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COE OR PMESII-PT? Methods to identify and analize operational environment

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THE SYRIAN CRISIS: IS THERE A COMMON EUROPEAN RESPONSE AT ALL?  
– THOUGHT-FRAGMENTS –

Abstract:

„The second decade of the 21st century will be that of the Arab world. Either because it will have successfully been transformed while trying to catch up with the world, or because a restoration will follow current revolutionary events, after which old ruling techniques and new social experience will need to be reconciled. In any case, we can be sure that certain realignment will follow the stagnation of several decades, even if we do not know in which direction things will change.” Péter Wagner assessed the ongoing events with these words in March 2011, when the transformation of Arab societies in the Middle East began. Therefore, the question rightly comes up whether the second decade of the 21st century would be a decade of crisis and squandered opportunities, or it will provide grounds for hope of real transformation in the Arab world. The article offers an evaluation of events in Syria, assessing what has changed one and a half year after the start of the revolutionary events. Can we see the direction of this change? Who are the key players on behalf of the international community, the world or regional organizations and other players? I wonder whether it was the European Union.

The main and only goal is to collect a bunch of EU reactions and statements. (The manuscript has been completed at the end of 2012.)

Keywords: The EU, Syria, changes, humanitarian crisis, refugees, tasks and measures of the Union

Prelude to the current crisis

The goal of my work (thought-fragments) is to examine and assess the era since Bashar al-Assad was inaugurated as President in 2000, and highlight some of the key features of his rule.¹ When the young President came to power, first he stressed his openness to change. Furthermore he emphasized that his main

task was to advance his country during the 21st century into the „era of information technology“. However, this was only short-lived, as even minor political reforms have not taken place. The fact that Syria was named as a member of ‘The Axis of Evil’ after 9/11 had a significant impact on the President’s ambition, as the country came under intensifying external and internal pressure (the latter means that influential family members and the inner circle of trusted counsellors did not support political changes.)\(^2\)

Despite the unchanged political conditions, the economy made progress, but this has not brought the expected fundamental changes in society. There were/are several reasons. For example, initiating changes on the ground became more difficult due to the prolonged financial crisis, the rapid growth of population, the high unemployment rate, the gradual rise in food prices, the mass movement of people from drought-ridden areas into the cities and the cumulative social and economic consequences of these factors. In sum, serious unresolved social issues have strained Syrian society in the past years.\(^3\) However, the Syrian President himself articulated a very different opinion even right before the outbreak of the crisis: „We have more difficult circumstances than most of the Arab countries, but in spite of that Syria is stable. Why? It is because you have to be very closely linked to the beliefs of the people. This is the core issue. When there is divergence between your policy and the people’s beliefs and interests, you will have this vacuum that creates disturbance. So people do not only live on interests; they also live on beliefs, especially in very ideological areas. Unless you understand the ideological aspect of the region, you cannot understand what is happening.”\(^4\)

Moreover, President Assad also said that protests in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen „would not find their way to this country, as his anti-American positions and confrontation with Israel had left him in better shape with the grassroots in his nation.”\(^5\) (… as you can see, the cartoonist\(^6\) was able to see the future. Somewhat, of course the reality was different.)

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2 Ibid. p.8.
3 Just to name an example: 12 percent of Syria’s population of 22 million people lived in extreme poverty in 2007, while 33 percent under the poverty line. This ratio has deteriorated since. Gazdik (2012), p. 9.
6 Cartoonist Patrick Chappatte’s view of the changing Arab world. He made 13 drawings and it was the 4th picture. These drawings appeared in the International Herald Tribune, in the Geneva daily Le Temps and in the Sunday edition of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/multimedia/picture_gallery/The_illustrated_Arab_Spring.html?cid=31916024 Retrieved on October 22, 2012
“The fall of dictators: Assad of Syria and Gaddafi of Libya are next in line.”

What was going on in Syria? The main features …

„After a slow start, the unrest sweeping the Middle East has reached the ‘Levant’.“

Indeed, protesters have been in the streets of Daraa since March 15, 2011. Demonstrations started off after a group of children between 10 and 14 years were arrested for painting anti-regime graffiti on a wall in town and hauled off to Damascus without their parents being informed. In an attempt to suppress the protests, government forces killed six people on March 18 and more later on. So the government responded using heavy-handed force and the demonstrations quickly spread across much of the country …at the end we could see massive demonstrations against the government of President Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, activists across the country have begun to coordinate their actions.

It was very appalling that the Syrian uprising came as a total surprise to all Syrians, and what is more, the uprising took even the Syrian opposition by surprise. The government was also taken by surprise as we could see above.

President Bashar al-Assad delivered a speech in the Syrian parliament on March 30, 2011, in response to a wave of protests across the country. At that

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7 Ibidem.
time, he recognized the impact of the changes in the Middle East and North Africa, from which neither Syria was left out: „You are fully aware of the great shifts and changes happening in our region for the past few months. They are important changes which will have repercussions throughout the region without exception, including the Arab countries and maybe far beyond. This obviously concerns Syria, because Syria is part of this region.”

**Organization of the opposition forces**

Seven months after the beginning of the revolution, a consensus was reached on establishing the Syrian National Council (hereinafter SNC), which was officially announced in Istanbul on October 2, 2011. The Syrian National Council is a political institution that represents most political opposition forces, blocs, and groups, as well as revolutionary movement committees. The SNC works as a national, general, and temporary umbrella organization that reflects the will of the people for revolution and change. The goal of the SNC is to build a democratic, pluralistic, and civil state.

The next fact looks interesting; namely the leader of Burhan Ghalioun of the SNC said that: „There is a deep change in the Arab psyche. No one can tolerate any longer the rule of regimes that have lost their legitimacy in the eyes of people. In the past ten years people's aspirations changed. The idea of an Islamic state or nation reached a deadline. The general trend in the population in the last ten years was towards democracy. All these attempts to democratize or introduce reform brought no fruit. People in Syria were terrified of the security services. Tunisia and Egypt brought new horizons, new light to Syrians. When the volcano erupted, it was clear there was an accumulation of disappointment that couldn't be quelled. This explains the courageous determination of protesters today. Freedom for Syrians today comes before bread, before life.”

The reality is much more complex, because this organization is too divided. Furthermore, the other organizations have also been active, but unfortunately most of them are uncontrollable or Burhan Ghalioun’s opinion there are only „too political hues”, but the reality does not justify him. To demonstrate this, only some examples: under Ghalioun the umbrella organization was too

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11 Ibid.
12 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15798218 Here it can be seen a guide to some of the most prominent groups, for example: Local Co-ordination Committees, Supreme Military Council, Free Syrian Army. Retrieved on December, 2012.
autocratic and his dictatorial style\textsuperscript{14} chased some well-known opposition persons from the SNC.

We have already talked about the Syrian people, the Syrian opposition forces, but where are the international organizations? So what about the other countries and concretely the European Union?

The President of the SNC said, that they asked „for economic sanctions; … asked for coordination between the Arab League, the European Union, Turkey, and the West. … asked for the support of these countries at the U.N. Security Council. The President himself asked Lady Ashton to create a financial fund to support the Syrian people.” She replied „that this is an important mater and would be discussed.” The President continued: „…we asked them to send a message to the regime with warnings that there is no way out. We asked to apply pressure on Russia and China and to make use of all civilian protection measures. This is why Foreign Minister Juppe called for a humanitarian corridor.”\textsuperscript{15} Indeed the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said the zone could be carved out either with the approval of President Bashar al-Assad’s government or organised by international observers.\textsuperscript{16} The Minister highlighted the importance of the humanitarian corridors, because the humanitarian convoys can travel in this way. But it is very important fact for them, that there is no possible humanitarian aid without an international mandate. The goal is to use „all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians.

**Syria and the European Union**

What are the main historical „nodes” in their relations? The first legal basis for relations between the EU and Syria is the Cooperation Agreement signed in 1977. The European Union seeks to develop a closer relationship with Syria, including political dialogue, mutually beneficial trade and investment relations, as well as cooperation in economic, social and political reform. It means that Syria is a signatory of the 1995 *Barcelona Declaration*\textsuperscript{17} and a member of the *Union for the Mediterranean*\textsuperscript{18} launched in 2008.


Syria is also a member of the *European Neighbourhood Policy*, but does not yet benefit from all its instruments and incentives, pending entry into force of the *EU-Syria Association Agreement*. (Until an EU-Syria Association Agreement is signed, the relations between the parties – as I previously mentioned – remain governed by a *Cooperation Agreement* signed in 1977.)

Despite the documented relations between the two parties the EU initiated sanctions…

Following the violent internal repression in Syria, the European Union has adopted since May 2011 a number of restrictive measures towards Syria, including an embargo on arms and equipment that can be used for internal repression or targeted sanctions (a travel ban and asset freeze – prohibition for the European Investment Bank to make certain payments) against those responsible for or associated with the repression.

The EU restrictive measures aim to contribute to stopping the brutal repression. They will deprive the Syrian regime of financial revenues which it is using to maintain its violent crackdown. So the EU strives to assist the Syrian people in achieving their legitimate aspirations. In this sense, all EU measures are aimed at assisting the Syrian people to achieve their legitimate aspirations for a free, peaceful, pluralist and democratic Syria.

In the future, the EU is interested in having a strong, stable, peaceful, prosperous and democratic Syria as its partner and neighbour. That is the reason why the EU proposed the strengthening of EU-Syria relations and negotiated with Syria an Association Agreement (see above) that was left open for the Syrian government's signature for almost two years, until the EU retracted the offer in the face of the regime's violent repression against the Syrian people. The EU has no interest in harming Syria as a country or its people. The EU restrictive measures are designed to have maximum impact on the regime while minimising any potential negative impacts on Syria's people.

In 2011 the EU exports to Syria consisted mainly of machinery and transport equipment (35.8%) and chemical products (15.9%). The EU imported

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23 In the same place.
from Syria mainly fuels and mining products (89.7%). Textiles and clothing represent 4.8% and agricultural products 2.7% of the EU imports from Syria in 2011.\textsuperscript{24}

**The crisis – the violence continuous today**

It can be seen, that (to a certain extent) the country has been politically and economically stable since President Bashar al-Assad took office in 2000. However, the political and economic reforms announced at the beginning of his term are materialising slower than expected, causing frustration among some parts of the population.

The strategic objectives of the EU co-operation with Syria are (referenced document see 23rd footnote). Syria justifies the slow reform by national security considerations, including the Middle East conflict. Syria’s relations with the international community have become tenser over regional issues, in particular the sovereignty of Lebanon. Syria is a key factor in regional stability and plays a pivotal role as a transit country between the EU and the Middle East. Syria and the EU have privileged cultural links and there is strong potential for further strengthening economic relations.\textsuperscript{25}

The Syrian regime has shown that it is unable to change and unwilling to stop its violent crackdowns on peaceful protesters and Syrian people at large. On the contrary, the repression even escalated. Instead of talking with the people, the Syrian leadership simply continues to kill them. Over two thousand citizens lost their lives, thousands remain in detention and there are numerous reports of torture and other abuse. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated these acts could amount to crimes against humanity.

**Eventually the EU can not remain inert …**

By the summer of 2012, the conflict had increased in tempo and violence could be experienced all sides.\textsuperscript{26} The Syrian government has waged an unrelenting campaign of arrests that has snared tens of thousands people.

In cities throughout Syria, including the capital, Damascus, and the largest city, Aleppo, the opposition had merged around armed groups identifying


\textsuperscript{26} About 400 died in June 2011 and more than 3,000 people in June 2012.
themselves as elements of the Free Syrian Army. From bases in refugee camps on the Turkish side of the border, the flow of weapons, medical supplies and money increased.

**The future’s what to do**

The European Union policy is based on new features, including a "more for more" approach, the importance of mutual accountability between the European Union and its partners, the need for partnerships not only with governments but also with civil society (e.g. NGOs, businesses, academia, media, unions, and religious groups) and a recognition of the special role of women in reshaping both politics and society.27

„In the case of Syria, the European Union has strongly condemned the systematic human rights violations by the Syrian regime.28 The EU has called on President Assad to step aside and allow a peaceful and democratic transition. Together with EU Member States at the United Nations Security Council, the EU spared no effort to ensure that the international community speaks with one voice, in full support of the UN-League of Arab States Special Envoy Kofi Annan's plan. The High Representative and EEAS (European External Action Service) participated in the Friends of Syria meetings.29 The High Representative convened regularly the Crisis Platform, bringing together all relevant services in the EEAS and the Commission (sanctions, humanitarian assistance, development cooperation, liaison with Delegations and support to the UN).

In response to the crisis, the EU suspended all types of cooperation, imposed restrictive measures and kept them under constant review. The EU has only maintained aid that benefits the Syrian population, students, human rights defenders and the opposition. The EU put forward a contribution of EUR 10 million as humanitarian aid to Syria and affected neighbouring countries. The EU has also worked closely with Syria's neighbours and has proposed a Commission Special Measure to reserve EUR 23 million of ENPI (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instruments)30 funds to support specifically Syrian civil society as well as refugees and affected populations in neighbouring countries.

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Retrieved on October 2, 2012.


30ENPI A new single cooperation instrument for the EU’s eastern and southern neighbours plus Russia
The EU Delegation in Damascus remained open to support the Syrian people and help coordinate the EU response to the crisis. The EU Delegation hosts several diplomats from Member States that decided to suspend the activity of their own Embassies.  

To sum up, the main purpose of these co-operations was to support Syria’s domestic reform process. That is why the meeting of the EU’s defense ministers on 26-27 September 2012 in Nicosia was so important. Concerning Syria, the ministers stressed the urgent need for a political solution to be found as soon as possible, so that no more lives are lost. The EU Defence Ministers welcomed the appointment of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi as the UN and Arab League Joint Special Representative for Syria.

"What we want to do is to support the peoples of the region to build their own democratic institutions, democratic societies and democratic states on the basis of human and political rights," said the Defence Minister, stressing that this was the best way to have peace, stability and security in the region.

At the end of September Brahimi told reporters, after briefing the council in a closed meeting, that Syrian situation is troublesome. “The situation in Syria is dire and getting worse by the day,” Mr. Brahimi told reporters after briefing the council in a closed meeting. What does it mean? „Food shortages loom because the harvest was bad, and Syria’s former self-sufficiency in goods like pharmaceuticals has evaporated with so many factories destroyed or closed by the spiraling violence, diplomats quoted him as saying.”

Among the EU countries Germany said that the opposition forces must develop a common, democratic pluralistic platform „to reassure several hundred potential high level defectors that they have a future in Syria. This includes religious and ethnic tolerance."

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On October 15, 2012, there was a meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, where the Council Conclusion was born. (It is presented a few examples/facts.)

An important fact is that the Union stands by the Syrian people in its struggle for freedom, dignity and democracy. It is also a fact that there exists a danger for the neighbours – in terms of security and stability – on account of the spill-over effects. The Council discussed the current Syrian situation and reinforced the sanctions against the Syrian regime. The most relevant statement is: „The EU underlines that those whose presence would undermine the political transition should be excluded and that President Assad, in this regard, has no place in the future of Syria.“

By the EU’s opinion the key factors are the members of the UN Security Council, or the League of Arab States, and Lakhdar Brahimi as Joint Special Representative of these international organizations. Even Catherine Ashton emphasized that the EU looks forward to the next meeting of the Friends of Syrian People Group to be held in Morocco in order to maintain international pressure on the Syrian regime.

Furthermore the EU will continue to provide assistance and calls on all donors to increase contributions for humanitarian and refugee assistance. The EU with the United Nations (OCHA) does its best to maximise the virtue of the aid.

In October 2012 activists said at least 30,000 people had been killed in the fighting, hundreds of thousands had fled to neighbouring countries and more than one million were displaced inside Syria.

The new and essential fact is the extension of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria and “its strengthening through the nomination of two members, Carla del Ponte and Vitit Muntarbhorn”. Del Ponte, who has also served as a Swiss ambassador and federal prosecutor, was named to serve on the commission alongside with Vitit Muntarbhorn, a Thai expert and veteran UN investigator. The group has already interviewed more than 1,100 victims, refugees and defectors thus far, but has been denied access to Syria.

I think her personality is almost a „symbol”. Mariangela Zappia, the European union Ambassador said it in an interview that Del Ponte „brings strong investigative skills and an ability to better systematise and use the huge

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amount of information that the commission of inquiry is putting together with a view to utilizing it during the prosecutions one day.” 43

And what can do the EU? We all know that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2012 has been awarded on 12 October to the European Union for its contribution „to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”. Catherine Ashton said at the ceremony: „The creation of the European External Action service has enabled us to develop a comprehensive approach to better promote Europe’s core values throughout the world. I will continue to work tirelessly to drive this process forward.” 44

It is true the human rights crisis in Syria is a major test for the EU in its own neighbourhood. In light of the recent announcement (the Nobel Peace Prize), the European Union and its member states have an opportunity to live up to their tasks deriving from the common security and defence policy. Furthermore, it is essential for them to take decisive action to ensure that refugees fleeing Syria are protected. 45 That is why the Amnesty International requested the EU and its member states to take measures to assist those fleeing Syria. 46

Consequently, „to do more, we need more access in Syria.” 47 It is sure, that the Syrian situation is serious and the end of the crisis does not loom yet … the task is given, Syria 48 only is one of the challenges in the Middle East. Finally, it is evident that the situation is very complex, therefore the future of the EU-Syria cooperation, too. It is certain that the energy-politics remains significant common question in the relations between the EU and Syria, but this issue will be the subject of the next article…

I think – after collecting the EU’s reactions and statements – that the European Union wants to help the Syrian opposition forces, but if the EU does not have a real (common) political will, it won’t be able to effectively help…While the EU’s countries are divided, Britain, France and Germany can’t

43 Ibidem.
46 Ibid. The concrete measures.
agree on what common measures to take. Diplomacy or (what) other? … the
dilemma remained.

List of bibliography:

PÉTER MARTON, PhD.

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA: ENSURING OPTIMISATION, ACCESS, AND OPTIONS

Abstract:

In the light of rhetorically stated goals, the underlying and partly contrasting reality, as well as the emerging new prospects, this article is interested in taking stock of U.S. involvement and interests in Africa, in a brief but thorough and comprehensive manner. First of all, however, it sets out the institutional background of the U.S. Africa policy in a nutshell. Overall, it argues that a triad of U.S. goals can be claimed to operate vis-à-vis the continent: namely the optimisation of governance in the region with related interests in economic liberalisation, the ensuring of access to natural resources for the U.S. as well as the global economy, and the availability of strategic (including military) options with a view to counterterrorism at the present and geo-strategic calculations in the future.

Keywords: Africa, U.S., foreign aid, public health, democracy promotion, natural resources, counterterrorism, China

Introduction

In the light of its declared principles and goals, the U.S. Africa policy is oriented around five key objectives or priorities, namely (1) promotion of

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1 Bureau of African Affairs – main page. U.S. Department of State. In: http://www.state.gov/p/af/index.htm (downloaded on 12 October 2012). The original text on the website in full is as follows: „There are five pillars that serve as the foundation of U.S. policy toward Africa: 1) Support for democracy and the strengthening of democratic institutions on the continent, including free, fair, and transparent elections. 2) Supporting African economic growth and development. 3) Conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution. 4) Supporting Presidential initiatives such as the Global Health Initiative, Feed the Future, and the Global Climate Change Initiative. 5) Working with African nations on transnational issues such as drug smuggling, money laundering, illicit arms, and trafficking in persons.”
democracy and assistance to democratic institutions, (2) support to economic development, (3) mitigation of armed conflicts, including preventive measures and support to peace-building, (4) assistance in the field of public health, and finally (5) to successfully tackle a host of trans-national issues which have implications regionally as well as, possibly, worldwide. This is the general official framework of U.S. policy towards Africa. Democracy promotion and assistance to democratic institutions represent an item which features prominently on the agenda mostly since the 1990s, ever since the national security imperative of viewing African political developments through a Cold War lens no longer made itself felt in the U.S. approach. Trans-national issues, on the other hand, are a consequence of globalisation and its darker aspects, among which we can find the recently growing drugs trade.

Contrary to the notion that this extensive list of interests may be the basis of deep and intensive involvement in African affairs by the U.S., observers tend to juxtapose rhetoric and reality and conclude that U.S. policy comes up short on the latter.\(^2\) Heightened interest in particular African developments typically arises out of specific circumstances from case to case when those may captivate the attention of certain active domestic constituencies of U.S. foreign policy and may mobilise them to lobby for increased efforts in given areas. The only exception to this rule (in Carmody’s assessment) may be those areas that are connected with oil, security, state stability and terrorism. Another subject that generally causes concerns is China’s rise in the African region. Apparently even calculations concerning the countering of China’s growing presence played into the creation of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).\(^3\)

This, the default assessment of the present can itself be countered, however, in terms of prospects, by reference to the growing importance of African natural resources for the global as well as the U.S. economy, the most often cited symptom of which is the already fast growing U.S. reliance on African oil imports. In fact, the importance of Africa’s resources does not relate only to oil, but other natural resources as well and has long since played a role in U.S.-African trade and investment relations. It may now be set to further increase in significance.

In the light of the above outlined rhetorical vision, the underlying and partly contrasting reality, as well as the emerging new prospects, this article is interested in taking stock of U.S. involvement and interests in Africa, in a brief but thorough and comprehensive manner. First of all, however, it sets out the institutional background of U.S. Africa policy, in a nutshell.


Overall, it argues that a triad of U.S. goals can be claimed to operate vis-à-vis the continent: namely the optimisation of governance with related interests in economic liberalisation, the ensuring of access to natural resources for the U.S. as well as the global economy, and the availability of strategic (including military) options with a view to counterterrorism at the present and geo-strategic calculations in the future.

Institutional background

Different aspects of Africa policy are overseen by different actors within the large, and to a great degree decentralised U.S. bureaucratic system. The State Department is primarily responsible for managing diplomatic as well as public diplomacy efforts in bilateral relations on the one hand, and multilateral affairs through engagement with global, regional and sub-regional organisations with African membership. It also oversees much of U.S. aid activities on the continent, partly via its chief auxiliary in this function, USAID. An extensive network of diplomatic representations is operated throughout Africa. The U.S. is represented in forty-eight countries with embassies, consulates or other diplomatic representations in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is comparatively impressive coverage of a very large sub-region. The Bureau of African Affairs is responsible for coordinating the above outlined, wide array of activities, headed by Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson.

Notably, the Obama administration’s national security cabinet, where the State Department does not necessarily play a dominant or even very influential role, does include, however, other old Africa hands, too, from the State Department. Susan Rice used to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs of the United States (1997-2001) under the Clinton presidency, and is currently the Ambassador of the U.S. to the United Nations. Gayle Smith, who used to serve as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), and as Senior Advisor to the Administrator and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Agency for International Development under Clinton, is now Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director at the NSC. The Rwandan genocide was apparently a formative experience for both, and together with Samantha Power, a former journalist who covered the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s; they exercised a key influence when the U.S. decision to join and crucially assist the intervention in Libya was made.

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Beyond the State Department and the key decision-making organ that is the National Security Council, the Pentagon takes significant and increasing interest in African affairs, too. 2008 was a major milestone in the institutionalisation of the growing attention on the part of the Department of Defense, when the U.S. military’s Africa Command was established – in charge of affairs hitherto overseen by the European Command.  

Finally, the President’s economic policy cabinet also plays a role in economic relations with African countries. Represented in its ranks are the Department of Commerce and the Treasury Department which play a role in the implementation of U.S. trade policy towards the region.

**Democracy promotion**

The network of U.S. diplomatic offices is entrusted with the promotion of a very diverse agenda within which democracy promotion only nominally enjoys priority. From exemption concerning the extradition of citizens to the International Criminal Court to concrete company interests, the advocacy of other interests regularly crossed the ways of aiding countries in good governance in the past, whereas autocrats may in fact be courted by the U.S. just like by other developed countries in case they have the hard currency of a major natural-resource base in their relationship with Washington.

Nevertheless, there have been policy innovations and effective tools put to use in furtherance of the cause of good governance: most importantly the Millennium Challenge Account managed by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a unique, one-of-a-kind independent aid agency, set up with reference in its name to the Millennium Development Goals, but functioning in a more complex way than an ordinary development assistance organisation. The MCC allocates funding to countries scoring above the median on seventeen indicators of the rule of law and the quality of governance, largely in respect of recipient preferences as expressed in the latters’ own poverty reduction and growth plans. Implementation is rigorously monitored. Currently, thirteen Sub-Saharan African countries qualify as “Compact countries:” Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia. More modest

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7 Although it may be noted that other independent government-mandated aid agencies are involved in distributing U.S. aid, such as the U.S. African Development Foundation (USADF), set up by U.S. Congress in 1980.

“threshold” programs are in place with six more countries beyond those mentioned already (with Kenya, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Uganda). Since federal fiscal year 2005 more than USD 5.5 billion has been spent through the MCC account. This is a remarkable sum given that the MCC in principle functions as a depoliticised and merit-based mechanism for the allocation of good-governance-promoting aid.

Having said that, the promotion of rights of freedom, rule of law, and democracy also entail the motivation of opening up African markets on the part of the U.S. It is eagerly seeking increased market access all over the continent, and aid is often related to the expectation of continued economic liberalisation in recipient countries.

In principle, democracy preference is not inconsistent with isolating regimes that are not – or not particularly – friendly to the U.S. or the West. Zimbabwe and Sudan come to mind in particular from the past, although change is underway in both cases, and the U.S. has in fact never ceased to be a major donor of humanitarian assistance to these countries. E.g. the Sudan was seventh among African countries in terms of total U.S. aid received.

Sudan is a case in flux in this respect. It diplomatically backed Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and especially in the first half of the 1990s functioned as a safe-haven of terrorists. For this reason, in 1993 the State Department listed it as a state sponsoring terrorism for the first time. Sudanese policy changed only under strong U.S. pressure which, in the wake of the extradition of Ilich Ramírez Sanchez, a.k.a. Carlos, to France, resulted in the ouster of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida organisation from the country. The U.S. did, regardless of this, launch cruise missile strikes against the country in the wake of the 1998 al-Qaida embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Sanctions were introduced against the country, the latest round in 2007, under the Bush administration. For its part, the government in Khartoum did not appreciate the long-standing U.S. role in the separation of South Sudan and the Darfur conflict, and the indictment by the International Criminal Court of President Omar al-Bashir did not help the relationship, either. Sudan was, however, forced to more positively approach the U.S. over the years. In return, the State Department, in its Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, even as it maintained the “state sponsor” designation, referred to the Sudan at the same time as a “cooperative

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9 Ibidem.
11 ARIEFF et. al., op. cit., p. 25.
counterterrorism partner;”¹² an interesting contradiction and indication of a slight shift in position.

Zimbabwe, against which sanctions are in place by the U.S. since 2001, has since seen a power-sharing agreement put in place between President Robert Mugabe and his Zanu-PF party and the opposition led by Morgan Tsvangirai in 2008. In spite of much foot-dragging in the implementation of the Political Agreement which resolved the domestic conflict over the 2008 elections, U.S. Ambassador to Harare Charles A. Ray was ready in a 2011 speech to the Zimbabwean parliament to call the bilateral relationship of the two countries a “dysfunctional friendship,” i.e. imperfect but a friendship nevertheless.¹³ The 2013 elections there as well as the future of the partisan security sector will all now have an important bearing on whether sanctions will be retained – although some voices suggest that the sanctions may be counterproductive for a positive outcome in this respect, and therefore the EU as well as others should revisit the idea of lifting them.¹⁴

Finally, the U.S. continues to be a major donor of assistance to the fledgling state-building process in South Sudan, ever since the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and also in the wake of the 2011 independence referendum. The State Department and USAID are extensively involved in governance as well as media and civil society support. The results of these institution-building efforts there are unclear at this point nevertheless.

It is also noteworthy, however, that the U.S. does not, by its democracy-promotion objective, limit itself in its relations with autocracies or imperfect democracies in such cases where U.S. strategic interests dictate engagement. An example of the former is Equatorial Guinea under President Obiang, while a case as far as imperfect democracy is concerned is Angola under President Dos Santos and the MPLA regime. Zimbabwe and Sudan are important exceptions in this respect, as autocracies sanctioned for their behaviour, Sudan all the more remarkably of the two as it is an oil-producing country where strategic reasons for engagement would otherwise very much be present.

Economic development

The most important U.S. economic or sustainable-development-related assistance programs outside the field of democracy promotion, security cooperation and public health initiatives are Feed the Future and the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI). The first is aimed at ensuring agricultural-sector growth and improving the nutritional status of vulnerable groups. About a third of the sum allotted to Feed the Future is directed towards Africa. The so-called “focus countries” in Africa are Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia (of course, other agricultural aid programs also exist).\(^\text{15}\) A smaller ratio of total global funding is spent through GCCI in Africa, promoting for instance clean energy, sustainable land use, and other forms of environmental conservation.\(^\text{16}\)

Overall, not excluding the more robust democracy promotion, security cooperation and public health programs, U.S. assistance to Africa has grown significantly since 2002, from about USD 1.5 to 7.5 billion per year. Clearly this also shows post-9-11 national-security calculations as well. The ten largest recipients are Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, South Africa, Uganda, Sudan, Mozambique, Zambia, and the DRC.\(^\text{17}\)

Note that these are not population-proportionate rankings, yet it is still remarkable that only two of these countries can be found on the list of MCC Compact countries which are selected on merit. The lack of overlap may thus show how the largest recipients may be benefitting from interest-informed U.S. aid activities, albeit as a counter-argument, one may also consider how it would be impractical to concentrate e.g. public-health-related assistance on the basis of the quality of governance rather than related to where the health situation requires it the most. As will be seen below, public health is in fact one of the most important segments of U.S. aid efforts in the region.

Public health concerns

It is worth mentioning under a separate heading as programs related to public health make the bulk, that is, nearly 70 percent of U.S. aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.\(^\text{18}\) President Obama created a unified framework for the three public health initiatives launched by the Bush administration: the Global Health Initiative now encapsulates the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President’s Malaria Initiative, and the Neglected Tropical Diseases Program.

\(^{15}\) ARIEFF et al., op. cit., p. 14.
\(^{16}\) ARIEFF et. al., op. cit., p. 15.
\(^{17}\) ARIEFF et al., op. cit., p. 25.
\(^{18}\) ARIEFF et al., op. cit., „Summary” page.
This also came with slight increases of funding and shifts of focus, e.g. to maternal and child health and nutrition. HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis are the key targets, with two-thirds of the world’s HIV+ population and a third of TB patients living on the continent, as well as with 90% of all malaria deaths worldwide estimated to occur there.\(^\text{19}\) To a certain extent, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS or TB may be seen as global security issues. In the age of global interconnectivity, including jet travel, these may not be contained within the continent and new strains developing there may end up transported to other parts of the world. Nevertheless earlier fears related to multi-drug-resistant TB, or MDR-TB, may be somewhat ill-founded as in fact multi-resistant strains generally are not as contagious as the more regular wild strains of the bacteria. With regard to HIV/AIDS, a major problem with how assistance is spent is the continuing influence of the “ABC” paradigm, or “Abstinence first, Fidelity in marriage, Condoms last.”\(^\text{20}\) This informs the Congressional earmarking of money for support to abstinence instead of secure sex or, for example, the practices of religious NGOs involved in HIV/AIDS prevention – the latter were given a major role in U.S. assistance programs under the Bush administration years.

**Mitigation of armed conflicts**

It could be tempting for the sake of simplicity to include under this heading all peace-and-security-related U.S. programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, in not all of the cases do they in fact serve the cessation or the prevention of conflict as such. Perhaps nothing could better illustrate this than how summer 2012 saw military aid to Rwanda cut over Rwanda’s support to the M23 militia in the Congo: a case of peace-and-security-related assistance *cut rather than spent* in order to promote peace.\(^\text{21}\)

Security assistance to Kenya also supports the Kenyan military’s efforts against the al-Shabaab militia in Somalia, within the framework of the global war on terror. In Djibouti, the U.S. maintains its only military base in Africa. Elsewhere, e.g. in the Central African area shared by the DRC, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Uganda, the U.S. supports efforts to eradicate the Lord’s Resistance Army’s last remaining units in the forest – this may in the long run clearly benefit the cause of conflict mitigation but first of all requires the active pursuit of conflict. The December 2009 Makombo massacre in the

\(^{19}\) ARIEFF et. al., op. cit., p. 11.


DRC may in fact have been a result of the LRA committing atrocities to survive under increased military pressure.

Conflict mitigation in its closer sense extends to past U.S. involvement in mediating to various degrees in a number of conflicts, usually not in a central but an indirect role, however. For example, the U.S. had its part in bringing about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, which was encouraged and facilitated by the eight-member regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and IGAD supported in turn by the U.S., among others.

The core of peace support efforts is however related to building an indigenous African peace support capacity. The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) succeeded to this end the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in 2004. Training has been offered as part of this program to tens of thousands of African soldiers, benefiting African Union operations most notably in Somalia and Sudanese Darfur, not counting the 2008 “mini” operation in the Comoros against Colonel Mohamed Bacar’s government.

Transnational issues, a.k.a. security-related cooperation

The State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs omits terrorism from its list of trans-national issues which it outlines as “drug smuggling, money laundering, illicit arms, and trafficking in persons.” Nevertheless, counterterrorism cooperation is clearly one of the most important issues for the U.S. The Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) was a product of this interest in 2002-2005, which was then transformed into the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), a program now under AFRICOM’s mandate, since 2008, and renamed “Partnership” from “Initiative.” The focus is on training and capacity-building for security forces (mostly special military forces) within the region to better guard the porous borders and vast stretches of land that characterise it. Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania were the participants in PSI; TSCTI subsequently extended to Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia. The program now incorporates public diplomacy elements as well, militarising an area of activity traditionally owned by the State Department. Needless to say, involvement in this program may also distort local political programs: the war on terror through this program effectively incorporates regional countries’ efforts to keep the Tuareg insurgency at bay. In this regard, the major setback of the recent changes in Mali has to be noted. It is


important to mention to this effect also the eventually NATO-led, Anglo-French-initiated, and U.S.-aided intervention removing former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi from power. Ironically, the same intervention poses another major, more clearly terrorism-related challenge as well: the looting of Libyan weapons arsenals may have injected thousands of MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defence Systems) or shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles into the illicit arms trade, inevitably creating a risk for civilian air travel in Africa and potentially elsewhere as well – as the 2002 attempt to shoot down an Israeli passenger plane in Kenya may illustrate.

The other sub-region relevant to counterterrorism is Somalia where the past few years, since 2006, have seen repeated interventions by regional countries encouraged and very actively supported by the U.S.: first by Ethiopia (2006-2009), and then by both Somalia and Ethiopia (in 2011); to help Ethiopia, in 2006, the U.S. even turned a blind eye to the Ethiopian military’s need to re-supply spare parts for their assets partly from North Korea. The U.S. takes a keen interest in trying to wipe out the Islamist al-Shabaab militia in the country which has in the past declared allegiance symbolically to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. To the same end, drones carry out strikes in Somali territory against suspected terrorist targets, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has done a lot to build capacity on the part of the Somali National Security Agency of the Somali federal government (no longer referred to as “transitional” since August 2012). The CIA even cooperates, quite extensively, with the quasi-state entity of Puntland, and its Puntland Intelligence Agency against radical Islamists.

Piracy is another matter of high inter- and trans-national interest. The issue rose to prominence by the mid-2000s. It partly grew out of legitimate grievances by Somali fishermen over illicit fishing in Somali coastal waters by opportunist companies using even super-trawlers to reap the benefits of government-free and thus relatively defenceless Somalia. Soon, however, piracy came to pose a threat to legitimate shipping in international waters as well, including the transportation of oil from the Middle East. Piracy as a result is an issue around which global major-power cooperation can be organised. True to its nature as world leader, the U.S. took the initiative of launching the anti-piracy cooperation which now involves even countries such as India and China. Here, too, local efforts are instigated to complement the external coalition – a “beach-side” as opposed to the “ocean-side” approach. Excesses are, unfortunately, present here

as well. With the anti-piracy mission’s sails somewhat out of wind by now, the Puntland Maritime Police Force, a paramilitary unit trained by private security/military firms from South Africa (at first) and the United Arab Emirates (later on), has apparently been left behind, with a vague Western ambition to somehow have it join the ranks of the security forces of the Somali federal government.\textsuperscript{26}

Another highly prominent topic on the trans-national agenda is the drugs trade which started to significantly expand since the second half of the 2000s. This affects partly the same undergoverned, large region of the Sahel addressed above. The countries of the Sahel, along with West African coastal states, experience the effects of a diversion of the cocaine trade from Latin America to the growing European market in the form of the increasing trafficking in the substance through their territory. The traffickers need safe-havens, warehouses and other infrastructure, thus the threat of state capture increases as well, with the creeping, gradual corruption of key state institutions, such as the security and justice sectors.

A further special issue on the trans-national agenda is that of the Lord’s Resistance Army, posing a similar challenge to that of Tuareg nomads, albeit the LRA is much more ruthless. At the time of the already mentioned Makombo massacre in the DRC, U.S. military personnel were already involved in supporting the manhunt for LRA fighters. Operation Lighting Thunder, jointly undertaken by Uganda, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army from the then-not-yet-independent South Sudan, and the DRC in 2008–2009 saw U.S. logistical and financial support as well as direct participation in the planning stages in Uganda. Currently, there are U.S. Marines deployed on a training mission to the DRC, since 2010,\textsuperscript{27} as well as in Uganda – the latter training mission also serves the needs of Uganda’s AU mission in Somalia,\textsuperscript{28} a more direct U.S. interest.

Remarkably, it is these issues and not a Rwanda-like humanitarian emergency which have brought about U.S. military presence in a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Coupled with strong interest in securing access to (and not the “control” of) natural resources, it is these issues that can be reckoned with as possibly leading to even more major U.S. involvement in state-building or other peace support operations on the continent, even if currently the

\textsuperscript{26}Ibidem.
appetite for such undertakings may be lacking, due to the influence of the experience from Iraq and Afghanistan. AFRICOM’s creation and existence may perhaps not seem too relevant at this point, with the only U.S. military base located in Djibouti and Africa Command itself operating out of Europe; however, the Command’s existence represents a further institutional guarantee that the prospect of extensive operations in Africa is a given. In Libya the Command has already overseen offensive military operations as well. At the same time, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is also looking to make its mark in reaction to developments in volatile parts of Africa, such as Mali, and was in the spring of 2012 looking for increased fast-track authority to be able to send personnel to even off-limits countries, which otherwise would be excluded from assistance programs and U.S. cooperation. This time their proposed draft legislation was rejected by Congress, but in the future the current legislative balance of preferences may change.29

Which does not so much figure on the trans-national agenda, even as it has been included on the Bureau of African Affairs’ website, as mentioned already, is human trafficking and the implications of migration. For obvious geographical reasons, this does not constitute such a direct and important interest for the U.S. than for Europe.

Trade and investment, mostly in natural resources

U.S. trade with African countries shows a very strong deficit: in 2005, the U.S. exported goods in the value of USD 10.2 billion, and imported USD 50.3 billion; by 2008 this grew to USD 18.4 billion in exports and 86 billion in imports.30 Much of these imports came through the AGOA scheme (African Growth and Opportunity Act), amounting to no less than USD 66.3 billion. Under AGOA, qualifying countries can export to the U.S. duty-free. For goods to be eligible, they at the same time need to be sourced domestically or from the U.S. itself, one of the ways in which the U.S. is seeking to win ground in tough trade competition31 with EU countries (Germany alone exports more to Africa than the U.S.) and China in particular (the largest exporter to Africa). Most notably, however, the side of African imports is extremely lopsided in terms of product structure. Nigeria, Angola, South Africa and the DRC together accounted for 83.7% of all U.S. imports from the continent in 2008,32 while

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31 CARMODY, op. cit., p. 48-49.
32 Ibidem, p. 12. Equatorial Guinea stands for a further 3.9%.
USD 71.2 billion of the total USD 86 billion worth of African exports was oil (mostly crude). Africa is an increasingly important marginal supplier, with a convenient location from which its low-sulphur, good-quality oil can be shipped to U.S. ports along a shorter route, in a shorter time. The remaining part of African exports includes platinum, iron and other ores, especially from the Congo, cocoa from West Africa, diamonds from various regions; in other words even the rest is heavily skewed in favour of natural resources. Nigeria and in particular South Africa stand out as countries with a relatively more diverse export structure.

African natural resources are likely to grow in importance. New energy resources and technologies are coming online, but shale gas and tar sands do not make the extraction of conventional crude oil reserves unnecessary in the foreseeable future. Mineral resources are also significant. Consideration of how the near-equivalent of „peak oil” in ore extraction compounds this challenge is something that should be added to the discussion. The potential depletion of iron, zinc, copper and other mineral reserves beyond what available technology may render extractable is a concern, and adds to the currently felt sense of an ongoing „scramble” for resources. If one anticipates more drastic changes in the evolution of the world economy, which we may well experience in the upcoming decades, and a rollback of some aspects of globalisation as a result of natural as well as man-made processes, in a less globalised world access to natural resources, currently distributed through a world market, may become more exclusive and the quest to control them more competitive as well as, potentially, violent. Thus, Western presence on the continent, including the AFRICOM’s involvement, may have gradually a greater significance in the coming period even in a conventional geo-strategic sense.

**Special issues – on special occasions**

A search relying on the analytical tool of Google’s “Trends” can reveal the transient nature of the phenomenon of public interest in certain African issues. The term “Darfur” produced intensive search activity at the time when the UN peacekeeping force was eventually accepted by Darfur in 2007, and during the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, dubbed “Genocide Olympics” by Save Darfur activists. Similarly, as for “Uganda,” interest increased mostly in March 2012, when the Kony 2012 video was published online by the NGO Invisible Children. Such surges of interest are typically generated by activists interested in certain African issues, largely in a decontextualised and highly stereotyping

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33Google Trends search for “Darfur.” At: http://www.google.co.uk/trends/explore#q=darfur&cmpt=q (downloaded on 10 October 2012).
34Google Trends search for “Uganda.” At: http://www.google.co.uk/trends/explore#q=uganda&cmpt=q (downloaded on 10 October 2012).
manner. A case in this respect is the Kony 2012 video which operated with all the conventional clichés, presenting Africa as the heart of darkness where devil-like creatures do horrible things to angel-like creatures and the Western white man is required as the saviour to tilt the balance in the struggle between good and evil in the right direction.

The Kony 2012 campaign did generate a sudden surge in interest, but far less in terms of follow-through. It could not affect the official foreign policy agenda very substantively or for very long at all.

U.S. civil society can nevertheless more easily make its influence felt in the form of supporting or demanding sanctions, such as the ones in place against Sudan. Sudanese policy has, as is evident from this, been shaped to some extent by similar activism on the part of the Save Darfur coalition, which included a mix of humanitarian activists, Christian evangelicals and even the Israel lobby in the U.S., along with those with a more long-standing interest taken in Sudanese developments. A recent account neatly summarises the modest beginnings of the South Sudanese lobby, which played a fundamental role in putting the Darfur movement on track, too. The lobby mobilised much support for its cause framing it as the anti-slavery struggle of threatened locals against the slave-holding Arab tribes, a narrative that resonated well in the U.S. historical context.

Not only noble-thinking activists are involved, however, on the part of U.S. society in U.S. Africa policy. A notable example of this may be the case of Christian evangelical preachers from the U.S. who, along with fairly receptive local audiences and church support, successfully lobbied that the Ugandan authorities should clampdown on gays as well as gay rights – contrary to the intentions of official U.S. foreign policy and other Western donors.

Conclusion

An assessment of U.S. foreign policy towards Africa has to weigh the components of the U.S. approach according to their comparative significance. Security cooperation in trans-national issues and the access to, and consequently the trade in natural resources seem to stand out in this respect from the otherwise

equally ambitious agenda of developing cooperation in the fields of governance, agriculture, and last but not the least, public health. AFRICOM’s establishment and its overseeing the initial stage of U.S. operations in Libya (Operation Odyssey Dawn) clearly marks a creeping, but unambiguously growing interest in military affairs on the continent, in the wake of post-9-11 engagement with regional armed forces, with regard to the U.S. counterterrorism agenda.

Prospectively speaking, the growing involvement may take U.S. foreign policy beyond what in the past seemed to have been a red line, whereby extensive direct military intervention would not really be contemplated in African conflicts – as a result of the experience in Somalia in the 1990s, to a certain extent. The important interest of securing access to African natural resources could also affect related policies of counterterrorism security assistance and armed humanitarianism, inasmuch as in some cases, intervention may itself threaten access to natural resources, or may facilitate it and promote different forms of security assistance.

Having said that, the elements of this agenda (counterterrorism, natural resource access, and armed humanitarianism) are far less organically interrelated than many it can assume. For this reason, it is a special occasion when moralising activist politics take on increased significance and inhibit any instinct on the part of the administration to ever wage clear-cut resource wars on the continent.

The triad of U.S. goals – mentioned in the introduction, i.e. the optimisation of governance with related interests in economic liberalisation, the ensuring of access to natural resources for the U.S. and the global economy, as well as the availability of strategic (including military) options with a view to counterterrorism at the present and geo-strategic calculations in the future – operates in an institutionally and discursively fragmented political landscape, and more coherence can only be expected if drastic geo-strategic developments make this a vital need at some point in the future. This is a possibility that cannot be completely excluded in the time ahead.

Bibliography


Abstract:

This paper discusses aims and objectives of the Russian foreign policy in the Indian context as they have manifested from the turn of the millennium, when Vladimir Putin assumed power in Russia and built a strategic partnership with India. Putin was first elected president on 26 March 2000 and first reelected on 14 March 2004. After a brief deliberation on the major domestic changes that have affected Russia, there follows an examination of bilateral ties and an analysis of the Russian foreign policy objectives in India. This work argues that the objectives of maintaining Russia’s role as India’s main arms supplier, and pursuing its security goals in the Asian theatre, constitute Russia’s main foreign policy goals in India ever since the year 2000. The main section of this work addresses the fate of multi-polarity, the Asian Triangle initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and related matters. It discusses Russia’s foreign policy largely within that context, while it abstains from providing a comprehensive narrative or a widely inclusive analysis of Putin’s foreign policy, for reasons of spatial constraint. In this way, this study may shed some light on the nature of Putin’s foreign policy priorities themselves – a subject that attracts much media attention and upon which there is significant academic debate today. Boosting civilian trade or achieving cultural influence appear as lacking items from Russia’s agenda, despite occasional rhetoric to the contrary. This article views armaments sales as the single, most important factor in the bilateral relationship.

Keywords: India, Russia, strategic partnership, Russian-Indian relations, Putin, Armaments trade, Admiral Gorshkov, Asian Triangle, multi-polarity, nuclear cooperation

Domestic changes in Russia in the early 2000s and their effects on foreign policy

Russia under President Vladimir Putin is a regional power with a global reach, and with a credible nuclear second strike capability. Russia today is the world’s largest exporter of natural gas and its second largest exporter of oil. During the Putin years, GDP growth in Russia oscillated around 6% yearly. In

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2006, before the crisis, growth was 6.7%. Pay arrears, rampant during the Yeltsin years, have been eradicated. In 2003, defense spending amounted to 4.6% of the GDP—a high figure in international comparison. In the year 2000, the new state owned company Rosoboronexport was set up with the apparent intention of monopolizing arms exports. It has achieved to capture 90% of Russian exports within the range of products that the country’s military-industrial complex supplies. It is hard to subscribe to a view which would see this move as leading to inefficiency, when as a result Russia emerged as the second largest arms exporter worldwide.

Staggering profits in the energy sector could well have been misspent entirely as in the 1990s, had Putin not been able to provide for discipline and consistency in leadership, reasonableness and predictability, and a team approach. According to Lo, Putin “restored professionalism to decision making.” Putin’s reelection troubles in 2012 changed that picture only to some extent. Foreign policy is deliberate. Putin’s domestic policies consistently reveal that his personal value system has very little in common with the salient values in the West. He drove oligarchs abroad, barred others to run for governorship of oblasts, put oligarch Khodorkovskiy in jail for eight years on tax avoidance and fraud charges. He ceased independent television channels like NTV in 2001, TV-6 in 2002, TVS in 2003. Putin and the Kremlin have been linked to high profile murders of business people, journalists and a former agent abroad. Putin’s bureaucratic professionalism allows him to follow, though

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5 Op. cit, p. 451
7 Op. cit, p. 28
8 Op. cit, p. 46
9 Op. cit, p. 96
10 Op. cit, p. 5
12 BBC Country Profile: Russia, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1102275.stm, date of access 1st Sept 2012
13 Ibid.
not openly discuss, his long term foreign policy vision and his immediate foreign policy objectives on the Indian theatre.

How Russia forged a new strategic partnership with India

Under Vladimir Putin, India has assumed and maintained a renewed importance for Russia. The relationship between the two countries falls short of being an alliance. “Strategic partnership,” a terminology that appeared during the Primakov years, is the standard expression to denote the boundaries, content and level of proximity in this intergovernmental relationship.

Diplomatic ties strengthened

Indo-Russian bilateral diplomatic activity increased considerably during the early 2000s. If contrasted with the Yeltsin era, the sheer number of diplomatic visits and the frequency of interaction will denote that for Russia, India became important again. At the level of executives, official visits to each other’s capital and bilateral talks have become a standard yearly event.  

The two countries’ foreign ministers meet less frequently than their government executives. Russia’s foreign ministers and India’s external affairs ministers also made use of international forums to enhance contacts with one another.  

Russia maintains an embassy in New Delhi with departments in Mumbai and Kolkata, and further consular departments in Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai. India maintains an embassy in Moscow, and further consular departments in St Petersburg and Vladivostok. In 2004, Vyacheslav Trubnikov was appointed as Russia’s ambassador to India. Trubnikov, who had served as the head of the KGB’s South Asian department, became the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service in 1996 (SVR, heir to the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, and presently responsible for foreign intelligence gathering). He was moved to the post of deputy foreign minister in 2000. In 2009, Trubnikov was replaced by Alexander Kadakin, a career diplomat with an eminent record.

14 Russian-Indian Relations, the Official Website of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in India, Rossiysko-Indiyskie Otnosheniya, Posolstvo RF v Respublike Indii, www.india.mid.ru/otn.html, date of access 31 March 2007
15 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/878912.cms, Times of India, date of access 31st March 2007
16 Russian-Indian Relations, the Official Website of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in India, Rossiysko-Indiyskie Otnosheniya, Posolstvo RF v Respublike Indii, www.india.mid.ru/otn.html, date of access 31 March 2007
A strategic partnership between Russia and India was declared formally on 4th October 2000 in New Delhi by Putin and Vajpayee. However, this kind of partnership is not an alliance. It encompasses confidence building, soft security issues and certain strategic commonalities that do not include strategic cooperation in the face of external threats from regional or global state actors. An international seminar on Indo-Russian relations was held 23-25th November, 2000 at Jawaharlal Nehru University, which hosted Indian and Russian International Relations scholars, and diplomats. Before Putin visited New Delhi, he had felt the necessity to send a signal to India that his friendship should not be taken for granted. He arranged for a chance meeting with Pakistan’s then new military dictator Pervez Musharraf at the UN’s Millenium Summit. Putin’s October 2000 talks included the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, reportedly on atomic cooperation. Its exact contents have not been made public up to date. The parties justified their newly established strategic partnership in relation to the latter security concerns, and expressis verbis ruled out that their cooperation would be aimed at restoring their Soviet era alliance. Putin’s subsequent visits in 2002, 2004 and 2007 and 2010 (latter as PM) were intended to strengthen strategic partnership between India and Russia. Indeed, in 2010, the relationship was elevated to “special and privileged strategic partnership,” a cumbersome formula.

Russia’s strategic aims in the Indian context

A strategic partnership is formally devoid of power objectives, and its security objectives are confined to issues of soft security and threats from non-state actors (until 2002, the Taliban threat deriving from Afghanistan and the Somali pirate threat in the later 2000s etc.). This thesis will argue that although Russia needs to maintain strategic partnerships with India and China to remain their main arms supplier (an economic objective at the core), it also exhibits power and security objectives that provide the unspoken rationale for those relationships.

India extended its attention to the entire Indian Ocean basin from the 1980s. While it did not aim at breaking with Pakistan, it was set on defending its

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20 Op. cit, p. 11
21 Op. cit, p. 10
22 Janos BESENYO, „A szomáliai kalózkérdés: Milyen érdekek mentén?” – Mediterrán Világ, 2010-13, ISSN: 1787-7350, pp. 43-79
territory including Kashmir in December 1999 in the Kargil sector when Pakistani-induced infiltration occurred there. The war in Kargil proved a major boost for enhanced weapons and ammunition demands from Russia in the Putin era. More importantly from a strategic point of view, with Russia’s blessing, India also obtained its first foreign air base in Aini, Tajikistan after 2001.23 The Farkhor/Ayni (Aini) air base has been operational ever since 2007, amidst secrecy. Indian presence there served anti-Taliban purposes before 2002, and serves Indian power and security goals today. It enables Indian warplanes to reach Pakistan literally within minutes. We may also suspect that there may be cooperation between Russia and India in the field of atomic power for war purposes, a relationship rumored to have been based on the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2000.24

I will argue in the next section on multi-polarity that Putin’s stratagem will not be directed against the United States (India’s strategic partner anyway). It is intended to balance out China, which was not India’s strategic partner until 2012. In October 2005, Russia and India held a joint military exercise for the first time in Mahajan (Rajasthan) and a joint naval exercise at Visakhapatnam in the Bay of Bengal (Indra). Russia also conducted an exercise with the PRC in 2005. Other exercises followed. Building direct military ties has become a facet of enhancing strategic partnership with these two countries. Russia is interested in helping India become more powerful than today, exactly relative to China. 2011 Russo-Indian verbiage regarding the Indian decision to buy Western warplanes instead of Russian ones does not alter this general picture.

In the following section on multi-polarity, I will show that India’s primary role for Russian power and security is to provide a balance against China. We will examine how Primakov had failed to take into account both the US capabilities and the implications of China-India frictions, when he constructed his version on multi-polarity. Arguably however, Putin does take into account both.

An assessment of the emergence and function of Russia’s multi-polar foreign policy

It is one of the main aims of this article to assess the supposition that Putin’s Russia today may have a geopolitically driven multi-polar foreign policy, and also to narrate the virtual appearance, exposure and subsequent fate

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of the Asian Triangle that was intended to include China, Russia and India. The concept of global multi-polarity and its strategic application the Triangle were aimed at establishing a new global balance of power, weakening and – in the long run – destroying United States’s hegemony. Yevgeniy Primakov clearly made attempts at constructing a geo-politically driven multi-polar foreign policy for Russia (1996-2000), but this thesis will argue that his version of a multi-polar foreign policy failed to achieve concrete results. Multi-polar discourse in itself is a mere reiteration of the fact that a country is not satisfied with its current power standing. As we shall see, Primakov’s foreign policy showed a strong tendency to be virtual, when it came to building a multi-polar world. Lo emphasizes how “the concrete business of multi-polarity” means “building influence and projecting power through deeds.” Economization of foreign policy, including an aggressive push for arms contracts, as in the case of India, has been instrumental in Putin’s move away from Primakov’s virtual power games. Putin usually “avoids any mention of political-strategic competition with the West” and more specifically, with the United States. Putin’s professionalism and opportunism have allowed him to pursue a pro-US course after 9/11, and to refer constantly to multilateral values and global concerns. Putin was enthusiastically cooperative with Washington after 9/11, and thereby achieved a halt on criticism of his Chechnya policy, where he had launched a new war in 1999. When the US intensified its military presence in Central Asia, and set up air bases in Uzbekistan and in Kyrgyzstan, Russia did not raise objection openly (albeit understandably, it secretly worked for an end to the American presence at those air bases). The Bush-administration’s abrogation of the ABM Treaty in 2001 was also met by a stoic Russian response that called the move “a mistake.” Instead of extrapolating on the grave consequences that the US could face as Primakov would have probably done, Putin quietly intensified Russian research into stealth technology, and indigenous Russian anti-ballistic missiles systems. Hence, we should expect that the quest for multi-polarity meant very different things between 1996 and 2000, and in the post-2000 decades.

The concept of multi-polarity had been originally a Chinese idea. In the late 1970s, China was a quasi US ally. Later in the 1980s, Deng’s low profile foreign policy tried to keep equidistance from the US and the USSR. After the Tienanmen square massacre in 1989, the PRC was internationally isolated and needed to reinforce domestically its crumbling ideological legitimacy with the

26 Op. cit, p. 67
27 Op. cit, p. 75
28 Op. cit, p. 85
29 Op. cit, p. 29
tool of nationalism. The intended international dimension of this nationalism was the doctrine of multi-polarity. The 14th Party Congress in October 1992 approved the foreign policy concept of ‘duojhua,’ literally ‘multi-polarization.’ ‘Duojhua’ was described as a long term foreign policy objective, but also as an existing trend, as an unalterable law of history. Thus Jiang Zemin altered Deng’s course of foreign policy to the advancement of ‘big country diplomacy,’ i.e. a more aggressive pursuit of the national interest on the world stage and the quest to make China a real world power. Jean-Pierre Cabestan sees it as the asymmetrical tendency of this Chinese concept that the PRC wanted to be seen “as the only Asian and perhaps the only world power able to speak on equal terms with (...) the United States.” China in the 1990s also often emphasized that there should be ‘one big country – one continent.’ The Chinese concept of multi-polarity, apart from references to Marxism, is rooted in the realist concept of international relations. The Marxist element of historical materialism that allows for the equation of a foreign policy goal with an unalterable law of history is the less important element in this concept. More importantly, the Chinese concept of multi-polarity is a doctrine that calls for the construction of a new global balance of power. It seeks to catapult China into the role of a global great power, equal to any, and it aims at weakening and ultimately destroying hegemony.

China was, it is, and in all probability, it will always be opposed to Japan obtaining a permanent seat on the UNSC. Until 2002, China also opposed India’s bid. Until that same year, there were no direct flights between Delhi and Beijing (!). When Putin makes pointed and repeated references to his adherence to multi-polarity at the conceptual level, he pays ideological courtesy to his Chinese partners, whom he needs as customers for Russian arms and energy and with whom it would be extremely costly to maintain strategic competition! An emphasis on multi-polarity in joint statements also allows Putin to please his voters who still see Russia as a global great power. In the Indian context, multi-polar discourse appeals to India’s sense of sovereignty and its long term global great power ambitions. At this level, multi-polar discourse is a diplomatic ritual.

In Cabestan’s assessment, China started to take India somewhat seriously only after 1998, when the latter acquired nuclear standing. Indeed, PM Wen

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31 Op. cit, p. 91
32 Op. cit, p. 86
33 Op. cit, p. 91
34 Op. cit, p. 99
35 Op. cit, p. 97
Jiabao in New Delhi in 2006 formally abandoned China’s claim to Sikkim, a province that had been incorporated in India in 1974. As China has not established clear border demarcation in Bhutan (India’s protectorate), China and India have no comprehensive border agreement yet. In June 2006, China and India reopened the old trade route through the Nathu La that links Sikkim to Tibet (closed from the year 1962). However, deep suspicions remain between Asia’s two continental giants. The PRC in the 1990s supplied Pakistan with nuclear technologies and sold conventional arms at prices that Indian analysts saw as concessional, and politically motivated. The PRC also pushed its advancement in Myanmar and intensified its relation after the year 2000. These developments, together with China’s striving to construct a blue-water navy, may be interpreted so that the PRC has aimed at the strategic encirclement of India. At the same time, India’s Look East policy that P.V. Narasimha Rao started aimed inter alia, at building ties with Vietnam, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Japan, an indication that India on its part also wanted to keep a check on China by way of a potential encirclement policy. China and India later signaled their aim to forge a “strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity,” a confidence building measure, not more.

How did Russia’s leadership under Primakov subscribe to the validity of multi-polarity as a descriptive and normative doctrine on global scale and a tripartite strategic cooperation to be directed against the West, despite the obvious shortcomings of its own power and that of its possible partners? The answer lies in the sheer magnitude of Russia’s frustrations in the 1990s. The CIS seemed to be a failure as a strategic unit. Armenia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were still more or less attached to Russia, but the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Moldova started to experiment with alternative great power orientations. Russia under the Primakov years tried desperately to compensate for its loss of power with new relationships. As we see now, Yeltsin was not ready or able to commit resources to make India a strategic ally. It sold India weapons that reflected Russia’s cutting edge of technology (whereby compromising on its own relative military standing), but sold all its weapons to India for market prices. Yeltsin’s Russia was also ready

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to supply India with weapons when others imposed sanctions. This step did not come costly in strategic terms, while it brought tangible commercial gains for Russia. In return, India had not been disinclined to give Russia a helping hand diplomatically. When the US bombed Serbia in 1999, it was Russia, Belarus and India that introduced a resolution to the UNSC which called for immediate cessation of hostilities. \(^{40}\) (It was then Russia, China and Namibia that voted for the resolution which needless to say failed.)

We shall now briefly examine how Russia has acted vis-à-vis China in the late 1990s and beyond. Has it been more inclined to treat the PRC as an ally? Has China been inclined to construct an alliance with Russia? In the early 1990s, Russia tried aggressively to establish good relations with the PRC. The PRC was happy to break out of its isolation that followed the Tienanmen massacre, with the help of Russia. There were five summits between the two countries within eight years in the 1990s. The two resolved their border disputes. China became the biggest buyer of Russian arms by the mid-1990s. It is still the biggest buyer of Russian weapons systems also today. It obtained the latest weaponry from Russia, including SU-27 fighter aircraft in 1996. China bought destroyers, armored personnel carriers; it contracted Russians to build a uranium enrichment plant in China. In the year 1996 alone, Russia sold $6.8 billion worth of arms and ammunition to China. \(^{41}\) In the long run, Russia might face strategic problems for having enhanced China’s military capabilities so greatly. \(^{42}\) China and Russia started to talk about constructive partnership in 1994, and declared strategic partnership in 1996. \(^{43}\) In April 1997, at the Sino-Russian summit, Primakov articulated for the first time his allegiance to the vision of multipolarity in the world. \(^{44}\) NATO bombardments of Serbian forces in 1995, sanctions on that country in 1998, US bombardments of Iraq and Sudan, bombardments of Yugoslavia in 1999, and NATO enlargement in Central-Eastern Europe in 1999, all these were seen in Russia as an encirclement. It became a general trait of the cabinet during Primakov’s premiership, regarding Serbia, Kosovo, or NATO enlargement, to threaten with grave consequences and then do nothing. Bobo Lo assesses Primakov’s foreign policy as an


\(^{43}\) Op. cit, p. 39

aggressive but futile competition with the West. After all, verbal tirades and the constant emphasis on geopolitics and multi-polarity did not save Russia even one of its humiliations in the late 1990s – they possibly aggravated them. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation that Putin approved in 2000, is often quoted as proof of the proposition that Russian foreign policy is doctrinally driven by the long term vision of multi-polarity on the global scale. The document however, had been drafted during Primakov’s time. Lo calls that document the “swansong of multi-polarity.”45 We may put forward the idea that it is rather the swansong of Primakov’s version of multi-polarity, i.e. that of a virtual global power game.

The tripartite strategic triangle of Asia united against the United States was thus a mere hypothesis in the late 1990s. It was not even a smokescreen: it was a Russian proposition that failed. In the Putin years, however, diplomatic meetings did display pointed meetings of the concerned powers as we have spelled out in this chapter’s section on diplomatic ties, and a diluted and implicit Triangle has become detectable. In our decade, as Swaran Singh spells out, “Russia, China and India have ever been accused of using the Strategic Triangle logic to further enhance their bargaining power vis-à-vis the US and to strengthen their engagement with that sole surviving superpower.”46

*The Triangle in its current implicit and diluted form is Russia’s attempt to maintain the country’s freedom of action, primarily within the Asian context. This thesis puts forward the proposition that the Triangle and its theoretical foundation, the concept of multi-polarity are not attempts to achieve strategic balance with the United States on the global scale today. Putin’s realism, opportunism and professionalism allow him to have the prudence to know what he cannot do. Putin in fact knows very well that we are living in an era of US hegemony and the world is unipolar. The Triangle is Russia’s forum to walk on tiptoes when balancing its bilateral India and China policies. It is a careful way to ensure that Russia does not become China’s minor ally in the latter’s attempted bipolar game with the US.*

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides clear proof that China recognizes Russian intentions to the construction of a regional balance of power in Asia, and dilutes the initiative with its own instruments. The Shanghai-5 group of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan was

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established on 26th April 1996, and was intended to be an instrument of confidence building between those countries. Its first treaty dealt explicitly with trust building on the common borders of the signatory countries. Yearly meetings became established practice when in 1998 the group met in Almaty, then in 1999 in Bishkek. Upon Uzbekistan’s inclusion as a full member, the Shanghai-5 was renamed Shanghai Cooperation Organization on 14th June 2001. Pakistan, India and Iran entered as observers in 2005. The US also applied for membership in the same year, but its application was rejected. The SCO’s two official working languages are Chinese and Russian. India has not formally expressed a wish to join the organization as a full member. The organization is headquartered in China, and many see it as a nascent security organization. India – a country that rigorously guards its own independent foreign policy course, but nonetheless has signed a strategic partnership treaty with the United States – is of paramount importance to determine the nature of the organization before it chooses to join as a full member.

**Russian-Indian arms deals and atomic power station commissions**

The meeting in 2000 heralded a new era, when Russian arms sales to India have been nearly $2 billion a year. 40% of Russian arms exports go to India, which continues to be the second largest buyer of Russian weapons systems after China. This article will argue that maintaining Russia’s role as India’s main arms supplier is one of the Putin’s two most important foreign policy goals in that country. India’s military capability element of its hard power has been growing considerably on the basis of the country’s new wealth after 2000. Its defense budget was $22.3 billion in 2006, before the crisis. India opened a tender for the purchase of 126 new fighter jets, an indication that its defense spending is expanding at a substantial rate. The fact that Western manufacturers won those crucial tenders was a bitter disappointment to Russia in the early 2010s. The RAND Corporation’s analysis of the South Asian

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regional military balance draws attention to the fact that India’s economy is now ten times the size of Pakistan’s, and the disparity is growing.53

Analysts point out that the strengths of Russia’s military industry include its state of the art aero-engine technology, acceptable aircrafts and helicopters (60% of total arms sales), and shipbuilding which costs 30-35% less than their Western alternatives, and cheap and reliable rockets, especially surface-to-air missiles. The structural weakness of the Russian military-industrial complex is its lack in young engineers, and that its most important defense systems had been developed in the Soviet era.54 It is of primary importance to note here that Russia does not sell its weapons systems, spare parts, technology, or its overhaul services at friendship prices to India.”55

India in the year 2000 ordered 40 Mi-17/Hip-H military transport helicopters from Russia, to be modified in India after delivery to combat helicopters. AA-12 Adder air-to-air missiles were ordered for SU-30MK aircraft. The Russian Navy sold six used Tu-142 aircraft. Negotiations started on the purchase of 124 T-90 MBTs. In the year 2000, an unusually high number of fire control and surveillance radars were delivered from Russia to India. The long and tedious negotiations on the fate of the used Russian Kiev-class aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov sped up in the year 2000, but the final contract was to be signed only four years later.56

In 2001, India ordered 5 Ka-31/Helix helicopters, and finalized an order on 310 T-90S MBTs ($700 million). Torpedoes and a high number of anti-ship missiles were also delivered in 2001. India also decided to lease one Victor-3 class nuclear submarine for the duration of three years ($75 million).57 The year 2002 brought prolonged dillydallying on the lease of the four Tu-22M3/Backfire-C bomber aircraft, fourteen BM-9A52 Smerch multiple rocket launchers, and the lease of two Akula-2 Class nuclear submarines (971 Schchuka B). Nevertheless, massive earlier orders of helicopters and Sukhoys could be successfully delivered in 2002, along with T-90s, air and sea...

55 Op. cit, p. 455
surveillance radars, combat radars, aircraft radars, and nearly 500 anti-tank missiles.\textsuperscript{58}

In 2003, India ordered from Russia 3 Ka-31/Helix airborne early warning helicopters, and six Mi-8 and Mi-17/Hip-H helicopters. It negotiated for sixteen MiG-29K/Fulcrum-D FGA aircraft for $700 million for use on the Gorshkov. Nearly 1000 anti-tank missiles for helicopters were delivered.\textsuperscript{59} In the following year, contracts were signed for three Ka-27PL/Helix-A, three Ka-31/Helix and six Mi-8/Mi-17/Hip-H helicopters. The discussions continued on Smerch rocket launchers, and India\textit{ probably signed a $1.4 billion deal to lease two Akula-2 class nuclear submarines possibly to be armed with Indian nuclear weapons.} Russia delivered also three Talwar Class frigates ($1 billion).\textsuperscript{60} The deal on Admiral Gorshkov was signed finally. The 45,000 tonne aircraft carrier (now INS Vikramaditya) is currently being upgraded and was to be delivered in 2008\textsuperscript{61}, but it did not materialize\textit{ until 2012}. In 2005, India ordered two Ilyushin tanker aircraft (Il-38/May), and finalized the deal on the sixteen MiGs for Gorshkov ($740 million).\textsuperscript{62} Massive deliveries continued in the year 2006. Currently Russia is bidding for 126 new fighter jets and associated military hardware that may cost India up to $5-6 billion.\textsuperscript{63} The new state export monopoly Rosoboronexport has recently set up a warehouse and service centre for spares and maintenance for the Indian Navy in a joint enterprise with the Indian firm Krasny Mir. A repair centre was set up for MiG29B-12s and Su-30MKIs in Nasik.\textsuperscript{64} Sales continued robustly during the Medvedev presidency, and in 2012.


Russian companies do not issue bank guarantees for cases of delays in delivery. Instead, they offer “comfort letters” to the buyer, an embarrassment. Indian armed forces complain that Russia puts up staggering price tags for upgrading weapons systems. In some cases, India simply goes for Israeli alternatives for upgrades. Russia for its part had constant worries over the possibility of Indian re-export of high quality defense technologies. It bullied India into signing an Intellectual Property Rights Agreement in December 2005 by refusing earlier to transfer the technology for Ilga surface-to-air missiles and is doing the same in the case of Smerch rocket launchers.\(^65\)

Russia’s record as a license provider is a major help for securing commissions from India. It had been Nehru’s dream to build up an indigenous arms industry within India. However, there are major obstacles in technology and know-how that hinder India to attain this goal. Famously, there are problems with Indian production of major ships. It is indicative of the problems of indigenous arms industry that the crown jewel of domestic production, the Light Combat Aircraft, is still running with a foreign (US made) engine, after a decade of concentrated attempts to produce a local substitute. Russia licensed out and provided the technology for 140 Su-30MK/Flanker aircraft (the deal was reached during Putin’s stay in New Delhi in 2000), 124 T-90S MBTs, further trainer combat aircraft, air surveillance radars and an also staggering number (6300) of Spandrel anti-tank missiles (over a decade).\(^66\) The Sukhoi license project is scheduled to last until 2018. Such ongoing projects, especially when transfer of technology is involved, necessitate a high level of mutual trust that cannot be reached through economic relationship alone.

Developing new weapons systems, even when building on preexisting Russian or Soviet basis, is very expensive. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (sea, land, and air versions; 280 km range) has been developed successfully in a joint effort between Russia and India and are now marketed for third parties.\(^67\) In December 2005, PM Singh engaged in negotiations over the joint development of a 5th generation fighter aircraft. India’s needs would best be met by a light engine airplane, which the MiG Company is willing to develop jointly. Sukhoys are the other option. Russian producer Irkut and Hindustan Aeronautics have also negotiated a deal for the development of a medium transport aircraft. The project will make use of French Turbofans engines and cockpits too. Agreements stabilized India’s contribution to the Global Navigation Satellite System, the Soviet/Russian equivalent of the US Global

\(^{65}\) Op. cit, p. 457
\(^{67}\) Op. cit, p. 459
Positioning System (GPS). 18 new satellites were to be launched from India with Indian vehicles to upgrade the GLONASS.\(^68\)

Building atomic power stations for peaceful purposes has emerged as an important Russian service in India in the Putin years, generating profit for Russian companies. Russia’s Atomstroyeksport is setting up two VVER type atomic power stations at Kudankulam.\(^69\) Both are subject to full scope IAEA safeguards. In early 2007, Putin and Manmohan Singh reached an agreement on the completion of the four further reactors close to the present site.\(^70\) The magnitude of civilian atomic commissions highlights that Russia has become important in contributing to India’s energy security in an era when India’s need for energy is significantly growing.

**India upgraded its ties with the United States to the level of strategic partnership on 18\(^{th}\) July 2005.** The deal included that the US sells nuclear fuel for India’s civilian reactors and lifts technology transfer restrictions. Upon US concern, India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear programmes, a *concession that amounts to very little in real terms.* The deal has since become law in the United States.\(^71\) This may have positively influenced in early 2007 the fate of the four further Russian nuclear reactors in Kudankulam, as the US opposition to those was withdrawn within the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is prudent to suspect that there might be cooperation between Russia and India in the atomic field for war purposes, as the signing of the 2000 MoU may also be interpreted to confirm the existence of such ties.\(^72\)

**Absent goals: civilian trade and opposition to cultural objectives**

*India’s energy security – regarding especially fossil fuels – is a field where the media speculations have consistently overplayed the significance of Russia’s contribution.* Russia currently is more important in the field of atomic power than in fossil fuels for India. India’s public company ONGC won a $1.7 billion stake in the Sakhalin-I oil project in 2001,\(^73\) and Gazprom is currently

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\(^{68}\) Ibid.

\(^{69}\) [http://www.kkhq.net/html/profile_mainpg.htm](http://www.kkhq.net/html/profile_mainpg.htm), official website of the Kudankulam project, date of access 1st September 2012


\(^{73}\) Russian–Indian Relations, the Official Website of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in India, [Rossiysko-Indiyskie Otnosheniya, Posolstvo RF v Republike Indii, www.india.mid.ru/otn.html](http://www.india.mid.ru/otn.html), date of access 1\(^{st}\) September 2012
developing an offshore gas block in the Bay of Bengal. Those are the only existing projects of cooperation between Russia and India in the fossil fuels field. In the long run, Russia may play an enhanced role in providing the energy-hungry economy of India with more fossil fuels, but geographical difficulties make pipeline routes very improbable between the two countries.

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CURRENT ISSUES

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CHALLENGES AND RESULTS IN SOFTWARE SECURITY

Abstract:

The objective of this article is to call the reader’s attention to the fact that the wide and rapid spreading of IT and Internet has entailed the computer attacks as well. The paper gives an introduction to the basic concepts of computer and software security; it touches upon some successful attacks that caused sensation. At last, it emphasizes that one of the most important issues is the prevention.

Keywords: Computer infects, software security, bots, bot herds, buffer overflow attack

Introduction

In recent years, the number of computers used in offices and households as well as the number of users has significantly increased in Hungary. Today it is not surprising at all if Grandma keeps in touch through the Internet with her relatives living in other cities or with a grandson learning on some university campus. Grandma may even use extended messaging with voice and camera (such as Skype). Meanwhile, other users may be playing on-line games, sharing files, sending around family photos, using social networking sites, or just browsing the Internet. They may be installing software or changing settings. This great variety of uses and activities is very positive. What is not so positive is the lack of basic background knowledge about computers. In general, we can say that the information technology knowledge of users is quite incomplete. Users often acquire knowledge of information technology in a self-educated way. This is praiseworthy, but a number of problems can appear due to this. Users do not have adequate knowledge of the programs they are using, so they try to solve problems on their own. If this method does not succeed, they try to get help from acquaintances or Internet sources. They will try the advice given to them (many times false or just partly right) in a naive manner (“Restart the computer, it always works for me!” or “Reinstall the whole thing!” or “Switch off the firewall!”). We still remember when a student stopped his computer system and after this could not use the Internet on that computer. He asked his
neighbour if his was working. After the answer ‘yes’ he retooled his computer to the parameters of the neighbouring computer, even the IP address, which should be individual. So, after this two computers did not work. They looked for a working third and retooled both to the parameters of that one. So they had three unconnected computers. After approximately quarter an hour, all of the laboratory’s computers became unserviceable! Though every example has its limitations (in Hungarian we say ‘every example is limping somewhere’), this incident is like when in a country without any vehicular tradition, automobile use suddenly expands like an explosion, but the drivers do not know the traffic regulations and the potential dangers.

It is but natural that there are also other examples of user-created problems. For instance, after successful reinstallion, it turns out that the users had not saved their data before reinstalling the system and/or software in question. Sometime ago, users had typed in the password of the e-mail program and selected automatic log-in. The program always sent the password automatically when they checked their e-mail, and now nobody in the family remembers the password anymore. Because of this, they cannot send messages now. For similar reasons, they cannot log into Skype, and the only option left for them is to call the help desk.

It is due to the same lack of information that they download programs from unknown sources from the Internet, or do not carry out the basic security set up when using a program. It is important to make clear to everyone that using a computer connected to the Internet is dangerous. It is an accepted statement that the real value is not the computer itself, but the data created with it and stored therein. A several-year-long correspondence or a digital photograph archive put together over years may get irrecoverable, if no backup copy has been made. The stored information is endangered by so-called computer pests, or malware. We divide these into three large (classic) groups [1]:

**Bacteria:** Those programs which are not able to function by themselves need a “carrier” program. The user does not know that the self-started program (e.g. image-viewer program or a packing program) can contain a bacterium. After starting, the bacterium can become active. Although the (classic) bacterium is not able to infect other programs (multiplying), soon after the start, it launches a new copy of itself. One bacterium does not cause retardation. It uses little memory and slightly oppresses the processor. The two running copies are not notable, but from here the proliferation continues according to the powers of two and become 4, then 8, 16, 32... running copies. In the 15th round the more than 32,000 running copies slow down the computer to such a rate where we cannot sit out the results of our commands, input through the keyboard or the mouse. In this way the shutdown of the computer will be also
impossible to wait for. The unsaved data can be lost, and because of the forced
shutdown, the file system can also be damaged. In some cases, the reinstallation
of the operating system is needed.

**Viruses:** Similarly to bacteria, viruses need a carrier program. But beyond
this, there are no more mutual points, since the virus after its start identifies the
other programs being used and attaches its own code to them: it infects them.
From here, once these programs are started, the virus also gets into the memory.
However, multiplication is only one feature of viruses. The other important
feature is that there is an event that prompts viruses to perform further actions
(such as deleting files, formatting hardware, or disabling antivirus software).
The triggering event can be a particular date, starting a program, having or not
having a certain file, the logging-in of a given user, etc. The fantasy and the
programming knowledge of the virus maker constitute the only limit. Certain
viruses spread themselves without any checking, and – in extreme cases – it can
happen that the same virus infects a program several times, or several viruses
infect the same program. Antivirus software can handle this in quite varied
ways.

**Worms:** The main feature of the programs in the third group is that they
spread through the computer network and reach the attacked computer in the so-
called source code (not the machine-made code, which is dependent on the
processor and the operating system). For example, the Word text editor of
Microsoft has an inner programming language, a so-called macro-language.
Also other systems have inner languages. So the worm has to figure out how to
start working. If it succeeds, from there on, it can spread further, but it can also
perform further actions on the successfully attacked system.

One of the most famous worms was the Morris Worm, also known as the
graduate student of Cornell University, discovered several safety errors in the
UNIX operating system while doing research for his thesis. He made this
program, which reputedly broke loose accidentally, exploiting these errors. Its
spread was built on three safety errors. The first one used the non-documented
switch of the electronic mailing program, called sendmail (-d). With the help of
this, he could give remote commands to sendmail. The second error was built on
a safety error of the `finger`d command (with the help of `finger`d we can get to
know if a particular user is logged into a distant system). With the help of the
buffer overflow attack (which we will talk about later), he put through attacking
commands. The third method performed unchecked commands to distant
computers, using the `rsh` command. Though the `rsh` was actually designed to
carry out distant commands, at that time the administrators trusted each other,
and many times there was a chance to perform this command without
identification. So the so-called “grappling-hook” part of the worm (the ll.c source code) reached the attacked computer. There it became able to run (being translated into machine-coded commands) and started. By this time, it liaised with that computer, accessed the grappling hook, and brought over the worm’s core. After the start, the worm looked for other attackable computers at first (in the file /etc/hosts). Then it tried to break the code of the users with the help of the most common passwords, stored in its brought along dictionary. When its latency was over, it launched a bacterium, which after quick proliferation slowed down the attacked computer to the point that the administrator had to shut it down. Within a comparatively short time it attacked many distant systems successfully, but after a little investigation, the administrators were able to find a temporary antidote (they renamed the C translator program), then they tracked down where the attack had been launched from. Morris was put on trial, where he was sentenced to pay a fine and was ordered to co-operate in repairing the attacked systems.

Because of happenings such as this, it is important to talk about security, including the security of the software.

**Results in software security**

Software security can be examined from three aspects.

**The first aspect** is the security from the software maker’s point of view. The application represents value. The programmer (or in some cases the owner of the rights of the software) would like us to pay for this value (the complete software), and not to obtain illegitimate copies. For this purpose, he can take security measures. In simpler cases a serial number has to be given. It has different names for certain manufacturers, for instance it is also called a product key. In more complex cases (e.g. for Microsoft products), after giving the product key, we have to launch an activating process. This connects the product key with the parameters of the given computer. This makes it harder in principle to transfer the software to other computers with the same product key. In favour of the security intensification, some manufacturers (especially formerly) launch a penalty procedure when detecting an unauthorized copy: they release a virus or other computer pest. This is not just unethical, but reflects poorly on the firms using this solution. In addition, when evidence is available, it can give rise to legal action.

**The second aspect** is when a programmer designs an application, and for some reason (deficiency of programming knowledge, or the error of the generative, or running system, the completed program contains security bugs. For instance, when reading the data, the program has to be given an integer, but
the user gives a real number by mistake. At this point some programs stop running. The unsaved data is lost, and the error can affect other programs that are running).

Many firms launch courses that give attention specifically to the occurrence of these faults, and demonstrate methods for reducing or eliminating this possibility of error. Nevertheless, it is not overstated that a completely faultless program does not exist. However, users expect to receive a free update that fixes any bugs or defects which turn out during normal use.

**The third aspect** is one that provides a real challenge to those in professional spheres dealing with security. There are people/firms whose interests are to obstruct the running of computers, or to install a program on them, which allows misuse. Formerly we mentioned shortly that in the course of data-input to a program, the user can give incorrectly formatted data (in case of a date of birth, the program may expect a number, say 5 or 05, but the user gives the name of the month – May – by mistake).

**DoS attack**

When this happens on purpose, and the goal is to stop a program in service from running, then this is a means of attack. It is called a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. Attacks falling into this group not only use the input as a target, but also exploit the vulnerabilities that can lead to the same result. Most of these vulnerabilities are built on an incorrect implementation of a contacting protocol. If within a short time a huge amount of this faulty contacting is initiated, in most cases the other computer will not be able to handle it in an acceptable way, so the computer slows down or crashes. Nevertheless, today the computers providing services (servers) have the capacity to take such a heavy load, so an effective DoS attack cannot be carried out by one attacker.

**DDoS attack**

Here the attack is launched from a number of computers simultaneously, or nearly so. One server acting alone cannot successfully defend itself against such an attack. This way of attacking is the so-called Distributed DoS (DDoS). This is like when a secretary has not only one boss who distributes tasks – at a pace she can handle easily and can complete all of the assigned tasks –, but lots of other bosses who are interrupting each other and continually giving her new tasks to do. She is unable to finish any previously assigned tasks, and she is constantly getting more and more new ones, just until she bangs her fist on the desk, stands up and walks out. While such a situation is not tolerated by humans, in the case of computers this is an accepted (but not normal) event.
The question comes up: how can an attacker get that many computers to attack servers successfully? Of course, it would not be “economical” to buy this amount of computers for this purpose; not to mention that in most cases the attackers are successfully identified, so after the attack all of the computers would be seized. To avoid this, the attacker gets the computers by passing the attacking program to everyday user’s computers, and the attack happens from there almost simultaneously (examples of this kind of DDoS program are Stacheldracht, Trinoo, or the Tribe Flood Network [3]).

But why do the users let this happen? In reality, they do not let it happen, most of them simply do not even know about it. The program gets to them in a roundabout way, and after starting, it contacts the attacker, practically logging in to ask for the target, the attack mode and time. Typical examples are the popular chat programs. The users can enter virtual chat rooms and can see the current discussion; they even can add comments to them. Someone uploads a picture that represents something unusual (for example a dog driving a Formula One car). This will interest many, and they ask for the picture. The attacker packs the picture into a self-unpacking packed file and attaches the attacking program as well. If this program is started, it unpacks itself, launches the attacking file and displays the picture. After generating this file, he tries to send it as soon as possible, and to as many users as possible, with the help of the chat program. If someone receives and launches this file, the attacking program launches and the received picture is also displayed, which presumably does not represent a dog in a Formula One car. Naturally, they mention it to the sender, so the attacker notices that they have launched the malicious consignment. Of course, he apologizes for having sent the wrong image by mistake, or he says he thought that the remote controlled car was a Formula One machine… But he does not even need these excuses, if he really has a picture like that. In addition, in this case these users may send the file on to their acquaintances, and it spreads further and further.

**Bots, bot herds**

From this time, on these computers this attacking program launches automatically every time the computer is turned on, and waits for the commands from the attack leader computer. Figuratively, this program behaves like a remote controlled robot. In the lingo, the computers running these programs are called “bots” or “zombies”. And the group of computers carrying out this attack simultaneously is called a “bot herd”. Each bot herd has serious value among attackers. They often hire out them by giving the password that the attack controller server can be reached with. Of course, they do not give the master password, used for taking over control of the bot herd again.
Figure 1: The structure of a Zombie-network

Today no solution is known that can guarantee the defence of servers against a DDoS attack. Although the cited examples did not happen in the recent past, they are well-known, and refer to the fact: how serious a DDoS attack can be. Known, successful DDoS attacks have happened against Yahoo, Amazon.com, eBay, Microsoft, etc. Although the servers can be saved from crashing – when the attack is noticed, administrators disconnect them from the Internet, or shut them down – in fact, the attack is successful in these cases as well, since during this time the service is not available.

Also for experts, it was a surprise that a successful DDoS attack reached the 13 root DNS server clusters [2], which provide the foundation of name resolution for the Internet function. When users browse or use other services, they give the name (and accessibility) of that computer, which provides this service. A well-known Hungarian news portal is for example Index.hu. Accessibility: http://www.index.hu. Similarly to mobile phones, when we look up the contact person from the phone book of the phone, we call the phone number of that person by pushing the call button. The same thing happens with using the Internet. To reach the index.hu page, the computer has to have the Internet address of the server (IP address). For the server of index.hu, this address is 217.20.130.97. (In a console window, the IP address can be easily found out using the command nslookup www.index.hu). This process (to allocate the IP address from the name) is carried out by DNS (Domain Name System) servers.
The address resolution is carried out hierarchically with the help of several servers, but there are some advantaged servers at the top of the whole hierarchy. These are called root DNS servers and are designed to handle enormous loads. Despite this, they can be stopped by a long-term DDoS attack.

**Buffer overflow attack**

Many methods of attack are known, but there is one with a long history that is still being used in significant numbers today. Briefly, its principle is the following: In order to be more transparent (and to be able to use the written program sections later and elsewhere), programs are written in sections. These section programs are called subroutines. When command series are needed for tasks which have to be carried out by the subroutines, first the current place in the running of the program is noted, then the subroutine gets the needed data for its task, and the running of the program continues in the subroutine. These data are called parameters, and the subroutine stores them temporarily in the computer’s memory. It carries out the commands, performs the needed procedures, then delivers the result to the calling program, and the program carries on, running from the original (previously stored) place. The subroutine can ask for more data from the user through the keyboard. If it does not check these, then these read-in data can overwrite the data, where the running of the program was before the invitation of the subroutine. In this way, we can change the direction of the running of the program, so that different commands are being carried out independently of the programmer's intentions. For example, the new command may be the installation of a DDoS program onto the computer.

**Security organizations**

Several organizations of good repute dealing with computer security are working to announce information about the discovered safety errors as rapidly as possible. One of these organizations is the SANS Institute [5] (SANS: SysAdmin, Audit, Networking and Security), established in 1982. Many countries’ official security organizations receive its security reports, including the Hungarian Hun-CERT (Hungarian Computer Emergency Response Team), working in the MTA SZTAKI organization. In a weekly report from 10 years ago (18 January 2002), they called attention to the possibility of 10 DoS and 4 buffer overflow attacks. In the latest report they warned of 2 DoS and 4 overflow attack possibilities.

Of course, some new vulnerability has appeared in the last 10 years. It can be generally stated that vulnerabilities are now more common that are not bound to one particular operating system or application, but rather concern as many
 systems as possible (an example is the method known as SQL injection, which concerns practically every database handling system based on SQL).

**Results**

Perhaps the most important result is that users, programmers, administrators and operators have realized the existence of these dangers. Courses have been held, and course teachers have been groomed. This has allowed secure software to be made, and have produced people who are capable of reviewing the security of previously designed software.

Returning to the initial traffic example, this is similar to the long-standing seat belt in cars. Tutorial videos have been made that present representations of accidents where the passengers did not fasten their seatbelts and where they did so. They explained why they are needed, how to set them, and how to use them. But after all this, it is the passengers’ decision whether to fasten them or not (taking into consideration that they can be fined for not doing so). The real solution is when the decision is not up to the passenger, but a system ensures proper security itself. An example for this is the ever more common airbag (though it requires the use of the seatbelt as well). From the perspective of software security the expectation is not to leave the creation of security features only to the programmer, but to have a system which provides for it itself. It is an achievement that such systems have already been made. To avoid buffer overflow attacks, several developing systems supporting the creation of C-language programs are available, where the system avoids being exploited by overflow attacks. The processor manufacturer Intel firm improves its processors by adding a feature called Data Execution Prevention (DEP). Since in case of an overflow attack, commands are placed in the area reserved for storing data, the implementation of commands in data areas can be obstructed. Switching on the DEP can prevent such an attack if DEP is supported by the operating system of our computer.

**Summary**

Reports of computer attacks have been around since the computer has appeared. Security systems try to protect computers from attacks. Unfortunately (as in the case of viruses), the attackers are always one step ahead. It resembles the problem of armour and anti-tank guns in military tactics, which is a continuous spiral. Thicker armour requires a more powerful anti-tank gun, against which a thicker amour is needed and this recurs constantly. Therefore, healthy suspicion is needed, so that we take care to download programs only from trusted sites, to see only trusted websites and to have adequate security.
software installed (e.g. Outpost Security Suit, Comodo Internet Security, Kaspersky Internet Security, etc.) (see the following table [6]).

**SOURCES**


[2] CISCO: *Defeating DDOS attacks*

[3] Dilip KUMAR: *Ethical Hacking and Countermeasures*

   (In: https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi/547-BSI.html, Download date: 17.05.2012)


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Table 1: Classification of security software on homepage of Matousec [6]
CONSULTATION

Col. ATTIKA TAKÁCS

THE HUNGARIAN MODEL OF DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION

Abstract:

Is there any tendency of integration within the defence administration after 2000? In all countries where the defence sector was revised during the last decade, the issue of integration appeared. What are the reasons for that? This is a complex issue; historical background; geostrategic position; security perception; security strategy, and other factors might be all behind the curtains. An integrated structure might prove to be successful in practice, however only under certain circumstances. The goals of integration might be: to generate better understanding between politicians and top military leaders; create a unity of efforts; provide a wide variety of tools for crisis management and ensure a more effective use of human resources. The following essay on the Hungarian model might help to create the reader’s own view on this topic, or even to establish a starting point for the development of a revised national MoD structure.

Keywords: Hungarian model, instrument of policy, integrated MoD structure, defence administration, democratic control of armed forces

We can recognise a tendency of integration within the defence administration after the turn of century, for instance in Czech Republic, India, Israel, Norway, Romania, and Slovakia. The integrations happened on different levels, depending on the historical background and traditions, the geostrategic position of the country, the security perception of society, the national security strategy, and many other factors. It is worth paying attention to the examination of this tendency.

The Hungarian Defence Ministry also has an integrated structure, including the General Staff, which is not usual inside the North–Atlantic Alliance. In some member countries it was also “tested” to develop the administration in this direction, but most of them concluded that the “traditional” structure – separate institutions – was more effective. The question might arise: “How does it work

1 08. 04. 2013
in Budapest?” How can two different functions be employed in the same organization with different operating philosophies?

The answers to the 21st century challenges are given in the National Security and Military Strategies. These strategies, which also have impact on the structures, determine the objectives to the Defence Administrations. Each objective should have an organisation to implement, according to the defence policy. In all countries where the defence sector was revised recently, the integration issue came up.

NATO has preserved the separated organisation so far, but the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan – accepted at the Bucharest Summit – indicates that it seeks for integrated solutions in the operational theatres, especially in reconstruction. Also the newly (2012 May) established Comprehensive Crises Operation Management Centre at ACO – determined in Lisbon – applies the integration in leading of operations.

It is a complex issue; and now, I invite the readers to establish their own view concerning the integration of political and military institutions.

According to the theorists, defence administration and defence staff should be separate in structure:

“Ministers of Defence, if they want to be successful, have to meet two conditions when developing and introducing such managerial tools and practices: they have to be part of the management framework of the general government and they should provide an organizational structure separated from the defence staff.”

However, in practice, the aforementioned criteria might be successful also in an integrated structure when competency borders are clearly marked, respected by both sides (political and military), and proper working methods are chosen to achieve the expected outcomes. Additionally, this structure supports the reduction of manpower in an organization on the strategic level, which was the goal of the Hungarian Defence Policy in order to balance the ratio between staffs and units.

Due to historical and geographical reasons, the Central-European countries, which previously belonged to the Warsaw Pact, had to adapt governmental structures quite often in the last two centuries, and develop new philosophies of

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defence management. This “periodical” change resulted in some sort of time jumping in the improvement of society and political institutions. The development stages were dependent upon the new international environment. Hungary was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with a monarchical dual-governmental system prior to WWI; between the two World Wars, our country became independent, creating her own monarchical administration with a strong German and Italian influence. After WWII, our country fell in the Soviet area of interest and was forced to establish a communist type system; finally in 1989, we stepped on the path of democratization.

After a rich historical journey, at the end of the 20th century, our nation had a strong eager for freedom and independence guaranteed by NATO within Europe. A complex social development process started in every aspect. A new generation of politicians grew up in the last 20 years; the economy was reformed under the pressure of compensation of the old system’s victims and world economical crises of recent times.

From an economical point of view, this period was also an art of balancing on the rope. The “east market” was nearly closed for the new alliance members after the soviet troops’ withdrawal from the area. In addition, there was no connection to the “western market”. The democratic governments of the last 20 years had to prove to the Hungarian society that joining Europe, in political terms, was a wise decision and the result could be seen not only in administration and legislation, but in living standards as well. However, state reserves could underpin this policy only for a limited time. Thus – not facing “a direct threat” – it became necessary to gradually reduce our military budget.

In the meantime, democratic governments in Hungary had to develop new defence policy, find the core function of the armed forces and use it as an instrument of security strategy of a new alliance member and an independent democratic country. The scientific society in Hungary supported these efforts:

“The use of military power and deadly violence should always be only in the hands of the democratic government. Hence the thesis that outside the state security sector there should be no military, paramilitary, police or intelligence organizations. All such organizations should be integrated and an overall political decision-making process should be applied – marked by civil control – in order to keep them effective and under democratic rule.”

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3 Hari Bucur-Marcu, Philipp Fluri, Todor Tagarev: Defence Management: An Introduction / p. 19
It is fully consistent with Clausewitz’s thesis written in Book Eight, in his work “On War”:

“Once again: war is an instrument of policy. It must necessarily bear the character of policy and measure by its standards. The conduct of war, in its great outlines, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws.”

There is no doubt about the principality of policy over the military leadership, but why should it exist in an integrated form? The answer is given by Clausewitz once again. Perhaps, in the time of Clausewitz, there was no expression of Defence Planning or Defence Management. If we examine the thoughts of the original author, we can find equivalency between the ancient “War Planning” and the modern Defence Planning process, which might prove the symbiosis of the governmental organization and defence staff, as follows:

“If war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities. But that, in turn, is only feasible if cabinet – that is, the government – is near the theatre of operations, so that decisions can be taken without serious loss of time. That is what the Austrian Emperor did in 1809, and the allied sovereigns in 1813 – 1815. The practice justified itself perfectly.”

This citation clarifies the historical roots of Hungarian governmental structure inherited from two centuries ago.

The combination of scientific theories, the examples of the NATO members’ governments, the historical roots, and the personal experiences of the new policy makers led to the creation of the following defence function structure in Hungary, shown in table 1.

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5 Equivalent with the Chief of Defense staff in he modern terminology.
6 “Clausewitz emphasizes the cabinet’s participation in military decisions, not the soldier’s participation in political decisions.” Carl von Clausewitz: ON WAR / Edited and Translated by Michael Howard, and Peter Paret / Princeton, New Jersey 1989 / Book 8 / Chapter 6 B / p. 608
According to the modern approach, we understand a wider meaning of national security. This requires the administration to have a strategy for all governmental sectors. The current ministries have their own strategies connected to the National Security Strategy. These include human rights, economic, financial, information, and environmental, healthcare, demographical, energy, political and military issues. The leading role in the execution of the National Security Strategy is allocated to the Defence Ministry. It has a coordinating and control role in the other ministries justified by the Defence Policy in creating and maintaining the necessary capabilities for the Standing Defence Plan.

A small country, like Hungary, does not have enough resources to ensure appropriate capabilities for the whole spectrum of operations. Therefore, the government has to make decisions on using mainly military or civil capability against a certain threat. The Civil Protection Planning focuses on the required civilian capabilities.

The other field of defence planning is the military force development, based on the military strategy to provide the required military instruments. However, due to limited military budget, it needs to be prioritized. The limited size of the
National Forces does not allow us to maintain the whole spectrum of arms and services economically. The missing military capabilities should be provided by international cooperation, which is the reason for establishing a separate organization within the MoD. A capability could be created by bilateral, multinational, or by alliance cooperation for instance Smart Defence and Pool & Sharing methods.

Those capabilities that can be afforded by national resources are developed in the Long Term Force Development Plan by the Defence Policy Directorate. This plan is forming the framework of the Defence Staff planning, according to the military axioms. It is the Long Term Plan that contains the goals and objectives to be achieved in the capability building process, written on the language of Defence Policy.

This directorate also deals with operational questions in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries. The directorate prepares defence political decisions and coordinates the political “flank” of the Defence Ministry. The political link to the alliance of NATO is represented with that directorate, taking part in the alliance political institutions.

Legal matters are an everyday issue to cope with; not only on the national level, but the international and operational theatres, these require a professional directorate as well. It is dealing with a wide variety of matters like preparing contracts, issuing Rules of Engagement, administrating the ministerial decisions, carrying out international legal harmonization, and exercising legal control over the defence institutions on a daily basis.

The Defence Economy Directorate is responsible for providing all the resources for the defence sector. In our language it is called producer logistic, which means more or less acquisition. Acquisition is the process by which equipment and/or services sourced from external agencies are used in the building of effective operational capability. The internal and external agencies are mainly defence industry suppliers from whom the required goods and outsourced services are provided through contractual arrangements that regulate the logistic chain of supply. The directorate fulfils the role of linkage to other national and international economy sectors.

The civilian side of the Ministry is led by a State Secretary. This position is on the same level as the Chief of Defence Staff (CHOD) on the military side within the ministry. The difference between the two sides can be distinguished

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8 Capability: “an operational outcome or effect that users of equipment need to achieve,” as defined in the HFI CMM Reference Material. Retrieved from http://www.processforusability.co.uk/HFIPRA/docs/reference_material.pdf
not only regarding the uniform and structures, but the leading method as well. The civil control is operating according to the management philosophy, focusing on the result, using formality, thinking incrementally, and oversees the progress in the defence sector.

The General Staff\(^9\), represents the military leadership in the Ministry, which consists of the traditional “J” branches; its structure shows strong similarity to the international strategic level staffs. The defence staffs have a set of predefined hierarchical command relationship and working method. The main role of the Staff is to translate the political decision into military language and streamline them to the military standards and planning system.

The General Staff is responsible for the following functions: human resource management, force planning, training & education, capability preservation & development, operations planning, consumption logistic planning, communication & information management of the Hungarian Defence Forces. Some of the traditional functions of the General Staff were delegated to Hungarian Joint Force Command; for instance conducting operations, when it was established in 2007. In some cases the work-sharing between the General Staff and Joint Force Command shows that the planning function remained on strategic level and the conducting role was delegated to the operational level.

The integrated Defence Ministry required a joint human resource management to identify the balance between the civil and military positions, establishing the equivalency and making possible to crosswalk between military and civilian positions. That allowed them to develop a unified organization and each member could find his/her position in the hierarchy. On each level of the organization of the Ministry there is an everyday cooperation between the two sides, according to competency borders, stated in the Organizational and Operational Procedures Directive.

As I mentioned before the State Secretary and the CHOD are the two “deputies” of the Minister. The second leading level was drawn at the “J” heads and directors positions. Each side has its own subordination; the general staff is the peak of the military structure, having some direct contact with headquarters support units. The political side has some subordinated companies performing the outsourced services, like industrial maintenance of main equipments, infrastructure management, cultural and military history institutions.

When we analyze a defence administration system, it is necessary to mention the role of the President. In war time, he is the Commander in Chief

\(^9\) There are some divisions filled by officers under the control of State Secretary supporting the defense policy directorate, together with the general staff they are forming the Defense Staff.
according to the constitution, supported by the National Security Committee, formed by parliamentary members, political party leaders and the CHOD. In peace time, he only has protocol functions towards the armed forces. He is periodically informed by the CHOD about the condition and the readiness level of the military forces. He promotes the selected colonels to the rank of general, visits the units which are deployed abroad, or takes part in disaster relief operations in home regions, and represents the State during National Ceremonies.

**Summary:** The two sides of the integrated Defence Ministry can complement each other with their special knowledge. It allows a reasonable exploitation of human resources, due to the lack of appropriate number of well-trained military and civilian experts, which is the consequence of the small size of the Hungarian defence sector. There is no misunderstanding when the political objectives are transformed into military ones, which is the most sensitive matter during a worst case scenario. These are also the most important lessons learned from the Second Lebanon War, which was the first failure of the Israeli Defence Forces in history. One of the reasons was that the political guidance provided to the military operation was not clear enough and military plans were not understandable for the politicians.

The Hungarian model might serve as a starting point to develop a new national MoD structure, not just for countries with similar challenges. All democratic governments must have the possibility to consider the whole range of options, when necessary, including the combination of political and diplomatic moves, military preparations without immediate military action, in order to maintain the full range of possible responses in a developing crisis. The lack of knowledge – how to use the military forces as a means of policy – might be avoided by having an Integrated Administration.

**Bibliography**

4. Table 1: Roles & Functions in the integrated Defence ministry. Own graph.

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GYÖRGY SUHA, PhD, Habil

SETBACK AND FAILURE: AFRICA TOWARDS AN ARMS TRADE TREATY

Abstract

The U.N. Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) would – for the first time – establish common international standards for authorizing international arms transfers, including basic regulations and approval protocols that would improve transparency and accountability. A prime purpose, according to the draft, is to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit trade in conventional arms, as well as their diversion to illegal and unauthorized end user. It would also prohibit signatories from delivering conventional weapons to those countries on which arms embargo is imposed or are charged with genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.

In July 2012, the diplomatic delegations from around the world failed to reach agreement on this landmark UN treaty to regulate the estimated $60 billion global arms trade business, as major weapons exporting nations – including the United States – said that more time was needed to finalize an agreement. The objective of this article is to overview the efforts of African governments and regional political institutions by highlighting national policies and preparatory positions on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).

Keywords: arms, weapons, ECOWAS, UN, Arms-Trade-Treaty, Africa, AU, SADC, ATT

It is the circulation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) that currently poses the greatest threat to global security and development. In Africa, if we consider the number of deaths, these weapons practically have served as weapons of mass destruction. Indeed Africa’s intra and inter state conflicts that are active in Africa today are fuelled by the easy availability, relative inexpensiveness, technical simplicity and easy mobility of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. In Africa where over 100 million small arms exist\(^2\), their effects are devastating. In a vicious cycle, they are both a cause and effect of violence. They not only kill and maim innocent people; but also prolong conflicts, choke development and deepen poverty.

\(^1\) (former ambassador, director of international relations of Wekerle Sandor Business School /WSUF/, Course Director of WSUF-Sorbonne Paris(IV) University, France)

Acquiring these weapons may constitute a stepping-stone towards any public crime, whether it is a petty robbery in the neighbourhood or an organised terrorist attack. According to moderate assessments, about 500,000 people are killed each year due to these weapons. An independent Canadian group of NGO’s estimates that around 640 million SALW exist in the world today (Griffiths-Fulton, 2006); civilians hold only 59 per cent of these legally. The exponential increase in the accessibility of SALWs amounts to the death of a civilian every minute and these weapons are the cause of 90 per cent of the death among civilians, whether it is a homicide or a suicide. Small arms proliferation has been particularly devastating in Africa, where machine guns, rifles, grenades, pistols and other small arms have killed and displaced many civilians across the continent. These weapons have been used in deadly conflicts in a dozen of countries. They are frequently recycled from country to country, and their ownership is transferred among fighters, security forces and war profiteers. In Central and Eastern Africa, many lives have been lost through conflict and its related effects. The irregular warfare that has been common there in recent decades is well served by these kinds of weapons, which are easily available and sometimes cost less than food items. In 1994, an intraethnic conflict in Rwanda left more than 800,000 people murdered, mostly with small arms, including machetes. Nearly 300,000 civilians have also lost their lives in the same way in Burundi. However, the foreign supply of arms to both governments and rebel groups continues to grow in illicit, ungoverned or poorly controlled transactions (Scherrer, 2004).

The small arms that are already in the subregion move easily across borders. The borders between Cameroon, Chad and the Central African Republic have been identified specifically as areas of high proliferation. Small arms and light weapons are widely available in southern Africa as well. Civil and interstate conflicts drive demand for small arms and create a pool of weapons that can also be used to commit violent crimes. Most were transferred there during the Cold War, but some others originate from within the region. South Africa maintains a sizable arms production industry. There is also another aspect of the issue here: the cultural significance of the AK-47 for the formerly colonized peoples of southern Africa. After decades of use by

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Remark: The lead agencies in the Control Arms campaign were Oxfam, Amnesty International, and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), to which Ploughshares belongs. 
anticolonial and antiapartheid movements, the powerful weapon has come to be associated with liberation. For example, the silhouette of a gun is featured on the Mozambican flag. Freedom songs from the struggles against minority rule in Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Angola often extolled the virtues of the AK-47, and those of the fighters carrying it. Recognizing the problems posed by its proliferation, many countries are involved in coordinated action, mainly within the framework of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The estimated 8 million small arms that are circulating throughout western Africa play a central role in fostering instability. Demand for small arms in West Africa is motivated by weak governance, insecurity and poverty. The supply comes mostly from external sources. They have been used in armed robberies, intra- and intercommunal feuds, local wars, armed insurrections, armed rebel activities and terrorism. They are used to facilitate drug trafficking, smuggling and other crimes. Overall, small arms maintain a general state of fear. As a result of the armed conflict in the region, many people have been killed, many others displaced or became refugees and their properties were destroyed. Every country in West Africa has experienced widespread violence in which small arms had a significant role.

Africa is still home to numerous post-conflict regions and areas with civil unrest and can be considered as serious top market segment of the 60 billion USD global arms trade as well. Abundance in SALW carries a great fear during the conflicts emerging in the regions of Maghreb-Zone. Post-conflict subsaharan countries like Sudan, Angola, Burundi, – recently Mali or Cote d’Ivoire – and Democratic Republic of the Congo haven’t yet sustained peace in their nations. Failed countries like Somalia, Guinea-Bissau also require special attention towards peacekeeping and stabilization. In South and East Africa, illegal arms have caused an increase in social turmoil and have also fuelled instability. The struggle for resources in poverty-stricken areas within Africa is another major factor as to why SALW are being traded illicitly. Many hostile groups look for weapons to counter their corrupt governments and the cheapest and fastest way of doing so is through the underground trading of firearms.

The global trade in conventional weapons – including SALW – remains poorly regulated. No set of internationally agreed standards exists to ensure that arms are only transferred for appropriate use.

**Institutional efforts from 2001 to 2009**

After much preliminary investigation in the impact of small arms on civilians and societies around the world, the United Nations convened a conference in 2001. The purpose of the conference was to decide on steps that nations should take to prevent illicit trade in small arms. Nongovernmental
organizations also participated by presenting evidence on the difficulty in separating legal and illegal transfers, and calling for tough controls on both state and non-state weapons sellers. The result of the 2001 conference was a Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (POA). The POA reflects that the problem of small arms transcends political borders, and that solutions must be multilateral and multilevel. Some of the major commitments of the UN Programme of Action include the following:

- Make illicit gun production/possession a criminal offense
- Establish a national coordination agency on small arms
- Identify and destroy stocks of surplus weapons
- Keep track of officially held guns
- Issue end-user certificates for exports/transit
- Disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) ex-combatants, including collecting and destroying their weapons
- Mark guns at their point of manufacture for identification and tracing
- Maintain records of gun manufacture
- Include civil society organizations in efforts to prevent small arms proliferation

The POA does have a few weaknesses. Specifically, it is not binding and does not indicate how to regulate small arms among civilian populations. Nor does it touch upon non-state actors, state officials’ misuse of arms, the role of public health and gender considerations or human rights.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took the lead in devising strategies to control the spread and misuse of small arms in Africa. In 2006 member states signed a Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials. It is a legally binding document that was predated by the ECOWAS Moratorium. It entered into force in September 2009. Highlights of the Convention include the following:

- A ban on international small arms transfers (except those for legitimate self-defense and security needs, or for peace support operations)
- A ban on transfers of small arms to non-state actors that are not authorized by the importing member state
- Procedures for shared information
- A stringent regulatory scheme for anyone wishing to possess small arms
- Strong management standards to ensure the security of weapons stockpiles
The Convention draws attention to gender perspectives and local manufacture of small arms and light weapons. The Convention led to the creation of the ECOWAS Small Arms Unit, responsible for policy issues related to the Convention. The ECOWAS Small Arms Programme (ECOSAP) was also created in 2006 as a five-year capacity-building program based in Mali.

In 2004, 11 states signed the Nairobi Protocol, a legally binding document that strengthens the Nairobi Declaration of 2000 and commits signatory states to concrete actions, including mandatory gun registration and a ban on the civilian ownership of military assault rifles (like the AK-47), to deal with the problems caused by small arms in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions. It requires these countries to incorporate provisions into their national laws, including the following:

- A ban on civilian ownership of automatic and semiautomatic rifles
- Registration of all guns
- Regulation of gun storage and competency testing for prospective owners
- Restrictions on the number of guns a person can own
- A ban on pawning guns
- Uniform minimum standards regulating the manufacture, control, possession, import, export, transit, transport and transfer of small arms
- Standardized marking and identification of small arms
- Regulation of security companies
- Uniform tough sentencing for unlicensed gun possession

The Protocol is monitored and implemented by a Secretariat known as the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), which works actively with civil society.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) adopted a protocol to control the flow of small arms and light weapons in the subregion called the SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials. It entered into force in 2004. The main goal of this Protocol is to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related materials, and regulate the import and export of legal small arms. Among the Protocol’s provisions there is the standardization of legislation on private ownership, and harmonized record-keeping of state-owned

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guns, along with the destruction of surplus state weapons. It also includes regulation of brokers and provisions for marking and record-keeping.

The above-mentioned agreements require national legislation to have a real effect, and it is even more helpful if those laws are harmonized between states. Even if they are not part of a subregional agreement, governments should take action to ensure responsible use and trade, and institute programs to reduce the amount of weapons in circulation. These goals can be achieved in a variety of ways. Limiting civilians’ access to inappropriate weapons and instituting licensing processes – similar to a driver’s license – is one fundamental step forward, as is ensuring the safe storage of small arms, marking and registering newly made guns, registering all guns to their owners and playing a larger role in all aspects of international trade.

**African initiatives from New York to Addis Ababa**

At the end of 2009 the United Nations General Assembly decided\(^7\) to convene a conference on the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2012 "to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms". The General Assembly also decided that four Preparatory Committee meetings (PrepComs) should be held to lay the groundwork before the final negotiations. The first PrepCom took place in July 2010, the second was in February–March 2011, the third in July 2011 and the fourth in February 2012.

In this complex, long-lasting preparatory phase, the African political aspects were always in focus of the global parties, as most of the African governments were actively engaged in negotiations to finalize details for a new global agreement premised to fight “terrorism”, “insurgency” and “international crime syndicates”\(^8\) (Bell, 2012).

The third ATT PrepCom\(^9\) was almost entirely focused on the implementation of an ATT in African context. The diplomats, representatives and security experts as well as civil NGO-s, like African States and International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) members were vocal and active throughout the meeting. With support from the Government of Belgium, IANSA members from francophone Africa participated in a series of events and activities alongside fellow civil society representatives.

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\(^9\) was held in New York on 11-15 July 2011
African states were much visible from the first day of the PrepCom. The African Group, represented by Nigeria, called for an ATT that would bridge existing gaps in current regulatory frameworks to enhance the controls on global arms production, stockpiling and trade among States and be an effective deterrent to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit trade in conventional weapons. The Treaty should also assist in preventing national and regional instability caused by the proliferation of and easy access to illicit small arms and light weapons.

The Group stated further that discussions on an ATT should cover not only a detailed outline of the procedures for enforcement, verification, transparency and information sharing and accountability in arms transfers, but also mechanisms to review existing regulatory frameworks. In this context, the Treaty should also provide sufficient provisions on international cooperation as a treaty obligation, including training and building of institutional and human resources in developing States, objective, well identified and measurable criteria as well as clear requirements for all transfers of conventional weapons.

Zimbabwe supported the African position regarding a clear legal framework which regulates the trade in small arms and light weapons. The United Republic of Tanzania also supported the inclusion of SALW and the international community to act to stop the suffering, crime, and conflict caused by the proliferation of small arms. Senegal also reaffirmed their support for the inclusion of SALW and ammunition in the treaty.

Zambia stated that the ATT will be implemented by several countries that either lack or have underdeveloped export control systems. Therefore the effective implementation of the treaty will depend largely on states cooperating with, and assisting each other. Zambia supported the establishment of a small, focused and independent Implementation Support Unit (ISU), as an instrument to enhance implementation.

Ghana also stressed that an ISU should be established as an independent, standalone body that should assist states in implementing the treaty, identifying gaps in national control systems and producing comprehensive national reports. Kenya maintained that states’ reports should cover all data on transfers and authorisations of transactions, but acknowledged that smaller states may face challenges in reporting regularly. Algeria suggested that reporting should be made only on a voluntarily basis. South Africa expressed concern about the possible obligation to report on “transfer denials”, arguing that such information may be sensitive and in some cases confidential for national security reasons.
Supporting the overall African position, Burundi believed that the victim’s assistance should help to comfort the heart and heal wounds left by violence due to the illicit trade of weapons. Burundi also urged that gender and socio-economic development need to be addressed. Malawi stated to be in favour of a robust treaty that supports peace and security as well as International Humanitarian Law. Nigeria stated that the ATT should enter into force after a minimum number of states have ratified it, and proposed 30 or 40 ratifications to ensure a quick process. Algeria suggested 60 ratifications.

In the light of the above, the African expectations toward the planned treaty were highly rated. Two months later, in May, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, through its Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (RCPDA), held the African Regional Consultations on the Arms Trade Treaty at the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The meeting was organized jointly with the International Action Network on Small Arms, in cooperation with the African Union Commission, sponsored by the Government of Australia. The regional consultations enabled experts from African States to discuss the different issues that arise in the Arms Trade Treaty Conference, in the light of the debate which took place during the preparatory process on key issues, including the treaty’s scope, criteria and implementation. Experts also discussed a possible African common position on the Treaty.

The consultations brought together governmental experts from 54 African countries, as well as officials from the United Nations, the African Union and African regional economic communities. Speakers included the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Angela Kane; the President-designate of the Arms Trade Treaty Conference, Ambassador R. G. Moritán; and the African Union Peace and Security Commissioner, Ramtane Lamamra. Leading regional and international think-tanks and non-governmental organizations also took part in the meeting as observers.

It was reconfirmed that the lack of an international framework on arms exports has obscured transparency and trust and contributed to the widespread availability and misuse of arms, which perpetuates conflict and undermines development. The RCPDA has provided technical support to Central and West African States in elaborating common positions on the Arms Trade Treaty, including the elaboration of a draft African common position.

According to the African evaluation the draft treaty would require all countries to establish national regulations to control the transfer of conventional arms and to regulate arms brokers. It would prohibit states that ratify the treaty from transferring conventional weapons if they would violate arms embargoes.
or if they would promote acts of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.

In considering whether to authorize the export of arms, the draft says a country must evaluate whether the weapon would be used to violate international human rights or humanitarian laws or be used by terrorists, organized crime or for corrupt practices.

The draft treaty reaffirmed "the sovereign right and responsibility of any state to regulate and control transfers of conventional arms that take place exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional systems." And it stated clearly that the treaty's aim is to establish the highest standards "for regulating, or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms" — not domestic trade.

Member States of the African Union have always been actively engaged in the negotiations to seek the views of member states of the UN on the feasibility, scope and parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument, establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, the ATT. According to AU’s statement it could be recalled that the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the “African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons” in December 2000, as Africa’s first input to the negotiations on the United Nations (UN) Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPOA). In this Declaration, member states undertook to identify, seize and destroy illicit weapons. The Declaration also provided for the establishment of measures to control the circulation, transfer and use of SALW.

The 8th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union (AU) adopted a decision10, requesting the Commission to take the necessary steps towards the establishment of a legally binding instrument to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and weapons in Africa. To this end, the Commission established a mechanism for coordination, policy guidance, research, and monitoring circulation of SALW through the ad hoc AU-Regions Steering Committee on SALW. It comprised the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Inter-Governmental Bodies with a small arms mandate. The main task of this Steering Committee was to enhance the capacity and harmonize and coordinate the efforts of the AU, the RECs and Regional Bodies with a SALW mandate to implement their programmes, and

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enhance cooperation and synergy across the regions in the fight against illicit proliferation and trafficking of SALW.

In this regard, the Steering Committee has developed the draft “African Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons”\(^\text{11}\). The draft Strategy was adopted by member states experts at the meeting that was held 26-29 September 2011 in Lome, Togo and was submitted to the Executive Council in June 2012 for adoption. The experts also elaborated an African Common Position on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) during the same meeting. The relevant draft has been adopted by the Executive Council in June 2012, and it gave a common framework for all AU member states in order to actively uphold what they have collectively shared to be key areas of the final Arms Trade Treaty.

**Failure and frustration**

Despite all political efforts and the fact that the majority of the African governments have voiced concern about the absence of globally agreed rules for all states to guide their decisions on arms transfers, the United Nations Conference on an Arms Trade Treaty held in July 2012, could not result in an agreement, however governments remain committed to concluding the process in the near future.

The need for a robust legally binding instrument to establish high common standards for international trade in conventional arms is obvious, but the pathway is not based on wide consensus. According to the media reports\(^\text{12}\), some diplomats and supporters blamed first the United States for the unravelling of the month-long negotiating conference. The American delegation – jointly with China and Russia – announced on the last day that it needed more time to consider the proposed treaty.

"This was stunning cowardice by the Obama administration, which at the last minute did an about-face and scuttled progress toward a global arms treaty, just as it reached the finish line," said Suzanne Nossel, executive director of Amnesty International USA. "It's a staggering abdication of leadership by the world's largest exporter of conventional weapons to pull the plug on the talks just as they were nearing an historic breakthrough."\(^\text{13}\)


\(^{13}\) Arms treaty must wait after UN agreement fails, Associated Press / Fox News, 2012.júl.28.
The failure of the parties to reach agreement before their self-imposed deadline caused dull sentiment of remorse that fell over the conference, as the high hopes for reaching an agreement ended dashed. Both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama withdrew their support in the last session when it became apparent that the agreement would not be finalized.

The United States insisted that a treaty had to be approved by consensus of all 193 UN member states. Ambassador Moritán, the conference chairman, said that the treaty supporters knew "this was going to be difficult to achieve." In his opinion, the negotiations failed because some delegations didn't like the draft, while "the overwhelming majority in the room did." He added that some countries had "different views" from the very beginning, including Syria, Iran and D.P.R Korea. However, at the end of the negotiating session, Mexico read a joint statement from more than 90 countries saying they "are determined to secure an Arms Trade Treaty as soon as possible." The UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon said he was disappointed at the failure to agree on a treaty, calling it "a setback." But Ban said he was encouraged that states have agreed to continue pursuing a treaty and pledged his robust support. Despite the failure to reach agreement, African leaders were still optimists and predicted that there were several options for moving forward in the General Assembly, before the new session begins, definitely not in 2012.
MARIKANA SHOOTINGS: PAY DISPUTE OR CRISIS OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRACY?

Abstract

South Africa is a regional great power in sub-saharan Africa. It has a great influence on the development of the whole African continent. Recent events might influence the future political structure of the country. The Marikana shootings in August 2012 killed 34 miners, more than any clashes between police and demonstrators since the end of apartheid. The massacre was compared with the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 and caused countrywide strike movements. As a simple pay dispute grew in significance, it had increasingly showed the lack of real leadership on the part of the government, the trade unions, the business circles and the police. As the role of mining in South Africa is extremely important, the shootings became a symbol of crisis of the South African democracy. The so called “Miner’s Spring” is a real wake-up call for the ruling ANC to deal with the country’s major issues: increasing poverty, housing shortages and a yawning gap between rich and poor. The events of Marikana may prove to be a watershed in the decline of the ANC’s legitimacy and its political power. However, to question the potential role of the ANC – as a credible, ethical and moral leader in preventing conflict – will be a painfull process.

Key words: South Africa, ANC, Marikana shootings, mining industry, trade unions, COSATU, Sharpeville Massacre, Jacob Zuma, Desmond Tutu, Cyril Ramaphosa, Oppenheimer Empire, LONMIN, pay dispute, labour conflicts, unequal society, increasing poverty, electoral support.

South Africa is a regional great power in sub-saharan Africa, thanks to its dominant economic „superpower” position. Without exercising political hegemony, it has a great influence on the events on the whole continent and even beyond. Since December 2010, it became full member of BRICS, an association of leading emerging powers. It takes part in most African peace keeping and other humanitarian operations on the African continent and plays a crucial role in the joint military operations between the European Union and the African Union.1 For the future of the whole continent is of great importance what path the development of this economic giant of Africa will choose. Recent events in the country might influence the direction the country will go in.

On 16 August 2012 in an incident between striking miners and the South African police force, 34 people died and 75 were injured. All the victims were killed within three minutes in a barrage of automatic gunfire. Most of them came from the Eastern Cape, from Pondoland in particular – a stronghold for the acting president of the country, Jacob Zuma. 270 miners were arrested and charged with the murder of their colleagues. The shootings made immediately headlines; the press reacted quickly in recognizing the significance of the tragedy and described it as a „national catastrophe“. COSATU, the Congress of South African Trade Unions issued a strong statement in which the tragic events were called a „colossal disaster“. 2 Cyril Ramaphosa, a hero of the anti-apartheid struggle, who in 1987 led a key strike of the miners against the white minority regime, wrote about the massacre that it represents „probably the lowest moment in the short history of a democratic South Africa.“ 3 Six days prior to the shootings, the miners initiated a wildcat strike because of poor pay. In the first days of the strike, already four miners, two police officers, and two security guards were killed. The police officers were hacked to death with machetes by strikers, the mine security guards were burned alive. The violence between two competing trade unions, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) 4 and its emerging rival, the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) 5 led to the initial fatalities. In the last couple of years the presence of the two trade unions led to clashes between miners all over the country but they did not escalate and the police did not open fire on striking workers.

Another Sharpeville?

The killing of 34 striking miners has opened up wounds in South Africa. The shootings which happened in a platinum-mine in Marikana 6 near Nkanini, 100 kilometres northwest of Johannesburg, North West Province, became known as the deadliest incident of violence between police and civilians in the country since the Sharpeville Massacre during the apartheid era. More than half a century ago, on 21 March 1960 in Sharpeville, in an African township an undisciplined police force opened fire in a panic reaction, when Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) 7 demonstrators burnt they pass books. The PAC leader, Robert

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4 The National Union of Mineworkers with a membership of 300,000 miners is the older (1982) and the larger trade union of the mining branch and is considered as a COSATU-affiliated and African National Congress-allied organisation.
5 The Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union is a breakaway faction of NUM, formed in 1998 and unlike the NUM is considering itself apolitical and noncommunist.
6 Marikana, former Rooioppies, is a small town in Rustenburg local municipality. Once it was home of the farm of Paul Kruger, president of the South African Republic.
Sobukwe and his followers accused the African National Congress (ANC) leaders, many of whom were at that time banned, of being out of touch with the African population, as they would call, „the masses”. The PAC leadership was stirred by Nkrumah who led Ghana to independence and his call for the freedom of all of Africa. They believed that more militant tactics would give Africans a greater self-confidence to overthrow the hated apartheid system. This was an anti communist and anti white movement, radical and racial. The PAC congress called for „African males in every city and village to leave their passes at home, join demonstrations and, if arrested, to offer no bail, no defence, and no fine.”

The „Pan-African explosion” was declared as a non-violent, disciplined and sustained protest campaign against the Pass Laws, but offering openly the opportunity for the the other side to „demonstrate to the world how brutal they can be.” The police did not disappoint the PAC leadership, during the Sharpeville Massacre 69 people were killed and 178 wounded. Those who died were mostly shot in the back.

As the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Desmond Tutu, the retired archbishop of Cape Town formulated, the Sharpeville Massacre was a watershed in the South African history with long living consequences: „The pernicious and debilitating legacy of apartheid, firmly entrenched for a long half-century and enforced with ruthless efficiency, is going to be with us for many a long day yet.” Sharpeville Massacre is by far not the only black page in the South African history, „ruthless and unjustifiable acts”, like the Soweto Uprising, the Rand Revolt, the St James Church Massacre, the Bisho Massacre, the Boipatong Massacre, the Shell House Massacre, or the Leliefontein Massacre did happen during the colonial as well as during the apartheid era. But 1994, the „pacted transition”, has promised an end of such bloody conflicts. As a matter of fact the violence never stopped. In this year alone other fatal incidents happened, including a six-week strike at Impala Platinum (Implats) in February, which left three dead and an attack on Aquarius Platinum in August which also left three people dead. The recent remilitarisation of the South African Police Service (SAPS) is also seen as it was not about mobilising to win a war against a specific enemy. It led to an attitude of seeing public order maintenance as a form of warfare. For many, it is reflective of concepts of „asymmetric war” in which the police forces engage in „low-intensity” but very violent conflicts with a range of non-state actors from „terrorists” and armed gangs to „insurgent” publics, like the striking miners. The Independent Police Investigations Directorate has seen a substantial increase of deaths in police custody and reports of abuse and torture by officers.

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11 Christopher McMichael: The South African Police Service and the Public Order War. Has the remilitarisation of the police led to an attitude of seeing public order maintenance as a form of
The recent developments appear to repeat the work of colonial and apartheid authorities. The explanation given by the police was that the shootings in Marikana only happened after the strikers refused to peacefully dissemble, and that lethal force was approved as a last resort as armed strikers attempted to swarm police lines. Against this narrative speaks a large number of evidence and suggests that rather than being an act of self-defence, the killings were part of a premeditated plan to stop the strike. The SAPS is in recent years often accused that in a labour-capital conflict made „war on the poor”, aided by the private security sector. In this regard, to speak about a new Sharpeville is clearly a journalistic exaggeration. South Africa is now a firmly established constitutional democracy, but the Marikana incident is admittedly a watershed in the South African politics. The “sheer symbolism” of policemen shooting at protesters would have suggested to many South Africans that “little has changed and that the state still serves a small rich minority rather than the impoverished majority.”

Most analysts agreed that the shootings in Marikana showed lack of leadership at the levels of the government, trade unions, business circles and the police. It was causing a breakdown in the system and led to the tragic events. Moeletsi Mbeki, an economist and brother of the former South African president said in an interview: „It’s a 140-year-old problem. The mining industry in South Africa effectively started in 1870. Marikana is telling us that the change in 1994 was to incorporate the black elite into the socioeconomic system that the white elite had been running for 140 years. It is a formula loaded with conflict in which violence keeps repeating itself.”

**Mining in the South African economy**

The role of mining in South Africa was extremely important since the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and of gold in 1886. Since the late 19th century it has shaped the country politically, culturally and economically. The sector has provided the critical mass for a number of industries that are either suppliers to the industry, or users of its products, like energy, financial services, water and engineering services, and specialist seismic geological and metallurgical services. In mining-related employment are engaged more than one million people, so the mining industry is one of the country’s major employers. It

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generates an annual income exceeding 330 billion South African Rand (ZAR), i.e. about 30 billion Euro. Two of the world’s largest mining companies have their origins in South Africa. BHP Billiton was the result of a merger between South Africa’s Billiton and the Australian BHP Group. Anglo American Plc.—with a primary listing on the London Stock Exchange and secondary listing in Johannesburg — owns many major subsidiaries, including Anglo Platinum, Anglo Coal, Impala Platinum and Kumba Iron Ore. Especially the „Oppenheimer Empire”, the Anglo American PLC is important for the country. It is considered the world’s largest gold-mining organization. Through its 45-percent share in De Beers, the company has a major interest in the distribution of 80 percent of the world’s rough-diamond production. The company was formed in 1917 as South Africa’s first home-based public limited company, called the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa (AAC), and has since become a unique multinational group, headquartered in London, England. The company dominates South Africa’s domestic economy, with interests in an estimated 1,300 South African companies and control of at least one-quarter (and possibly as much as two-fifths) of the South African stock market. The group’s corporate structure is based only in part on majority share ownership of subsidiary, associate, and other companies.

The overall impact of mining on the economy is substantial, as it employs directly half a million, informally more than a million people. In 2009 mining accounted for 6% of total non-agricultural formal employment in the economy and 7.8% of total private sector non-agricultural employment. The mining sector over the past 140-years has provided the critical mass for the development of South Africa, e.g. the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) was originally established on the basis of funding the mining sector in the late 19th century. The mining sector still accounts for a significant one third of the market capitalisation of the JSE and continues to act as a magnet for foreign investment in the country. Once established, the JSE was able to provide the basis for “capital-raising” for other sectors of the economy as well.

In 1970 mining still accounted for more than 20% of South Africa’s GDP. By 1980 it achieved above 22 %. During the „mining boom” of the last decade, the South African mining industry was shrinking by 1%, while the world average growth was about 5% per annum. Nationalisation talks, not enough investment, labour unrest but also diversification of the economy was the reason

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Retrieved 18 October 2012.

15 South African mining industry snapshot 2009.

Retrieved 9 October 2012.
why by 2010 the share of mining in the GDP went down to 6%. Nevertheless, the industry is still indirectly contributing to one fifth of the GDP. The sector is smaller now than it was in 1994, when the crippling international sanctions against the apartheid regime were all lifted, though it is still overwhelming in one respect, if secondary beneficiated minerals are added, about 60% of the exports are commodities from mining. According to an estimation done by the Citibank in 2010, South Africa has 2.5 trillion Rands (220 billion Euros) worth of mineral reserves. Mining is important in more than one way, it is crucial in the fight against poverty and underdevelopment. It is the largest contributor by value to black economic empowerment in the South African economy.

Today, South Africa is the world’s largest producer of platinum, chrome, manganese, vanadium, and other minerals. The platinum group metals (PGM) sector has become the largest employer, contributing 36% of total mining employment, followed by the gold and coal sectors respectively. Along with Russia, platinum mining in South Africa produces a total of 90% of the world’s platinum demand – which is about 130 tonnes per year. In the north western part of South Africa, there is the famous platinum belt, or Bushveld Complex, which has been mining since 1897. The belt is known for PGMs with associated copper, nickel and cobalt. It extends over 65,000 km² and reaches up to 8 km in thickness. It is by far the largest known layered igneous intrusion in the world and contains most of the world’s resources of PGMs (and of chromium and vanadium as well). This area accounts for more than 90% of South Africa’s platinum production. Five of the largest platinum-producing mines are located in the Rustenburg area.

Most platinum production in 2002 was from the big three producers, Anglo Platinum, Impala and Lonmin. In the last decade substantial contributions are being made by a second generation of producers like Aquarius, ARM and Eastplats. In line with the expansion of the platinum industry, a number of new mines were set into operation, like Platinum Australia and Platmin. Lonmin’s Marikana operations produce the majority of its PGM (752,000 oz of platinum in 2007). It was here that the brutal violence of August 16 occurred. The new Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union, which has won over tens of thousands of its members to unseat the long-established and politically connected National Union of Mineworkers. The new union charges that the

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19 Ibid. p. 369.
20 Ibid. p. 375.
national union is no longer aggressively pressing for higher wages and better working conditions because its leadership is too entrenched with the government and is cozying up to the management of big mining firms. The leaders of NUM have been accused by the rival trade union, AMCU of having benefited from the new South Africa while little has changed for ordinary miners. From the miners the rock drill operators have the most physically demanding jobs. They earn only around R10,000 (less than 900 Euros) a month, and after deductions take home about R4,500 (400 Euros). On the other hand, the CEO of Lonmin, Marikana’s owner, earned R15.8m (1.5m Euros) last year. Those miners, who are in formal employment cling on to their jobs, for fear that they may never get one again. The postapartheid combination of political and economic liberalization challenges the promise of social emancipation. There is a general sense of systemic unfairness, people resent the fact that so many whites can prosper, based on the social, financial and educational advantages obtained during the apartheid years.

The Marikana mine, about two hours driving distance northwest of Johannesburg, is listed on both the London Stock Exchange and Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and is the world’s third largest platinum producer. The bulk of its 28,000 employees work in the mine, and around 23% belong to the AMCU. After the shootings, the media was showing miners living in ghettos of corrugated iron shacks without running water or electricity. That provided an example of the failure of social justice and fair payment. One of the richest platinum mines in the world was not only paying several times less salaries than miners would get for the same jobs on other continents, but the actually payed wages were not enough for a decent life either. Lonmin must have been confident of this. The company ignored the nearby Nkaneng shack settlement’s degradation. The lack of clean running water, sanitation, storm-water drainage, electricity, schools, clinics and any other amenities made Nkaneng an inhospitable residential site to reproduce labour power, yet Lonmin’s approach to the community’s troubles was tokenistic. Instead of building decent company housing for migrant workers, for example, it paid an inadequate „living out allowance” to support rental payments in shacks, a sum of around 150 Euros per

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22 Ibid.
month, which was in many cases just added to wages for remittance to the home region, leaving Nkaneng nearly uninhabitable.26

Such conditions persuaded the ANC’s leadership to seek peace with the „give us the mines” radicals and to agree to set up an inquiry. It was seen as a victory for the party’s powerful and militant Youth League. Under the slogan „economic freedom in our time”, it has been pressing the government to take over at least 60% of all mines, without compensation, to distribute the country’s wealth more fairly. This, the league argued, would accord with the 1955 Freedom Charter’s call for: „The People Shall Share in the Country’s Wealth!... The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole”.27

“Miner’s Spring” or wake-up call for ANC?

The Marikana shootings provided an illustrated example of the failure of the South African government to deal with the country’s major issues: increasing poverty, housing shortages and a yawning gap between rich and poor. Many are asking the question: is the young South African democracy at risk of falling apart? Widespread crime (215,000 people were murdered in the first decade after the end of apartheid), an AIDS epidemic (more people are infected with HIV than anywhere else in the world), and a government rife with corruption stain the miracle of the peaceful transition to full democracy in 1994.28

The ANC was already starting to lose electoral support before Marikana and sinking into factionalism. The party is accused of enriching tiny black elite, while failing to bring decent education, healthcare and jobs to the poor. In recent years South Africa has replaced Brazil as the most unequal society. It was always one of the most unequal countries in the world. The unemployment rate reached in second quarter of 2012 nearly 25 %. The illiteracy rate among 15 to 24 year olds in 2009 was almost 10 %. More than 25% of population was living on less than $2 a day in 2006. Seven per cent of children below the age of five were severely malnourished in 2010. The under-five infant mortality rate was 104 per 1,000 live births in 2007. The congress of trade unions complained that the poorest 10 percent of South Africans share R1.1 billion (less, than 100 million Euros) while the country’s richest 10 percent has R381 billion (nearly 44 billion Euros).29 The top decile of the South African population accounts for 58 percent of the country’s income, while the bottom decile accounts for 0.5

percent and the bottom half less than 8 percent.\textsuperscript{30} According to the self-determination of the ANC, it is a „disciplined force of the left”, and its „policies are rooted in the needs and aspirations of the overwhelming majority of South Africans, many of whom are poor.”\textsuperscript{31} Indeed, in a country of more than fifty million inhabitants, four-fifths of whom are black, only some three million blacks are considered to belong to the „middle class”, with a small but growing portion of society, nearly half a million new entrants a year.\textsuperscript{32}

The „scramble for limousines” of the new elite is seriously damaging the fame of the ANC and its leadership. The events of Marikana may prove to be a watershed in the decline of the ANC’s legitimacy and its political power. As the ANC has increasingly been undermined by the stench of corruption and power abuses, its inability to undo the sharp socio-economic inequalities of the apartheid era combined with a record of mediocre economic growth may finally be corroding the enormous capital of good will it gained by leading the struggle against the white minority rule.\textsuperscript{33}

The once a courageous anti-apartheid warrior, Cyril Ramaphosa, who now sits on the board of Lonmin, had to apologise in the national radio for extravagantly bidding R18m (more than 1,7 million Euros) for a prize buffalo.\textsuperscript{34} His example is not without parallel from the ranks of the new black elite. The South African president’s son Duduzane is co-owner of a company, the platinum belt region’s largest firm, specialising in short-term labour outsourcing, called „labour broking”. Though the company denied this, it had a recognition agreement with the pro-government trade union. Nor is it a secret that the president’s nephew, Khulubuse Zuma plays a destructive role in nearby gold-mining territory as Aurora co-owner, along with Nelson Mandela’s grandson and Zuma’s lawyer. That mining house has perhaps the single most extreme record of ecological destructiveness and labour conflict in the post-apartheid era, reflecting how white-owned mining houses gave used-up mines with vast Acid

Mine Drainage liabilities to new black owners, who are ill-equipped to deal with the inevitable crises.35

Desmond Tutu expressed his outrage at failing politicians in South Africa. The archbishop emeritus spoke out against greed, failing schools and „nightmare of Marikana”. Nevertheless, there is little indication that the Marikana fiasco will cause the authorities to realize that the restoration of public order can not be a new form of warfare. However, to question the potential role of the ANC – as a credible, ethical and moral leader in preventing conflict36 – will be a painful process for many black voters.37

**Literature:**


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UN PEACEKEEPING IN NAMIBIA

Abstract

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group operation in Namibia in 1989 was a turning point in the shift from traditional peacekeeping procedure to a new generation of multidisciplinary process. It represented a political mission, a peacemaking mission and a peace building operation, all in one. The host country, Namibia can be found on the south-western part of the African continent. And today, it is considered to be a safe, stabile state where there are no gunfights or political persecution any more, so the country is rarely presented in the CNN news. This article is about the way how Namibia became a liberated state and about a successful new UN mission generation, along with the Hungarian role in police activities.

Keywords: Namibia, United Nations Transition Assistance Group, peacekeeping, independence, liberation, South West Africa People's Organization, South African Defence Force, South West Africa, freedom, police contingent, Hungarian, peacemaking, South African Police, Koevoet

Since the late 1980s United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have significantly changed from the traditional operations – where the function of the UN force was that of an interposition force, whose authorization was to separate warring parties – to a new generation of multidimensional “interventionist” force.

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) operation in Namibia in 1989 marked a turning point in the change from classical United Nations peacekeeping force to a new generation of multidisciplinary, “interventionist” and multidimensional force, whose objective go beyond the mere separation of combatants and includes bringing about new political dispensations [Tsokodayi (2011:II)].

The peacekeeping-military activities of the Hungarian Republic in Africa have been receiving more and more exposure in recent years. This relates not only to those involved or interested in peacekeeping, but also to common people, who are gathering more and more information about these events. Despite all this, there is still a lot that is unheard of or scarcely revealed. The following article is about how Namibia became a liberated state and about a successful UN mission, along with the roles of Hungary in the police activities.
Namibia

Namibia can be found on the south-western part of the African continent. People in the North often think of Africa as a place which is unsecure and unsafe. However, today the country is considered to be a safe, stable democracy on the African continent, where there are no gunfights or political persecution any more, so the country is rarely presented in the CNN news. Hence Namibia is a peaceful, constantly developing country.

From the time of colonial history and politics

Namibia was first discovered by Portuguese travellers from Europe at the end of the 15th century. However, as from the coast only the endless deserts could be seen, the explorers thought that these vast lands would be worthless; therefore they moved on [Udogu (2011) pp. 17-18]. Namibia became a German protectorate during the so called “Delayed Germanic Colonisation” process, at the end of the 19th century. During the Congo Conference in Berlin between 1884 and 85, the Germans put their hands on the entire territory and named it the Deutsch-Südwestafrika (German South West Africa). At this point Great Britain was still looking forward to becoming neighbours with the Germans [Szabó (2002)]. During the First World War, the South African Union occupied the region. From the formation of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) in 1961, Namibia became part of the RSA, until her sovereignty was recognized. Namibia was also part of the horrific oppressions system of the apartheid and went a long way to gain its independence.

The SWAPO – a party formed from the alliance of the liberating organizations – won the first free elections and has been in power ever since. There are 72 representatives in the Parliament. Since 1994, there have been elections held every fifth year that have been judged completely democratic, according to the opinion of some of the major international organisations such as the UN. At the latest elections held in November 2009, twelve parties were able to nominate legitimate candidates and run the electoral processes.

The Republic of Namibia is a relatively new state among the numerous countries in Africa (only South Sudan is younger). In cooperation with the UN, the progress of the country will be closely monitored in the future. Namibia is incredibly active on various international platforms and is a member of many International Organisations.

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1 At the conference the following countries were present: Germany, France, Great Britain, the Austria-Hungarian Monarchic, Italy, Russia, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Dánia, Sweden, Turkey and the United States of America
2 South West Africa People's Organization
http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/ACHPR_Namibia_UK.pdf [2012.01.22]
international organizations. It serves as a respectable precedent for many other African countries as a good example for peaceful transition and gradual development. The ethnical content of Namibia is very varied. The Bushmen and the Namas and the Damaras have been living in this region since ancient times. Approximately 600 years ago, the Ovambos, the Hereros and half a dozen of other ethnic groups appeared and – last but not least – since the 17th century some Europeans have migrated to the region too. The ethnic constitution is as follows: 87.5% Africans, 6% whites and 6.5% mixed origins.4

The country has been characterized by economic and political stability as well as by constant progress for the past 22 years. Namibia has become a model in Africa, showing an example to be followed in development, unity and tolerance.

**Geography, climate**

The Republic of Namibia is located in the south western part of the African continent. It is bordered by Angola in the north, by Botswana in the east, and the Republic of South Africa in the south and by the Atlantic Ocean on the west along its 1,400 km long coastline. Its territory is 830,000 square kilometres big. Its capital city is Windhoek located almost exactly in the geometrical centre of the country. Namibia is inhabited by 2.15 million people and its density is 2 people per square kilometres [The online Factbook: Namibia]. Its huge vast lands are home to many diverse geographical formations and various climate belts. The Namib Desert and the Etosha National Park can be both found here just to mention some of Namibia’s natural wonders.

**Language, Education**

The languages spoken in Namibia are not the least homogenous as all the different ethnic groups speak different languages. On the path to independence choosing the appropriate official language for the country took a lot of thoughtful consideration and was eventually a significant political decision. Apart from the indigenous languages of Namibia, three European languages gained important role during the past centuries in the south western African country. The emergence of the European languages can be divided into two separate phases.

The first phase took place at the end of the 19th century along with the German colonization. During these processes the German language gained an important role and became the official language of the Germanic colony. The

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second phase can be characterized by the appearance of other two European languages that filtered through the borders of Namibia from the South African regions. One of these languages is Afrikaans, which traces its roots back to Dutch. Afrikaans was spread by the Boer colonists that settled on different parts of Namibia between the 17th and the 20th centuries with fluctuating intensity. Despite the fact the Boer settlers with Dutch origins were colonists themselves; soon they had to face the hardships of ethnical cleansing as the British arrived in the region setting up the first couple of concentrations camps. With the British occupation, the English language also appeared.

After acquiring their independence, English became the official language in 1990. However, it wasn’t the practicalities that supported this decision. It was rather the politics, because at that time about 90% of the population did not speak English [SocioLingo Africa (2009)]. Neither of the languages of the occupiers or the oppressors was any better than the others. Eventually, due to the major role of the UN in Namibia’s becoming an independent country – the UN uses English as one of its official languages – and also due to the international dominance of English, English became the official language of the country. The rejection of the German and the Afrikaans languages can be also explained with political and historical reasons. In spite of the fact that still many people in Namibia use Afrikaans in their everyday lives, this language has no international importance. German on the other hand was only used by the non-African minority population. Thus, English has become the official language that is still only used by a relatively small group of people. However, English is becoming ever more populat among younger generations. From among the non-official languages in Namibia, the most widely spread languages are Afrikaans, German, Oshiwambo, Herero and Nama (the languages of different ethnic groups) [Ethnologue: Languages of Namibia.]. 1,600 different schools can be found in the country, where 550,000 juvenile are taught by 19,000 teachers and are facilitated by 4,000 other grown-ups. The government is trying to extend education to all members of society; however some of the nomadic tribes – including the San and Himba ethnic groups – are still isolated and not involved in the education system.5

Economy

Namibia used to be part of the RSA’s mandate territory for centuries that exercized a strong influence on its economy. Significant part of import and financial stock and human force still comes from the RSA. The disadvantageous agricultural characteristics of Namibia are balanced out by the mineral resources and the mining industry, and all the branches connected to the procession of the

heavy industry products. These constitute 8% of the domestic economic income and 50% of exports. The most profitable is Namibia’s uranium production that makes Namibia rank among the top five uranium producers worldwide. Namibia is also famous for its diamond mining, fishing and its guano production along the coast. It has a reputation for its mineral deposits and ranks one of the world’s top number ones with its uranium, wolfram cadmium and copper extraction. Despite the fact that Namibia is rich in natural resources, its processing industries are underdeveloped [The online Factbook: Namibia]. With the extinction of the non-renewable energy resources, this country can soon lose its major source of income. With this picture in mind, an alternative solution had to be found to secure the country’s future. This is why the creation of educated society has been emphasized. Despite the limited agricultural possibilities, almost half of Namibia’s population makes a living from agriculture. So – just like in many other African countries – the development of the secondary and tertiary branches is yet to come. It has caused some serious problems that the deserted regions are still lacking basic infrastructure and the distribution of wealth is absolutely uneven. It is mainly the investors from the neighbouring southern countries that profit from the privatization of the mining and processing industries [NEPRU (2010)].

**Background**

While Europe was still busy with World War I, on 16 August 1915, German South West Africa was thoroughly occupied by South African troops. In 1910, the South African Union had been established by Capetown, Transvaal, Oranje and Natal that were already under British rule. With the outbreak of the World War, the Union started its military activity. German troops and the German speaking inhabitants were both imprisoned in prison camps. This way German South West Africa de facto ceased to be a German colony. South African troops kept the region under military control. On 30 January 1919, a mandate system was adopted and the victorious powers took control of the region. With the ratification of the Versailles treaty on 28 June 1919, the Weimarian Germany withdrew all her claims from all her former colonies to the favour of the Antante powers. At the same time, South Africa gained provisional powers over South Western Africa. This way South Western Africa became part of the League of Nations and it has de jure ceased to exist as well. Wilson, the president of the United Stated declared that the provisional forces over the mandate territory should not remain for good and they should enable the people living in the area to reach self-government in the long-run [Dierks (2005)].

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The South African Union was part of the British Association of States from 1926 and it did every endeavour to annex South Western Africa [Hearn (1999) p. 37]. As the descendant of the League of Nations, the UN was formed on the 24 October 1945. A delegate from the UN called Bevin expressed that Great Britain would place all its mandate territories under UN authority. To the contrary, on 7 May 1946, the RSA handed in a petition to allow them to integrate the occupied parts politically as an organic part of the RSA. This petition was rejected by the UN on 14 December 1946 – mainly due to the proposal of Maharaj Singh. International lawyers considered this a precedent to allow the UN to act as the lawful heir of the League of Nations, when it comes to making a legitimate decision concerning the mandate territories [Dierks (2005)]. Nevertheless, the RSA informed the UN at the beginning of 1947 that they would still treat South Western Africa as a mandate state and not as a ward [Udogu (2011) p. 44]. According to the National Court, the RSA was not obliged to ratify the agreement on the ward status. So the UN set up an ad hoc committee to place South Western Africa under its ward in compliance with the UN Resolution 449 A of the General Assembly [Dierks (2005)]. The Committee had numerous attempts in 1951 with the RSA to negotiate the status of the region. These attempts were rejected by South Africa as they thought that the UN was not the competent partner to talk with, instead the negotiations should have been made with the USA, GB and France. The leaders of Namibia were invited by the UN to represent local people at the general assembly. However, South Africa denied issuing passports for the Namibian politicians, so they were still unable to speak up for their country.

In 1953, the UN General Assembly decided to revise South West Africa’s (Namibia’s) mandate even without South African consent. This attempt did not bring any achievements though [Dierks (2005)]. The International Court carried on dealing with the case of south western Africa throughout 1956. The documents expressed that the UN did have the right to take sides in the case of South West Africa and it should enable petitioners to have their say at the assembly.¹⁸

On 19 April 1960, the SWAPO was formed, which was the first, non-ethnic, pro-independence opponent party [Hearn (1999) pp. 38-39; Dobell (1998) pp. 27.32].⁹ Sam Nujoma became the president of the party; other party members included Mburumba Kerina, Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, Jacob Kuhangua, Solomon Mifima, Paul Helmuth, Andreas Shipanga, Erasmus

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¹⁸ These people were as follows Michael Scott, Mburumba Kerina, Jariretundu Kozonguizi, Hans Beukes, Markus Kooper, Sam Nujoma, Ismael Fortune, Jacob Kuhangua and Hosea Kutako.

⁹ One predecessor of the SWAPO was OPO (Ovambo People’s Organisation), which only represented the Ovambo ethnic groups.
Erastus Mbumba, Emil Appolus, Maxton Joseph Mutongulume and Carlos Hamatui. From this point on, the International Community considered the SWAPO as the representative of the legal Namibian opposing party. However, South Africa considered it as a communist movement [Dierks (2005)].

**Apartheid politics**

The goals of the Namibian independence movement not only include the achievements of national sovereignty, but also the termination of racial distinction and inequality. From this point of view, the Namibian Independence movement is completely different from the independence movements of other African countries. The origins of the Apartheid regime can be traced back to the demand for demographic changes by the growing black population, which endangered the autonomy of the white ruling classes. Industrialization between the two World Wars attracted a lot of African inhabitants from the countryside to the cities, radically enhancing and making the “Black Scare” more widespread among the white inhabitants. Due to all these factors, the Apartheid ideology and politics were born. The only goal for building up an Apartheid system was to preserve the inequalities between the black and the white population. These anti-Semitic struggles were secured legally as the party, representing the interests of the Dutch community – forming a two-third majority of the white population – won the elections in 1948. The victory brought fundamental changes in the history of South Africa. The new government was constituted of ministers who strongly disagreed with the South African Union joining Great Britain against Hitler’s Germany in WW 2. Besides, the English and the Jews, it was the non-white community that became the major target of the system. Racial inequality and inferiority were not only advertised, but legislative measured were also taken. The registration for revealing racial origins became legally mandatory from 1950 [Hearn (1999) p. 38]. From 1953 public transportation carriages became segregated. From 1957 all public places were segregated too. From 1960 different races were allowed to go to their work places only through different entrances. After getting rid of the compromising policies followed until 1948, it became only a question of time when the oppressed layers of society would rebel against this system [Bür (2008)].

**The beginnings of opposition**

In 1961, the South African Union ceased to exist and the South African Republic was born. The country announced its independence and quitted the British Association of States. This way the RSA had to face the world on its own and still, it took a long time for Namibia to achieve its real independence. Despite the fact that the General Assembly ended the South African mandate
with its Resolution 2145 issued in 1966, still they could not enforce this Resolution of Pretoria, and so the General Assembly had to escalate the issue to the Security Council\(^\text{10}\). So the SWAPO started its military attacks for the deliberation of South Africa on 12\(^{th}\) June 1968 [Dobell (1998) pp. 35-37]. In the meantime, the UN acknowledged this territory under the name of Namibia. The illegal occupation from this point de facto was upgraded to a freedom fight. At the same time, the General Assembly of the UN reprimanded South Africa for not letting UN observers entering the region [Dierks (2005)]. The Security Council dealt with the issues of Namibia in several cases, and in 1970 it was declared in the UN SC 276 Resolution that South Africa is illegally present in the region. This resolution did not bring any changes either, so on 29 July 1970 the Security Council had to turn to the International Court to ask for advice in the UN SC 284 Resolution, from its experts concerning the consequences the denial of the UN SC 276 Resolution would bring to South Africa [UN: Namibia - UNTAG].

The Court emphasised that if any subsidiaries of the UN expressed that any situation may be non law-abiding, then it cannot be left without consequences. The members of the UN must do everything to cease the illegitimate situation. South Africa, which was responsible for the emergence of the violating situation according to the Court, must terminate this situation, and withdraw its troops from the territory of Namibia. The fact that South Africa is not entitled to rule the south-western territories does not eliminate the responsibilities of the South African government to pursue their responsibilities and duties. The Court clearly expressed that the member states of the UN consider the South African presence in the Namibia region illegal and void. They must also avoid supporting South Africa in any ways, or to help them in occupying Namibia [International Court of Justice: Namibia]. In a 1971 ruling, which was the fifth decision made by the International Court concerning South Africa; the Court broke with the theories articulated by the 1966 verdict. It also confirmed the decisions made by the UN and condemned South Africa. The Court pinpointed that the future presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal, and they must end the occupation of the country. The ruling made it clear that all UN and non-UN countries must stay away from any form of connection with South Africa. Despite of the decision of the International Court, the issue of Namibia remained unresolved. Also the UN was dealing with the situation of the territory in its many resolutions and working out many plans to find a solution, still unsuccessfully [Dobell (1998) pp. 40-41].

In the meantime, the situation of the neighbouring Angola completely destabilized. By 1973, about 50,000 Portuguese military troops were fighting the

three liberating organisations. They were called the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. For this reason the South African Defence Force (SADF) was also mobilized. The same year the UN created the position of United Nations Commissioner for Namibia. From this year on, the German Federal Republic changed Namibia’s policy and from this time it was officially stated that South Africa was illegally occupying Namibia [Dierks (2005)]. In 1975, Angola became independent. However, the same year a civil war started between UNITA, MPLA and FNLA, which situation was worsened by the intervention of other external international forces. The socialist type of government was supported by the Soviet Union, while UNITA fighting against them was given credit by South Africa and Zambia [Hearn (1999) pp. 39-40; 45-46]. The Soviet Union became one of the main supporters of the freedom movements to secure its own interests. Ideologically the MPLA and the SWAPO were both close to the Soviet Union and the Russian forces provided more and more military help by delivering tanks and airplanes and sending experts. Later on, even Cuban troops were shipped to Angola, thus making MPLA stronger than the others. By 1976, the MPLA and the Cuban forces gained full control over Luanda and its national infrastructure, and they pushed all UNITA activities to guerrilla fights. In 1976, the Cuban troops fought back FNLA, and MPLA and UNITA kept fighting each other with the help of the USA and South Africa respectively. This way the SWAPO got stuck between two military forces: South Africa on the one side and the UNITA troops on the other side [Hartmann (2009) pp. 27-50].

On 30 January 1976, the UN passed the Resolution 385 declaring the organization of free election in Namibia under the provision of the UN, but South Africa ignored this Resolution [Hearn (1999) pp. 41-42]. On 29 September 1978, the Security Council passed Resolution 435 after long preliminary talks that outlined the final solution for the Namibia situation. It was this resolution that triggered talks between the countries involved with the cooperation of the US. The international organisations gave an ultimate dated at the beginning of 31 March 1978 for the declaration of its independence. Still, South African air and land forces launched attacks against the SWAPO troops stationed in south Angola, and in April almost 40 SWAPO commanders were detained. In response, the UN asked its member states to support the SWAPO [Dierks (2005)]. With the Reagan administration joining the conflict in 1981, the US took up a new role in hammering out the conflict. The US asked South Africa to draw up the price they would need in order to be able to accept UN SC Resolution 435 and to enable Namibia to have free elections [Hearn (1999) pp. 49-52]. South African asked for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops as the

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11 MPLA: People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola – Labour Party (Portuguese: Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola); FNLA: National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Portuguese: Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola); UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola)
guerrilla fights between 1985 and 1988 have become serious battles in the Southern Angolan territories, where heavy military arsenal was accumulated on both front lines. It was already clear that these fights were no longer about the freedom of Namibia, but about the power struggle of the two regional powers – Angola and South Africa – developing into a wide spectrum military conflict that needed to be resolved urgently. According to experts, the gradually unfolding desperate situation of South Africa has also contributed to the final cooperation [Hartmann (2009) pp. 27-50].

**Peace process and peacekeeping actions**

By 1988, the peace treaty was supported by many countries including the US, the Soviet Union and Cuba. The fights gradually decreased by 1988 and peace talks started in July 1988. The cease fire commenced from 10 August 1988. The same year in December, in New York the three lateral peace treaties was ratified by Cuba, Angola and South Africa [Hearn (1999) pp. 44-45]. The peace treaty also had an appendix stating the UN SC 435 Resolution would go into action and the withdrawal of the South African troops from Namibia would be carried out. Even though this was accepted by South Africa, it denied accepting cease fire with the SWAPO. After this, the Chancellor of the UN gave an ultimate to the parties involved and eventually the cease fire was ratified on 1 April, and the military conflict came to an end [Udogu (2011) pp. 172-174]. At the same time, the declaration of the independence of Namibia – with the UN Security Council Resolution 435 – entered also into effect. Although there were still some minor conflicts taking place between the radical white groups and the free black military forces, after the ratification of the New York agreement both parties were able to control their regular into forces and hence they were able to avoid further clashes. With observes from UNTAG arriving in the region, the demilitarization process started and troops returned home. In a few years’ time, Namibia became a peaceful and balanced country. The 22-year-long fights demanded about 12,000 SWAPO and 700 SADF casualties [MTI (1989)].

**The UNTAG peacekeeping activities**

On 16 February 1989, the UNTAG was formed with reference to the UN Resolution 632 to support the work of the UN in its endeavour to realise Namibia’s independence and to carry out free, legitimate elections. The UTAG mission ensured the termination of all malicious atrocities and the withdrawal of occupational forces. All discriminative laws were made void, all political prisoners were freed and all refugees were guaranteed a safe and peaceful journey home, according to international laws [Hearn (1999) p. 62].
In February 1989 Lieutenant General Dewan Prem Chand arrived in the Namibian capital Windhoek, and not much later peacekeeping forces followed [Dierks (2005)].

The transitional period started on 30 March 1989. Canada stated that they would open a diplomatic agency in the country, to constantly follow the independence processes. The news was disseminated by Joe Clark the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs after having met up with Andimba Toivo ya Toivo in Ottawa, the Chief Secretary of SWAPO the party fighting for Namibia’s independence [MTI (1989)].

The mission of the UN consisting of 8,000 members was dedicated to ensure Namibia’s independence, which eventually happened. The plan of the UN started with the cease fire and was concluded in April 1990 by the formation of the independent government, and the formal independence becoming active. This plan contained the abolition of the racist laws until May 1989 and the return plan of the nearly 41,000 Angolan and Zambian refugees home. In November 1989, the elections for the Constitutional National Assembly were held.

The UNTAG operations started officially on 1 April 1989. The mandate of the UNTAG was defined by the UN SC Resolution 435, whose execution was blocked by South Africa for years. The Finnish Martti Ahtisaari was appointed as the leader of this mission, but he only got to Namibia with an 11 year long delay [UN: Namibia - UNTAG]. The UN SC Resolution 435 never defined the starting point of the mission, only the fact that it should finish one year after it start. The UNTAG was a comprehensive operation that was carried out according to the theories provided for in the 4 paragraph of the Constitution of the UN [UN SC Resolution 435]. The UNTAG was enabled by the Resolution 435 – which was later confirmed by Resolution 632 – that it had the right to monitor the lawful and fair elections and to create the national assembly [UN SC Resolution 632]. The peacekeeping forces played an important role in carrying out the legitimate elections, demilitarizing the opposing parties, checking the withdrawal of the South African troops and supporting the return of the refugees.

The UNTAG was considered as a novelty operation by the UN as there were no opposing opinions from either of the member states of the UN. It was a real collaboration of the countries at the end of the Cold War years, because it did not count which side of the Iron Curtain the participants were from. To be precise, there was only one disagreement concerning the budget, so the budget

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12 There were 4500 soldiers, 1750 policemen and 1800 civil servants serving in the mission.
had to be reduced. The budget started off at 700 million USD and eventually a 416 million sum was agreed on for the operations [Hartmann (2009) pp. 27-50]. Many feared that the low number of the peacekeeping forces would be manipulated by South African troops and hence manipulate the outcome of the peace keeping processes. This never happened and the outcome of the elections was respected by both parties. In the mission, there were both soldiers and policemen alike. It was the task of the soldiers to demilitarize both the South African and the SWAPO troops, to monitor the withdrawal of the South African troops from Namibia, and demobilize those Namibian regular and territorial units that fought against the SWAPO.

By the end of April 1989, 30,000 SWAPO troops were demilitarized. The demilitarization of the South African military forces in the meantime was going according to previous plans. Thanks to this, by November 1989 all troops belonging to the South African Defence Force had left Namibia [Hearn (1999) p. 117]. Military hardware was extracted from the region in three months. Their weapons were delivered to South Africa with the control of UNTAG. The collection of small arms became much more of a headache as many of them stayed with inhabitant, still a significant amount of them were taken out of circulation [Hartmann (2009) pp. 27-50].

The mission’s scope of authority also extended to civil police tasks. In fact, it was’t commissioned to carry out direct provost duties, but instead, police forces serving in the UN were monitoring their local counterparts. This included observing the everyday work of the local police forces and accompanying them everywhere so that their work became controllable. The observers had an important role in local people feeling safe and that the UN was present in Namibia. Despite a lot of criticism in the beginning from parties present in Namibia – especially from SWAPO – and also people being sceptical about the presence of the UNTAG, eventually their mission was carried out successfully [Hearn (1999) p. 32]. After a few month of hardship, they even received local support. Eventually UNTAG achieved its goals in ensuring Namibian sovereignty, as by the end of the mission, it paved the ground for the people to live independently provided by the newly won freedom. As Resolution 453 laid down, the one year time-frame of the mission, the mandate of the UNTAG expired after a year. A few hundred UNTAG officials stayed in the country form an advisory body, or as trainers of the Namibian police forces, but the former roles of the UN expired with the Namibian independence born. The independence of Namibia was officially proclaimed on 21 March 1990 and it became a member state of the UN on 23 April the same year.
The activities of the Hungarian police contingent

In 1988, the Hungarian government was requested by the former Chief Secretary of the UN, Perez de Cuellar, to send military troops and police forces to the UNTAG mission to Namibia. For specific reasons, Hungary only provided the mission with police forces. However, only three English speaking members were found, so the other 22 members had to be „borrowed” from the national security services and from among the members of the foreign affairs services. The head of the contingent became Ambassador Tamás Gáspár, the Head of the African Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled as lieutenant-colonel. Győző Somogyi police lieutenant-colonel was appointed as his deputy. The police forces were responsible for training the others as members of the foreign affairs and the national security services were not familiar with the classic police duties, such as checking somebody’s identity, trace fixing and the like. Later on however, their command of languages and former diplomatic experience turned out to be a great advantage. Their basic training was provided by the Police Academy, but they received constant training from the fellow policeman from the very beginning of the mission. It was a comprehensive training and participants got vaccinated to all tropical diseases. Compared to later missions, participants received very good equipment, almost perfect compared to domestic equipment. They had mixed devices including equipment both for the police and the soldiers. They did not use their regular grey police uniforms, but a green coloured one, which, apart from the winter period was perfect. As the government at the time wanted to break out from its international isolation, it took Hungary’s part in the mission very seriously and wanted to provide the members of the mission with the best equipment available. The group set out for Vienna on 23 April 1989 and from there, together with the Austrian police forces to Cairo. There they were joined by other international police groups. From Cairo they flew to Windhoek via Nairobi. There they were welcomed by the leaders of the UN mission and they participated in a week long training session concluded by passing a test at the end of the week.

The Hungarian police contingent was divided into three smaller groups. 13 people went to North Opuwo under the command of Zsolt Varsányi. The members of the second group stayed in the central areas in Windhoek and the third group served in Keetmanshoop. The groups were led by police forces as they were professionally trained. However, the group quickly dissolved in the capital city as their leader László Temesi was appointed to have a role at the headquarters of the mission and so his people were dispersed in different camps. Tamás Pál became the leader of the southern troops, despite the fact that officially Tamás Gáspár was in charge who quickly became the commander of the entire southern region. He was the one who moved the headquarters of the
police mission to Windhoek, into the Trosky Building. Later on, as his commission for sector commander expired, he became the President of the Commission Committee of UTAG. Apart from him, there was one more Hungarian serving in the field of Logistics at the headquarters. All the other members were stationed at different police stations and observation points.

The Hungarian police forces were responsible for checking the activities of the Koevoet\textsuperscript{13}, which was created by the South African Police to fight back the guerrilla attacks of the SWAPO. They accompanied the patrols with jeeps and occasionally with helicopters too. During their patrols they ensured that local people were not terrified and they were entitled to meet with their political groups and express their opinions freely. The Hungarians soon became famous for their command of languages. The 13 Hungarian policemen spoke 13 different languages including Russian, Turkish, Persian, French, German, Spanish, Finnish etc., and of course English was spoken by all members. There was a case when their commander accidentally dropped the conversation of two policemen, saying: “They can’t possibly be policemen, they speak so many languages.” He said so because these languages are not usually spoken by policemen from the west. However, many Hungarian members joined from the Foreign Affairs.

Compared to other police forces, the Hungarians were overeducated, as all of them had academic degrees. This was due to the fact that in Hungary policemen are trained holistically and they have to master all field. This is not usually the case in other countries, where an average policeman for example never studies criminal investigation. This different background was soon revealed, as the Hungarian policemen registered data on the site, investigated, interrogated at the same time and the collected data were divided among policemen from other countries. This was not always advantageous, but work delivered by the Hungarian contingent was highly appreciated and positively evaluated by the leaders of the mission. As the Hungarians returned home after the change of the communist system, many of them were fired or they had to retire. The mission and their work were not evaluated appropriately, despite the fact that this was the first mission of the Republic of Hungary to Africa accomplished successfully.

**Final thoughts**

“The UNTAG operation had many novel features and constituted an evolutionary step beyond the United Nations traditional role in peacekeeping and monitoring self-determination processes. This was because of the far-}

\textsuperscript{13} Koevoet means crowbar in Afrikaans (and Dutch); officially name was the South West Africa Police Counter-Insurgency Unit (SWAPOL-COIN), also known as Operation K
reaching mandate given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council. UNTAG’s principal function was to create the conditions for the holding of free and fair elections. This meant that it was required to be, and was, deeply involved in the whole political process of Namibia’s transition from the illegally occupied colony to the sovereign and independent state. UNTAG thus had to play its part in monitoring and implementing a ceasefire, withdrawing and demobilizing troops, monitoring local police forces, managing a political "normalization" process, supervising and controlling the resultant elections and assisting the transition to independence. Because of the vast international interest in Namibia, a territory with a unique status under international law, each step was taken under a searchlight of public scrutiny and comment. The mandate made it one of the most political United Nations operations, and the logistical dimensions, together with the strict timetable involved, caused it to be one of the most demanding, in practical terms.

The lessons drawn from the successful operations will ever remain: the full cooperation of all parties, the continuing support of the Security Council and the timely provision of the necessary financial resources. Against this background, UNTAG has demonstrated how much the United Nations can achieve by making full use of all its resources, including its diverse skills and its staff’s commitment [UN: Namibia - UNTAG].”

It was an excellent case of successful UN peacekeeping mission in delivering peace and stability. The Republic of Namibia can look back upon 22 years of peaceful democratic development. For the period from the time of independence, Namibia has done quite well as far as its international reputation is concerned. It can be illustrated with the aim of Namibia’s Constitution, which is internationally respected. Therefore, the Namibian State can establish a positive precedent in implementing constitutional reforms and ensuring democratic rule and good governance in the southern African region (Angola, DRC and Zimbabwe) [Erasmus (2010)].

Thus UNTAG was not just a peacekeeping operation; it was a political mission, a peacemaking mission and a peace building operation all in one [Tsokodayi (2011:II)].

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SUPPORTING THE OPERATION OF CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURES

Abstract

Nowadays the Critical Infrastructures (CI) play a vital role in the life of the modern world. They are essential tools to provide safe and convenient circumstances for the everyday life of human societies. In case of their malfunction, the effected services fail to fulfil their tasks, which can endanger the life of citizens living within their area of operation. Thus, their defence against technical breakdowns or hostile attacks is a matter of highest importance. The following article tries to introduce the significance of CIs and their proper protection. “The more we know about the possible malfunctions of our cells the greater our conviction of not being completely healthy.” 1

Keywords: network, future IT warfare, structure of networks, Critical Infrastructures, Critical Information Infrastructures

One who says, that he is completely familiar with the structure and functions of the human body does not tell the truth. The junctions of our cells and their mutual effects on each other are going to remain undiscovered for a long time. The complicated system built from these cells is the human organism itself. We are working, doing sports, having fun, leading our own life without paying attention to the changes of our organism. Fortunately, the malfunctioning of a single cell does not cause serious problems. Our organism can mend or exclude the defective cell and we can carry on without noticing the trouble. However, at a critical mass of ill-functioning cells, the degradation of human organism cannot be halted any more, the stability of it fades away and in the worst case one cell can destroy the whole body.

Up till now, the medical sciences have carried out symptomatic treatments instead of healing the roots of sicknesses. There is no pain; there is no trouble, isn’t it?

Nowadays physicians are researching the functioning of cells and their mutual effects as well. They are studying networks and homogenous systems. If the producers of medicines consider so, the aims will not include only the blunting of pain or the total destruction of all cells – regardless of their positive or negative roles – but target human focused cure of sicknesses. The main goals

1 Barabási Albert-László
are to detect the real problem by the means of a simple blood test, then cure it by a specialised treatment.

During the research of networks, the system of balances has to be studied as well. The alteration of one element of the network might influence not only the concerned network but – as a chain reaction – it could change the other networks as well.

**Let’s think about the relations of bio\(^2\), and technospheres\(^3\).**

The raw materials of tools used by the human kind are taken from the natural environment or biosphere of course. That is also a recognised fact – although many people do not want to realize it – that during the production and operation processes some materials get back to the environment and damage its balance. The main point is the moderation, because the bio-sphere can adjust itself to the changes only up to a certain limit. The exaggerated use of antibiotics or other drugs found in drinking water are damaging our hormone system and can endanger the life of people. However, the drinking water is vital for the human kind and so is the infrastructure providing it.

In order to understand the meaning of Critical Infrastructure (CI), I have to determine the system, which is supported by the CI.

The system is the set of elements linked up with each other and serving the same purpose. The alteration of one element influences other elements as well.

According to the aforementioned declaration, a system is stable provided that the system and its elements do not change. This state can be maintained, until an external effect forces the system to change. This external effect can be caused by the environment itself, or the obsolescence of material.

**The definition of Critical Infrastructures is as follows:**

“Critical Infrastructures are those networks of joint, interactive and mutually dependant infrastructure elements, facilities, services, systems and processes, which are essential for the normal operation of a country (inhabitants, economy and governmental administration) and they have significant role in the maintenance of a minimal level legal, public and national security, economic, public health and environmental state.

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\(^2\) Hungarian Explanatory Dictionary of Scientific and Standard Language Words: "biotope, belt of life: area of organic life; the effective zone of a living being, the living area of living beings on Earth."

\(^3\) Technosphere means the things created by the mankind, which do not occur in nature.
Critical Infrastructures are those networks, resources, services, products, physical or information technology systems, equipment, tools and their parts, whose malfunction, disturbance, jamming or destruction have a significant short or long term, direct or indirect effect on the citizens’ economic and social welfare, the public health and security, the national security, the economy and the governmental administration.”

Vital elements of the system are:

“Equipment, facility or other network element of a determined sector, which is essential for the maintenance of vital social roles – such as public health, security of the populace, economic and social public services – and their failure could cause the interruption of the aforementioned services and result serious consequences,...”

Vital Information System and Facility (Critical Information Infrastructure):

“Network-like physical or virtual systems, equipment and methods of the society, which are essential elements of the systems providing permanent flow of information and maintenance of the operation of systems or other identified elements of the systems.”

The definitions clearly state the importance of the aforementioned elements regarding the safe operation of a state. Similarly to other systems, the failure of a critical amount of elements could lead to the collapse of the whole system, which is more devastating if it happens to the controller information infrastructure.

The balance of the IT systems is also very important. In case of critical systems, the failure of the system’s balance could cause interference and catastrophe.

The scale-free systems highly tolerate the random errors, but an intended attack targeting the junctions of them can demolish them quite easily. Many points with few edges can be eliminated without influencing the network as a whole. Considering the Internet it can lose 80% of its junctions but the remaining 20% are still working as an intact network.

4 2080/2008. (VI. 30.) Governmental Resolution and Green Book on the national programme of the protection of critical infrastructures
5 2012. CLXVI. act on the identification, indication and protection of essential systems and facilities
6 65/2013. (III. 8.) Governmental Resolution on the execution of the 2012. CLXVI. act on the identification, indication and protection of essential systems and facilities
As the drawing of the lottery, the failure of random equipment can’t interfere with the whole scale-free network either. What is the probability of the selection of a very important junction with many links? In case of the Internet and other similar networks, the degree exponent is less than three. Because of this fact there is no threshold, which prevents the network disintegration, when the points are removed continuously.

However, a targeted attack is different. If the junctions with many links are destroyed firstly and it is carried on with the other junctions with less and less links, the network falls apart at a certain threshold. What is strange is that this threshold can be reached quite soon, it is not necessary to remove too many junctions with many links. Although our system may be resistant to errors, the removal of the junctions with many links (e.g. central routers) imposes an almost unbearable burden onto the other important junctions and transfer medias. The other items can work for a while, but later packets are going to be lost and congestions are going to emerge.

I am of the opinion that the junctions providing important links can cause similar problems. Although redundant connections are always installed within the systems, these connections have smaller capacity.

“The Internet is the first thing, which was created by the man but the creator does not understand it. It is the greatest attempt to anarchy ever.”

Perhaps if the Internet would have not started to live its own “life” and in 1964 Baran8 would have succeeded in fulfilling his basic theory concerning the primacy of distributed models, we should not fear of the targeted attacks so much.

The electrical supply systems are also capable to suppress this kind of deviations as soon as possible. Considering the operation of systems, the unfortunate fact is that there is no proper safe system, only some people think that they know everything about it and also can control it.

The emperors of the Roman Empire had also a false perception concerning the invulnerability of their realm. The permanent conquest of foreign territories increased the empire and its structure to an unmanageable level, which could not be handled by the technical and infrastructural means of the

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7 Eric Emerson Schmidt
8 Paul Baran declared in 1964-ben: so as to establish a communication channel by which we can minimize the vulnerability caused by an attack we have to establish a distributed network instead of the decentralized networks.
age. The news of provinces reached the emperor only within weeks or months, which delayed or prevented the effective actions and the “barbarians” fast and devastating intrusions destroyed the once mighty and invincible empire at last. Nowadays, it is also very important to control our critical systems completely. Good planning and permanent maintenance of the critical informational infrastructure are vital. Damages of this element can cause serious and irreversible catastrophes on the whole system.

Firstly, the critical infrastructures and their elements have to be determined. A kind of asset estimation has to be done in order to identify the necessary parts of operation. But not only the physical items have to be organized, but the technological and environmental (legal, social, services etc.) aspects, different data, softwares, existing documentation and human resources have to be surveyed too.

Recognizing the aforementioned facts, the required professional skills and experts can be identified as well. But prior to the specific measures to be taken, the risk analysis also has to be carried out. The most important part of the risk analysis is the information concerning the aforementioned elements, the relevant “business” requirements and the availability of the system and the business processes.

The risk analysis must include the assets, the threats, the vulnerability and the possible interferences. Following this method, a scheme can be formulated in connection with the normal operation and other situations caused by expected events.

The management has also a serious role regarding the safe operation of CI. The most important is the commitment to the safe and continuous maintenance of the system, but it has more components as well. These are the requirements, services provided by the system, bearable time frame without IT support, time frame of lost data restoration, bearable measure of lost data within a certain period of time and frequency of security saves. The management has to identify the sets of data and logos, which have to be saved and decide in connection with the issues of safe operation. The leaders of the organization have to realize the importance of the permanent supervision of the system. The CI is not similar to a book, which can be read or neglected by our mood. The system is more look like a pet or a child. It requires continuous supervision and maintenance during the whole life cycle, regardless of other conditions. It can’t be neglected – due to time or financial shortages – because it can have irreversible negative effects in the future. The equipment and technology have to be permanently maintained

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9 Besides its economic meaning the word of “business” defines the goals and tasks of CI systems as well.
and developed such as the human resources, because they all contribute to the safe operation of the system. In order to plan the system correctly, the TCO\textsuperscript{10} has to be determined and it has to be included in the annual business plan and budget. During the life cycle of CI, the PDCA\textsuperscript{11} concept also has to be followed.

The risk analysis report has to be assessed by the management of the organization. A matrix has to be drawn up, which includes the possible effects on CI and the probability of their occurrence. Those effects that have a strong effect and a high probability have to be taken seriously. Based on a cost-benefit balance, the management has to decide in connection with the tolerable risk. Preventive actions can reduce the risks. The chief executives also have to formulate the counter measures against the negative events, which is called reaction. Besides these factors surplus risks can also emerge, which can usually occur because of lack of funds or intention to deal with them or they are not significant. The preparation of risk management can be outsourced to another business venture as well. Apart from the aforementioned risks, unfortunately there could be other unforeseen threats too.

The risk management has its own framework and methods, which have to be determined and the business continuity plan has to be prepared as well. The latter ensures the required permanent service of the organization and the CI. In case of emergency, the normal operation has to be switched by a plan prepared well in advance. There has to be a catastrophe plan, which describes the actions to be followed by everybody in case of “unforeseen events”.

The operation of a logically built system has to be supervised and controlled. In order to manage the system easier, its boundaries and subsystems (if they are necessary) have to be set up. The hierarchy of the control and management is very important as well. Each system element has to be supervised by a responsible person, who is acting according to strict guidelines. The guidelines must be valid in the whole organization and the conditions of execution have to be provided. Those guidelines, whose conditions of execution do not exist, cannot be followed. The mentioned guidelines and documents must follow the hierarchy. It is not enough if the members of the system get familiar with the rules, but they have to be motivated to follow them properly. The actions are included into the directives, documents and action plans have to be exercised and mastered by the personnel. The communication has also a vital role in the success. The communication has to work in every direction because sometimes the management and sometimes the employees have to be persuaded. The mapping up of horizontal and vertical relations of the system is also essential for its safe management. The communication channels have to follow

\textsuperscript{10} Total cost of ownership
\textsuperscript{11} PDCA: Plan, Do, Check, Act
this multi-direction relation. The communication has to be provided on each level in order to avoid the loss of time caused by the hierarchy.

A successful action plan is measurable, includes exact elements, points and thresholds, actions and reactions. It has to be compared with itself and with other systems in real time.

The trainings have to be available for all employees working on different levels and they have to be carried out by different programmes. The training has to be continuous and it has to be improved by the means of feedbacks.

The audited systems can be measured more precisely, but the audit must be carried out by an organization independent from the manager and the developer, because it can assess the system impartially.

The aforementioned facts are just outlining the issues of CI system management and they reveal the complexity of the subject. During the economic crisis some management intended to save money on the IT systems. It is definitely true in case of the governmental administration, but this process has grave consequences in middle and long term. In the private business life some ventures are developing – even by the funds of other sectors – just to gain advantage on their competitors. Based on the news, the preventive actions should be more significant as well. The cyber crimes and cyber espionage is more and more frequent in the civilian life and governments and international organizations have to deal with cyber espionage and warfare, supported by other countries as well. More and more countries introduce in the armed forces cyber defence or cyber assault units. Besides the armed forces, the secret services are also following the trends of course.

As it was mentioned before, the intermittent or irregular maintenance of the CI can have irreversible consequences. It is more dangerous if more areas are neglected at the same time. For example contracts and maintenances are cancelled, still working but obsolete equipment is not improved etc. One of the most neglected areas is the training, because the managements usually intend to save money by postponing or giving this activity up. They do not realize that the IT can’t be compared to other services. Due to the fast pace development of the IT technologies, some months or years “absence” can cause enormous risks. The experts and professionals have to be trained continuously and they have to visit the relating conferences and exhibitions, so as to be able to handle the modern technology.

The lack of the aforementioned developments, capabilities and maintenance do not multiply the negative effects, but exponentially increase the risk of the system’s malfunction and vulnerability. In case of a CI, it can’t be allowed, even
if the management knows and takes the risks. Nevertheless, this kind of risks must not be taken, because as a result of them, the CI is going to come into conflict with itself. In this case we can’t speak about the operation of the CI, because it “degrades” itself to the level of a simple system, which does not need a special attention. Irresponsible management or insufficient funding can endanger the safety of the organization or the country. That is the reason why so important the existence of proper legislative and financial conditions, or in the lack of them there is no point operating a certain CI system. It is not the area of odd jobs rather of high level services, or better to leave it. The concerning legislative activity has to be in harmony too. If an act declares the need of a high level CI system, which serves an organization or a country, other rules can’t contradict and prevent the system’s operation. Contradictions and negative economic decisions or cancelled investments are always dangerous to the operation of CIs, which in extreme cases can demand human lives as well. Of course there are many examples, which can confirm this statement but perhaps the risks and consequences of public health or nuclear systems are the most typical. The processes can be very similar to the nuclear chain reactions. The neutron radiation transforms the 235 U isotopes into 236 isotopes, while it becomes unstable and the process starts. The 236 isotopes split up into a 142 barium isotopes and a 92 crypton. The process releases an enormous amount of energy and other radiating isotopes. One of the conditions of the process is the sufficient mass of uranium atoms, which is called critical mass. Fortunately this process takes place in a controlled environment.

The CIs have to be compared to each other and their links have to be revealed. The interdependence, which means the mutual effects of the systems, is also a very important factor. The other effects have also to be measured and we have to be prepared for them. The interdependence also confirms the existence of horizontal and vertical communication. The contact persons have to be identified and their registry has to be updated regularly. Most of the documentations have to be available, in hardcopy versions as well. The management has to prioritize the Critical Infrastructure (Critical Informational Infrastructure) and its elements so as to use them in the action plans.

The continuous operation of the critical informational infrastructures means the maintenance of the system’s stability. However, it is not so easy to achieve this, since there is no perpetuum mobile either. The system is permanently affected by external powers. By the passing of time, the parts of the system become obsolete, and its environment and the cooperating systems change too. These factors have to be taken into consideration even in case of financial crisis. In fact, I am convinced that they are more important in such times. We have to balance the deviation of the system and it can be achieved only by permanent maintenance, improvement and with the help of skilled professionals. If the
deviation reaches the critical level, it can’t be stopped, the system becomes more and more unstable and erratic and at last uncontrollable. The system has to be supervised and controlled. The management has to react to the changes, but to solve this matter they need money, time and human resources. These elements have to be also in balance (they exercise a mutual effect on each other), which can’t be upset without a resulting instability. If the operation of a system is really important, its conditions have to be taken into consideration, too. The critical infrastructure is very similar to the human organism. If the essential necessities are not provided, it gets weak and vulnerable, and later on, it perishes.

Bibliography

LINE CHANGE: REPLACEMENT OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Abstract:

In 2008, a comprehensive reform of the Russian Armed Forces was started. The Serdyukov–Makarov tandem initiated a strict and straightforward process, thus they have gained many opponents along the way. Most probably, they have committed several mistakes, too – the biggest and the final one must have been the corruption scandal around the Ministry of Defence and its companies. In November 2012, the Serdyukov–Makarov tandem and their team was dismissed and a new Defence Minister and Chief of the General Staff were appointed. This study aims to examine whether the personnel changes would lead to a change in the direction of the Russian Federation Armed Forces reform.

Keywords: Russian Armed Forces reform, Serdyukov–Makarov tandem, corruption scandal, significant personnel changes

Introduction

In November 2012, an unexpected “line change” happened in the Russian Ministry of Defence and in the Russian Armed Forces. On 6 November, the President of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation decided to release Mr. Anatoly Serdyukov from his duties as the Minister of Defence.¹ Soon afterwards, President Putin decided to dismiss Army General Nikolai Makarov from his post of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and First Deputy Defence Minister and also from military service on 9 November.²

The reasons behind personnel changes

According to official justification published on the Russian President’s internet homepage, the leave of Minister Serdyukov became necessary due to the situation developed within the Ministry of Defence and in order to create the

necessary conditions for an objective investigation into all the suspicious issues. In October 2012, the Main Military Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee initiated five criminal cases — i.e. fraud, excess and abuse of authority — in order to explore the background of the suspected transactions and to determine the responsibility and to draw up the exact charges against the personnel involved. Anatoly Serdyukov participated in the Ogoronservis (Oboronservice) case as a witness. The Investigative Committee had the task to prove the charges — and according to President Putin — if there was a solid base for that, even Mr. Serdyukov could be brought to the justice. In November 2012, Serdyukov resigned in disgrace amid allegations that several of his close associates had enriched themselves via the fraudulent sale of the ministry’s real estate. But, Serdyukov was only a witness and he deserved the presumption of innocence.

The removal of Serdyukov was not unexpected, indeed. However, the timing was unforeseen. He was the first really civilian Minister of Defence in the Russian Federation. The military was satisfied neither with his professional background, nor with his plans regarding the Armed Forces’ reform. The active and retired officers were not pleased with his disrespectful behaviour, or with his personnel policy within the ministry. The representatives of the military industry had to argue with the ministry led by Serdyukov continuously over the state defence order, about the prices and quality of the Russian made products. The key persons of the Russian military industry have been discontented due to the fact that the Serdyukov–Makarov leadership decided on the foreign procurements. In the last few years, there were rallies organised and open letters published in mass media against Serdyukov demanding his resignation. Moreover, from time to time Serdyukov had quarrels with other Russian leaders, for example with Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Nevertheless, those cases have not resulted in the dismissal of the Defence Minister. Most probably, after the Oboronservis case was revealed, the corruption case became the “red line” for Vladimir Putin in the end of October 2012. Even then, Serdyukov received several days to step down and to retreat without disgrace. He missed the opportunity. Finally, in November 2012, he became the prey of the fight against corruption that Putin had promised to implement already in his pre-election campaign.

3 "Чрезвычайная ситуация в Минобороны”, 06.11.2012., http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2012/11/06_a_4841881.shtml, (06.11.2012)
Whatever is the reason behind Serdyukov’s forced leave – conflicts of interest, potential corruption charges, family matters with his wife or father-in-law\(^6\) – the Russian public seems to agree with President Putin’s decision. This may be proved by a survey carried out by the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre in November 2012: „More than half of Russians are confident that A. Serdyukov should have been dismissed earlier, as the situation in the army has worsened a lot with him being in office (55%). … One-third of respondents believe that the Serdyukov’s dismissal was timely in terms of corruption investigations (32%)… Only 4% think that the dismissal of Serdyukov was untimely.”\(^7\)

However, not only the Minister but also the key military person, namely the Chief of the General Staff also left the rink. After the dismissal of Serdyukov, the departure of Army General Nikolai Makarov was already expected. The close and consequent co-operation between the two major players of the Armed Forces reform predicted that they are to carry out their task together – resulting either in success or in defeat. However, they had to leave without completing their mission. During the four years of their co-operation, they had to face an armed conflict in Georgia and afterwards they were the ones to launch the implementation of the most significant Armed Forces reform since the collapse of the Soviet Union. During those years, they have received harsh criticism as far as the process of the reform included personnel cuts, administrative reorganisation of the forces and a realignment of the whole military establishment, including the Defence Ministry and the subordinated institutions, military healthcare and education. In November 2012, Serdyukov and Makarov had to leave the battlefield, thus an era of the Russian Armed Forces reform hallmarked by their names ended.

The removal of the Defence Minister and the Chief of the General Staff was only the first step to accomplish the personnel reshuffle of the ministry’s leadership – what is to say to implement a line change.

**The aftermath of the key dismissals**

On 6 November, the successor of Anatoly Serdyukov became Sergei Shoigu. Shoigu is a long-time ally of the President Putin. Before his appointment to the position of Defence Minister, he was the Governor of the Moscow Region. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the Ministry of the

\(^6\) Serdyukov’s father-in-law: Viktor Zubkov, former Prime Minister, Chairman of the Gazprom Board of Directors.

On 9 November, Army General Nikolai Makarov left the battlefield too. On the same day, Colonel-General Valeriy Gerasimov was appointed into the position of the Chief of the General Staff. There were many military leaders openly or covertly criticizing the reform of Serdyukov and Makarov, most of them had been relegated or cleared away. Gerasimov is one of the key opponents of the military reform, more precisely, the way of its implementation, more specifically, he oppose the concept of Army General Makarov. Gerasimov used to belong to the group of the military leaders openly opposing some of the ideas of the former Chief of the General Staff. The state of the game changed; actually Gerasimov became the Chief of the General Staff. He has a comprehensive experience as a field commander, Chief of Staff and commander of different Military Districts, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Gerasimov has a combat experience (from North Caucasus – in the Second War in Chechnya). He served for a year and a half as Makarov’s Deputy in the General Staff. However, he had to leave – he was dispatched to the Central Military District (with Headquarters in Yekaterinburg) in April 2012. It is also an interesting fact that Gerasimov was responsible for running the May 9 Victory Day Parade since 2009, thus he received a good publicity and he became known by the Russian and even by the international public as a talented commanding General.

The newly appointed leaders were ordered by President Putin to continue the military reform, to build good contacts with the military industrial complex in order to fulfil the tasks regarding the rearmament of the Army and the Navy, and also to improve the structure and the command and control of the Armed Forces. The experts are also awaiting the correction of former orders regarding the military education and military science and they also expect the General Staff to be strengthened both in its role and with new officers.\textsuperscript{8} The new military leadership has promised to re-activate the former officers who were estranged by the Serdyukov–Makarov tandem.

As a consequence of the new appointments, the new military leaders have decided to clear out the Ministry of Defence from the remnants of Serdyukov’s era. The female civilian colleagues brought into the leadership by the former minister mostly as deputy ministers and as heads of departments – frequently offended by the military because of their unprofessional approach – had to leave already in November 2012.

The Shoigu–Gerasimov tandem had decided to bring in their own team they can trust in. Thus, by the end of November, Aleksandr Sukhorukov, the First Deputy Minister of Serdyukov was replaced by Colonel-General Arkady Bakhin, the former Commander of the Western Military District, who was another critic of the methods of Serdyukov–Makarov’s Armed Forces reform. Colonel-General Oleg Ostapenko, the former Commander of the Aerospace Defence Forces was appointed to the vacant position of the Deputy Defence Minister responsible for the military sciences and innovations on 9 November. Ms. Yelena Kozlova, the Deputy Defence Minister responsible for financial matters was dismissed and the new person in this position became Mr. Ruslan Tsalikov on 15 November. The key position and the responsibility for the state defence order were given to Mr. Yuriy Borisov, instead of Mr. Dmitry Chushkin.\(^9\) There are four deputy ministers who saved their positions: State Secretary Deputy Defence Minister Nikolay Pankov who has a military background (he served until 2009), he is General of the Army in reserve, Mr. Anatoly Antonov, who has a great experience in the field of international negotiations especially concerning the bilateral and multilateral arms limitation treaties, General of the Army Dmitry Bulgakov who has an extended routine in the field of logistics, and the only civilian female Deputy Minister of the Serdyukov’ era to remain in her position Ms. Tatiana Shevtsova, who is a former Deputy Head of the Russian Federation Federal Tax Service. All the other deputies – there are six of them – are newly appointed ones. According to the new presidential decree in force, signed in December 2012, there are altogether ten deputy defence ministers.\(^10\) The six new deputy defence ministers are either of military background or the former colleagues of Minister Shoigu. First of all, Colonel-General Valeriy Gerasimov has become the new Chief of the General Staff / First Deputy Minister of Defence. Colonel-General Arkady Bakhin, who has a comprehensive experience as a member of the leadership of several Military Districts, and another opponent of former Chief of the General Staff has been appointed to the position of the First Deputy Minister of Defence. Colonel-General Oleg Ostapenko with substantial practice at the Space Forces and the Aerospace Defence Forces has become one of the deputy ministers.

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Deputy Defence Minister Yuriy Borisov is a civilian person with military education and industrial experience gained on the level of the Federal Agency and Ministry of Industry, with huge practice regarding the military-industrial complex – being on the side of the companies and an opponent of Minister Serdyukov. And there are two persons brought in by Minister Shoigu from his former positions. Mr. Ruslan Tsalikov the Vice-Governor and prior to that Deputy and First Deputy of the Minister for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters, i.e. Sergei Shoigu, with whom he used to work since 1994. The other person is Lieutenant-General Yuriy Sadovenko with a military education and several years of professional experience in the Armed Forces, prior to being appointed in the Ministry of Defence as the Head of the Office of the Minister; he served in Shoigu’s ministry in the Gubernator’s Executive Office.

With the new minister and deputies in charge, the substitution of the entire top echelon, i.e. a line change was introduced. However, those reshuffles induced other changes in the ministry’s leadership. The reassignments of military commanders have brought about other changes: Colonel-General Nikolay Bogdanovsky has become Gerasimov’s successor as Commander of the Central Military District. Ostapenko’s successor is General-Mayor Aleksander Golovko as the Commander of the Aerospace Defence Forces.

And due to the corruption scandal, several-dozen other people who had been employed as head of departments or Serdyukov’s advisors had to leave too.

The consequences of changes

After his appointment, the new Minister of Defence assessed the situation in the ministry and the results of the Serdyukov–Makarov’s phase of the Armed Forces reform. The President expects the new Shoigu–Gerasimov leadership to build a reliable relationships based on a partnership with the representatives of the military industrial complex.

Only in case of conformity between the ministry of defence and the military industrial complex would it be possible to leave behind the failures in the cooperation of the past and to fulfil the procurement plans. This would be the only way to successfully conclude the modernisation of the military industry and

afterwards to efficiently accomplish the State Armament Programme with mass purchase of Russian-made armaments and weapons.

Regarding the Armed Forces reform, the objective of the new minister of defence is to continue the process started by Serdyukov, but to correct the mistakes committed in the course of transformations and modernisations by his predecessor. The work that has been done before is to be continued, some minor things need to be fixed. At least, this was what at the first meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Defence the new minister assured the audience about.\(^{13}\)

What minor things shall Minister Shoigu and his team fix? The clean-out of the personnel was inevitable and it has mainly already been done. The problems with the supervision and management of the ministry’s real estate have to be addressed – thus a close colleague and trustee of Minister Shoigu, namely Deputy Defence Minister Tsalikov with financial-economic background was tasked with this issue. The military sciences and the innovation issues will be revised and handled in the future by Colonel-General Ostapenko. The combat training of troops will be by Deputy Defence Minister Bakhin through the reinstituted Main Combat Training Department. Another harshly criticized topic of the Armed Forces’ reform was the transformation of military education – from now on; this issue is to be addressed by Deputy Defence Minister Pankov.\(^{14}\)

Most probably, as a consequence of the personnel changes, the process of the Armed Forces reform is to receive a new impetus. The question is – whether it keeps its course. Whether the line change would result in a change of direction? There have already been published some potential fields of changes in the course of the reform. In December 2012, Lieutenant-General Viktor Bondarev, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force told that there was a plan not only to create eight concentrated air bases, but also to develop and modernise all aerodromes of the Air Force. Moreover, one of the key elements of the Serdyukov’s transformation process should be revised, according to Bondarev who has told that there have been talks about the re-alignment of the Aerospace Defence Forces and their subordination to the Air Forces. Finally, there are rumours even about a possible return to the former six Military Districts, instead of the existing four that were created in 2010.\(^{15}\) It has appeared in some

\(^{13}\) ”Шойгу скорректирует проделанную Сердюковым работу”, http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20121127/912422117.html, (2012.11.27.)
electronic media that the foreign procurement contracts are also to be revised by the new leadership.

There are many differences between the styles and personal behaviour of the ex-Minister Serdyukov and the present Minister of Defence Shoigu. At this stage of the transformation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces might have its own special relevance. In 2012, Vladimir Putin started his third term as the President of the Russian Federation. Already in the period of the elections there were mass protest movements organised by the political opposition. President Putin did not need unpopular politicians and ministers in his team. And Serdyukov was highly unpopular. Since the first days of his activity, Shoigu has been trying to develop a good relationship with the active and retired military. He deems it important to award the military officers and their commanders for their activity and service to the Fatherland. He has also expressed his gratitude to some journalists for their work and co-operation with the Ministry of Defence and with the Armed Forces. All these efforts – rarely seen from ex-Minister Serdyukov – seem to increase Shoigu’s popularity within the military.

In 2012, President Putin decided to face and to try to liquidate the corruption. In October 2012, the Oboronservis story turned out – and it became clear that the Ministry of Defence was not intact anymore.

**Outlook – the line change and the future of the reform**

In November 2012, Sergey Shoigu became the Minister of Defence – a person with military rank of General of the Army. He is person from the very narrow circle of President Putin, having a broad working experience within and between power structures of the Russian Federation. He is A Hero of the Russian Federation – with deep respect and acknowledgement for the military profession. He is a person in military uniform – with political support and high popularity among the people.

In the light of anti-corruption campaign, it was inevitable to crack down on the accountables of the Oboronservis-case and other suspicious businesses within and under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defence. The officials who might have been involved into or related to those cases had to leave their positions.

In the forthcoming years the Russian leadership assigns huge financial resources for the development of the Armed Forces, for the modernisation of the military industry and also for the accomplishment of the State Armament Programme 2011–2020. For the purpose of the State Armament Programme, the
Russian leadership has assigned 23 trillions Roubles\(^{16}\) (20 trillions for procurements and 3 trillions for the implementation of the federal programme on the development and modernisation of the military industrial complex). The expenses for the national defence shall constantly grow in the next few years, reaching the volume of 15 626 billion Roubles, i.e. 3.7 per cent of the GDP and 19.7 per cent of all expenditures of the federal budget in 2015.\(^{17}\)

Besides the dismissals of the former leaders of the military reform and the constantly growing financial possibilities, there are further changes to expect in the course of the Armed Forces reform. It was well-known that Anatoly Serdyukov and Dmitry Rogozin, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the military industrial complex had professional disputes. Rogozin had always supported the companies of the Russian military industry, just like President Putin. However, Serdyukov and his military counterpart, Makarov have insisted on foreign procurements: in order to finish the procurements of the State Armament Programme and the rearmament of the Russian troops in a shorter period of time with professional pieces of armament and weaponry of the West.

They insisted on their idea even against the objection from the Generals, from the military experts and from the Russian military industrial companies. After four years, the military reform hallmarked with the names of Serdyukov and Makarov steped into a new phase. Meanwhile, one of the most important segments of the Armed Forces reform, i.e. the rearmament of the troops and mass procurements in the framework of the State Armament Programme were just about to start. In November 2012, President Putin appointed his reliable ally Sergei Shoigu to the position of the Defence Minister. On one hand, this action shows that Putin would like to avoid similar corruption cases like the Oboronservis, especially in terms of growing military expenditures. On the other hand, the nomination of a member of the closest circle of the President shows the importance of the defence sector and the commitment of the political leadership to the implementation of the military reform.

In order to meet the expectations of the President and to fulfil the demands, Shoigu has to implement a consistent rearmament and development of military capabilities of the Russian Federation. Shoigu has found himself in a complicated situation. „When Sergei Shoigu took over the defencem ministry in November, he inherited a military at a crossroads, torn between tradition and the half-completed reforms of his predecessor, Anatoly Serdyukov. Mr. Shoigu will

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\(^{16}\) 1 RUB=40,66 EUR

have to decide whether to maintain a large conventional force or to pursue Mr. Serdyukov’s goal of creating leaner, more modern armed forces.”

Conclusions

It should not have been by chance that Serdyukov and his team had not been fired earlier. Not only because he used to have a significant political support, but also due to the fact that he concluded the assigned tasks. He has introduced both the popular measures, i.e. salary increase for the military and also the unpopular ones, for example the personnel cuts. He made his best to come up to the presidential expectations and carry out a straightforward and clear cut reform. The military reform initiated in 2008, thus it was not Serdyukov’s personal programme. A Russian military expert assessed Serdyukov’s achievements as follows: „Putin used Serdyukov to perform the crude, ruthless and cold-blooded operation. … Yet, it is clear that the reforms begun in 2008 were not Serdyukov’s. They were, from the start to the end, Putin’s reforms. Once they were finished, Putin showed Serdyukov the door, letting his minister make a quick exit as catcalls and expletives accompanied his retreat. … But Serdyukov was unexpectedly good in his role, and he pushed through the military reforms at a remarkable pace.”

It might be too early to assess the results and achievements of Serdyukov–Makarov phase of the Armed Forces reform. However, it should be stated that its key significance is that at least it was started – after almost two decades of agony.

The question now is how the new leadership will be able to continue the process. It might be softened due to the fact that the new military leaders are the opponents of the strict and ruthless reform process. Have they been touched by the wind of change, do they comprehend the necessity of the reform? Do they understand that the reform is not only the increase of allowances and pensions for military, not only the solution of housing and social problems? The military reform should be something far more than that. In my opinion, in case the Russian Armed Forces would like to become capable to respond to the traditional and the new security challenges and also to take part in the international peace support operations, then the political and military leadership has to adopt the country’s Armed Forces to the future tasks and transform it accordingly. This is exactly the main goal of the Armed Forces reform

introduced in 2008: to create a mobile, compact, well equipped and trained whenever and wherever deployable Armed Forces. Undoubtedly, the former leadership committed many errors; however the reform process started.

According to my position, the present line change shall not lead to a change in the Russian military and defence policy. The security and the military policy of the Russian Federation are defined in key security documents approved by the President. The National Security Concept through 2020 (2009) and the Military Doctrine (2010) were approved in the last few years, already in the period of Putin–Medvedev’s tandem and they cover the period until 2020. These documents enumerate the cornerstones of security and military policy – there are no serious changes to be expected, at least in my view. The main aspects are the following ones: developing military co-operation between the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, strengthening military capabilities and achieving the full international recognition of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation in order to enhance the military influence of the Russian Federation in the post-soviet area, and finally, achieving the primary goal – to efficiently and successfully conclude the Armed Forces reform. I consider that these issues are to remain the most important ones for the state’s leadership in the short term and also in the long run. Basically, it is not the military leaders themselves that are really important, but the intention and the will of the state’s leadership: the military has to perform its duties and tasks.

Nowadays, the Russian leaders’ intention is to restore Russia’s great power status. They would like the world to recognise the Russian Federation as a key actor on the international scene. To this end, they need reliable and combat-ready Armed Forces. That is exactly why the Russian leadership has set the task to move beyond the shadows of the mass army inherited from the Soviet Union – now or never.

References


The Grand Magal is the annual festival of the Mourides, an important Muslim brotherhood in Senegal. It takes the form of a pilgrimage to the holy place of the brotherhood, the town of Touba, which contains the mausoleum of Cheikh Amadu Bamba, the founder of this Sufi order. The Grand Magal brings together hundreds of thousands of devotees each year, or even as many as one to two million according to some observers. The stewards of this holy site are soldier-monks – almost all of them Baye Falls – devoted to Amadou Bamba and distinguished by their rasta-style appearance and dreadlocks. Baye Falls are young men and some women, in general having a specific material and spiritual preferential system. They are fully dedicated – almost fanatically – to their marabouts, religious leaders whom they consider sacred and as descendants of Allah. This devotion is without border. Many of them dedicate their lives, their skills and capacities to their marabouts.

Keywords: Mouridism; Sufism; Senegal; Baye Fall; identity

Introduction

The Grand Magal is the annual festival of the Mourides, an important Muslim brotherhood in Senegal. It takes the form of a pilgrimage to the holy place of the brotherhood, the town of Touba, which contains the Mausoleum of Cheikh Amadu Bamba (1850-1927), the founder of Mouridism (1883), a Sufi order. The Grand Magal brings together hundreds of thousands of devotees each year, or even as many as two to three million according to some observers. Touba and the tomb of the Cheikh is thus the symbolic centre of the brotherhood. The stewards of this holy site are soldier-monks – almost all of them Baye Falls – devoted to Amadou Bamba and distinguished by their Rasta-style appearance and dreadlocks. Baye Falls are young men with some women in general having a specific material and spiritual preferential system. They are fully – almost fanatically – devoted to their marabouts, religious leaders whom they consider sacred and mystical. This devotion is without border. Many of them dedicate their lives, their skills and capacities to the marabouts.
Although there has been extensive literature written on the Grand Magal of Touba and Mouridism, the topic is not explored yet. Christian Coulon (1999) and Eric Ross (1995) looked at the religious feast itself, its geographical meaning and its rituals. Others focused on Amadou Bamba’s theories and practices of education (Cheikh Anta Babou, 2003) and his relation to ajami literature (Fallou Ngom, 2009). “Although much has been known and written about Amadou Bamba, the principal leader of the order, and the notable descendants; the scholars have generally not studied the common Murid taalibe, or disciples, as individuals.”\(^1\) Only a few wrote about the Baye Fall community\(^2\) and even less focused on the Baye Falls themselves and their identity.

In this paper, I summarize how the Baye Fall individuals and some religious leaders thought about the identity of the Baye Fall. These primary source data were collected during a two weeks field visit in Dakar and Touba in the framework of an anthropological-photographic project 9-24 January, 2012.

**The Baye Fall – an introduction**

The Baye Fall branch of Mouridism was founded by Sheikh Ibrahima Fall (1858-1930), one of the first and most Fidel of Amadou Bamba's disciples. Baye means ‘father’ in Wolof language, hence the name Baye Fall

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\(^1\) Glower, 2007:166

\(^2\) Mc. Laughlin, 1997; Bjarnese; without date
means Father Fall. “Displaying an absolute, 'slave-like' devotion to his master, Ibra Faal foreswore religious piety and instruction so that he might dedicate himself completely to performing hard, physical work for Amadu Bamba (e.g. growing food, cutting firewood, fetching water and building shelters and mosques). Ibra Faal's total submission to his sheikh and his refusal to observe even the most fundamental rules of Islam like prayer and fasting are characteristics that have been maintained by his followers up to the present.”

Due to the belief system of the Baye Fall, the submission to a sheikh and hard work are sufficient in themselves to guarantee accession to paradise after death.

The Baye Falls voluntarily serve the interest of the religious community: they build houses; organise events; offer social services and serve their marabouts in everything that is required. Baye Fall monks are living for the religious community. They live a minimalistic lifestyle as Ibrahima Fall did. They wear patchwork clothes sewed by colourful pieces of textiles used by others. On the other hand, they are extremists in their engagement to their religious objects: amulets, necklaces and bracelets and other accessories on their body believed to hold gri-gris or supernatural powers.

Baye Falls in Touba
Photographed by Gergely Lantai-Csont, 2012, Touba

A bibliographical overview

In his essay, Neil J. Savishinsky (1994) compares contemporary Baye Falls with Jamaican Rastafarians. Due to Savishinsky’s definition: “The Baye Faal are an eccentric, flamboyant and heterodox Senegambian based Islamic sect

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3 Savishinsky, 1994: 64
whose members' appearance and behaviour so closely resemble those of Rastafarians that some even refer to themselves as such and claim that they are in fact the 'true' and 'original' Rastafari.”

In his paper “The Baye Fall of Gueule Tapée, A new religious path towards adulthood?” anthropologist Jesper Bjarnese focuses on the Baye Falls and touches the question of identity. For him, the Baye Falls “present themselves proudly as Baye Falls; a sub-grouping of the Mouride brotherhood – and a self-ascribed identity of numerous and quite different groups of young men throughout Senegal, and beyond.” Interestingly, Fiona Mc Laughin uses the terminology “Baye Fall Movement” in his article.

In light of Benedict Anderson’s theory of imagined community, John Glover – in his book “Sufism and Jihad in Modern Senegal (the Murid Order)” – considers the extent to which the Murid order is an imagined community and how, as an artefact of sorts, it was built and has been maintained as such by its members. In our case, a vital “medium” by which this imagined community has been built and sustained is the preservation, transmission, and accompanying interpretation by Murids of the life histories of the original taalibe, who founded Darou Mousty in 1912.

In the traditional Wolof society there have been two distinguished groups: the neeno and the geer. The neenos are organized around specific occupations including the tegg (blacksmiths); uude (leatherworkers) and the gewel (praise singers or bards, also known as griots). The neeno used to live separately from the geer. They were endogamous and could be identified by their family names. These days, and especially from the religious point of view all believers are considered as equal. In Murid theology, religious concern is considered to have precedence over ethnicity, social status, or occupational backgrounds, yet there are two basic distinctions: taalibe and shaykh. In this regard, the taalibe is technically a student who studies and works under the shaykh. These taalibes receive formation in the daara or settlement, a means by which a Muslim could gain a new role in society as follower of Amadu Bamba. As a taalibe, the disciple found a home, work, education, and most importantly a means to enter Paradise after death.

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4 Savishinsky, 1994: 64
5 Bjarnese, without date: 1
6 Mc Laughin, 1997:569
7 Glover, John, 2007: 165
8 Glover, 2007: 169
9 Glover, 2007: 168
The role-taking self-theory of Walker Percy could be also applied here for the Baye Falls, too. Due to this theory, one sociological view of the self is that” the self achieves its identity by taking roles and modelling its own role from the roles of others, e.g., one’s mother, father, housewife, breadwinner, macho-boyman, feminine-doll-girl, etc.” For the Baye Falls the roles are delivered from the severe rules and puritan lifestyle of Ibrahima Fall and the path showed by the marabouts. As the wife of Abdou Karim Mbacke expressed “Baye Falls go to the daara (association, or educational institution) as general people. They learn about the Koran, the prayers and the saints there. They understand the lifestyle of the Baye Fall and if they like it, they devote their entire life to the marabout by their own will. It is like a total reformulation, re-education of these youth.”

Baye Fall identities – different approaches

„Any person thus has many complementary social identities, and the context decides which of them is activated at any time. The model of segmentary identities serves as a reminder that identity is not fixed, is not ’innate’, but is fashioned in the encounter between an individual and a social situation….He or she is a member of many groups with only partially overlapping membership. Which identity is assumed in a situation of conflict, when an individual must choose, say, between loyalty to the party and loyalty to the nation or ethnic group, is an empirical question.”

I am a Baye Fall!

Daouda Sow ‘Abo’ is a 30 years old young Senegalese who has been working in Cape Verde Islands for 10 years. He is an artist, a wood carver and sells wooden artefacts and other African souvenirs for tourists in Sal Island, Santa Maria city where he rents a table in a shop shared with other Baye Falls. In an interview in Dakar, on 19 January 2012, I asked him, who he was:

- Abo: “I am a Baye Fall. Senegal is very important to me. I would like to settle down here. I want to live in the holy city of Touba when retired. It is important for me and my family members to be buried in the cemetery of Touba. It must happen this way.”

- ISZ: “What does being a Baye Fall mean to you?”

10 Percy, 1983:19
11 Extract from interview, 21st January, 2012
12 Eriksen, 2001: 272
• Abo: “I do just good things. I do not do any bad. I open everything for people. I have an open heart. A good heart. I do not lie. Baye Falls are not dangerous. They are good in communication, they are very hard working. They never get tired.”

• ISZ: “Among the following, who is the most important for you: Allah; Mohammed; Amadou Bamba; Ibrahima Fall; Abdou Karim Mbacke Fallilou (the marabout of Abo); your mother or father?”

• Abo: “Abdou Karim is the first for me. He brings me good luck. After Abdou Karim, it is my mother and father, Ibrahima Fall and the other Baye Falls.”

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Existing without existence

Fallou Karim Mbacke, son of Abdou Karim Mbacke Fallilou, a powerful spiritual-religious leader in Senegal and a descendant of Amadou Bamba told me about the Baye Fall identity in his living room, in Dakar:

• Fallou Karim: “It will be very difficult for you understand this. It is very mystical and spiritual, such as our religion. You see Abo. He is kneeling next to you. You can see him, feel him. But if I tell him to die for me, he would do it. It means that he is permanently here with us, but if I want, he will end his existence. This is why I say: they exist without existence.”
The passion starts with the Baye Fall

Yapsa, an elder Baye Fall sits in the middle of the circle and talks to the other Baye Falls sitting around him. He recalls some magical stories of Amadou Bamba and praises Ibrahima Fall. He told me the following about identity of the Baye Fall:

- Yapsa: “We are the soldiers of God! We are good people. The strongest and the most passionate. Passion starts with the Baye Fall! Our heart is opened. For us, everybody is equal. We love each other and everybody. Modesty, purity, submission, hard work and the serving of the marabout. These make a Baye Fall a Baye Fall.”

Conclusion

The Baye Fall identity could be seen as a collective one, due to the theory of collective identity by Appiah. In this regard, the public discourses by which all can recognize themselves as members of the group are the oral traditions and life histories, biographies, poetry, song and iconography of Amadou Bamba, Ibrahima Fall and other saintly marabouts. The characteristics internalized by the group members generate labels in a process of identification. These characteristics or labels are: devoted, hardworking, open hearted, puritan, modest. As common patterns of the behavior within the group, the following could be distinguished: the characteristic appearance of the Baye Falls (dreadlocks; clothing; wearing amulets); the Yungu get-together (a common occasion to praise God by singing) and the magal (begging).

Constructed or not, a means of re-integration of marginalized Senegalese youth or not, due to my observation, the Baye Fall identity not only exists, but passes the national borders of Senegal. It could be considered as a trans-national community or movement, where the common belief, the religious practices and the special lifestyle closely tie one with another.

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13 Glover, 2007:187


Capt. LAJOS LISZNYAI, PhD aspirant

COE OR PMESII-PT? METHODS TO IDENTIFY AND ANALYZE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Part I.

Abstract

NATO member countries use two main methods to describe and analyze the operational environment. Analysts and soldiers working on this topic can apply 11 variables of Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) method or the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment and Time (PMESII-PT) method. In order to compare the operational environment (countries and battlefields) objectively, analysts or soldiers have to decide when and what kind of analysis they need. The main goal of my study is to introduce and compare the above mentioned methods, support the daily tasks inside and outside the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF). This essay is the first part of a series in order to introduce the COE as a possible method. In the second part, I will describe the PMESII-PT and compare the effectiveness of the mentioned analysis types.

Keywords: analyses, methods, Contemporary Operational Environment

Motivation

Using one of the mentioned aspects (COE or PMESII-PT) helps compare the battlefields regardless where they are in the world. The common methods allow us to identify and collect the lessons learned during the assigned operation, help identify and avoid the same mistakes in the future. With other words:

„to ensure the survivability ... You must be able to identify the modern threat on todays’ battlefield. Todays’ enemy has the ability to strike and blend back into the local population. As a leader, you must be able to recognize his tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP’s) and neutralize any threat.”

Analyzing the battlefields by COE

According to the FM 7-100 (OPFOR Doctrinal framework and strategy) there are 11 variables of COE. These aspects are useful when it comes to

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1 „The Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) is the operational environment that exists today and for the clearly foreseeable future.” FM 7-100, p. IV.
2 Scout Leaders Course, OPFOR COE motivator, 2007
describing and identifying the nature and characteristics of battlefield; identify efficiently the danger that is waiting for our soldiers.

The 11 variables of COE are the follows:

- nature and stability of the state;
- regional and global relationship;
- economics;
- sociological demographics;
- information;
- physical environment;
- technology;
- external organizations;
- national will;
- time and
- military capabilities.

With the help of these 11 aspects, it is much more effective to describe and analyze the battlefield.

**Nature and stability of the state**

*It helps identify what the strength and weaknesses are (e.g.: political will, security forces available, economic background, natural resources) of the particular state(s). Once the weaknesses are identified, the attacker can improve the effectiveness of his attack against the enemy’s weakest point, he can reach the desired endstate easier than by conducting frontal attack.*

Some examples from failed states\(^3\) environment:

- In Somalia in 1992 the United Nations (UN) sent international troops to the country, but nobody had been prepared for that kind of chaos. The warlords were fighting against each other. They had just one common interest: all of them positioned themselves in front of the International Community (IC). Within their territory, they acted like a “state”, but not in the classic sense of the word… The UN forces didn’t find reliable partner who had mass support, suitable for IC and able to manage his own territory or the whole area of country as a state actor. One of the most

\(^3\) ”…a government that cannot control the overall territory of a state, most of the population doesn’t accept the political elite, it has weak legitimacy, the government can’t ensure the public security and public services (e.g.: health care, education), can’t possess the monopoly of maintaining armed forces.” WAGNER p. 344.
expressive sign of anarchy and lack of centralization that Somaliland⁴ and Puntland⁵ became formally independent states.

- In Iraq, after the Coalition Forces (CF) defeated the Saddam regime in 2003, the state collapsed, because the well qualified, but politically not independent Sunnis were swept from the administration. The other ethnicities (e.g.: Shia, Kurd) did not have enough and well qualified representatives, who could fill the gap from district to country level. The problem still existed till 2007/2008, when the national reconciliation started.

  From 2003 to 2008, Iraq was one of the most dangerous countries.⁶ The country’s failed states index is improving, but it is still far away from the former “peace time” quality.

- Officially in 2006, a state level country (Israel) fought against a non-governmental organization (Hezbollah). From the other side Hezbollah is just a part, but quite decisive part of Lebanon, with international background and state level supporters (Iran, Syria). Within Lebanon the Hezbollah started to build up its own social-economic web. However, it could not build all of the state level characteristics⁷.

  Summarizing this variable, I have to mention that the IC identified the stability and nature of states successfully, but wasn’t prepared to face the kind of situation created by an overthrown, even collapsed country. IC wasted years for nation building and building up a new local leadership, but almost everywhere the citizens believed that the new government (leadership) was only collaborating with the IC, just like during the colony time/period. Of course, from the other side the CF made robust efforts (political, economic and military level) in order to stabilize the countries, direct their evolution to the “democratic way” and prevent the mentioned countries from becoming hotbeds of terrorism.

  In Lebanon, the IC and UN only increased political pressure on the fighting parties and did not intervene. The peacekeeper/observation mission of UN was set up only after the end of the armed conflict.

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⁴ Former British Somalia
⁵ Area located western from Somaliland and northern from Somalia (as a motherland).
⁷ For the conditions and characteristics of state level actors and failed states see WAGNER p. 344.
Regional and global relationship

Regional and global relationship helps to identify and understand the external environment, which is involving and surrounding the designated area/country.

In accordance with the lessons of history, nowadays, the traditional long term fixed alliances have been replaced by much more flexible regional and global level cooperation.

The major characteristics of regional and global relationship:

- Somalia has a hostile relationship with almost all its neighbors. There is a considerable Somali minority not only in Kenya, but Ethiopia and Djibouti as well. Somali nationalists say they want to unify all of the Somalis. On the one hand, it is useful for the Somali government because a common outer enemy helps the cohesion and the nation building

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process. Also, the threatened position of neighboring countries emerged a coalition against Somalia. However, this coalition endangers the government and country to conduct its plan effectively. Although, the internationally accepted borders in Africa are not the same as the ethnical/national borders, at this moment the IC does support any efforts to set up such borders. Since the end of colony era, many local conflicts happened (e.g.: 1964, 1977-78, 1982 struggle for Ogaden territory), but only few of them were successful (from the aggressor’s point of view).

- Iraq had a good relationship with most of its neighbors (Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia), because of the traditionally good family - political - ethnic roots. Turkey and Iraq also have a huge number of Kurd populations. Both countries tyrannize or not recognize the Kurds as an independent ethnicity. That’s was also a common Turkish and Iraqi interest and the base of a fair relationship. In the late Saddam-era, Iraq had two main enemies: Iran and Kuwait. Kuwait was a former Iraqi province. After it declared its independence, Kuwait supported Iraq during the Iraq-Iran (1st Gulf war). But since the beginning of 1990s their relationship has become hostile, because Iraq wanted to occupy Kuwait’s natural resources.

The modern Iraq-Iran conflict dates back to 1970s, when the two countries started a political struggle for the oil rich area, in the vicinity of Shatt el-Arab River. During the Iraq-Iran war both countries tried to gain the leading role alongside the Persian Gulf. Both parts intervened in the other country’s internal politics, using the Shia-Sunni opposition as a tool.

The Turkish-Iraqi relationship is changing from time to time; generally it is balanced, but everything depends on the Kurd-question. Turkey supports the regional stability of the region, but its political and military leadership is committed to control the Kurd problem not just inside Turkey, but outside country as well. Since 2007/2008, the Turkish air force struck the Kurdistan Workers' Party’s (PKK) bases. Following these, the Turkish land forces penetrated into Iraq in order to clear the area from “extremist” armed groups. The other problem between Turkey and Iraq (and almost everywhere in the region) is the management of

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9 HETTYEY pp. 94-95.
10 BABOS – PAPP pp. 74-75 and 91-92.
11 Iraq set up a short term personal union/confederation – except Saudi Arabia - with the mentioned countries and Egypt.
12 The US lead CF defeated the Iraqi Security Forces during the 2nd Gulf war.
13 More than 27 million Kurds live in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. This ethnic group does not have their own state, but within the mentioned states their number is decisive. Their efforts to establish and unify all Kurds in one independent country are against the interests of Turkey and other regional middle sized states. Their goals and will are not taken seriously by the other countries.
water supply. Turkey built dykes and created water basin areas alongside the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Not just Iraq, but also Syria protested against this decreased amount of water output.\textsuperscript{14}

- In Lebanon we can witness the negative effects of half spectrum intervention (both official and unofficial). Like the Kurd-question, the situation in Lebanon is also fragile. Iran and Syria support the Hezbollah in every way (financial, military/political advisors, economically), in order to increase their own influence. They try to disguise this as a “Lebanese interest”. According to some sources, in 2006 during the Israel-Lebanon conflict North-Korean “volunteers” also took part in the conflict as advisors and engineers.\textsuperscript{15}

- The situation is very similar in Afghanistan. There is no comforting result without the support of neighboring countries. Iran and Pakistan are acting similar role like Britain and Russia in 19–20\textsuperscript{th} centuries.\textsuperscript{16} From the background both Iraq and Pakistan are partly responsible for the turmoil in the country. Both of them ensure political, religious and economic safe heaven for extremist groups. Iran is handling the Iraqi-Afghan situation as part of its nuclear ambitions. Pakistan is trying to gain as much military and financial support from the United States as possible. But at the same time, the Pakistani government is constantly losing its authority over its western countryside. This disintegration also hampers the successful handling of the situation. We also should not forget about Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Both countries are supporting the IC with military bases and in some other ways. But on the other hand, numerous Tajik and Uzbek minorities are living in North-Afghanistan. There are several organizations here, which are supported by the Tajik and Uzbek governments both by official and unofficial means.\textsuperscript{17}

The most of the above mentioned regional conflicts are due to the artificially formed state borders, which were created after World Wars I. and II. The borders do not follow the ethnic composition of area, that’s why the nowadays existing nations have permanent conflicts with each other. Some of them are using the “ethnic card” in order to conceal the disproportions in the

\textsuperscript{14} LISZNYAI (2011 I.) p. 152.
\textsuperscript{16} The Great game took place between the Russian and British Empire in order to control that strategically important area (and not the ethnic groups!). Thanks to Afghanistan’s „frontier location” nobody could conquer the area for a long time. After the Great War, Afghanistan was created by the winners, but it is also an artificial state like the formerly mentioned one (the Pashtuns majority is still less than 50% of the population). Huge numbers of Pashtu are under the control of a foreign state (Pakistan).
\textsuperscript{17} One of the most important organizations of this kind is the \textit{Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)}. 
economy, in the political system and in the society. I also have to mention the fear of “Shia half-moon”, which determines the policy of Middle East-located Sunni countries and also that of the Western states.\textsuperscript{18}

**Economics**

*The level of economic system shows the potential, the kind of assets and resources possessed by a state. It describes the relationships between state and non-state actors, helps to conduct long term operations/campaigns or not.*

Most of failed states have no economy in the classic sense of the word, because there is no bureaucracy and legal system which can control production. Somalia and Lebanon are not rich in natural resources (or at least they haven’t been discovered yet); their agricultural revenues can’t cover their expenses.

Iraq and Afghanistan have a huge amount of natural resources. Their development depends on the quality of national economy and the number/percentage of well qualified citizens. Unfortunately, most of the well graduated intellectual citizens have left these countries because of the insecure environment.

One of the common points within the four countries is their strategic location. In general, ethnical problems do exist in a lot of countries and regions, but these analyzed states are located on the key terrain of the world. It is not indifferent for the IC that these countries remain failed states, with huge number of uneducated, religiously suggestible young citizens, who can easily constitute extremist, intolerant masses.

Generally, the economic strength of a country mostly shows the state’s capability and will to buy and maintain different military technologies as well as its ability to provide welfare for its citizens. Also, the economical capability determines how long the state can wage war against its enemy.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} Mostly Shia Muslims dominated (but not everywhere led by Shia Muslims) countries: Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Iran and some other states alongside Persian Gulf. The Western countries traditionally have better relationship with Sunni states; however these countries are much more conservative. The Shia Muslims could control not just the decisive part of Middle East, but more than 40\% of the world’s oil reserves. The international ships are using the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal. The control of these areas by „unfriendly” governments could cause unforeseeable effects for the world’s economy.

\textsuperscript{19} FM 7-100 p. VI. and HART pp. 14-15., 493-511.
Sociological demographics

The sociological demographics variable shows us the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity of the area; many times help to identify the real roots of conflict.

None of the analyzed countries is built up of a homogenous ethnicity. That means, they are not nation-states in a political/international sense. The lack of nation consciousness fuels disagreements, the population basically define themselves as a member of tribe, ethnic or religious group and not as a nation. The main effort of these people is to unify the similar religious/ethnic groups (e.g.: Pashtuns, Somalis) in one country. This causes permanent/constant (armed) conflicts with the neighboring countries. These countries are wasting their potential capabilities for the struggle, instead of investing in economic improvement/prosperity.

From the attached diagram we can realize that especially in Somalia and Lebanon, the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) can endanger internal stability not just in their homeland, but also in those countries that accept these refugees. The host nations have to face an ever-growing tension, because they cannot conduct their pacification as effectively as necessary.

For instance, in Lebanon the Hezbollah can conscript its mass base not just from the Lebanese population, but the twelve refugee camps, which are located in the country. One of the main reasons for instability inside Lebanon is the huge percentage of refugees. More than 405,000 Palestinian refugees have settled down “temporarily”, but most of them have been living in the refugee camps for decades.\(^{20}\) Additional hundreds of thousands Iraqi and Syrian refugees are living in Lebanon.\(^{21}\) According to this, almost 20 % of the populations are refugees or IDPs. Resulting from its role as a host, the Lebanese government cannot afford to integrate this huge mass with such a variable ethnicity. Actually, the Palestinian refugees do not have political rights or private properties. Similarly to the Gaza bank situation, these masses do not have hope for a better future.

In those countries where the ration of refugees/IDPs reaches a critical level, the host nations lose the possibility to control the situation. The extremist groups

\(^{20}\) Most of them settled down in Lebanon after the first and second Arab-Israeli war. Also a huge number of refugees arrived in Lebanon after the Cairo agreement (1969). Lebanon agreed to accommodate the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) members from Jordan. MAACHAR pp.5-6, 12.

will have enough volunteers to improve their mass base and gain control over internal policy. Thanks to their initiation, extremist groups can use the civilians and refugees/IDPs as a shield against governmental institutions and internal security forces. Their refugee camps ensure a hotbed of extremism, perfect cover and concealment against hostile intelligence services.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Figure 2. Social demographic situation\textsuperscript{23}}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Information}

\textit{Media and other open source assets show us how the population sees and thinks about events. Manipulation of public opinion can decisively change the mood of population or the IC.}

Most participant forces of these conflicts try to use every form of international media to gain influence/control over the hearts and minds. The IC forces have integrated media specialists into their own forces. These take documentary footage of their daily routines. It could be useful for their own

\textsuperscript{22} COUNTRY REPORT 2009. pp. 133-134.

The table does not include the ethnical diversity inside the countries or their proportion within the refugees/internally displaced persons (IDPs)!
forces, because the homeland could understand the reason of conflicts and the necessity of IC forces’ presence better.

On the other hand, the “bad guys” also make their own videos. Their main goal is to provoke and use the Alliances’ mistakes against them. They use these failures as a weapon in trying to gain control over the population and the IC.

It is enough to think of the situation in Afghanistan or Iraq after the Koran burning or after the unnecessary and disproportional use of the escalation of force (e.g.: bombing, UAV strike), when innocent women and children were injured.

According to the Hezbollah’s motto „if you haven’t captured it on film - you haven’t fought.”

**Physical environment**

_This aspect is made up by the weather and terrain. Using complex terrain, harsh weather conditions in order to mitigate technological advantages of the IC (NATO) is one of the most popular TTPs of opposition (under armed) forces._

Most of the analyzed countries have historical road and settlement structure. The majority of population is living alongside these clearly identifiable locations. When assigned soldiers/sections make the intelligence preparation of battlefield (IPB), they prefer OCOKA which is part of IPB.

Creating a good assessment of OCOKA doesn’t mean just taking into consideration the natural and manmade obstacles, roads and other types of physical environment. It is also essential to take into account why it is so important to occupy or hold the point or area in question.

**Technology**

During the conventional type of conflicts the modern military forces can gain and retain initiation during the full length of war. Symmetrical warfare mostly ensures victory for the forces that are technically and technologically better equipped. In every scene of analyzed conflicts, the Alliances or Israel preferred the effect base operations and network centric warfare using high tech quality assets.

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24 MELLIES p.66.
25 Observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach.
On the other hand, the military history shows us, that after the end of symmetric war, the winner of the battlefields cannot necessarily grant the safe and secure environment. That may engender asymmetric warfare. Majority of the citizens live in an urbanized environment, where it is quite difficult to control and check the entire population. These cities are acting as a safe haven for insurgents and extremists groups. Usually, after the end of armed conflict, the internal security forces lose their former capabilities to control and maintain civil order inside the country. This is especially so in the analyzed countries: the ethnically and religiously divided population find themselves in the middle of civil war.

The insurgents and extremist groups can gain the initiation, because they are familiar with the environment, they can melt easily among civilians after ambushes, and they can use complex terrain in order to mitigate the technological advantages of Alliance. Most insurgents groups – as I am going to describe it in part of Military capabilities – are using former Soviet type weapons. These weapons may not be brand new or represent a high tech technology, but when used in a well prepared ambush, they can destroy expensive, high tech weaponry (e.g. using RPGs against helicopters or IEDs against APC/MRAPs).

Sometimes the insurgents can afford to buy high tech weapons. For instance, in 2006, the Hezbollah had UAVs and cruise missiles, but these could not influence the outcome of the conflict. However, their presence caused surprise for Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).  

**External organizations**

*Usually, the external organizations are present in every war-thorn area; mostly under the umbrella of United Nations (e.g.: UN HCR. Red Cross). Their main goals are to decrease suffering and negative affects of war, trying to improve the locals’ life conditions.*

One of the biggest and most effective NGO is the US AID. It is not impartial, but its power and financial possibilities almost match that of the Red Cross. US AID is cooperating with district and province level local leadership, is supporting the PRTs and other international units/organizations. NGOs do not have own bodyguards or force protection units. Their security depends on the locals’ goodwill and on how effective their reconstruction projects are.

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26 SNYDER pp.132-134.
In Somalia, the NGOs had to hire local armed clans as “technicians” in order to guarantee the security of their employees.\textsuperscript{27}

**National will**

One of the most decisive elements that form the national will of IC nations is the number of casualties. Nations tolerate losses differently. The US population supported almost a decade-long parallel war in Iraq and Afghanistan, because these conflicts were communicated well. This was not the case in Somalia, where the US Army left after Operation Continue Hope.

There is a similar situation in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict: according to Hasan Nasrallah ,,the Israeli Achilles heel... was the ...Israeli society itself.”\textsuperscript{28}

Both mentioned examples show the necessity of calm internal policy background. Without it no war can be won.

The main problem and one of the decisive points (from the enemy’s side) is how the hinterland can identify with soldiers and their efforts on battlefields.

**Time**

*The role of time as a COE variable is similar to national will. Opposition forces want to use/manipulate and turn the way of war to their advantage.*

Basically, the clans/tribes/nations who are fighting in their home front, want to solve the situation (mostly civil war) before the IC sends peacekeepers. If they cannot do so in time, then they will prolong the conflict, because they are well-awre of the fact that if the peacekeepers arrive, it will be the IC – and not some of them – to decide how to settle the situation. So the IC decision can also be in full contrast with the objectives of some parties. For this reason, the conflict may be protracted, and the insurgents’s aim will certainly be to conduct attrition warfare against the much more equipped international forces. However, no one coalition can afford to maintain in the long term an expeditionary military force. It cannot do so not only because the serious technical and financial consequences, but because it can surely expect to lose gradually the support of the domestic public opinion. For instance, since 2006 in Iraq (and 2009 in Afghanistan) the US political and military leadership (via NATO) started to revise its former goals. The IC accepted the revised goals, gave up the

\textsuperscript{27} STEWART p.8.
former desired endstate and changed it with flexible, realistic decisions in order to set up and strengthen the current status quo.\footnote{29}

**Military capabilities**

The military capabilities of participant forces vary from country to country. \textit{The number of the opposition forces and their weapons largely determine their strategy and TTPs.} In Somalia most weaponry came from the Soviet era, when they got it as a military aid. A huge part of supplies moved to extremist groups in the beginning of 1990s, when the state collapsed and armories were looted. \footnote{30}

Similarly, insurgents and armed groups in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon also use Soviet (Iranian, Chinese) type weapons, but the use of methods, effectiveness depends on the TTPs.

For instance, Hezbollah had a wide spectrum of side arms, anti tank and artillery weapons. On the basis of experience, they organized their defense in deep (20-25 km), in the vicinity of main weapon systems. The minefields, natural and manmade obstacles canalized the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) into the well-prepared ambushes. \footnote{31} Anti armor defense was organized at squad and also company/battalion level (started with RPGs through Metisz-M, Kornet-E, AT-14, Milan, TOW). \footnote{32} The mass use of anti armor weapons ensured the adequate destruction of IDF’s vehicles.

Surprisingly, the Hezbollah had Iranian developed UAVs. The number and quality of these could not change the outcome of the struggle, but the UAVs existence and presence on the battlefield had psychological effects. \footnote{33}

The role and structure of Hezbollah’s armed forces reflect the following: „\textit{It was not a regular army, and it was not a guerrilla one in traditional sense either. It was something in between.}“ \footnote{34} – stated Hasan Nasrallah.

On the other side, IC (especially the US, Israel) used the full spectrum of high tech weaponry by well trained soldiers. Their quality and enormous fire power did not leave any other option for the opposition forces but to adjust their TTPs to their capabilities (asymmetric warfare).

\footnote{29} For more details see: BAKER – HAMILTON
\footnote{30} HEGEDŰS p.225.
\footnote{33} MELLIES p.53.
\footnote{34} MATTHEWS (2009) p.6., BIDDLE – FRIEDMAN p.7.
Other (internet) sources


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CIMIC PROJECTS

Abstract:

In this article the author would like to introduce CIMIC projects in an easy-to-read way, so as to make the topic understandable for non-professional reader as well. Therefore, he does not explore certain topics in full depth; still, he tries to provide an interdisciplinary overview of the subject.

Keywords: CIMIC, projects, NGO, Afghanistan, Kosovo

A war is a burden on the whole society. The way and amount of support with which the civilian population can contribute to military activities depend mostly on the given political system, the degree of division of labour and the military ability of the enemy. The division of labour can reach a lower or higher level, depending on different internal and external circumstances, such as the social factors, the amount of raw materials, the state of development in the educational system, the influence of the neighbouring countries etc. These are the most important prerequisites for creating a professional army. If the army gets more professional, it has several advantages. Let me mention two quick examples: not everyone has to take part in military actions; the armed forces can consist of less but well-trained members as well, although this cannot be afforded by each country. After joining the NATO, the Hungarian army has become more professional, at the same time, they started to set up the different elements in 2000, and the real CIMIC\(^1\) ability appeared only in 2003. The Civil-

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\(^1\) CIMIC: Civil-Military Co-operation
Military Cooperation Centre was set up, the name of which was changed to Civil-Military Cooperation and Psychological Centre, when the PSYOPS\textsuperscript{2} appeared in 2004. “Connecting these two activities was obvious, because one of the main tasks of the PSYOPS is to “publish” what the CIMIC does during a project in an operational area.”\textsuperscript{3}

**CIMIC**

The definition of the CIMIC is the following: “The co-ordination and co-operation in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”\textsuperscript{4} The basic task of CIMIC is supporting the army and the civil population and keeping contact between the civilians and the military services.\textsuperscript{5} With CIMIC, it became possible for the military service to liaise with the population in a professional way through the strengths trained specially for this task.

*The aims of CIMIC are the following:*

- “Liaise with civil actors at an appropriate level.
- Engage in joint planning, at the strategic as well as the operational level, with appropriate civilian bodies before and during an operation.
- Carry out continuous assessments of the local civil environment.
- Including local needs, in order to identify the extent of any vacuum and how that vacuum might be filled.
- Oversee the conduct of civil-related activities by military forces, including the provision of requisite functional specialists.
- Work for a timely and smooth transition towards civil responsibilities through the involvement of the proper authorities.
- Work with other staff branches on all aspects of operations.
- Advise the Commander on all of the above.”\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{2} PSYOPS: Psychological Operations

\textsuperscript{3} *Lélektani műveletek a biztonság növeléséért*, interjú Boldizsár Gábor ezredessel, in: http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/15687, 27-12-2012

\textsuperscript{4} MC 411/1, in: http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-e.htm, 07-01-2013


Keeping contact is present since the very beginning, thanks to the coexistence of civilians and soldiers, although this was not institutionalised in the military forces for a long time. Therefore, keeping contact with the civilians was of different intensity and standard, and its quality depended mainly on the abilities of the leader. Usually, the civilian population never escapes from or is never completely relocated from an operational area; therefore, military forces have to deal with their presence during and after the operations, since they influence military activities. It is important to try to be on friendly, peaceful or neutral terms with the population and other local organisations. For this, sometimes the contact-keeping activity is enough, when the given soldier who had CIMIC training makes contact; however, sometimes this does not reach its goal in itself. This is a very complex situation, the success of which can depend on many different factors, for example on the culture, the internal affairs or the economic situation of the given country, etc. In order to support the local residents and also to win them over to the military forces, the commander can decide to carry out a project by using the CIMIC.

Photographer: Erika VARGA

**Project**

The project is defined in a broad sense, so it is worth narrowing it down, according to special areas. “A CIMIC project is a specific task or activity managed by the military force either independently or in partnership with one or more civil bodies (national and/or regional authorities, civilian populations, non-governmental organisations and international organisations).”

Operations are usually divided into tree periods: before, during and after the operations. The precise definition of the transitions between the sections is often quite malleable. The CIMIC ability continues uninterruptedly its project-like

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activity during the three periods, until the withdrawal of military troops. The Hungarian Army performed this kind of activity in Afghanistan, Kosovo and in Iraq with a staff officer. With the exception of Afghanistan, the operational phase in these operational areas came to the level that project-like activities have been completed.

“Improving the life conditions of the population contributes to creating a safer environment”. Through CIMIC projects, the population and local organisations can get much support for starting a normal life again. At the time of a war, everyday survival is the most important for people, physiological needs, such as to eat and drink. In this case, their desires take place at the bottom of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. After the battles, physiological needs are present and further needs also arise, for example the desire for work. In an ideal case, economy should start after the war, which would maintain and make the system operate. However, this is difficult because in many cases the inoperativeness of the state may also contribut to the revival of the conflict. Supporting the local population may include for example distributing water, giving food packets, warm clothes, blankets, giving aggregators for the local governments, supplying the police with flashlights, building schools, renovating hospitals, giving fuel, building bridges, streets and gates. As we can see, support can be of quite many types. Therefore, projects can be grouped according to different categories.

CIMIC projects can be classified according to budget categories:

- Non-cost projects, for example the distribution of clothes donations collected in Hungary.
- Low-cost projects, for example supplying schools with pencils and paper. The bidding limit is less than half a million Ft.
- High-cost projects, for example building streets and bridges. Typically, these are carried out in more stages and start above an amount of half a million Ft.

When selecting the type of projects, it is crucial to know from what source the money used for a particular purpose derives. This is based on the principle “the one who has the money, has the right to decide as well”. The other decisive factor is the needs of the commander and the applicant: projects are carried out where it is justified, according to operational criteria.

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The CIMIC activity aimed at projects is not for its own sake. On the one hand, it helps the locals, and on the other, it increases the acceptance of the military forces. In the case of NGOs specialised in aid, sometimes the following question arises: why does the army take their work over and follows such activities? “Since the principal responsibility of the NGOs is rehabilitation and re-building, therefore in some cases they feel that the military forces interfere in the “civilian profession” in a selfish way in order to achieve their goals (the security of forces, increasing acceptance).\textsuperscript{10}

Before selecting the most appropriate projects, we must have previous knowledge of the given country, the given society, its structure and its culture. It is worth involving social scientists as well in this previous gathering of information, so that CIMIC specialists can use this information in operational areas. For example, if the young are over-represented in a given society, then it is worth putting a greater emphasis on education. When choosing the projects, we always have to specify the aims we would like to reach in the short, medium and long run. For instance, giving food to the locals so that they do not starve might be a short-term objective; and in the long run, we might build a school for them to improve education.

CIMIC projects can be classified according to the nature of their support areas into the following categories:

- Supporting infrastructure: building and reconstruction of streets and bridges, digging wells, building water supply systems, flood prevention systems and electrical systems.
- Humanitarian assistance: giving relief for the needy, participation in solving disasters (floods, avalanches, earthquakes, mass accidents).
- Supporting education: building and renovating schools, donating furniture objects (cabinets, desks), educational materials, brochures, pens.
- Supporting public health: building, renovating and expanding public health institutions, purchasing pieces of furniture (cabinets, instruments and books), purchasing and donating health products, medicines and bandages, purchasing and overhauling ambulances.
- Supporting the government: renovating and fixing governmental, police and military buildings, and their logistical and IT support.
- Supporting the agriculture: cleaning channels, building granaries, donating seeds and agricultural equipment.

\textsuperscript{10} \textsc{Padányi} József, \textsc{Galgócz} István, \textsc{Boldizs} Gábor: \textit{A civil-katonai együttműködés lehetőségei a nemzetközi feladatokban részt vevő magyar katonák biztonságának növelésében}, 2006., 33. p.
• Promoting culture and sports: building libraries, supporting sports departments, building and renovating sports facilities.

The project requests can arrive in different ways. The requests can appear through the CIMIC patrol, the CIMIC house, the Liaison Teams and Force Protection, and through the direct contact with local superiors. Immediately after the cessation of armed activity, the way of arrival and administration of the project requests cannot be, in general, clarified yet, since probably the state system has not been set up/reconstructed, therefore the official contacts cannot work yet. As time progresses, the way of the arrival of project requests becomes more ordered. As the state system becomes stronger, it becomes more and more similar to a constitutional state. In Afghanistan, for example, the Provincial Development Plan is created by the Provincial Development Council, which is reported to the Provincial Reconstruction Team. In the council, every segment of the society is represented. The leaders of the centre of the province, the Sura\(^{11}\) of the province, the local leaders, the UN’s representative of the province are present, and the local CIMIC chief and the PRT commander are usually also invited to their meetings.

Photographer: Erika VARGA

When planning and carrying out different projects, it is worth involving the local leaders and institutions, the public, the entrepreneurs; and consulting with the NGOs and IOs working there. Involving the locals is important because in this way they feel more that the projects are their own and do not consider them merely as gifts. For example, a local resident will take better care of a gate or school if he or she also took part in its renovation. Involving local entrepreneurs

\(^{11}\) Sura: council
is needed because they give work for the local population, and in this way the economy starts improving, which will finally help in withdrawing the troops. When giving fuel for example, the leader of the local community can be involved because in this way we will increase the local’s respect for him. Moreover, he knows the locals, so we can avoid problems if there might be a queue for example.

In Afghanistan, a functional expert is ordered for infrastructural projects, the task of whom is the following: “the temporary reinforcement of the CIMIC subordinate unit by providing special knowledge in the following areas: public affairs, civil infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, economy, trade, cultural affairs”. In the board of effective force, the name of his position is an infrastructural officer. The functional expert is always an engineer. First, this person was a military engineer, and with the progression of the operations, a local civil engineer has gradually taken this position over in Afghanistan.

A possible outline of the realisation of a project:

- Receiving a project request and preparing the project plan of the commander.
- Preparation of a concrete project proposal.
- Finding an entrepreneur to carry out the project. In case of a project of great value: making the entrepreneurs compete, viewing references. We should aim at choosing local entrepreneurs: where possible, he or she should offer cheaper work and/or work of better quality than the other entrepreneurs. Those who are self-employed should be preferred, in this way everyone will aim at being self-employed after a while. Moreover, the reliability of the entrepreneurs is also very important, both professionally and for the sake of security.
- Entering into a contract. In this way both the interests of the entrepreneur and the one who enters into a contract are protected and this will help the establishment of constitutionality in the long run.
- Starting a project. If there is an important event, there should be a ceremony. In case of greater, long-term projects, where local leaders and the media are present, it is worth holding an opening ceremony so that the locals know what is going to happen there.
- Continuous control. With the help of continuous control we can reach that the capital for the project is used really for what it has been intended to. In addition, keeping the deadlines can also be solved more easily if the implementation is controlled. Continuous monitoring has another advantage as well: if there happens to be an obstacle, with concentrated forces it can be overcome faster.
- Technical takeover. The actual takeover of the project after confirmation.
- Opening ceremony. Usually, it is the commander or its assistant who inaugurates the project. If possible, the local management and media are also present. For example, if the project is the renovation of a building, usually a commemorative plaque is placed on the wall of the building so that everyone will know in the future who built the given school or bridge. When inaugurating things of smaller size, we usually mark them with the logo of the continent, or if we donate benches, school bags, exercise books, pens, etc., we mark them with the label: “Donated by Hungary”.
- Payment of projects.
- Report of the end state. A detailed report of the realisation and inauguration of the project has to be made for the superiors.
Impact analysis. If possible, it is worth re-checking the project whether they have really reached their goals; for example checking whether the school which has been built is really used or not. If not, why not? Aren’t there enough students, teachers or school equipment, or has an NGO built another school we had no information about? Or if the project was successful, we might think of carrying out similar things in the given area.

Each operational area is different; therefore, it is difficult to find a general toolbar which is suitable for every CIMIC project management. Above, I tried to outline some aspects which help to gain an insight into carrying out projects by the Hungarian Army. The experts dealing with the projects have at their disposal the TTP8 and the national regulators, and this knowledge and the regulators are used in accordance with the operational concept, taking into account the nature of the given operational area and the mission of the commander. A high level of creativity, empathy and professional experience are all essential for this work.

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**REVIEW ABOUT “Survival”**  
written by Sándor Horváth

Is it important for you the safety of your loved ones and yourself, when you work in the country or far away from your home, abroad? Are you aware of the danger signals during your staying and travel? Not? So, you have to buy immediately a security manual, which deals with this kind of situations. It is the first time that such a security manual is available for everybody in Hungarian, which deals with the security aspects of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions abroad, and raises awareness as well as provides guidance in the case of different emergencies.

In the past decade, there has been a steady increase in the number of field activities, and Hungarian staff has been deployed under the OSCE, UN, EU, MFO flags around the world. This book serves not only for peacekeepers, but also for civilians, as a primer on how to navigate as safely as possible in the potentially wild world of adventure, in post conflict areas and in third world countries. For those who are accustomed to operating in comfortable and insulated confines of the modern society, this book is a compulsory reading, before you even think about going to your first foreign mission or travel.  
The author, Sádor Horváth is a former member of the Hungarian Special Police Unit (RKSZ), who participated in several CIVPOL peacekeeping missions. He gained unique practical experience in the field of personal security throughout those years he spent in post conflict areas. Using his extensive practical experience and the available literature, he has written a very good guidebook, which can be used in everyday life as well. Therefore, the manual is a useful reading not only for peacekeepers and aid workers, but it could be handy in everyday life as well.
This is an excellent reprint of the basics of personal security in the mission area, which consists of more than 200 pages and covers the following main areas: introduction to the rehabilitation of post-conflict societies, self-preparation, characteristics of post-conflict environments, terrorism, hostage situation, recommended behaviour in captivity, personal security and safety in general, life-saving protective equipment, office security, home security, family members in the mission area, local employees, fire protection, travel safety, mine awareness, map reading and orientation, traffic safety, four-wheel driving techniques, radio communication, self-defense and fitness, stress and stress management, basics of first aid, main diseases, cross-cultural communication and cultural shock.

The manual attempts to distil Sándor’s recommendations based on his previous field experiences and vocational literatures, in order to increase the survival capability of future peacekeepers and travellers. There are plenty of useful illustrations. Some of them, we have already seen previously, but the others are completely new.

The information is generally laid out in a logical fashion, and I found most of the guidance very practical, functional and useful. I might quibble with a number of minor things, but none of that would kill you and there are a lot more excellent advices that will save your butt.

This is a good choice for someone looking for an in-depth basics survival manual, not useful only in mission area, but in everyday life, too.

**Title:** Survival -
Tuned to security- Guidebook for peacekeepers, aid workers and travelers; 206-pages, price: 2490 HUF
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4. www.globalsecurity.org/army/iraq (downloading time: 19 04 2012)

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