fundamentalism as a factor providing political stability in the region;
- The failure to do anything might increase the effects of political Islam threatening the regional security.

Behind the attitude of certain countries, there’s the fact of growing rate of Muslims in their societies. In France, 3 million of the 5-7 million of Muslims have voting rights, most of them are former Algerians.

Anti-Islamic statements of some western politicians and economic sanctions can further strengthen the fiery anti-western sentiments of Arabic public opinion that boost the support for political Islam.
**Islamic extremism**

Because of its geographical expansion, Islam has become a global factor. It cannot be considered as a united movement, but the different schools had effect on each other. The radicalization of Islam started in Egypt in the 1960’s under Nasser’s presidency. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the victory of Iranian Revolution in 1979 played a major role as well. These events persuaded the followers of radical Islam that they have to take on confrontation. There was a significant advance in the methods of organizations operating in the name of Islam. Governments of the 1970’s-80 supported the activity of groups with religious background to balance the impact of leftist groups. This has considerably changed by now.

Presently, political Islam (except for Iran and Sudan) can only step up against governments as opposition force. Their activity includes the spreading of Islam, recruiting university students, the assassination of political figures and attacks against tourists. Their actions are viewed as legitimate answers to the violent dealings of the state against them.

Organizations with Islamic background also have important social role in societies. Out of the five pillars of Islam, charity (zakat) is the duty of every Muslim. Charity is a major source of income for the organizations, which enables them to fund socially beneficial activities and programs like education, etc.

The Islamic organizations also aim to establish an Islamic state though the exact details of such an establishment are unclear. It raises the question of the existence of the Islamic model, and whether it can be adapted to the capitalist development model.

*Europe, in the future has to take into consideration the following consequences:*

1. In case the political and economic liberalization of the Arab world continues, Islamic forces cannot be excluded from this process.
2. The Islamic movements have to be considered as opposition forces with existing strategy and ideology, including radicalism which is concomitant to these movements.
3. The unconditional support for Arab governments cannot mean the only alternative against Islam.
The Islamic fundamentalism and the Jihad

The Islamic fundamentalism is more a political than a religious phenomenon, which aim is to distract the political system. It has religious goals as well. In this case, we cannot talk about a unified political movement, because each of them is linked to the present political system in the given country. The aims and methods are different; there is no cooperation between the groups.

Jihad is the radical form of Islam. Originally the idea of Jihad spread after the death of Prophet Mohammad and it means: that God delivers his religion all over the world. Presently, the Jihad means: war against infidels and apocalyptical war between the Islam and heterodoxies, which will end with the hegemony of Islam. The new approach of Islam is: the Thanatophile ideology (idealization of death).

Three main forms of Jihad are:
- Irredentists Jihad, which aim is to take back the territories occupied by non-believers.
- Internal Jihad, against infidel Islamic governments (Northern-Africa).
- Global Jihad against the West.

The Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and Africa.
(Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 2006.11.14. [7])

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<th>Organizations</th>
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<td>Asbat al-Ansar (Lebanon)</td>
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<td><strong>Islamic Jihad Group (Syria, Iran)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)</strong></td>
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Abstract

Nowadays the Islamic radicalism and the radical terrorist organizations of the Middle East and Africa based on this ideology impose serious threat on international security. Diminishing the threat on western countries requires the careful study of the development and consequences of Islamic radicalism and anticipating some of the trends. The effects of Islamic radicalism on the individual countries, international security, crisis management and the western democracies is one of the main problems nowadays. Actually the conditions are favourable for the further spread of Islamic radicalism: globalisation and the demographic boom in the Islamic countries contribute also to the frustration of these countries, encourage anti-western sentiments and promote terrorism as a method of warfare.

Conclusions

Negative effects of globalization on Islamic countries and the internal problems like poverty, demographic boom and the injustice of social development provide ripe conditions for the spreading of radical Islam. Conflict areas offer excellent background for the development of radicalism.

The main area of operation continues to be the Middle East, mainly the crisis in Iraq, Lebanon and Israel-Palestine which cannot be solved in the near
future. Terrorist organizations operating in this region can help each other and create the possibility of civil war.

The spread of political Islam developments is connected closely with international reactions. It is a paradox situation, since strong international measures only generate more powerful radicalism and strengthen the activity of terrorist organizations whose cooperation renders anti-terrorist struggle even more difficult.

The Islam as a religion provides excellent political framework for the radical organizations. Stepping up against them can be easily considered as anti-Islamic. Such a struggle can only be won by “true-believers.”

The Islamic terrorist groups use the most sophisticated communication systems, but at the same time these groups exploit poverty and also the solidarity of Muslims living in Western countries. The divided public opinion in Western countries is defined by Muslim citizens living in these countries. More monolithic societies tend to be more radical on this issue.

Due to the demographic changes, the rapid spread of Islam seems unstoppable today. According to estimates, almost 50% of the world population by the middle of this century will be Muslim. This process clearly indicates the extent of the problem.

The formation of a well-operating, western-friendly modern Islamic state could significantly reduce the spread of radical Islam and could have a positive impact on creating peaceful relations.

The clash of civilizations envisioned by Huntington, could be avoided by making compromises, but it requires a great deal of tolerance. The formation of a bipolar world where the West and the Islamic countries confront is unlikely. Worldwide globalization will probably support the creation of a multi-polar world where powers are forced to cooperate.

The distributors of political Islam are radical organizations, which are classified as terrorist groupings by the West.

The international judicial control for anti-terrorist operations has been already elaborated. However, the Islamic countries cannot participate in the formation of UN Security Council resolutions concerning this issue. The western democracies have no problem with Islam as a religion, but they are against of violent Islam and terrorism.
References

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CONSULTATION

Colonel István Kopcsó dr.

THE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR MILITARY MEDICINE – HUNGARY

In the era of military administration it is not without notice that Hungary is intended to establish a Military-Medical Centre of Excellence (MED COE). Even though the information available about the Centres of Excellence (COE), including the Hungarian endeavour, is very scarce. In the following I’d like to introduce the general concept for COEs and then I will review the MED COE in detail, including the history of creation so far, the way ahead and all the experiences we can draw in this recent stage.

The place of COEs in the structure of NATO

The end of the bipolar world order and moreover the 9/11 cataclysm called for a paradigm shift in the NATO establishment, which meant to alter the goals, the command structure, the composition of the forces and the abilities. The political decision necessary to execute these changes was made on the NATO Prague Summit by the gathered heads of states.[10]

Maybe the greatest achievement in this area is that the task of supervising NATO’s transformation was placed on an equal level with strategic planning. One of the most important components of the transformation is the reform of the command structure which process revised the role of NATO’s headquarters based on their different task rather than location. This resulted in the transformation of Strategic Command Europe to its successor: Allied Command Operations, which will concentrate – just as its name suggests – on the operational command and planning. A similar course took place with Strategic Command Atlantic as it became the Allied Command Transformation that wishes to be the engine of NATO’s transformation and according to the meaning

[1] * Officially a centre becomes a „NATO” COE only after accreditation
it has been tasked with the control and constant supervision of the process of transformation. Its tasks can be divided into four main areas:

- Defining of strategic concepts, principles and requirements
- Joint concept development
- Future capabilities, R&D
- Training and education

The aim was to unify the control of the present aforementioned capabilities under a single command and thus facilitate new ones. Basically this led to the creation of the so called Centres of Excellence\[11\] (COE) whose purpose is to solve the occurring problems of transformation theme by theme.

The COEs – along with many other NATO funded organization – were subordinated to ACT\[12\], but this means a professional supervision rather than traditional military command and by that I mean the representation and assertion of the Alliance’s interests. The close supervision of the ACT is present in every dimension of a COE, like in its creation, accreditation or the actual operation and even the development of the annual Programme of Work (POW). The role of ACT has to be taken very seriously, since it is tasked with the accreditation of all COEs and it supervises the regular (due every two years) inspections of the centres required to keep their accreditation.\[13\]

**The Centres of Excellence, introduction**

The Hungarian specialized literature and press were rather indifferent about this topic so far, therefore I could only find three related documents\[14\]. Just as it happens with new phenomena and concepts there is a considerable confusion even within a narrow group of professionals. It is clear now that all COEs are subordinated to the ACT, but what then is a COE? By definition a COE is a national or multinational organization that serves the transformation

\[1\] MCM-236-03: MC Concept for Centres of Excellence, 4 Dec 03; http://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/TNCC/CentresofE/Documents/MCM236MCCO
\[12\] MC 324/1.
\[13\] Alexander Schott: Centres Of Excellence, Development and Timeline, NATO ACT, 7-10.o
\[14\] These are listed here:

  Klára Siposné Kecskeméthy: A NATO kiválósági Központjai, Új Honvédési Szemle, LXI. évf. 11. szám, 2007 nov.
  Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem
of the Alliance with its acknowledged knowledge and experience and it offers an opportunity to improve the quality of military training and education, furthermore promotes the interoperability between NATO’s nations and gives them the chance to expand their capabilities. All COEs will take part in doctrine development and validation.

Therefore the aim of the COEs harmonizes with the mission of ACT by creating the opportunity of a two-way knowledge-transfer between the participating nations and between them and the ACT/NATO thus supporting the process of transformation. According to these definitions, a COE is a national or multinational facility that works within a narrow professional area and it creates a well organized environment for the experts of the participating countries for research, sharing of experiences, development and validation of doctrines or other intellectual products. COEs will also be the scene of training according to these developments.

**Participation** – The members of the Alliance are welcome to participate in a COE in every aspect (as noted on the following picture). This participation can happen in two ways: a nation can either be a sponsor (sponsoring nation – SN) or a contributor. The sponsoring nation status means a fully enabled membership with the right to delegate a member to the Steering Committee of the centre and thus gaining the right to vote (and to veto) about decisions
concerning the centre. In exchange – just as its name shows – such nation will have to pay the determined amount of the expenditures. On the other hand a contributory nation will have no financial responsibilities towards the centre and will only take part in its professional activities but of course will not be granted with the right to delegate a member to the Steering Committee and thus will not take part in the decisions concerning the centre.

The partner states (PfP, MD, ICI or contact) or different local or international organizations can not be the part of the COE organization, still can play important roles in its activities, the preferred form of such co-operation is the project oriented, so-called active liaison participation.

1. picture Participation in the COEs activities

The manning of the centre can be purely national or multinational, but by the experiences so far the multinational aspect is a key to success.

Added value – The centre can not duplicate or contest any capabilities already present in the NATO. The centres according to their complementary role, generate new capabilities, furthermore in their collector role they gather and unify capabilities already present but scattered in NATO’s organization.

Resources – Just as the manning this can be a national or multinational issue. These questions are defined precisely in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the host nation and the sponsoring nations. An important condition about this topic is that the manning of the centre can not be at the expense of NATO’s military command structure, therefore cannot draw away human resources from NATO and that the wages of the centre’s personnel
cannot be funded from the resources assigned to NATO. \[15\] COEs are not allowed to make profit, and thus can only ask for a subsequent compensation for their products and only to the extent of their upkeep. They are obliged to satisfy NATO’s demands free of charge and usually that is equally true in the case of the sponsoring nations (this is defined in the MOU).

**NATO standards** – The activities of a COE must be in harmony with the Alliance’s doctrines, rules and standards and also a COE should improve these if needed.

**Clear relationships** – Clear relationships are to be established between sponsoring nations and the appropriate Strategic Commands (ACT, ACO) through MOUs and Technical Arrangements (TAs).

Furthermore the COEs – as compulsory accreditation criteria – have to meet the following requirements:\[16\]

**Capabilities** – It is vital to stress that basically no COE can develop solely national capabilities as these projects must have joint and multinational perspective. Of course we can not expect every COE – considering the scarcity of resources in manpower and other resources – to engage equally in the operational (for the ACO) and the transformational (for ACT) aspect of product development. The precise spectrum of capabilities and professional areas of a COE is set during the concept-building phase, but are subject to change as sponsoring nations join the centre and also by the annual programme of work.

**Expertise** – All COEs must employ credible subject matter experts (SME) with the appropriate qualifications. Since the working language is English, the personnel occupying officer positions (SMEs) is required to use the language in an advanced level. Since COEs represent “excellence” both in their name and activity the aforementioned high requirements are absolutely justified, but it is rather hard principle to enforce these principles, especially when dealing with the SNs, since it is their privilege to delegate whoever they choose to. The FN can only indicate the requirements for a position, but has no further influence.

**Education and training:** when ordered by any NATO-related organization, it is coordinated by the ACT and thus these courses and other events have to be in accordance with the NATO’s regarding training and education regulations.

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\[15\] Note: the centre’s personnel are not NATO personnel.

\[16\] IMSM-0416-04: NATO Centres of Excellence Accreditation Criteria, 11 Jun 04
**Security:** NATO standards apply regarding the staff, visitors and classified materials. The COE is responsible for the installation, operation and maintenance of proper security measures.

**Accessibility:** NATO nations and entities have assured customer access to COE services an support. A COE may sell products for organizations outside the Alliance, but this must not interfere with any orders from within the organization. The priority of clients is the following: ACT – NATO organizations – NATO nations – Other (PfP, international organizations, etc.).

**Communication:** basically, the COE maintains an open line of communication with the SCs and NATO organizations but for the everyday tasks it is vital to establish appropriate number of CRONOS/MINERVA terminals. The open line VTC capability is an accreditation criteria, and also it is strongly desired to have a protected line for this purpose.

**Other requirements:** besides the aforementioned criteria and rules there is an immense amount of further regulations and rules regarding the COEs operation that are set in different MOUs (Operational and Functional), bilateral agreements and Technical Agreements. One of such rules is the fact that the COE is commanded by a Steering Committee assembled from the representatives of the SCs. This Committee has the authority to approve the budget, the Programme of Work (POW) and with the help of the COE director, it decides in the most important questions.

*The operational era of a COE is shown on the following picture:*
Establishing a NATO COE in practice

The classic case when a COE can be established is the following: a NATO member nation has a high-quality capability that is offered for NATO (fully or partially). This has to be followed “just” by the approval of the concept (by ACT), the persuasion of the possible SCs to join and to develop the exact principles of their participation (MOUs and TAs) and of course the process of accreditation (ACT, NAC), with the centre already operating. The accredited centre then applies for the activation as an IMO (International Military Organization). Generally speaking this form of establishment is common in the senior NATO member countries.

Considering the more recent member nations the process usually takes place like this: the FN initiates informal talks with the respective, higher level, professional committee (like COMEDS or SNLC). The aim of these arrangements is to identify the proper professional area in general and the capabilities to offer for the Alliance, that are also feasible and needed by NATO. After this, the Framework Nation contacts the ACT with the concept and the letter of approval from the aforementioned committee. The ACT’s responsible body, the TNCC (Transformation Network Coordination Cell) analyses the concept and does its “reality check”:

- Does NATO really need the offered capabilities?
- Is the Framework Nation capable of realizing these capabilities?

If the FN succeeds in persuasion of the ACT, from this moment it should follow the process we explained in relation with senior NATO members. As we will see regarding the NATO Military-medical Centre of Excellence, this whole procedure required lengthy and very thorough arrangements with the highest-level medical board of the Alliance, the COMEDS (Committee of the Chief of Medical Services in NATO), however the efforts are starting to pay back. At this point, we have to note, that NATO never openly refuses a concept, since the non-viable ideas will perish without multinational support mostly before reaching the accreditation phase or during the accreditation itself.

As a summary of this topic, we included a general timeline for the process establishing a COE in general, based on the experience of the TNCC.

Based on our experiences this is a very ambitious plan of action that can only be complied with a coherent and satisfactory national and international support and coordination and without any unexpected setback.
As a closure of our topic so far, we can observe the list of accredited centres and also the ones to be established.\[17\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (and Location)</th>
<th>Accredited?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center for Analysis &amp; Simulation for the Preparation of Air Operations (CASPOA)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Military Cooperation (CIMIC) COE (Germany &amp; the Netherlands)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold Weather Operations (CWO) COE (Norway)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Joint Operations from the Sea (CJOS) COE (U.S.)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Control (C2) COE (The Netherlands)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confined and Shallow Waters (CSW) COE (Germany)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Cyber Defense (CCD) COE (Estonia)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (CIED) COE (Spain)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Against Terrorism (DAT) COE (Turkey)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) COE (Slovakia)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Intelligence (HUMINT) COE (Romania)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Air Power Competence Center (JAPCC) COE (Germany)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiation, &amp; Nuclear Defence (JCBRN Defence) COE (Cz)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>COE for Military Medicine (MED) COE (Hungary)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Engineering (MILENG) COE (Germany)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mountain Warfare (MW) COE (Slovenia)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Mine Warfare (EGUERMIN) COE (Belgium &amp; the Netherlands)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine, Hungary

Considering all the described criteria and rules, it might be hard to understand why Hungary tries to establish a COE. Basically, the initiate is the outcome of four important factors in a fortunate constellation:

- First of all, there was a well-articulated need for such organization from NATO. Hungary has delegated many talented medical officers to NATO’s command structure and agencies, who could realize the need for an organization such as this in a timely manner and whose vocation was essential in our case. I firmly believe that the support from COMEDS and ACT is basically the essence of every single Hungarian medical officer’s efforts so far.
- Second, we enjoy the full support of the Hungarian medical service, which treats this project as a top priority. Also, there is a dedicated and agile team that has been assembled to make our plans happen.
- Third, we have the skills and the credibility to complete such endeavour: we have experienced and recognized experts, officers familiar with the know-how of the Alliance, and the support of the State Health Centre and the HDF ’Dr György Radó’ Honvéd Medical Centre.
- And last, we have the full support of the Hungarian military and political leadership as well, who have recognized the importance of our endeavour. All the emerging difficulties came naturally from the novelty of the organization and have been dealt with swiftly.

The MILMED COE’s timeline so far is a textbook example for COE establishment. Although, the timeline provided by ACT indicates a general “more than a year” period, our approximately two-year plan is a rather short one. The time required for the thorough preparation of the concept resulted in a great success of the 1st MOU conference, where 23 nations were present and thus giving us a reasonably solid basis for further actions. On the given pictures we can examine the organizational setup and the timeline for the MILMED COE that sets the date for accreditation in 2009. This is a real and deliberate projection and we have the assets and the initiative to complete it.

This centre is the very first NATO Centre of Excellence in Hungary. Therefore it is quite obvious that it holds a great importance: we, as the officers and employees of the centre will accomplish its mission and expect to gain further recognition for the HDF and for our country.
2. picture: The timeline for the MILMED COE establishment

3. picture: MILMED COE organizational plan
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OF AL-QAEDA

Any organisation that desires to raise the flag of Islam high and proud, must gather as much information as possible about the enemy.\textsuperscript{18} The Moujahedeen need a strong Islamic intelligence system to confront the risk associated with secret work inside the cities.\textsuperscript{19}

In fact, Al Qaeda’s training material routinely emphasizes the need for operatives to adopt a rational approach to the planning and execution of operations, in which a professional, almost scientific approach is required.\textsuperscript{20} The terrorists define planning as “…the scientific pre-examination of targets to identify the right target and the best means to work on him. This is done by putting together a set of special coherent, comprehensive, and firm measures aimed at misleading and surprising the enemy and reducing as much as possible the losses from the act if it is uncovered…”\textsuperscript{21} Some Al Qaeda related manuals as Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad(Encyclopedia), and Declaration of Jihad Against the Country’s Tyrants(Declaration) define the intelligence as the covert search for and examination of the enemy’s news and information for the purpose of using them when a plan is devised. The Muslim groups seek to obtain pieces of information that will help to achieve the objectives. The great benefits of the intelligence is that it guarantees that the task will be carried out successfully. Fundamental to Al Qaeda’s intelligence outlook is the principle of "know the enemy" a principle that guides the organization and its operatives to develop a detailed understanding of its targets and the methods and customs of its foes. In addition to the counterintelligence implications of this doctrine, this intelligence principle is considered by Al Qaeda strategists as one of the key determinants of operational success or failure. The Declaration writes about the intelligence as “…the nation that wants to achieve victory over its enemy must know that enemy very well. It also must know the site of the battle in detail. Those who fight an enemy that they do not know do not win because a successful military plan must be built on clear and trustworthy information. The commander who

\textsuperscript{18} Al Qaeda, Declaration of Jihad against the Country’s Tyrants, Military Series, n.d, p.80. This 180-page training manual was recovered in the home of Al Qaeda member Anas Al-Liby in Manchester, England, in May 2000.
\textsuperscript{19} Instruction manual found in Al Qaeda safe house, Washington Post, 9 December 2001.
\textsuperscript{20} For instance, one Al Qaeda manual, Al-Battar Training Camp, has a regular feature entitled "Military Science", which dispenses operational advice, including how to conduct operations such as kidnapping and assassinations.
\textsuperscript{21} “Planning Special Operations, Al Battar Training Camp, no.18,13 September 2004."
fights an enemy and does not know his strengths …is blind and destined to fail and fall…”[22]

The Declaration goes on to describe the scope of these intelligence requirements, observing that intelligence is important for the following reasons:

- Based on the enemy’s up-to-date information, his capabilities, and plans, the Organization’s command can design good quality and secure plans.
- Information about the enemy’s intention provides early warning signs for the command, which in turn makes appropriate preparation and thwarts the enemy’s opportunity.
- Information benefits the Organization’s command by providing information about the enemy’s strength and weaknesses.
- Information benefits the Organization’s command by providing information about movements of the enemy and its members.

As this article will demonstrate, this intelligence is the decisive factor in determining the feasibility of an attack along with the operational details required for success. Its collection reveals an understanding that knowledge is essential to Al Qaeda’s capacity to make realistic assessment of its operating environment and form expectations on the likelihood of operational success. An Al Qaeda document on assassinations demonstrates the role and thoroughness of the organization’s intelligence preparations. Referring to the collection of biographic data on the target, the document’s author, Abdulaziz Al-Moqrin[23] sets out the intelligence requirements for the operative in the following terms:

“…his name, age, photo, residential address, his car (its model, color, plate number and make), his daily schedule, for instance, he normally leaves home at 8:00 a.m. and returns at 2:00 p.m. then goes out again at 4:00 p.m. and so on, and his weekly schedule. He might have one day a week when he has fewer guards and runs away from his routine, or he might be promiscuous and immoral so he escapes from his guards and escorts to be able to commit his immoral acts. He can then be hunted down in holiday places. Is he trained or not, is he armed or not, does he have guards or not (and if the answer is yes then how many guards does he have and what are their shifts, are they trained…and what kind of weapons do they have)…”[24]

[22] Al Qaeda, Declaration of Jihad against the Country’s Tyrants, p.80.
[23] Abdulaziz Al-Moqrin (1973-2004) was a former Al Qaeda leader in Saudi Arabia, where it is believed he was responsible for he kidnapping and beheading of American engineer Paul Johnson. Al Moqrin was killed by Saudi Security Forces in 2004.
The application of Intelligence

Al Qaeda, and those disparate groups inspired by its ideology and methods, has demonstrated remarkable consistency in the manner in which they plan and execute operations. Clearly defined and distinct stages are apparent from the moment a target is selected, to the execution of the operation, making the entire process amenable to analysis. This modus operandi is crucial in gaining and understanding of intelligence by placing it within the context of the organization’s broader operational process. The operational planning is usually defined by the following stages:

a) Identifying a target. This process involves the selection of a target from all those available to the group. A range of factors are considered at this stage, including feasibility, the likelihood of success, and the extent to which a successful strike against this target might promote the organization’s strategic and symbolic goals. Intelligence is the tool used primarily, although not exclusively, at this stage of the planning process. Initial target identification and the compilation of a detailed intelligence report have been described by one Al Qaeda operative and trainer as the first part of the military process.

b) Determining the means of executing the operation. The most important element to be determined at this stage of the planning is the method of carrying out the operation. The intelligence collected on the target is critical in helping to make this determination.

c) Communicating the plan from command to those responsible for its execution. According to Al Qaeda leaders it is a commander’s responsibility to review the plan with members of the crew until they “have absorbed the plan perfectly”.

d) Preparing for the operation. This will normally involve the procurement of weapons and the selection of personnel, along with the carrying out of dry runs. This phase will likely also entail other stages, including an approach plan and an attack plan.

e) Execution of the operation.

f) Withdrawal of the operational team/s. Not all Al Qaeda operations involve suicide tactics. Some post operation escape plan is worked out in detail, and may include the preparation of fake identity documents to facilitate travel. Similarly it is common practice for members not responsible for carrying out the operation to depart the area immediately prior to its execution.
The use of intelligence, too usually follows clearly discernible patterns and phases, each with their own purpose and intelligence requirements. In chronological order, these phases typically include target identification, construction of a detailed plan, and the final intelligence run.

**Target identification**

Target identification consists of narrowing the field of targets from among all those potentially available. Due to the nature of its real and perceived grievances, the range of targets available to Al Qaeda is greater than previously available to any other terrorists group in history. Intelligence aids in target identification by providing the basic information needed to assess a given person or object as a preferred target, separating it from the tens of thousands of others that are theoretically available. The identification of targets through surveillance and other intelligence collection methods, and its dissemination to the Al Qaeda leadership for examination and assessment, are the first stages in most Al Qaeda operation.[25]

Intelligence sources: To assist in target identification Al Qaeda may exploit any of the thousands of people that have passed through its training camps over the years. This has provided the organization an intelligence network that spans the globe, capable of providing preliminary intelligence to the Al Qaeda leadership on a wide spectrum of targets. The intelligence received by the organization during this phase might be solicited or unsolicited.

The organization uses convert Muslims to conduct surveillance. The following letter, found on a computer used by Ayman al-Zawairi, provides instructions.

“…gather information on:

1. Information on American soldiers who frequent visit nightclubs in the America-Canada border areas.
2. The Israeli embassy, consulate, and cultural center in Canada.
3. If it is possible to enter America and gather information on American soldier checkpoints, or on the American army in the border areas inside America.
4. Information on the possibility of obtaining explosive devices inside Canada. I have given to our brother 1500 $ for travel expenses in

Canada and America, and also the cost of the ticket for the trip back to us after four months. God willing…”[26]

Similarly intelligence capable of identifying potential targets might also originate from sympathizers with no direct connection to Al Qaeda. For example, the organization has made broad appeals for intelligence from those most sympathetic to its worldview. Alternatively the organization might task reconnaissance teams of varying sizes to scout targets after deciding on the country or area to be attacked. The reconnaissance team involved in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 is believed to have numbered only two.[27]

**The Casing Report:**

The surveillance, or casing report, is Al Qaeda’s principle intelligence document and primary means of target identification. Disseminated to the Al Qaeda leadership, they are used to identify those elements fundamental in determining a target’s attractiveness, including the feasibility of attacking the target and likelihood of operational success. Al Qaeda operatives are expected to complete these reports in a prescribed manner demonstrating the existence of a bureaucratic and formalized approach to intelligence reporting and target identification. This helps to ensure standardization. The classification of these reports are “Normal, Sensitive Very Sensitive”. Operatives were also encouraged to include as much detail as possible, include photographs and maps as well. An example of a casing report prepared as part of a plan to assassinate the Saudi Interior Minister, Prince Nayef shows the details to us.

*Sample Al Qaeda Intelligence report.*

“…THE TARGET: Nayef ben Abdul Aziz. He will be receiving at King Khaled International Airport a foreign security figure on a secret visit to the Kingdom.

SPECIFYING THE TARGET: Nayef ben Abdul Al-Aziz Aal Saoud.

PARTICULARS OF TARGET:

NAME: Nayef ben Abdul Al-Aziz Aal Saoud.

AGE: 71 years, born 1933.

POSITION: Saudi Interior Minister

RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: Riyadh–several places (amongst them palace in Arqa and Om Al-Haman Palace. He also has a number of other places which he frequents).


DAILY PROGRAM: He sleeps just before dawn until the afternoon, goes out to the Ministry on some days and this is from seven o’clock in the evening until eight thirty in the evening, the rest of the day is spent on night outings, parties and private meetings.

NUMBER OF GUARDS: Eight trained.
TYPE OF ARMAMANET: Light.

When the target alights from the car the guards are close to him but without body contact.

The movement on the motorcade: the roads are closed and the target car travels in the middle of the motorcade with look-alike cars. Note that they may put more than one similar motorcade for camouflage.

The guarding crew breaks up surveillance. The guarding crew sometimes carries out a change of route.

The number of guarding cars in the motorcade is no less than ten cars and their job is to clear the road. The first car is the car with the oscillating light then the cars where the target is and these are often similar in colour, model and without numbers or have similar numbers, then the protection cars followed by the patrol cars which block off the motorcade. Sometimes the motorcade travels without the target who travels in a small motorcade along side streets.

The target changes his car.

Mostly no cars come close to the motorcade and the reason that the roads are blocked off.

Route information: the distance from Arqa palace to the airport 40 kilometers.

ROUTE DESCRIPTION: Arqa-the Western Circular-the Northern Circular-the Airport Highway with the probability of travelling along other routes such as: Arqa-Kharees Highway-the Eastern Circular-the Airport Highway.

DATE OF DEPARTURE FOR THE RECEPTION: 15/4/1425 Hijri.
TIME OF DEPARTURE: Six pm.
ARRIVAL TIME: Six twenty five pm.
SIDE ROUTES: Several amongst those are he exists of the circulars (4-5-6-7) and the Western Gates of the University of King Saoud.
BRIDGES: The Field linking the Western Circular and the Eastern Circular to the Airport Highway.
CAR PARKS AND DESERTED PLACES: None.
THERE ARE SEVERAL TURNS/BENDS: Amongst those the bend where the Western Circular meets the Northern Circular, and the bend where the Northern Circular meets the Eastern Circular, and there are trees of medium density, parks and soccer grounds. And there is also a high building of several stories that belongs to the Sabek Company, and the Imam University building as well as trees in the medium strip which
separates the two roads and which is suitable for hiding, setting up ambushes, or planting time bombs and at the entrance to the airport highway there is a gate which can be closed…”[28]

This Casing report as an example amongst hundreds to demonstrate the way intelligence is used by the Al-Qaeda leadership to support decision making.

**Construction of a detailed plan**

Operationally, this is the most important phase of Al Qaeda’s intelligence effort. It is also the one that is likely to form part of Al Qaeda operation, regardless of its size or complexity. Once a decision is made to proceed, Al Qaeda will engage in a thorough process of intelligence collection on which to construct a precise plan of attack. The aims of this intelligence phase are twofold: first, to establish target and environmental familiarity based on detailed and current intelligence, and second, to identify routines associated with the target. These will determine the details of the operation, including the precise timing of the attack, the method by which the target will be approached, the roles and responsibilities of each operative, and the resource requirements. This intelligence serves as the basis on which the attack will be choreographed, often down to the finest detail. To assist in the construction of a detailed plan, intelligence might also be collected by other means, including open source documents such as maps, transportation timelines, telephone directories, biographical dates. The internet can help them to build up profiles on target.

**Final intelligence inspection**

The final phase of intelligence process is intended to identify any unanticipated issues or changed circumstances in the operating environment that might undermine the likelihood of success. It is the final attempt to ensure that the leadership and the operative are acting on the bases of the most current information and that this remains consistent with earlier assessment and expectations. This phase normally takes one of two forms: the dry run or the final reconnaissance mission.

The dry run: The dry run or operational rehearsal, involves replicating as closely as possible the conditions likely to be encountered at the time of the attack. In this way, surprise and other unforeseen circumstances are likely to be minimized. According to The Declaration, rehearsals are a useful means of “discovering any unexpected element detrimental to the operation”.[29]

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[29] Al Qaeda, Declaration of Jihad against the Country’s Tyrants,p.73.
The final reconnaissance mission: The final reconnaissance mission involves conducting a final visual inspection of the target, the target environment, and routes to the target. Its purpose is to ensure that there have been no changes to the anticipated operating environment, thereby minimizing the likelihood of encountering circumstances not factored into the planning process. The Declaration advises that “...Shortly before the operation, reconnaissance should be repeated in order to confirm that nothing new has occurred…”[30]

Conclusion: The documented evidence indicates that intelligence has provided the various levels within Al Qaeda a significant measure of operational control and certainty. For the Al Qaeda leadership, it has provided command and control capabilities that have allowed it to invest in and pursue operations most likely to promote its strategic and symbolic objectives. For the Al Qaeda operatives the collection and accumulation of intelligence has provided a measure of predictability through its capacity to describe the target and target environment in advance of the attack.

Notes:

1. Al Qaeda, Declaration of Jihad against the Country’s Tyrants, Military Series,
4. Gaetano Joe Ilardi, Al Qaeda’s operational intelligence-A key prerequisite to Action, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, volume,31, ISSN 1057-610X.

Dr. Mary Rédei *

HOW COULD A NEW HOST COUNTRY APPLY THE BRAIN?

The main focus of the paper is to show how a new host country gained by human resources via spatial mobility. The impact of shifted role of Hungary in international labour market circulation and its geopolitical situation generated a modified exchange of human resources. On side, the lower level of mass human resources was filled from East and from developed world the highly and more or

* Az MTA Doktora, ELTE TTK FFI maryredei@ludens.elte.hu
less specially qualified eligible sources. At that time it has loss the best local “engines”.

The structure of paper will touched upon the gain of Hungary from human resources via immigration, the internal brain drain and the loss of domestic sources by special interest for highly qualified persons. And finally we will share the first result of student mental map survey. Closing remarks are how the current economical crisis re-writes the flow.

1. Human Resources surplus of Hungary via immigration

Our immigrants were ethnic Hungarians, so the language is not created any barrier in their social integration. But the professional integration has need more effort. The ethnic based immigration enriched us by highly graduated, but poorly experienced people. Most of them it should be re-engineered.

Hungary enrolled 200 thousand new citizens. The arrivals had good qualification. 15 % had skill, 45 % finished the high school, and 35 % were graduated. (Tóth P.P. 1996.) And this is only the direct demographic impact. Their age structure juveniles the autochthon population, which is in a long-term ageing period, essential. Currently the fertility rate is low, the quantity of propagative female cohorts are small. Noticeable the foreigner’s contribution is 2 % of new born babies. In the case of ageing capital it has more meaning.

After two decades immigration and the relatively rapid procedure to get Hungarian citizenship, the ratio of foreigners comparing to the European level, is low. See table 1.

1. Table: Staying permit holders in Hungary
The diagram 1. points out the age structure of foreigners. Comparing to the autochthon population the juvenilia is clear. Except from Austria are coming in pension age. By citizenship analysing we have more diversified details. According the migration literature, it is not fit to the Rogers curve distribution and shows a significant retirement migration to Hungary. (Illés S. - Michalkó 2005. Illés S. - Kincses Á 2009.) By deep interview series we can confirm some of them arrived like second home, some agree on that Hungary is pleasant cheap place to live, and purchased their pension here. One more explanatory factor is that, those who migrated from Romania, had got the Austrian citizenship, but this short period of occupational pension is not cover their living in Austria and they prefer the mother country advantages.

1. diagram: Age specific curve of stock foreigners by total, and by origin countries. 2008.

The main interest of foreigners is aimed at resort places, like Lake Balaton, small settlements. This process is one side a re-vitalizing option to the lagging area of Hungary and the other side speed the ageing process. Their residence interest is visible in real a state market.

2. Internal brain drain

In the mid of 90’s there was high interest of FDI towards Hungary. As it is known the FDI required the local eligible human resources. In the first period the cheap labour was the main aspect. By the extension of international
production the leaders and semi skilled workers were in focus of interest. The domestic supply was narrow, the speed demand absorbed them, so after a couple of years the head-hunters turned to the direct university recruitment. And the series of university stock exchange for human sources has opened. It is still has a meaningful motivation for those students, who are taking consideration of their carrier, and take the time on their side.

At this time Hungary experienced by internal brain drain. As I had published how the domestic highly qualified labour was able to load the international requirements, and later they could join to global market. By establishing the regional headquarters’ in Budapest, most of the regional managers were recruited from here and started the direct enrolment from universities. Some of excellences became leaders in domestic economy and soon were appointed as regional directors. I mean this way of mobility was better prepared, based on an experienced situation, and more human, than only to leave the country and start an individual work searching.

Due to the internal brain drain process, at this time, in 90’s, Hungary moderately lost highly qualified people. Most of them still have permanent and useful contact by domestic state of affairs. On of the determining impact of FDI was to invest more in your skill. The higher education boom was extended to foreign study. Hungary became a host country in student migration. The people invested more in their skill, because they foreseen the value, and opportunities. The intensive student migration resulted the current young generation is more familiarized, and skilled for international conditions.

2.1. Manufacturing restructuring has demand for skill workers

After 2000 the attractivity of our country started to decrease, and by manufacturing restructuring there was an urgent demand for semi-and skilled workers, which was fuelled from the neighbouring countries. For some of them that was an upswing to EU. Nowadays, the main discussion is going around, whether we have lost those, who temporary joined to European market, for ever, or we would be able to profit from their newly expanded contacts. Their education cost was covered from public budget, which is missing from different budget lines. Currently the ministerial governance wants to tie after graduation, so they limited the place of their practicum. But all this are against the principle of free movement. It is a painful reality we are not able to offer carrier and use their ability in home.

Time to time is clear, Hungary, like other part of the emerging economy, is not able to keep the best and bright young graduates or PhD students. 15 % of
the great Erasmus students stay in the host university or industry. The TNCs attract and took them, and there is a low chance to feed the local economy.

The diagram 2. confirms that, on all from neighbouring countries with on the average higher school qualifications arrivals than the autochthon population, except the Romanian citizens (Német N. an al ate, 2009) (Rédei M.- Kincses Á. 2008.) Within Europe this tendency chiefly the Slovenes and the EU15 countries (and among them Austria) in case of it is rugged, here cross-country over the 18 years have college graduate. Gné. Lukács É. and Illés S. also came (Gellérné L.É.-Illés and,. 2005:) Citizens „of the developed west states with the license job accepting ones at average of a higher school graduation and the tertiary sector a from Hungary job permit holders prefers”.

Discrepancies of the school qualifications between the Hungarian and the foreign citizens were measured by discrepancy index. If the arrivals’ school qualifications an identical in the host population, the index value is one, if the rate is larger at one, arrivals have a better proportion than the autochthon population in qualification, is above 1. Value of the index in the Hungary a hedger to all college graduate foreigners 1.46, to intermediate one 1.05, till to the positive one 0.69. Since year 2001.shift can be observed from the superlative higher value into her intermediate direction, but the indices are denoting clearly, that Hungary came by the international migration to notable transcendent capital. (see 2. table and diagram 3. on counties level)

2. diagram: Graduation level by origin continents, 2008.
From geographical point is an important issue how they have settled. Like the *table 3.* shows, in 2008. Each second foreigners has chosen Budapest, and two thirds of Asians has concentrated here. All this confirm the regularities according that the metropolitan areas are in the focus of interest.

3. **diagram:** Graduation level by origin countries, 2008,
3. Usefulness of migration, like a basic preference

Beyond the demographic impact the usefulness of international flow can be sum up the roll of studentificatio in urban areas, more tax, and interest on real estate market. I agree these are giving a good consumption of economical upswing, if is effectively used by a pro-action policy. The studentificatio is started by the rising interest of non neighbours. As it is known the immigrant and the staying permits holders have special starting or temporary interest, so they are target group for some consumption. A small flat in centrum, or near the agora, this is their opening needs.

3.1. Studentificatio

During the transition period the role and importance of human resource has been increased. At the implementation of investment, specially the non-domestic ones, the eligible human resources was a key issue. As the substance of education expanded the qualified labour force became even more popular. This new demand influenced the local population to invest more in it. (2 % of household expenditure goes for education.)

Hungary is a great example if you live within a challenging environment, then one has to do more and more in favour of compliance. Currently Hungary hosted 17 thousands foreign students. And high ratio is (10 thousands) ethnic Hungarians. Examining and understanding the situation brings us to the point
how the material attitude turns to non-materials, form fordist to the not fordist way of thinking. The quality of brain (skill, ability) is essential. And it gives the valid ticket for mobility. One can experience that the growth of human capital became a value, the open-minded people had increased. It became possible to step over the borders, and today it is clear that no legal barrier anymore, only ability barriers which could limit mobility.

The question of studentificatio influences the local community’s economy, its real estate, its services, its labour market, and its educational system. Lot of examples can be brought up at Hungary what kind of changes studentificatio (e.g.: student camps) caused in the structure of towns or at their usage. At most cases, former military camps were re-used. At time of creation they were outside of towns, nowadays as towns grew, they became a part of the towns and towns decided to re-use these buildings. In some places not only the milieu, but even more the structure of the city has changed.

3.2. Taxpaying

Some countries in their statement about migration reported the identification of migrants not from the point of security is important, but more from the economical aspect. In such a way the evaluation of remittances (Rédei 2007c) and taxpaying became an issue.

The foreign taxpayers in Hungary are fewer than 2 % of total ones, but in some counties they are concentrated. Like in capital nearly 5 % and Slovaks in Komarom county are 4 %. The half of the foreigners is paying tax. See the table 4.

4. Table: Foreign tax payers, 2007
Examining taxpayers by nationality weight of the neighbouring countries is 59 %. Within the taxpayers the Romanian citizens' proportion the culminating (42 %,) but also close the Asians run to 20 %.

The tax paying is depends on their economical activity. Into the legislators, managerial, representation of interests managers master group a staying permit holders economic a small management team is characteristic for Asian citizens, they employed his quart can be classified here, however 35 % are the facility to featured professions. These turns are characterising the Asian employees chiefly. Another nationality detachment is not denoting so much rugged homogeneity single, but professions requiring absolute application of the superlative qualification dominants the American and from African continent at arrivals' circuit also.


To sum up the demographic, economical features of foreigners in Budapest, a lot of students are high economical activity is characteristics, there is a wide range of profession. Budapest is still able to rise their attraction, like as it has happened in other metropolitan area. The number of foreign citizens was
75 thousands in 2008, which means 5 % of total. From the point of future it is remarkable the number of non European is rising and their aspiration for settling in Budapest is growing. My expectation and population forecast is based on the international migration. Hungary has no demographic reserves, and the aging process is irreversible.

4. Loss of talents

Finally what is going in the “head” of enrolled students? It is always a black box. In 2009 we have opportunities to join to TIGRIS research group in University of IAS, and carried out 250 surveys in 6 different sciences, asking students about their dream. Research was part of the “Eurobroadmap” FP 7 SSH. In Hungary we asked 250 university students in different field, how they labelled Europe, what is their favourite and non favourite cities, countries and potential mobility expectation. The global survey was taken for 12 000! questionnaires in different countries, among them BRICs, emerging economies, and first cross tables are under analysis.

The first result of our survey is our students comparing to the other new member countries also have a limited spatial extension in their mind. Main motivation of their movement is towards the western countries, but no towards the main immigration goals. The low level of interest is to the neighbourhoods countries. It was surveyed, although, this environment is better known for them.

4.1. Impact of crisis

The impact of the economic crisis on migration has drawn the attention to the mismatching of labour market. The migrants are the hardest hit labour force group, they are the redundancy. Their unemployment rate is rapidly increasing, more than the native. It makes difficult the estimation, their high rate of shadow. And we recorded the ever highest immigration record in last year. (36 thousands) How is that? This vulnerability is partly due to the fact that migrant workers are overrepresented in economic sectors that have benefited from the previous long growth period, and are now particularly hard hit by the crisis such as construction, hotels and restaurants, etc. But immigrants, in particular the most recent arrivals, are also more often employed in less secure and low-skilled jobs which are among the first to disappear during a downturn. It needs to be taken in account the period of coincide. The crisis is long-term and deep, their stay is based on short term conditions. Especially the fact, they are overrepresented in low skill level manufacturing industry, which more flexible than value added branches. I agree by the statement “need to ensure that the benefits of migration are shared between sending and receiving countries. This requires responsible recruitment policies to avoid the risk of brain drain and
greater portability of social rights to reduce obstacles to returns.”-said OECD. The question is that who is ready for return? As we have seen the immigrants from Eastern Europe, those who arrived from countries, the have no any other choice than wait and accept the compromise motion. This situation is affected the local market, and their sending home. The World Bank forecasts a decrease in remittances of between 5 and 8 per cent in 2009.

One of the aim of paper is to reflect for how affected economical crisis on international flow. I mean there are double effects the domestic recession was fuelled by global crisis. Among the Eastern countries Hungary lag behind the others, loss attractively, and ethnic based migration became moderated. Those who were employed in abroad, they are returning. The outflow has high pressure among the professionals, like doctors, dentist, engineer, informatics, and MBA graduation. Hungary like some other cases in the world is not able to offer opportunities at home. If we have a look how has changed the regional unemployment rate, we have an unusual picture and shift. The western part of Hungary, which highly developed and mainly export oriented companies are there, in the first couple of month of crisis, send their employees. So the low level of unemployment rate comes near to the high ratio of Eastern part of Hungary. It is shows how sensible and ready to make correction a multinationals, comparing to SMEs. The Hungarian economy is not able to absorb the best and bright people, so it has to face the loss of them.

Finally, it can be concluded, Hungary gained from immigration in the 90thies, especially the qualified labour. As the principle of migration, by recession the best people move towards the emerging economy. I did not find the current outflow so crucial; the main problem is we can not see any short hope for their return. By their outflow create an attraction those who want to settle here.

Bibliography

THE OCCUPATION OF WESTERN SAHARA 
BY MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA

With the myriad of post–colonial conflicts that have and continue to afflict the African continent, it is seldom known that the longest running of these is that between Morocco and the Polisario Front on Western Sahara. The objective of this article to examine the roots of the conflict and provide some information about the occupation of Western-Sahara in 1975.

The crisis over Western Sahara started in the early 1970s when Spain was forced to announce plans to withdraw from the territory it had effectively occupied since 1934.

Both Morocco and Mauritania lodged claims to those parts of the territory they had occupied, considering them to have been part of their countries well before the Spanish occupation. To these two countries therefore, their move was one of ‘recovery’ rather than ‘occupation’.[31]

The main causes of the conflict in Western Sahara may be encapsulated broadly in three interrelated categories: politics, economy and geopolitics.

The political aspect relates to the Moroccan ideology of “Greater Morocco” which in the early 1960s, in defiance of the principle of *uti possidetis juris* (inviolability or sanctity of the borders inherited from the colonial era), espoused the idea of a greater pre-colonial Morocco extending over the territory of the Spanish Sahara, parts of present-day Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Senegal.[32] Mauritania’s involvement in the conflict was precisely due to the fear of its government that, after occupying Western Sahara, Morocco would continue its march southwards and eventually annex Mauritania as well.[33]

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[31] Ian Brownlie, Ian R. Burns: African boundaries a legal and diplomatic encyclopaedia p. 443
[33] Ian Brownlie, Ian R. Burns: African boundaries a legal and diplomatic encyclopaedia p. 147
The second theme (the economic one) relates to the abundant natural resources of the Western Sahara. In particular, the discovery of significant phosphate deposits in the Bucraa region in the early 1940s triggered heightened interest in the territory from both Spain and then Morocco. Equally important are the rich fishing grounds off the Western Saharan coast, which were exploited illegally first by Spain (until its accession to the European Community (EC) in 1986) and then by the European Union.

It is also thought that the Territory has great potential in terms of commercial oil and gas reserves. Moroccan dealings in these resources led the United Nations Security Council in 2002 to request a legal opinion on the issue. In its opinion, UN legal counsel affirmed that any further exploration or exploitation of these resources would be illegal if it proceeded in disregard of the interests and wishes of the Sahrawi people and without consultation with their legitimate representative, the Polisario Front.[34]

Finally, mention should be made of the international context at the time, particularly the Cold War, when the US and France joined hands to prevent the emergence of an independent state in Western Sahara. To this end, they exerted pressure on Spain, at a time when the Generalissimo Franco was on his deathbed, to hand over the Territory to Morocco.[35] It is pertinent to recall, in this context, the position adopted by former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who, in a recently declassified document of the State Department of 11 November 1975, revealed that he was afraid that “Hassan [King of Morocco] may be overthrown if he does not get a success” in Western Sahara.[36] In effect, the stability of the friendly Alaouite monarchy in Morocco – which is structurally weak in the absence of real political legitimacy – constituted the Western powers’ main reason for defending and supporting the indefensible fait accompli – Morocco’s illegal annexation of Western Sahara.

At the request of the UN General Assembly, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a legal opinion on Western Sahara on 16 October 1975 in which it clearly established that:

The materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity.[37] Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution

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1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory. Shortly after the release of this opinion, King Hassan II of Morocco ordered the so-called “Green March” to invade the territory of Spanish Sahara. This march was finally set in motion on 6 November 1975 after Moroccan armed forces had already advanced and penetrated the northern part of the Territory on 31 October. In response, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 380 (1975) of 6 November 1975, in which it “deplored” the holding of the march and called upon Morocco “to withdraw from the Territory of Western Sahara and all the participants in the march”.

On 14 November 1975, a secret deal (also known as the Madrid Tripartite Agreement) was signed in Madrid between the governments of Spain, Morocco and Mauritania, whereby Spain agreed to institute a temporary tripartite administration in the Territory, including representatives of Morocco, Mauritania and Spain. The agreement was evidently null and void, in terms of Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as it violated the United Nations Charter and various resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly. To persist in their defiance of international law, Morocco and Mauritania signed an agreement on 14 April 1976 in which they partitioned and annexed Western Sahara – the northern part going to Morocco and the southern part to Mauritania.

During the period of “Madrid negotiations” the units of the Spanish Foreign Legion, the Spanish Naval Infantry, Airborne, and Police units in the city of El Aaiun surrounded the districts where locals lived and started collecting weapons and arrested those who demanded independence. Local soldiers serving the Spanish (Troopas Nomadas, Policia Territorial and members of the Spanish Legion) were disarmed and disbanded. The Governor of the territory took discriminatory measures against the local people, e.g. he prohibited petrol stations from selling petrol to the local people. The Spanish military leadership set down immediately to work out the Golondrina evacuation plan of the civil population then they reinforced the defence of phosphate mines, important buildings and they started evacuating the garrisons in the desert.[38]

By 8th November more than 12,000 civilians had been evacuated from the territory by sea and air to the Canary Islands. Spanish merchants sold their shops with stocks and state-run schools were closed down because of the lack of teachers. The Spanish even transported their animals from the zoo to Almeria,

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[37] Ian Brownlie, Ian R. Burns: African boundaries a legal and diplomatic encyclopaedia p. 157-158
[38] Tony Hodges; The Roots of a Desert War (Lawrance Hill & Company, 1983.) p. 218.
exhumed their relatives buried in local cemeteries and transported the remains to the Canary Islands, where they reburied them. So by the time the parties announced the Madrid Accords, there had been no Spanish citizens in the Territory of once Spanish Sahara except for the armed forces and civil servants.

On 12th November leader of Polisario Front El-Vali announced that the Madrid Accords are considered null (15th November), while independently of this King Hassan II announced on 15th November that he had closed the Western Sahara file and appointed Ahmed Bensouda Governor of the territory in El-Aaiun. As for Polisario the King stated that their leaders were unable to pull together the almost 60,000 Saharawians and they could stage actions only with the help of mercenaries who were unable to fight a desert war against the well-trained Moroccans. This is why the organisation itself did not pose any threat to the state of Morocco. He made this statement being aware of the fact that the approximately 2,500 local troops and policemen previously hired by the Spanish joined Polisario with their weapons.\footnote{Tony Hodges; The Roots of a Desert War (Lawrance Hill & Company, 1983.) p. 230.}

In the UN camp in Megaries Mehdi, one of the cooks who had been member of the Territorial Police in El-Aaiun joined the rebels together with the others after the retreat of the Spanish. According to him the Spanish let them down and he would have still served them if they had not retreated.

Many more of the soldiers like him serving now in Polisario units but who used to serve with the Spanish Legion, with the Saharan nomad troops or the local police before, applied for a rent of merit to the Spanish Government. In accordance with the current negotiations the Spanish government would pay service rent to all those who had served at least 10 years in any of the armed units established and led by Spain.

Subsequently, the Moroccan military started their entry into Western Sahara and Spain announced that in a couple of months they would end civil administration on the territory. (only Franco could have protested because of the Moroccan occupation but he died on 20th November) The situation was further complicated by the fact that on 28th November in Guelta the Jemma dissolved itself in spite of the fact that according to the three-party agreement the council was intended to play a significant role in settling the situation.\footnote{UN Document S/11902, December 10, 1975.}

A delegation of people living in former Spanish Sahara held a press conference organised by Polisario in Algiers on 6th December. The Deputy President of Jemma together with 56 other representatives were also part of the delegation (three of them were also members of the Spanish Parliament, the
Cortes). The Secretary General of Jemma declared their joint proclamation on the dissolution of the Council and the establishment of the 41-strong Saharawian Interim National Council. The statement was signed by the 67 members of Jemma as well as by several tribal leaders.[41]

Since the Madrid Accords recognized Jemma as the official representative of the Saharawians, by dissolving the Council the Saharawians deprived Morocco of the possibility to use the organization for its own purposes and the other signatories of the Accords were also put into an embarrassing situation.

"The views of the Saharan population, expressed through Jemma, will be respected." Article 3 (18)

It was under these circumstances that on 10th December the UN passed two resolutions that partly contradicted each other.[42]

The first Resolution (3458/A) reiterated the right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara already present in previous resolutions, which stated that Spain and the UN are responsible for decolonizing the territory.[43] The resolution was passed with 86 votes for, 41 abstentions and no votes against.

The second Resolution (3458/B) acknowledged the three party Madrid Accords and called on the signatories to ensure respect for the freely expressed aspirations of the Saharan population. At the same time it requested the Secretary General to appoint a representative who would supervise the free referendum.[44] The situation in this case was not as clear as in the previous one because 56 countries voted for the resolution, 42 against it and 34 abstained. By the time the resolutions were passed, a significant part of Western Sahara was occupied by the Moroccans.

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On the map you can see the territory divided between the Moroccan and Mauritanian governments in the Madrid Accords.

A part of the Sahara territories was occupied by the end of November 1975 by the Moroccan army. The invasion forces in cooperation with the withdrawing Spanish army started the occupation of the area from two separate directions.

The objective of the units advancing along the coast line was to capture El-Aaiun and the phosphate mines at Bou Craa. According to the first official reports the Moroccan forces penetrated Western Sahara 100 kilometres deep and on 28th November the second largest settlement, Smara was also taken.

In less than a month a 25,000-strong contingent, that is one third of the Moroccan Army, was stationed in the occupied Sahara territories. 15,000 troops deployed in the Saguia El-Hamra garrisons (Farsia, Jdiriya, Haousa, Smara), 5,000 men in El-Aaiun, and another 5,000 soldiers were stationed near the southern borders of former Spanish Sahara. The offensive went simultaneously with a mass migration of the population.

On 11th December Moroccan units captured El-Aaiun (there was Polisario resistance only in a few places although on 12th December a minor unit attacked the Moroccan troops in the town), while Mauritanian forces, launching their offensive occupied La Guerra, then Tichla.

By the end of December the Spanish forces had gradually withdrawn from the town, on 28th December the airfield was handed over, then on 12th January 1976 the last of their soldiers left former Spanish Sahara when Villa Cisneros was abandoned.

Afterwards there were only 150 Spanish civil servants in El-Aaiun in order to implement and supervise the smooth handover of the public

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administration of the area. The last Spanish citizen who left the town in late February 1976 was Colonel Rafael de Veldes Iglesias and thus the Kingdom of Spain ceased to be a factor in Western Sahara.\[48\]

Local soldiers made redundant from Spanish military service joined their previous enemy, Polisario, and established Sahara Liberation Army for fighting Moroccan troops (SLA).\[49\] In spite of the fact that ill-armed Western Saharans tried mostly to defend (and evacuate civil population), one of their minor units attacked the Mauritanian town of Zuerat as early as 29 December. The town, also a mining centre, is located in 400 kilometres from the capital deep in the desert. During the attack the infrastructure of the mine was damaged but the town itself was not occupied although it was defended only by 60 Mauritanian troops. At that time the Mauritanian army had merely some 3,000 trained soldiers, 2,000 gendarmes, and a few obsolete fighter planes, which made its units an easy target for Saharawian guerrillas, constantly harassing them. Former foreign legion fortress famous Ait Ben Tili, surrounded by Saharawian units, was also defended by Mauritanian forces. In order to help out defenders in dire straits President Ould Daddah requested combat planes from the Moroccan Air Force.

However, not even the Air Force was able to bring relief to the fortress; moreover one of the Moroccan Northrop F-5s was downed by the guerrillas. Finally, the fortress was captured by Polisario troops on 21\textsuperscript{st} January.\[50\]

In the following days insurgents attacked the towns of Bir Moghrein and Inal but despite the huge damage inflicted they were unable to capture them because of the concerted counterattacks of the Mauritanian army.

With French assistance the Mauritanian forces were reorganised and in the third week of December launched a counteroffensive near the border with Western Sahara. After a short but bloody battle they took the town of La Guerra and started to push back Polisario fighters and their civil supporters from the area (19\textsuperscript{th} December).\[51\] On the next day Tichla fell but Argoub, a small town near Villa Cisneros was captured only on 11\textsuperscript{th} January after a two-week-long siege. The roughly 200 soldiers and civilians defending the town fought until the very last bullet and the Mauritians managed to take only a few prisoners – seriously wounded soldiers – as the majority of defenders had gotten killed during the battle. Since that time Saharawians had had only one option – to flee.\[52\]

\[49\] John Damis: Conflict in Nortwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute. p. 70-71.
\[50\] Tony Hodges: The Roots of a Desert War. p. 230-231.
\[51\] John Mercer: The Sahrawis of Western Sahara. p. 10.
\[52\] Tony Hodges: The Roots of a Desert War. p. 23.
The refugees went first to the northern area of Western Sahara bordering Mauritania (Amgala, Guelta-Zemmour, Oum Dreiga, Tifariti, etc.), then they were evacuated to Algeria with the assistance of the Algerian Army. Besides providing transportation to the refugees Algeria also supplied weapons, food, drinking water, and medicine to Saharawian soldiers.

As early as that time the first cracks in the Moroccan-Mauritanian Alliance appeared because the Moroccans were worried that the Mauritanian troops could not take Villa Cisneros on time and entered the town under the command of Colonel Dlimi. A Moroccan garrison was established there in spite of the fact that in accordance with the Madrid Agreement the town would be controlled by the Mauritians. Although a Mauritanian administrative centre was set up in the town the real power was represented by Morocco.

On 27th January 1976 Moroccan military units attacked an Algerian convoy at Amgala (first Amgala battle) and the Algerian troops withdrew after a several days battle, as they had suffered heavy casualties.

Thanks to its significant water supply Amgala is a very important place in the Saguia el-Hamra valley, where a Polisario logistic base was established with Algerian support. Refugees were provided with food and medicaments from this place and they were also further transported to safe havens in Algerian territories. The unexpected Moroccan attack inflicted heavy damage to the Algerians and 99 of their soldiers were captured. The furious Algerian High Command demanded an immediate retaliation and the breakout of a war between the two countries were prevented by the bold and decisive action of Algerian President Boumedien. From that time the Algerian leadership increased its material support to the rebels but held back its troops from further clashes.

The retaliation came fairly soon – between 13th and 15th February Polisario units defeated Moroccan troops in the second Amgala battle.

As for the balance of power Moroccan and Mauritanian troops had superiority although the combat worthiness of the Mauritanian units equipped with French weapons and trained by French specialists was rather low. The rebel forces consisted of a few thousand volunteers equipped with small arms, mortars, and some antitank missiles and SAMs from the Algerian and Libyan

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As the performance of the Moroccan troops in the desert was far from what King Hassan II had expected from them the Moroccan Air Force raided the refugee camps in order to put an end to war as soon as possible. From 22nd February several air raids were launched against refugee camps Gueltata-Zemmour, Tifariti, and Oum Dreiga. The bombings were approved by Colonel Dlimi and it was also him who approved the use of napalm bombs which are more efficient than conventional ones. However, those bombing raids were nearly inefficient from military aspect as their victims were mostly children, women, and elderly people.

The Royal Moroccan troops also applied methods that had already been used by the Spanish before: poisoning wells, machine-gunning herds, looting civilian population, tortures, and even public executions. As a result of such events and atrocities the mass migration of civil population accelerated. By the end of February the number of people, mostly children, women, and elderly people living in refugee camps in Algeria had increased to more than 100,000.

The Spanish troops were supposed to withdraw by 28th February 1976 but had left the area earlier, thus abandoning its population.

Although the UNHCR realised the desperate situation of refugees in camps he could not respond immediately therefore he called on those sympathising with the Saharawians to help.

The Algerian Government was not prepared to receive and supply so many refugees either, which led to critical medical and hygienic situation in the camps soon.

On the actual situation in the camps a report was written by the members of a Swiss group of medical doctors, who had arrived into the region with the help on the International Red Cross in order to help the refugees. This is how the members of the group – Dr. Elio Canevaschini, Dr. Emmanuel Martinoli, Dr. Marie-Claire Martinoli and Dr. Marc Oltramare – tell about their experience:

„We have the sensation that both the Algerian Government and the Red Cross are able to provide only limited assistance to the refugees therefore

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we regard the rapid international cooperation and immediate help to refugees of extreme importance.

The number of refugees is growing by the day due to newcomers and the majority of the mass of people is comprised by women, children, and elderly people.

The proportion of children under 15 is 45% and that of babies under 1 year is around 6-7%. The refugees are accommodated in 14 camps and their number is over 70,000. Their accommodation poses a serious problem as 3-4 families share a tent. Due to infections and other diseases there is a grave risk of epidemics.

Firewood is another serious problem as these people often have to go 200 kilometres for collecting firewood. Then it is equally divided among the refugees but still there are some who lack firewood.

Food supply also presents difficult problems as the monthly supply of a refugee is 6 kg of flour or wheat, 3 kg dried vegetables, 2 kg sugar, 2 kg powdered milk, 3 kg dates and 1 kg of tea.

The refugees are living under very bad conditions – many of them are traumatised or suffering from burns from the bombings. They are treated by 3 doctors, 15 assistant doctors, and a few enthusiastic volunteers."

On the basis of the mandate provided by the General Assembly in December 1975 UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim sent a special representative to Madrid, Rabat, Algiers and Western Sahara in order to initiate negotiations on the soonest possible implementation of UN Resolutions. His Special Envoy was Swedish UN diplomat Olaf Rydbeck, who started his work on 7th February when he visited El-Aaiun, Smara and Dakhla. He was deeply shocked by the news on the events that took place in the territories occupied by the Moroccan and Mauritanian forces (bombing of refugees, escalation of guerrilla war, etc.) and in his report clearly stated that on the basis of what he had seen it was impossible to organise a free referendum in Western Sahara. Thus the tour of duty of the UNSG Special Envoy was unsuccessful and “Morocco could continue the reunification of the territories of Western Sahara to the motherland.”

On 25th February the Jemma was summoned (out of its 102 members 57 came to the conference but not all of them supported the Moroccan and Mauritanian territorial demands) thus the vacant seats of those supporting the rebels were handed over to representatives loyal to Morocco. The new Council

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1 Tony Hodges; The Roots of a Desert War. p. 235-237.
sworn in to King Hassan II but neither the UN, nor Polisario, nor even Spain accepted the new Jemma as the legal representative body of the Saharawians since the genuine Jemma was dismissed in November 1975. That time Spain submitted a report to the UNSG and declared a withdrawal from the territory.⁶⁸

Responding to the Moroccan measures President of the Sahara Interim National Council Uld Ziou on the main square of a refugee camp in Ait Ben Tili, near Bir Lahlou, declared the establishment of Sahara Arab Democratic Republic at midnight 28th February.⁶⁹

On 5th March 1976 Ahmed Baba Miske introduced the first Government of Western Sahara in Hotel Saint-Georges in Algiers. Madagascar was the first country to recognise the new state and later on another 78 countries followed suit.⁷⁰ In spite of the fact that later, due to diplomatic pressure, many of them suspended the relations with the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic, it keeps maintaining some official relations with 54 countries. However, the declaration of independence did not trigger many changes as the Moroccan Army continued to occupy the territory.

On 14th April 1976 the allied powers, occupying most of the territories, officially signed the treaty on the division of the area and on drawing a new border line between the two countries.⁷¹ Morocco received the two biggest towns, El-Aaiun and Smara, and the phosphate mines thus increasing its areas by some 35%,⁷² while Mauritania was given Villa Cisneros and a long section of the coast line with good fisheries, however, the inland area comprised only desert and nothing else.⁷³ That is, the treaty on the division of the area clearly favoured Morocco.

**Escalation of the Conflict**

Once the new state was declared the UN Secretary General decided to delegate the Swedish UN diplomat Olaf Rydbeck to help bring about a possible agreement. In his statement of 25th March 1976 the Secretary General detailed the purpose of the delegation: to obtain the opinions of the Moroccan and Mauritanian Governments about Resolution 3458 of the General Assembly. The planned visit elicited strong objection in Moroccan public opinion, and the Swedish diplomat's visit to the refugee camps in the vicinity of Tinduf on 31st March led to serious tension between Morocco and the UN.⁷⁴

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⁶⁹ C. R. Pennel Morocco since 1830 a history p. 340
⁷³ David J. Dean: The Air Force Role in Low-intensity Conflict. p. 36.
On 4th April 1976 Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Laraki informed the UN Secretary General that the special representative will not be authorised to continue his mission in Rabat. Shortly afterwards the Government of Mauritania also announced, that the diplomat's visit would not be timely. After this the Secretary General himself initiated negotiations with the UN ambassadors of the involved countries, but could not achieve any significant results.

Polisario reopened hostilities. The series of attacks known as the May 20 Offensive commenced in earnest on 11th May, when coordinated assaults were launched against El-Aaiun, Smara, Bou Kra, Bir Moghrein and Chinguetti, and damaged the phosphate-carrying conveyor-belt system.

Before launching the offensive the Saharawians warned the foreign citizens working in the phosphate mines and the Mauritanian iron-ore mines that if they do not leave the area they would be treated as enemies. At that time over 280 highly trained French experts, employees of COMINOR (Comptoir Minier du Nord) worked in the Mauritanian iron-ore mines. The Mauritanians were supposed to guarantee their safety. The warning was labelled as a terrorist threat, and those affected did not take it seriously, so the attack against Mauritania's capital, Nouakchott, by Polisario units on 8 June 1976 was a serious surprise.

The fact that a military unit of about 600 men was able to march unnoticed more than 1,000 km through enemy territory indicated a thorough knowledge of the terrain, and support of the local population. The attack lasted nearly one hour, the selected targets (including the presidential palace) were subjected to mortar and machine gun fire. Some of the local units fled, but the Saharawians were not able to exploit their success because their leader, El-Vali Mustafa Sayed was also killed during the attack.

At the same time Polisario also attacked Tan-Tan, Jdiria and Guelta-Zemmour in the northern areas. At that time the Saharawians had already changed their tactics: they had realised, that in the face of mechanised and well-equipped Moroccan units they could not successfully defend the population centres still in their possession, and reverted to guerrilla warfare with which they were already familiar, and which had brought them greater success.

Since tribes related to the Saharawians lived throughout Mauritania and southern Morocco, they could count on support from a part of the population.

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[77] John Damis: Conflict in Northwest Africa–The Western Sahara Dispute. p. 84.
[78] Tony Hodges: The Roots of a Desert War. p. 244.
during nearly all of their attacks. Polisario units, consisting of several hundred men could move with relative ease not only through the occupied territories, but on the territory of enemy states as well.

The Moroccans firmly held the towns and forts handed over by the Spain, but their supply lines were under constant attack.

Mauritania, beset by economic and ethnic tensions, was the weaker of the two countries, therefore Polisario was more active in the territories occupied by it than in those occupied by Morocco.\[^{79}\]

**War with Mauritania**

On 15\(^{th}\) January 1976 President Oud Daddah appointed a trusted veteran politician, Hamoud Ould Abdel-Wedoud as Governor of the territories occupied by Mauritania.\[^{80}\] The new governor initiated an administrative reorganization of the territory and turned it into a separate region called Tiris el-Gharbia, with Dakhla as its capital.\[^{81}\] The new region was subdivided into four districts (Dakhla, Awsard, Tichla és Argoub).

They created three military districts in order to establish firmer control of the occupied territories. The headquarters of the first district was established in the town of Awsard; its commander was Colonel Viah Ould Mayouf, who had prepared the territory's occupation and directed the war against the Polisario. The headquarters of the second district was deployed in Zouerat; its commander was Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Ould Bouceif, who was responsible for Mauritania's north-eastern territories. Bir Moghrein and Ain Ben Tili were under him also. The headquarters of the third district was established in Dakhla, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi was assigned to command it.\[^{82}\]

About this time the task of settling the refugees in camps was completed, and the Saharawian could begin the systematic destruction of the two occupying countries' economic institutions.

In the spirit of the Sahara Arab traditions - and due to low standards of training and a shortage of heavy weapons - Polisario organised guerrilla operations (ghazzi). Their units (kataeb), equipped with Land Rovers and light personal weapons, would cover several hundred kilometres, deliver a quick raid,

\[^{80}\] Tony Hodges: The Roots of a Desert War. p. 241.
\[^{82}\] Tony Hodges: The Roots of a Desert War. p. 242.
then disappear.\[83\] Since the Mauritanian desert is nearly twice the size of France, the military and law enforcement forces available to the local authorities were insufficient to keep the territory under control.

Insurgent attacks made transportation of phosphate mined in the Bou Craa mines impossible (between 1976 and 1979 the Fosbucraa company lost 1.722 billion Pesetas due to the attacks). The rail line connecting the Mauritanian iron-ore mines to the seaport was regularly damaged which caused serious problems to Mauritania, whose main source of earnings was iron-ore.\[84\] The Mauritanian political leadership was shaken by the attacks, but they thought that the situation could be salvaged by some quick changes in the armed forces leadership.

Thus, the Chief of Staff was immediately dismissed. Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Ould Bouceif, commander of the second military district replaced him.

This was the first time the Mauritanian leadership criticised the activities of the Moroccan army, since they had been expecting the Moroccans to start a counteroffensive against Polisario. However, the Moroccans settled into defensive positions and did not pursue the Saharawians retreating into the Sahara. As a result, Polisario fighters launched attacks against the Mauritanian towns of Nema and Tisitt from territories occupied by Morocco.

Due to the escalating attacks the Mauritanian army's strength was increased to 17,000 men (of these 10,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers belonged to the black minority; this would eventually generate serious tensions within the army and lead to several mutinies), and purchased modern weapons.\[85\] Training of the new recruits was accelerated in the training centre established with French assistance in the town of Atar. However, none of these measures brought any significant success.\[86\]

In this auspicious military situation the III. Polisario Congress was held on 24\textsuperscript{th} August 1976. In addition to the press, several official government delegations (Benin, Algeria, Bissau-Guinea, Libia, and some others) also attended. Members of the former Jemma and the Deputy Secretary General of PUNS (Sahara National Unity Party) also attended. During the Congress the first Constitution of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was approved, which meant final ratification of the draft the Sahara Provisional National Council had published in February.

\[83\] David J. Dean: The Air Force Role in Low-intensity Conflict. p. 42.
\[84\] Tony Hodges; The Roots of a Desert War. p. 243-244.
\[85\] Toby Shelley: Endgame in the Western Sahara. p. 43-44.
\[86\] Tony Hodges: The Roots of a Desert War. p. 246.
That was the time when new Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz was elected Head of the Council of Ministers. Although the delegates agreed to continue the armed struggle they also decided to commence a diplomatic offensive in order to inform the world on the real situation. As a result, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic Hakim Brahim even participated in the Geneva congress of the Socialist International as an observer. Since every diplomatic contact was extremely important for the new state it tried to establish contacts with every country, regardless of its political leanings, in order to gain the broadest possible recognition.

SADR representatives participated as an official delegation in the XIII. Summit of the Organisation of African Unity in Port Louis (Mauritius), where 29 African countries voted for the Western Saharawian's right to self determination, independence, and territorial integrity. As a consequence of the voting, Morocco announced suspension of its activities in the organisation. The diplomatic offensive, launched with the assistance of Algeria, brought some success, since by the first half of 1977 the Western-Sahara state was recognised by nine African countries (Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Bissau-Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Ruanda and Togo).[87]

Naturally, as a result of this they also tried to increase the effectiveness of military operations thus on 1st May 1977 the insurgents launched another attack against Zuerat in Mauritania. The town was defended by a garrison of nearly 1,000 men as well as a 60 km barrier of 3 to 5 m deep ditches reinforced with barbed wire.

There were nearly 250 French miners (among them military advisers), employees of SNIM (Societé Nationale Industrielle et Minière) and their families in the town. Although the expert responsible for their safety, Jean-Charles Eudeline had repeatedly recommended evacuation of the families his recommendations had been overruled. The guerrillas opened their attack at 05:00 hours with a coordinated mortar barrage. The attack lasted about four hours, during which the power station, the fuel tanks and the mining equipment were so heavily damaged, that production had to be suspended for a while. During the battle two French experts were killed, and six others were taken prisoner by the attackers. After this most French personnel and their dependents (altogether 449 persons) were evacuated to France.[88]

The suspension of production caused serious damage to the Mauritanian economy. At that time Mauritania was able to handle its problems stemming from the situation in Western Sahara only through military assistance from Morocco (as a result of the 13th May 1977 military agreement some 10,000 well-trained and equipped Moroccan soldiers were stationed in Mauritanian territory),

and financial assistance from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.\footnote{89}

In spite of the freshly arrived Moroccan troops, Polisario units launched another attack against Nouakchott then after the successful operation they withdrew without losses.

The attacks generated protests from France. French Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis de Guiringaud accused Algeria of organising the attacks, and demanded the release of Frenchmen taken prisoner. The Algerian leadership rejected the French accusation in an official communiqué.

France then sent a 200-men military unit to secure the capital, and from the end of November strengthened the defence of the larger Mauritanian population centres with Jaguar strike aircraft from Dakar airbase (Operation Lamantin).\footnote{90}

The Mauritanian situation worried France because the country was a former French colony and belonged in their military and economic spheres of interest. Mauritania had emphasised separation from France after gaining independence (introduction of its own currency, Ouguiya, and nationalization of the iron-ore mines), yet a thousand ties linked it to the former colonial power. When even the capital came under Polisario attack, the frightened President turned to the French leadership and requested their urgent assistance. A new military assistance and cooperation agreement was soon signed, and France sent fifteen military instructors to the Atar military academy, to assist in training Mauritanian officers.

However, these steps only encouraged the guerrillas, who took two more French mining experts prisoner.

Then French president Giscard d’Estaing immediately created a crisis team in the presidential palace in order to solve the situation as soon as possible.

The crisis team included Minister of Defence Yvon Bourges, Minister for Cooperation between the Armed Services Robert Galley, Chief of Staff of the French army General Guy Méry, and the president's representative Louis de Guiringaud. Calling on experts of the army and the intelligence services, the crisis team begun to develop possible plans in the rooms of the headquarters beneath the Elysée palace (COA-Centre Operationnel des Armées).

\footnote{90} Tony Hodges: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p. 151-152.
Due to the high risk factor and difficulties in locating the French hostages, the Chief of Staff rejected the possibility of a commando-style rescue operation. After a short debate his opinion was accepted by the other participants. General Méry then recommended negotiations to free the hostages, and at the same time deploying forces in Mauritania to defend French interests. The participants accepted the general's plan and immediately started to execute it.[91]

Some of the French supersonic combat aircraft stationed at Ouakkam airbase in Senegal were placed on alert, since they could reach Nouakchott's airspace in less than 50 minutes. The unit of 1,300 French soldiers deployed at the airbase was reinforced by a further 300 troops. During the night of 1st November a force composed of rapid response units under the command of General Michael Forget landed at the base in Senegal, then a few days later the General and 60 of his specially trained soldiers redeployed to Atar, in Mauritanian territory.

Command of the Ouakkam base was taken over by Colonel Huret, who was also responsible for the logistic support for Operation Lamantin. On his arrival Forget immediately begun to develop communications routes between Ouakkam and the Mauritanian bases. Meanwhile Breguet-Atlantic aircraft of the French Navy carried out reconnaissance patrols over Mauritania. Although these aircraft had originally been used for detecting submarines, they and their trained crews constituted an important element of the Operation. In addition, the French also used long-range Mirage 4 reconnaissance aircraft to map and photograph less well known regions. In accordance with the request of the Oaukkam airbase, the aircraft were launched from Bordeaux, France.

The purpose of the reconnaissance flights was to locate the Polisario units and observe their movements, then inform the Mauritanian military and gendarme units preparing for a counterattack, as well as the French strike aircraft. In order to support the operation, the Moroccans sent a further 600 troops to areas occupied by Mauritania, where soon there were 1,200 Moroccan soldiers, and further units were arriving from Morocco. In January 1978 there were 2,400 soldiers stationed in the area of Zouerat-Nouadhibou, 600 at the Akjouj iron-ore mines, and a further 2,800 men in Tiris el-Gharbia. The Moroccan Air Force deployed three F-5 fighter-bomber aircraft to Nouadhibou airfield, in order to participate in combined operations.[92]

It seemed unlikely that Polisario would challenge such a powerful force, therefore the Mauritanian leadership restarted rail traffic on the Nouadhibou-Zouerat line, which had already been shut down for a month.

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However, the Saharawians attacked the first freight train and took the French engineer prisoner, along with the train's Mauritanian military escort.

The French were incensed, and on 25th November they transferred a further four Jaguar combat aircraft from their base in Toul to Mauritania, in order to participate in the counterattack against Polisario. This type of combat aircraft was far more modern than the Northrop F-5 used by the Moroccans. The French army commissioned these long-range aircraft in 1971. Each was equipped with two 30 mm cannons and an anti-aircraft missile jammer system. At that time the French had six Jaguars, two KC-135 F, two Breguet-Atlantic and four Noratlas aircraft at Ouakkam airbase.

The Jaguars were first used on 2nd December against guerrillas attacking the rail line near Boulanour, then on 12th December in the vicinity of Zouerat.\(^{[93]}\) As a result of the air strikes Polisario offered to release the French prisoners taken in Mauritania, but the French forces continued their attacks. Polisario commenced talks with then UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim then on 23rd December released the French prisoners without any conditions.\(^{[94]}\)

The French leadership would have liked to continue the operation, but due to the press-campaign of the SADR and the protests of several human rights organisations they finally instructed the General Staff to withdraw the French forces. After this, although they continued to aid the Mauritanian government, France took no active part in operations against Polisario.\(^{[95]}\)

The guerrillas, no longer threatened by French air strikes, immediately renewed their attacks against Mauritanian targets (rail lines, mines, etc). By that time Mauritania was facing serious economic and internal political problems, and these attacks hastened the country's withdrawal soon from the West-Sahara conflict.\(^{[96]}\)

\(^{94}\) Tony Hodges: The Roots of a Desert War. p. 254-255.
\(^{95}\) David J. Dean: The Air Force Role in Low-intensity Conflict. p. 43.
\(^{96}\) C. R. Pennel Morocco since 1830 a history p. 342
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INFORMATION IN THE POLICE COMPONENT OF KOSOVO CRISIS MANAGEMENT
OPERATION EULEX[97]

The author is a police officer, an EULEX advisor, with significant experience in international peacekeeping mission.

Information society is intensive knowledge-based economy based on highly developed science, high technology, and information technology. This cannot be divided from globalisation which has its achievements and is driven by both information revolution and global communication. At the same time “… Developed technology and information technology are useful not only in production as they also foster the efficiency of international organised crime and terrorism…”[98]. In general it can be stated that the illegal proliferation of previously tightly controlled weapons of mass destruction can be expected; that of the so called dirty bombs[99]; the international trade in illegal drugs, arms, explosive materials, and human trafficking are growing; the influence of organised criminal circles is increasing; cyber crime threatens the operation of internet, banks, strategic and national defence institutions, and other state organs.

Apart from conventional terrorist groups new-generation extremist religious organisations were established which committed grave terrorist acts. Asymmetric warfare is gaining ground thus combating terrorism generates comprehensive challenges at international level. Various types of environmental damage, lack of water, famine, poverty, limited resources of conventional energy, illegal migration, war crimes, crime against mankind, religious, ethnic, racial conflicts, or territorial disputes comprise another set of general problems. The establishment of information society may not be very popular but it is reasonable to treat and accept it as an objective and historically inevitable social

[97] EULEX=European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, conducting its mission in Kosovo under the guidance of Brussels but on the basis of UNSC Resolution 1244.
[99] It is a bomb with a conventional explosive charge emitting radioactive material in the atmosphere when exploded.
process. It has huge potentials while missing the chance to exploit it may cause tremendous losses.

The new situation in Europe and its neighbouring regions and the Balkans conflicts necessitated the establishment of an independent common foreign and security policy by the European Union. This move resulted in civil crisis management which highlights creation of parallel capacities in the field of law enforcement agencies, reinforcement of state of law, support to public administration, and civil protection. The crisis management missions meet the current challenges to the region in the field of foreign and security policies in the front line. The relevant decision makers need analysed intelligence providing reliable basis for efficient measures. The level of efficiency promotes the stabilisation of the crisis-stricken regions; moreover, it allows taking preventive measures aimed at the protection of EU Member States.

The present article aims at presenting opportunities in the field of gathering analysed intelligence which assists the daily work of decision makers in a crisis-stricken environment with the participation of international players supporting the activities of local law enforcement agencies. “… The process of information gathering cycle consists of repeating phases with defined content and order. These are the following: outlining the users’ requests, tasking, information gathering, information processing (analysis, evaluation); reporting, dissemination, feedback …”\(^{100}\) The second most important task following the information gathering is analysis and evaluation. “… The objective of analysis and evaluation is to provide decision makers with intelligence of the proper quantity, format and time appropriate for their needs and the decision making process…”\(^{101}\) In an international environment the notion of intelligence has a more comprehensive interpretation including the collection of data, reports, analyses, forecasts, prognoses, information gathering, intelligence\(^{102}\), and also OSINT\(^{103}\). The cyber space is globalised, however, this analysis does not include customs, justice, or military authorities, although there cannot be proper cooperation without the involvement of the above mentioned players. In late 2008 the EULEX mission\(^{104}\) was launched at its full operational capacity, with


\(^{102}\) Civil and military secret services, law enforcement intelligence.

\(^{103}\) OSINT = Open source intelligence collected from media, internet, scientific publications, study papers, and other intelligence which cannot substitute covert information gathering.

\(^{104}\) Besides observer mandate the mission also conducts executive tasks. Besides the police component its structure also includes customs and justice pillars.
primarily observer and advisor roles following the UN presence and also providing support to the local law enforcement agencies trained by the OSCE\textsuperscript{[105]}

Today the Kosovo Police Forces is not an auxiliary institution with limited scope of action but a state authority with full-fledged responsibilities. The launch of the nearly 3,200-strong EULEX\textsuperscript{[106]} civil crisis management mission was preceded by a two-year-long preliminary planning activity by the EUPT Kosovo\textsuperscript{[107]}. Although the UNMIK\textsuperscript{[108]} was present in Kosovo from 1999 to 2008 and had an executive mandate the tasks and philosophies of the two organisations stemming from their different mandates were also different. The structure of the operation and the personnel were tailored to the mission and tasks. The system is still permanent although the structure and manning of certain subsystems may change. No doubt that the information is forwarded to the appropriate level of decision making by the current structure. The main issue is whether all information gets to the mainstream flow of information and if so whether there is some which does not get through the analysis-evaluation phase. After the preparation of the previously approved structure diagram there is no information on the preparation of a study examining the character, success, or efficiency of the flow of information in advance. This should be done for quality control reasons as well. It is not certain either if that would have appeared as a requirement in the preparation and planning phases.

On the basis of the above points the question comes up what approach the EU and the relevant special committee of the preparatory and planning group delegated to the field had. Were they satisfied with the nature of information network built on the personnel planned by them? It can be presumed that there has not been a comprehensive approach which would deeply analyse the operation and efficiency of the flow of information. In order to eliminate this problem a control mechanism should be integrated which has a strong and critical approach during its operation; is able to identify the direction of the flow of information and to locate its junctions; to map units sending information, the origins of classified information, the subunits receiving and collecting information; identify the organs in the preparation of decision making. Moreover, it should examine whether all analysed and evaluated intelligence arrives to the decision makers, whether there is any unwanted redundancy or rivalry; whether there is a bottleneck in the system slowing down or impeding

\textsuperscript{[105]} Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
\textsuperscript{[106]} The Strengthening Department, headed by Colonel Imre Pallagi, is the most important organ of the police component.
\textsuperscript{[107]} EUPT Kosovo=European Union Planning Team in Kosovo. Its task was to ensure and plan the transition between the UN and the EULEX.
\textsuperscript{[108]} UNMIK = United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, operated on the basis of UNSC Resolution 1244.
the flow of information; what remains within the system and what data should be brought in from outside.

Having outlined the global growth in the need for information, new security policy challenges, and the preliminary steps of the deployment of the EULEX mission the fundamentals of information flow of the local and international personnel-chart should be mentioned. The local law enforcement agencies go through frequent reorganisations. The structural changes include the change of leadership too. This often leads to the change of previously approved strategies, which may have its temporary impact on the speed on the flow of information and may result in a slowdown. This is due to the fact that as a young nation and a new state an above mentioned authority with a full scope of responsibilities tries to identify itself and present new and different ideas. Beyond the changes, however, there are fundamental elements in the structure where information is generated. On territorial basis these are the precinct, district/town, county, national HQ, national institutions, while on structural basis\[109\] these are criminal, public safety/security, criminal intelligence, analysis and evaluation unit, and, finally, international relations. The Criminal Records Office should also be mentioned here.

1. All registered crime categories and activities appear at the criminal service before overt investigations. A wide range of tools are at hand for criminal investigation resulting in a large quantity of information. While only a fraction of intelligence from covert information gathering gets to overt investigation all data provided by the latter activity serves the successful accomplishment of attorney or court process.

2. Public security, protection of public order. It manifests “visible police”. Patrol, duty officer, police constable, receptionist, section leader. They maintain a daily connection with citizens and in the case of their acceptance both the formal and informal support of the parties is higher.

3. Criminal intelligence\[110\]. Although the tools, forces, and methodology of covert information gathering are used by criminal agencies today they are primarily used by agencies specialised in criminal intelligence. The intelligence from here is more complex and sophisticated which is of extreme significance. In the chain of command it may be forwarded to civil and military secret services or other national and international law enforcement agencies.

\[109\] The list of the structural separation is incomplete because information is not generated everywhere.

\[110\] For example, as an independent body or a body integrated into other units such as services against organised crime or drug trafficking.
4. Analysis and evaluation unit. In the cycle of information gathering the analysis and evaluation process has a significant role. Such types of information get into a database with a more limited access. Its integration into the structure is recommended and not only at criminal investigation units but at a national level too.

5. International relations. The organisation serves as a link between foreign law enforcement agencies. The precondition of such cooperation is rapid reaction, bilateral cooperation, and mutual trust. Accession to international, European, etc. law enforcement agencies is recommended which includes the opening of national offices with 24/7 accessibility. The maintenance of informal relations is particularly significant and recommended.

Obtained information should be archived, which means constant administrative duties to the police officer in command. It is common knowledge that not everybody is capable of producing accurate reports containing all the details while meeting the deadline. The occasional non-arrival of a report, a delay or deficiency damages the system thus weakening the quality of the information gathering cycle. Without an aim at completeness let us enumerate a few types of reports and information storage forms deriving from the activities of a different kind, the production of which is accompanied by administrative duties. These are daily reports, weekly reports, monthly reports, quarterly, biannual and annual reports; immediate reports on major crimes and serious incidents. Worthwhile information can also be found in reports on conferences and reports concerning certain issues; in the contents of official communication; in summarizing, evaluating and investigative reports; in the response of an adviser to the superior’s daily actions; and in statistics based questionnaire. There are types of reports made for decision-makers exclusively, nominally “alert, change tracking and crisis indicating daily report, thematic report, evaluating report, analyzing report, prognosis, research report, background report and founding report...”[111]. The creation, processing and transmission of information during civil crisis management operations can be outlined through the following means. In another interpretation, which is the point and what the environment is where breaching imposed regulations would deprive decision-makers from properly analyzed information? They are employees of local law enforcement agencies and international advisers.

In civil crisis management delivering evaluated information to leaders of various levels is not the only challenge, but it has also become a major criterion whether the quality of information creation techniques is sufficient at the level

of employees, whether the flow of information functions properly, whether everybody fulfills their administrative duties and whether everyone is familiar with the current reporting protocols. Furthermore, whether everyone fully exploits the possibilities of information gathering, whether all the brochures and relevant information reach the next level, whether there is a unified concept of creating quantity and quality information, whether there is rivalry, whether there is unjustified retention of information, or unnecessary redundancies. Apart from this, a certain amount of information loss must be taken into account which does not even get in or get across the system before processing; and there is also likelihood of some leakage of a certain amount of information due to local civil employees. It would be reasonable to establish an information management unit for the maintenance of efficient information support, which would be in the subordination of the current Commander of the police component in the EU civil crisis management and where both deputy leaders and director generals would have access clearance. The unit would not have sphere of authority in the field of decision-making; its sole task would be evaluation and analysis. Without an aim at completeness the following information would appear in the unit’s system: the ESDP\textsuperscript{112}, UN, NATO/KFOR\textsuperscript{113}, OSCE, materials issued by components of justice and customs\textsuperscript{114}, materials created at and by the local police and the EULEX police component whose source has already been discussed above. Apart from the establishment of an information-management unit increasing the number of deployed intelligence\textsuperscript{115} and liaison officers should also be taken into consideration.

Conclusion

Since the 1960s researchers have been analyzing the theoretical issues of information society worldwide. Later it became part of the gradually shaping globalization. Despite the existence of the global digital gap, the appearance and upsurge of information society – as the new phase in the development of human society – cannot be ignored. The cyber space is globalized in spite of the lack of an established technological background in some places. After the Cold War the number of peacekeeping missions as well as the number and geographical range of civil crisis management operations significantly increased. Following the deployment of military and civil peacekeeping forces of international and regional organizations the EU also launched its civil crisis management operation which, apart from stabilizing the region, aims at protecting the Member States.

\footnote{112} ESPD = European Security and Defence Policy
\footnote{113} NATO Kosovo Force. NATO-led international peacekeeping force
\footnote{114} The organizational structure is not identical in every operation
\footnote{115} In case of monitoring-adviser mandate it is a rather open sort of activity
The police leadership of an operation deployed in a crisis region needs analyzed and evaluated information to prevent new types of security and defence policy challenges and for intelligence purposes. It is fairly reasonable to gain information not only from own homogeneous organization or the local law enforcement agencies but from other players also present in the field. In accordance with the mandate most of the information is provided by local police, which is the basis of the reports produced by advisers. This can only be maintained if the connection is permanent; all administrative duties are fulfilled despite of the routine and monotonous nature of the procedure.

Creating, analyzing and forwarding information to the competent decision-maker is not enough, as the aim should also be to collect it as accurately as possible in a multi-player environment. Therefore it is reasonable to observe the structural diagram as early as the planning phase of civil crisis managements and to make a suggestion on ensuring the optimal information flow. In case it is not realized it is worthwhile to do it later on and review it periodically. The establishment of an information processing unit should be taken into consideration which does not own a sphere of authority in the field of decision making and is in direct subordination of the police leadership. All significant information would be stored and processed here which would provide further support to the preparation of decisions.

Imre Dobák PhD aspirant

AN OVERVIEW OF RISKS TO THE ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY OF THE CARPATHIAN EUROREGION IN UKRAINE

The recent geopolitical changes, namely, the NATO and European Union (EU) enlargement, have profoundly modified the geopolitical situation in the Central Eastern European region. The rise of new threats of non-military in nature, have also accompanied these changes, thus linking environmental and security concerns.

Because of the EU expansion, Ukraine has become a neighboring country to the EU, making it worthwhile to examine its environmental security problems. The western Ukrainian territories, which are near the EU, are of
particular concern. These Ukrainian administrative regions – the Ivano-
Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lviv, and Transcarpathian oblasts – are part of the
“Carpathian Euroregion”\[^{116}\], which is a transfrontier association spanning across
the border of five neighboring countries.

This brief essay tries to indicate the importance of the relationship
between environmental and security problems in the Carpathian Euroregion
(CE), focusing on the environmental threats and dangers. In examining the
different security threats (e.g. smuggling, drug trafficking, arms trafficking,
terrorism) it becomes apparent that there is a real threat to the environment in
these regions.

There are many definitions of “environmental security” in various studies,
but accepted the definition of Millennium Project\[^{117}\], the environmental security
is:

- …the relative safety from environmental dangers that are caused by
  natural or human processes due to ignorance, accident, mismanagement or design, originating within or across national
  borders.
- …the state of human-environment dynamics that includes
  restoration of the environment damaged by military actions,
  amelioration of resource scarcities, environmental degradation, and
  biological threats that could lead to social disorder and conflict.

Sources of environmental dangers exist “within” a country and
“transborder”. The causes range from “natural” to man-made (“human” type),
and are brought about by military, industrial, agricultural, terrorist, and societal
activity, or by natural disasters.

**Background**

In 1991, after the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine became independent. Being sandwiched between the European Union and Russia, Ukraine has a

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\[^{116}\] The Euroregion was established in 1993. It is located in the neighbouring areas of
Poland, Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. The member areas: Poland (Krosno,
Przemysl, Rzeszow and Tarnow voivodships), Slovakia (Kosice and Presov regions),
Hungary (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Hajdú-Bihar, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Heves, and
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok counties), Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lviv,
Transcarpathian oblast), Romania (Satu Mare, Maramures, Bihor, Suceava, Zilah, Botosani
counties).

\[^{117}\] Environmental Security Study - Emerging International Definitions, Perceptions, and
org/millennium/es-exsum.html - (The Millennium Project is an independent,
non-governmental organization, functions under the auspices of the World Federation of UN
Associations (WFUNA).
special location between the East and West. Its population is more than 48 million people, and its territory is 603,700 square kilometers\[118\]. The perimeter of Ukraine’s border is 6993.63 km, sharing 1391.39 km (19.9%) with EU states (Hungary – 136.7 km, Romania – 613.8 km, Republic of Slovakia – 98.5 km, Republic of Poland – 542.39 km).

The particular areas of interest in the Carpathian Euroregion (area 51,600 km\(^2\), and the population 6,362 million\[119\]) are the Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lviv, and the Transcarpathian regions. This part of the country is at the intersection of the north-south and east-west transit economic routes.

The territory of the Euroregion spreads through the Carpathian Mountains, and is divided among Ukraine and neighboring Romania, Poland, and Slovakia. Approximately half of Ukraine’s CE region is mountainous (24,000 km\(^2\)), while the other half is plains. The Ukrainian Carpathians are covered predominately by forests and grasslands, and rich in flora and fauna. There are almost “1,500 protected territories” (e.g. nature preserves, biosphere preserves, natural parks, regional landscape parks, dendrological parks, botanic gardens, etc.)\[121\]. Because of the Carpathians, the proportion of area categorized as forest in the CE is high (more than the average in Ukraine, which is 17.3% of the total land area).

Ukraine has good trade connections with its Eastern and Western neighbours. Its primary industries manufacture heavy machinery, chemicals, and timber. The country and the Euroregion territory are rich in different natural resources. There are many mineral deposits in the CE territory [e.g. sulfur in the

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\[1\] source: http://www.envsec.org/easteur/docs/ENG_UKRAINE%20envsec.pdf


\[10\] http://www.franko.lviv.ua/rasd/en/nature/nature.htm
Yavoriv area, potassium salt in the Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts (Stebnykiv, Dobrogostivsk, Boryslav, Kalush-Golyn, Trostyanets, Turo-Velytsk), table salt in Precarpathia and Transcarpathia (Drogobych, Kalush, Dolyna, Solotvyne), zeolite tufa deposits in Transcarpathia[122].

The area of CE in Ukraine is a transit route for the major east-west gas pipelines, which pass through Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, and for the oil pipeline towards Slovakia. The oil and gas fields are situated in the center of the above-mentioned four oblasts. Refineries and processing plants were installed in the Precarpathian region. The major oil fields are located in Dolyna, Boryslav, and Bytkiv. Larger gas fields can be found, for example, in Dashava, Kalush, Bilche-Volytsk, and Ugorsk.

Besides Chernobyl the Khmelnitsky and Rivne operating nuclear power plants must also be mentioned, which are relatively close to Ukraine’s Euroregional territory.

In summary, according to a study of Environmental and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), this part of Ukraine – where is located the West-Ukrainian industrial area and the Carpathian Mountains are located as well – is one of the environment and security priority areas in Eastern Europe.

**Environment and Security**

At the beginning of the last decade, the countries in the Central Eastern European region coped with many environmental problems. Most of them occurred during the communist period. Steps were taken in order to solve the problems, but even now the western part of Ukraine has been the scene of many security problems.

The issue of the environmental security of the CE has been at the top of the agenda for cross-border cooperation. In recent years, this diversified territory of Ukraine was the subject of much research concerning the environment and “sustainable development.” There are also studies and publications about these environmental problems, protecting the environment, and strategic regional development.

Obviously, the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant was Ukraine’s biggest environmental disaster, which has created an unprecedented situation in the region. However, this study will only focus on the western, EU-

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neighboring sections. This western region also has environmental risks of its own caused by

- the military,
- hazardous waste disposal,
- industrial air contamination,
- water pollutants,
- floods, mudflows, landslides, illegal logging, etc.

**Man-made Environmental Pollution and Natural Disasters**

In 1991, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited outdated technology and an obsolete industrial infrastructure. Today the situation has improved, but many environmental problems still exist in the country. Certain industries continuously pollute the water and air, but the western parts of Ukraine are not the hot-spots of industrial pollution. The main industrial zones, located mostly in the eastern part of the country, have high levels of environmental pollution (Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhya, Lugansk, Odessa, etc.).

Currently, the main sources of **air pollution** are coal-burning, metallurgy, mining, chemical production, and energy, but transportation vehicles (car, train, air transport, etc.) also create detrimental emissions to air. Nevertheless, the energy sector is predominately responsible for the air pollution: “Ukraine's power sector is the twelfth-largest in the world in terms of installed capacity” [123].

The air quality in western cities, such as Uzhhorod and Khmelnytsky, is better than in the eastern territory of the country. According to a relevant article [124] in the Transcarpathian Oblast the amount of industrial emissions in 2007 decreased by 10 % compared to the previous year (in 2006 - 25,6 and in 2007 - 23 thousand tons). In 2007, the air in Chernivtsi was reportedly the cleanest in Ukraine.

The media often reports of industrial accidents and the pollution of rivers. In recent years, media has had much to say about the polluted Tisa river. The river’s contaminations are caused by two main types: on-going sources of pollution, and industrial accidents that cause ecological catastrophes. The


sources of the on-going contaminations are factories near the river, or chemical fertilizers.

Taking everything into account, the Carpathian rivers (e.g. Tisza, Laborec) often suffer from industrial contamination. There are many examples of recent transboundary chemical pollution (water and air), which are caused by industrial facilities from neighboring countries.

“…since 2000, there have been several accidental discharges of cyanide and heavy metals in Romania that eventually reached Ukraine and Hungary via the Tisza river. The worst of such spills occurred in 2000 at Baia Borsa and Baia Mara, Romania. These accidents highlight the dangers inherent in gold mining technologies…to pose significant environmental risks…”[125]

The location of gas and oil pipelines in Ukraine poses environmental risks as well. These pipelines (e.g. Brotherhood, Druzhba) that transport the oil or gas through the region into Europe have been operating for 20-30 years. Seven oil and gas pipelines pass through the Transcarpathian Oblast, and it has experienced environmental contamination. In 2003, the Druzhba oil pipeline spilled 110 tons of oil into the Latorca River at the Vereckei Pass[126].

Concerning the heritage of the Soviet Union, it’s worth noting the former military facilities, which affect environment on the area of CE in Ukraine. Different military facilities and depots (ammunition depots, airstrips, and former missiles sites) are located in the Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Transcarpathian oblasts.

The rocket fuel component, melange, of which the Soviet Army left large stocks in Ukraine, generates permanent environmental risks. According to the website of the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), 16,764 tons of melange is stored in eight depots in Ukraine[127], and two are located in the western part of the country. Also, Ukraine inherited a huge nuclear weapon arsenal from the Soviet Union, but moved its nuclear weapons to Russia.

In the beginning of the decade, hazardous waste was illegally imported into Ukraine. Most of the imports came from Central and Eastern European countries. Now it is a serious problem in the affected regions (e.g. in the Lviv and Transcarpathian oblasts), where “the waste is being dumped or stored in and around several villages and railway yards.”

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According to a study by ENVSEC, in the four Carpathian oblasts there are about 540 tons of pesticides stored close to the transboundary watercourses, which comprises about 2.5% of Ukraine’s water resources.

“…During 1999-2005, according to a contract with the Hungarian company “ELTEX,” a private company imported industrial waste from Hungary. This waste was mentioned in the contract as raw material for the rubber industry. In total, more than four thousand tons were imported and stored near a village in the Zakarpatska Oblast….“ [128]. The problem of the industrial additive “premix” dumped near the border has been unsolved for years. This material was transported from Hungary years ago, yet even now its elimination has not been arranged.

Excluding environmental risks posed by humans, flooding is likely the main transborder environmental risk in this region. Heavy rainfall and melting snow often cause floods in the Transcarpathian Oblast, where there are more than nine thousand rivers and creeks. The largest rivers are the Tisa (233 km in Zakarpatya), Latorca (156 km), Ung (113 km), and Borsava (112 km) rivers[129]. There were well-remembered floods in 1998, and later in 2006, but this natural catastrophe occurs almost every year. Besides endangering people’s lives and generating economic losses, floods effect soil erosion and even chemical pollution of the water when industrial sites are affected.

The volume of logging has increased year by year (from about 11.4 million m³ in 1997 to 15.2 million m³ in 2005[130]). Due to deforestation, not extraordinary are the landslides, and mud-flows (e.g. in the beginning of 2008, in the western part of the Zakarpattya Oblast, 500 m³ slid into the road[131]).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Disasters and Environmental accidents in the region (Some examples)</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Flooding in western Ukraine (Transcarpathian oblast)</td>
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[129] data source: Szuhányi György - Kárpátalja víztartalékának jellemzése, Debreceni Egyetem Agrártudományi Centrum, Mezőgazdaságtudományi Kar,
[131] Földcsuszamlásokat okozott az eső - 2008-03-03 - Kárpátinfo.net
(November 1998), when the flood has destroyed many homes (32,833 people suffered from the flood, 1,316 homes are destroyed completely, etc. [132]

- Flooding – Tisa – in Transcarpathian region (Febr. 1999), or because of rains in Romanian and Ukrainian highlands (Carpathian Mountains) (May 2000)[133]

- Flooding in the Tisa River Basin in the Transcarpathia oblast (9-11 March 2001) (9 people had died, 11,579 people were evacuated, 942 buildings had been completely destroyed, 3 bridges completely destroyed etc.)

- „A cargo train, en route to Poland from Kazakhstan, derailed near Lviv, releasing gas from six tanks and generating fire” – 2007 [134].

- Approximately 5 tonnes ammonia liquor flow away in Znyacevo (Munkacevo district) – 2008 [135]

- “...until 2001, eleven tons of pesticides were stored in the village of Sianky in the Lviv Oblast…. In 2001, the pesticides were repackaged in concrete containers, but this has not prevented further leaks.”[136]

**Conclusion**

The aim of this short essay was not to review the environmental problems in full. It was only to show some aspects of the environmental security from a regional viewpoint, and the regional “frame” of this essay was the western territory of the EU’s new neighborhood.

The Ukrainian part of the five-nation Euroregion has some aspects concerning environmental security:

[133] http://www.dartmouth.edu/~floods/
[135] Balogh Csaba - Ammóniumfelhő Ignéc felett - 2008-02-03 - Kárpátinfo.net
• Transit economic routes, gas and oil pipelines, etc.
• The Carpathian Mountains, with its untouched and well preserved ecological systems.
• Ukraine’s inherited “Soviet-type” industry, with high-level emissions of pollutants.
• There were many soviet military facilities in this region.
• Geographically it’s close to the location of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

**Accident**

• Recent exportation of hazardous materials from the new EU member countries to the western part of Ukraine.
• The crossborder environmental dangers (e.g. floods) concerning the European Union.

Our neighbor, Ukraine, faces the same environmental problems as other parts of Central and Eastern European countries. The natural disasters and other environmental problems do not stop at the administrative borders of the countries. Therefore, the cooperation of the neighboring countries in this region is extremely important.

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HAWALA
THE INFORMAL VALUE TRANSFER SYSTEM

What is hawala?

Informal funds transfer (IFT) systems are in use in many regions for transferring funds, both domestically and internationally. The hawala system is one of the IFT systems that exist under different names in various regions of the world. Hawala is a traditional and alternative Asian Remittance System in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and the Horn of Africa. Known as hawala in India, hundi in Pakistan, fei qian in China, padala in Philippines, hui kuan in Hong Kong, and phei kwan in Thailand.

The FATF\[137\]( Financial Action Task Force) uses the following definition:

„Alternative remittance systems cover any system used for transferring money from one location to another and generally operating outside the banking channels. The services encompassed by this broad definition range from those managed by large multinational companies to small local networks. They can be of a legal or illegal nature and make use of a variety of methods and tools to transfer the money”.\[138\]

Origins of the word of hawala and hundi

The words hawala and hundi are both used, interchangeably and correctly. There is only one system, the usage “the hawala and hundi system“is incorrect. The correct usage is “hawala or hundi system”.

The word comes from the Arabic root h-w-l, which has the basic meaning “change” and “transform”. The word of hawala is defined as a bill of exchange or a promissory note. When the word came into Hindi and Urdu languages it

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\[137\] The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF is therefore a 'policy-making body' that works to generate the necessary political will to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas.

The word hundi comes from the Sanskriti root meaning “collect”. In addition to this, it also has the same meanings as hawala. The hundi operator is the *hundiwala*.

Both terms are used.

**The history of hawala**

Hawala is an ancient system originating in South Asia. Its origins in the classical Islamic law (Sharia) and is mentioned in texts of Islamic jurisprudence in early 8th century. Hawala itself later influenced the development of the operation in civil law.

Hawala is believed to have arisen in the financing of long-distance trade around the emerging capital trade centres in the early medieval period.

In early 20th century the hawala appears to have developed into a fully-fledged money market instrument, which was only gradually replaced by the instruments of the formal banking system. Today, hawala and “traditional” banking exist as parallel, but intertwined economic systems in India and Pakistan.

**How does the system work?**

Hawala systems involve the transfer of the value of currency without physically moving it. In fact “money transfer without money movement” is a definition of hawala that was used, successfully, in a hawala money laundering case.

An effective way to understand hawala is by examining a single hawala transfer:

“An initial transaction can be a remittance from a customer (CA) from country A, or a payment arising from some prior obligation, to another customer (CB) in country B. A hawaladar from country A (HA) receives funds in one currency from CA and, in return, gives CA a code for authentication purposes. He then instructs his country B correspondent (HB) to deliver an equivalent amount in the local currency to a designated beneficiary (CB), who needs to disclose the code to receive the funds. HA can be remunerated by charging a fee
or through an exchange rate spread. After the remittance, HA has a liability to HB, and the settlement of their positions is made by various means, either financial or goods and services. Their positions can also be transferred to other intermediaries, who can assume and consolidate the initial positions and settle at wholesale or multilateral levels.

The settlement of the liability position of HA vis-à-vis HB that was created by the initial transaction can be done through imports of goods or "reverse hawala." A reverse hawala transaction is often used for investment purposes or to cover travel, medical, or education expenses from a developing country. In a country subject to foreign exchange and capital controls, a customer (XB) interested in transferring funds abroad, in this case, university tuition fees, provides local currency to HB and requests that the equivalent amount be made available to the customer's son (XA) in another country (A). Customers are not aware if the transaction they initiate is a hawala or a reverse hawala transaction. HB may use HA directly if funds are needed by XB in country A or indirectly by asking him to use another correspondent in another country, where funds are expected to be delivered. A reverse hawala transaction does not necessarily imply that the settlement transaction has to involve the same hawaladars; it could involve other hawaladars and be tied to a different transaction. Therefore, it can be simple or complex. Furthermore, the settlement can also take place through import transactions. For instance, HA would settle his debt by financing exports to country B, where HB could be the importer or an intermediary.”[139]

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[139] EL-QORCHI, Mohammed: Hawala
Why does hawala work?

Hawala „works” because of its cost effectiveness. The secondary consideration is that there is often related or even integral to existing business dealings.

One reason for hawala’s cost effectiveness is low overhead. The second reason is exchange rate speculation. In addition, since many hawaladars are involved in businesses where money transfers are necessary, providing remittance services fits well into these businesses’ existing activities. Monies from remittances and business transfers are processed through the same bank accounts, and few, if any, additional operational costs are incurred by a business that offers hawala remittance services.

Finally, one of the most important movement is trust. Hawala dealers are almost always honest in their dealings with clients and fellow hawaladars. Breaches of confidence are very rare. It can be note that one of the most important meanings attached to this word hawala is “trust”.

There is an array of advantages for users: [141]

- The system is cost effective. Hawala brokers take a small commission and usually practice more advantageous exchange rates than the official rates. Hawala operators low overheads, and generate profit through small commissions and exchange rate speculations.
- The system is safe. In countries plagued by political insecurity such as Afghanistan, it is one of the most convenient, safe, reliable and inexpensive ways to move funds within the country.
- The system is efficient. A Hawala remittance transaction takes place within one or two days.
- The system is reliable. The system is based on trust and there are no reported instances of customers being cheated in the literature. A breach of trust would keep the customers away.
- The system is flexible and not bureaucratic. The informal nature of the transactions makes them very attractive to users with tax, immigration or other legal concerns. For example, illegal migrants do not have

adequate identification and couldn’t use the formal banking system to send money home.

- The system is anonymous. It facilitates transfer of money without records or documentation.

- The system doesn’t leave a paper trail. As it is rare that Hawala brokers keep records after the transaction is completed, it is unlikely that the transaction will be identified or detected.

- The system is culture friendly. For migrant workers, ethnic or kinship ties with the Hawala brokers make this system particularly convenient and easy to use.

Is hawala legal?

All authors consulted agree on the advantages of using hawala both for legal and illegal purposes. Hawala is attractive to customers as it provides a fast, safe and convenient way to transfer funds, usually with a far lower commission than that charged by the banks. In countries where there are strict regulations governing domestic and international money transfers, Hawala can be driven by capital flight motivations, by customers concerned with internal security and stability using alternative remittance systems to place money abroad, or pay for education or medical treatment.

Hawala has been made illegal in some U.S. states and some other countries but there is a legal and effective system in many countries across the world (UAE, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India etc.)

In South Asia the situation is more complicated. Hawala is traditionally associated with South Asia and the Middle East. Its primary users are members of the expatriate populations from the Indian sub continent, East Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe who migrated to Northern America, Europe and the Persian Gulf region and send remittances to their family who remained in their country of origin.

These migrant labours have reinvigorated the system's role and importance. While hawala is used for the legitimate transfer of funds, its anonymity and minimal documentation have also made it vulnerable to abuse by individuals and groups transferring funds to finance illegal activities.

Economic and cultural factors

[142] EL-QORCHI, Mohammed: Hawala
As we declared before hawala is less expensive, swifter, more reliable, more convenient, and less bureaucratic than the formal financial sector. Hawaldars charge fees or sometimes use the exchange rate spread to generate income. The fees charged by hawaladars on the transfer of funds are lower than those charged by banks and other remitting companies, thanks mainly to minimal overhead expenses and the absence of regulatory costs to the hawaladars, who often operate other small businesses.

The structure is swifter than formal financial transfer systems partly because of the lack of administration and the simplicity of its operating method; instructions are given to correspondents by phone, facsimile, or e-mail; and funds are often delivered door to door within 24 hours by a correspondent who has quick access to villages even in remote areas.

The minimal documentation and accounting requirements, the simple management, and the lack of bureaucratic procedures help reduce the time needed for transfer operations. In addition to economic factors, kinship, ethnic ties, and personal relations between hawaladars and expatriate workers make this system convenient and easy to use.

**Summary**

Hawala system is an informal banking arrangement that allow the transfer of funds both domestically and internationally without using formal financial institutions. As a cheap, fast, and reliable money transfer system, they are primarily used by itinerant workers overseas sending remittance to support their families in their home countries.

Although it is difficult to quantify accurately the volume of funds transferred every year to the developing world through such channels, remittances are very important sources of income for many impoverished households and may play an important role in promoting growth and development.

However, in the aftermath of 9/11, there has been growing concern on their potential role in money laundering. As they are anonymous and require minimal documentation, they can be easily misused by criminal organisations, including terrorist groups to conceal the proceeds of criminal activities or corrupt officials to launder the proceeds of corruption.

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