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THE HUNGARIAN DRUG-POLICE

Introduction

The illicit production and distribution of drugs and psychotrop materials and substances mean an immensely serious danger for the society as a whole and for the individual as well, so cutting back the number of illicit distribution and the connected crimes demand highest priority from the authorities of all states. It is publicly known that the illicit distribution is the source of outstanding financial benefits and huge fortunes, which make it also possible for the supra-national criminal organisations to penetrate, pollute and to corrupt the economical and state structure, the legal trading and financial activities, as well as the society at all levels.

As direct consequence of the worsening of the drug-situation, the defensive reflexes of the society became active, the national drug-strategy was completed, new legislation came to force, civilian organisations were established to help handle the problem. The police forces and the national security services – as key state factors to handle the problem – have worked out a synchronized action-program for the future.

Circumstances of the drug-police

The implementation of the National Drug Strategy affects almost all segments of the society in connection with the decrease of demand, suppression of supply or the elimination of damaging effects of drug-addiction. Among the participating organisations in implementing the aims and tasks of the National Drug Strategy the National Police has a very important role. The police adopts special methods and procedures which cannot be replaced in the field of reduction of demand and supply.

In the fight against drugs the Police of the Hungarian Republic fulfils a triple function:

- basic function in the area of criminal investigation are decreasing demand and supply, as well as investigating and reducing the secondary crimes committed in order to obtain drugs;
- another task is reducing demand in the frame of explanatory activities in the area of crime-prevention;
- further task as administrative authority is to practice licensing and control activities.

The police has, in the interest of fulfilling its national and international commitments of decreasing the supply and demand, as well as implementing administrative tasks – in accordance with the drug strategy of the Hungarian Republic and anti-drug action programs of the EU – had worked out its anti-drug strategy for 2007-2014. This task-system – which is a resolution of the Chief of the National Police – is mainly based on criminological approach and is implemented through the application of the total criminological toolbar. The tasks in the police strategy contain appropriate answers to the actual problems and tendencies regarding the future. The document contained the tendencies of the drug-situation, today’s criminal situation, the legislative background, the structure of the police fulfilling the tasks, the connected technical and human resources, as well as the ideas regarding possible cooperating partner organisations. One of the priorities of the National Drug Strategy in the interest of cutting back the drug-problem is reducing of crimes committed in connection with drugs, so reducing possibilities to acquire drugs. The reduction of supply indicates all methods, through which forms of behaviour coming under the Criminal Law can be investigated. This includes legislative regulations, law-enforcement, synchronization of the activities of the police, customs and penal authorities, actions against secondary criminal offences in connection with the abuse of drugs and the international law-enforcement cooperation.

The tasks of the police connected with the reduction of the supply are on the short term to determine the number of drug-consumers and distributors, to slow down negative tendencies, on the long term to stop the increase of illegal activities in connection with drug-crimes. One of the main tasks of the law-enforcement organisations responsible for drug-investigations is to find and eliminate illegal production plants, to destroy raw materials.

According to the National Drug Strategy, crime-prevention – reducing the situations favourable for crimes – is one of the basic tasks listed in the act. It means information, education in the interest of preventing one becoming a committer. Participation in the drug-prevention activities, that means reducing demand is integrated here as a special area. It is primary task of the crime-prevention departments of the county police organisations, of the sub-units of the local police departments, as well as of the desk-officers to prevent crimes connected with drugs. Primary aspect is the authentic education and information.

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1 The referred document had been issued as order No.17/2006 (XI.24.) of the Chief of the National Police about the unified implementation of the tasks laid down in the drug-strategy of the Police of the Hungarian Republic. Source: http://www.police.hu
to reach the most threatened young generation and its environment with targeted programs. The targeted education of the young generation, teaching them to follow the laws could be one of the keys to solve future drug-problems. Beside the already tested prevention-programs – as the D.A.D.A.\(^2\) program or its further developed version, the ELLEN-SZER\(^3\) - the involvement of the adult population in the wide ranged guidance, emphasizing responsibility, participation in the preventional programs, is furthermore needed.

The police branch responsible for maintaining public order works in three areas affected in the fight against drug-crimes. First, resulting from its original tasks, maintaining public order, has an effect on reducing supply, second, with participation of the officers, holds lectures in different educational institutions on prevention, so playing a role in reducing demand, and third, as part of its administrative functions, fulfils tasks regarding drug-investigations.

The National Drug Strategy places and defines the drug-administrative activity in the chapter on reducing supply. Accordingly, it is the task of the drug-administration to prevent that drugs, psychotrop materials shift from the legal market to the illegal one. The organ established for this purpose is the Central Drug Administration within the Administrative Main Department of the National Police.

The National Drug Strategy within the institutional system of reducing supply, on the long term aims to reduce the access to materials used for abuse, and to increase control of the legal and illegal materials and substances. For the implementation of a stronger control of drugs, psychotrops and substances, the level of training, the technical background as well as the participation in international cooperations should be developed. The monitoring the trade of not regulated, but for international observation proposed chemicals and the establishment of a joint data-base have to be organised. A long term investigative and preventive aim is the successful implementation of the National Drug Strategy with domestic and international partners, to study the national and international changes in the field of crimes and investigations, when necessary, to modify the aims and tasks determined by the National Drug Strategy.

\(^2\) The D.A.D.A. is the school program of the police in educating security. The county police HQs and the officers of the local police stations hold regular lectures for students. The D.A.D.A. is a personality-developing program teaching how to correctly evaluate yourself and to have self respect. Its aim is to have children recognise the threatening situations, to be able to make a difference between positive and negative influencing factors.

\(^3\) The Crime Prevention Service of the Hungarian police has developed this program mainly for the most endangered children in grammar schools. This is the further developed version of the D.A.D.A. program. The program ELLEN-SZER is targeted for 16 year old youngsters, either in colleges or technical schools, trade schools or specialised schools; because it takes the generational specialities into consideration to educate them on prevention.
The professional activities of the drug-police

The short overview of the general terms of the police administration substantiates the detailed explanation and understanding of the function, tasks and administrative activities of the Hungarian drug-policing.

Policing is a branch of the public administration that insures public order for the society. In the policing administration one can find the general features of public administration, policing can actually be seen as one of the elements of the administrative system. The task of the policing is to save public order and internal peace, which is carried out through the legal restrictions of the personal rights, implemented within its sphere of administrative authority.

The content of policing administration is to implement enacting activities, constantly ensuring the personal and material conditions to fulfill policing tasks. The policing administration can also be separated into external authority- transactions and internal administrative activities to maintain the policing organisations.

The right of policing is the sum of all legislative regulations, which ordain the professional and organisational function of the police authority, as well as the service order of the staff. The material rights of the policing authority is the sum of all legal facts, when realised, a policing case arises.

The police authority acting as administrative authority, with its executive powers takes one-sided measures, through which it identifies obligations for the client and enforces its measures.

Policing, as part of the civilian administration, was established in the modern times, when it broke off from the army and fulfilled assignments of civilians or local communities. The function of policing is to protect public order and internal peace with executive means. These functions are exactly summarized in the famous Prussian “Allgemeines Landrecht” of 1794, according to which „the function of policing is to ensure public peace, public safety and public order, as well as to take necessary measures to prevent the community of individuals from threatening dangers.”

The complexity and differenciety of policing administration means that different administrative forms are needed in the different branches. The policing authority with public safety tasks is fulfilling its duties upon public

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5 The No. 1/1999 administrative decision of the Supreme Court regarding the decision made by the head of the superior police organ in connection with the judgement of the claim.
6 István Szikinger: The basic legal questions of protecting order. New Policing Studies, RTF, 199/1, S.41.
administrative authorisation (the chosen topic of drug-policing belongs to this category), while the criminal investigative service is responsible for law-enforcement. The two qualities require different organisational structures and administrative culture. The administrative authority responsible for public security is part of the public security system.

The decree No. 14/1989 of the deputy minister for interior affairs decided about the establishment, position within the police's organisational structure, and main duties of the Hungarian drug-policing organization still functioning today. The decree has – in the interest of a more successful control – developed the centrally managed system with regional character. The special central organizational unit was positioned within the Policing department of the Administrative Policing Division of the National Police and the territorial organs at the administrative police departments of the seven appointed county police HQs. The regional units had competence over more counties.

There were many changes here in the last two decades. The main reason for this on the one hand is that the National Police was separated from the Ministry of Interior, on the other hand were the changes within the organizational and commanding system of the police.

Today the drug-policing activity is centrally managed through the administrative policing branch within the National Police. Studying the current structure (October 2008) of the National Police it is clear that administrative police is functioning as a main department of the Policing Main Directorate. The Administration Police main department consists of two departments:

- policing department
- offence and administrative department.

Within the policing department 3 desk officers (chemist, pharmacist) are responsible for fulfilling the tasks of drug-police on a national level. In the territorial desk-officer network there is a drug-police officer within all county police HQs.

The basic legal source for the official drug-policing activity is the Act No. XXXIV. of 1994 about the police. The Act determines that the police – within its policing function – fulfills the authority tasks in connection with production,

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7 The authority-activities regarding the control for drugs has a more then 7 decades history in Hungary. The Drug Control Central Organisation established in 1934 within the Ministry for Interior dealt with drug-trafficking based on the legal trade of medicine from both administrative and police aspects. The establishment of this organisation was on the basis of the agreement on restricting production and regulating distribution accepted in Genf in 1931. The organisation identified and terminated the infectious sources, investigated and neutralized drug-dealers.
trafficking and use of materials dangerous for public safety – including drugs, etc.

The policing activities regarding drugs are enforced through international and national laws. At the same time they determine as functions the supervision and control of medical and scientific use of the production and trafficking of drugs, psychotrops and substances.

It must be taken into consideration that the drug-problem requires this administrative policing activity of the police at an international level as well, because in most of the West-European countries the supervision of the legal transactions of drugs and psychotropic substances has priority in the work of the police.

The National Police through the Central Drug-Policing:
- provides for the authority and police supervisional and controlling functions in connection with activities regarding drugs, psychotrop materials and substances;
- approves activities regarding medical use of drugs as well as approves the persons responsible for such activities;
- gives out the permissions to transit drugs through the country, to take out or bring in new samples dangerous in connection with drugs or abuse, and gives out verifications regarding registration of any activities in connection with drugs not for medical purposes;
- cooperates in the licensing-procedures of these activities, with the Ministry for Health, Social and Family Affairs, with the National Pharmaceutical Institute, and in the implementation of the regulations with other responsible institutions, with National Customs and Finance HQ, National Public Health Service, National Security Office;
- fulfills tasks regarding giving out authority permissions to produce, traffic and use of plants suitable to produce drugs in the cases determined by law, approves the transport of poppy and cannabis within the country;
- keeps registry of seized drugs, psychotrops and substances, of their preliminary disposal or destruction; 8
- provides for the transport of drugs, psychotrops and substances which are corpus delicts, to the place of safe-keeping. Supervises 9 and controls registration and storage of drugs; 10

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8 Joint Order of Minister of Justice, Minister of Interior and Minister of Finance No. 11/2003 (V.8.), §83 (2)
9 According to order §84 (2)
10 According to order § 85-86.
decides about the future of seized drugs or takes measures to destroy drug in compliance with the rules of procedure.

The authority-activity of drug-policing

One of the primary tasks of the drug-policing is the licensing activity regarding trafficking and use of drugs, psychotrops and substances. Other authorities also participate in this procedure. In all licensing cases the Central Drug-Policing of the National Police is a main actor. In the incoming and outgoing licensing procedures the main partner of the drug-policing is the National Command of Customs and Finance. In the licensing authority activities the functions of the pharmacies is fulfilled by the State National Health and Medical Officers' Service. In licensing the use of drugs and psychotrops the Health Licensing and Public Administration Office is the cooperating authority.

The legal base for the authority licensing activity is the 142/2004 (IV.29) Government's order on the activities carried out with the use of drugs and psychotrops. The substances listed in the appendix and all activities with their use come under the effect of the order. Medical and non-medical, as well as scientific and research activities come also under the rules of the order. Cleaning of poppy-seeds contaminated with poppy straws has to be reported, and the order contains the rules for veterinary institutions and specifications for retail distribution.

To issue a license, the applicant has to provide the documents listed in the order, with special attention to the existence and ensurance of the conditions of safe storage and handling. In the application the one-person responsible for the activity has to be given. Before issuing the license, the existence of conditions will be checked on the sight.

In the licensing procedure the authorities carrying out the tasks:

- in all cases as police the Central Drug Policing of the National Police;
- In case of export, import and transit the National Command of Customs and Finance;
- in cases of veterinary products and in cases of activities in connection with plants appropriate for the production of drugs the Ministry of Agriculture;
- individual destroyment-licenses: State National Health and Medical Officers’ Service.

The authority-functions regarding the control of drugs, psychotrops and substances are carried out by:

- the Police: Drug policing with general competence;
- the National Command of Customs and Finance: import, export and transit competence;
- State National Health and Medical Officers' Service: regarding drug-substances in cases of activities in the field of pharmacies;
- Health Licensing and Public Administration Office: activities carried out through licensed use of drugs and psychotrops.

Observance of the rules of drug-orders is controlled by the drug-policing organization of the police. The rules for the prescription of drugs: the prescription has to be issued in two copies. The doctor has to sign and stamp both copies. On one of the copies the word "copy" has to be written. If the drug is prescribed in a dosage more than the largest individual or daily dosage, the overstepping must be specially stated and signed by the doctor. When this is missing, the pharmacist can not give out the medicine.

The control of specifications regarding storage of drugs and psychotrops is carried out according to the relating government's order. 11 Drugs and psychotrops - except certain medical products - have to be stored separated from all other substances, in a storeroom with strong walls from the sides, adequately lighted, with security lock (iron bars) and electronic security equipment, or - depending on the amount - in a fixed safe with security lock, positioned in a room with electronical security equipment.

Control of implementation and registration for scrapping and decommissioning belongs also to the duties of the drug-policing organization. A record has to be made about the scrapping and decommissioning of materials which have to be licensed and declared. At least 20 days before, the place, time and way has to be reported. Within 10 days after reporting, the arrangements for the controlled decommissioning will be ordered in writing.

The drug-policing organization follows the route of seized drugs, with adherence to the general rules of handling, registering, preliminary disposal during seizure and court procedures. 12 The seized drug is in all cases a special evidence, which is saved and stored by the Police during all stages of the criminal procedure. In the possession of a legally valid judge's order the destroyment of the seized drug is carried out in the way of burning. There is a possibility to use the seized drug for law-enforcement or medical purposes, for training, testing or in the interest of international commitments.

**Conclusion**

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12 Joint Order of Minister of Justice, Minister of Interior and Minister of Finance No. 11/2003 (V.8.), §78-86
The Hungarian Drug Policing is a special area of the policing activities carried out by the police. Its establishment was made necessary because of the difficulty and worsening tendencies of the home drug-situation and the intention to increase state control. Separated from criminal investigation, it is functioning as a branch of administrative policing. Organically it is within the administrative policing branch of the National Police and the county police HQs.

Its main functions are connected with the legal trafficking and use of drugs, psychotrops and substances, with the licensing and control of activities carried out with these materials. The activity of the Hungarian Drug Police basically contributes to the fact that the legal drug trafficking should be under state control, and there should be no possibility for illegal trafficking and activities.

To reduce drug-crimes the effectiveness of the home police activities, international cooperation and exchange of information have to be increased in the field of reducing supply, and a closer working relationship has to be established between national police and national security organisations, making a maximal advantage of the special possibilities of these organisations.

In this activity the introduced drug-policing organization has a special role, operating within the organizational frames of the Hungarian Police, carrying out special tasks. There will be a demand for its work in the years to come.

Colonel Antal Beraczkai

PREVENTIVE STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN AGAINST SUICIDE TERRORISM

Suicide attacks are one of the most difficult types of terrorist attacks to prevent. As a method to attain martyrdom it generates many new options for the perpetrators. They can choose from among a broad range of targets, deploy a variety of resources that are relatively easy to obtain. This martyrdom also runs counter to our sense of logic. It is for this reason that suicide attacks are more difficult to imagine, predict and prevent. An examination of the individuals who carry out suicide attacks led to the conclusion that here is no specific profile for suicide terrorists, given that most of them are perfectly ordinary people. What distinguishes them from others is their need to do something for the society in which they feel at home, or the imagined community to which they believe to
belong, combined with their willingness to sacrifice themselves to achieve this goal. Group pressure, recruitment by terrorist organisations, and online jihadist propaganda all play a role in the process.

What is the suicide attack, how can we define it? “Suicide attack is an operational method in which the very act of the attack independent upon the death of the perpetrator.” This is an unique situation in which the terrorist is fully aware that if he does not kill him/herself, the planned attack will not be carried out. The terrorist makes concrete preparations for the possibility of death as a result of the attack (preparing a last will, carrying out purification ceremonies, etc). Very important to emphasize in this type of attack the terrorist finds him/herself in a very special psychological mood that some expert has already defined as a “tunnel vision”. In this mod, he/she enters the one and of the tunnel and if he/she decides to march to the other end of the tunnel and fulfill his/her mission his/her death is essential. The terrorist knows he/she has no other option-either he/she presses the button and kills him/herself and others or he/she refrains from pressing the button not to kill and nothing happens. When he suicide attacker is at the target scene it is very difficult to find the right tactics and methods to identify and neutralize him/her at the last moment before he/she detonates him/herself. The suicide terrorist is the ultimate smart bomb as some journalists call them, a human missile relentlessly homing in on its target but with flexibility in timing and access. The suicide terrorist thus has the ability to effect last-minute changes in his or her attack plan, on the bases of ease or difficulty of approach, the paucity or density of people in or around the target, and whether or not security personnel are present or other countermeasures are visible. Suicide terrorist operations are also inexpensive to mount. According to one estimate, the total cost of a typical Palestinian suicide operation is about one hundred fifty dollars. Yet this modest sum yields a very attractive return: on average, suicide operations worldwide kill about four times as many people as other kinds of terrorist attacks. In Israel the average is even higher, inflicting six times the number of deaths and roughly twenty six times more casualties than other acts of terrorism. These attacks are also less complicated and compromising than other terrorist operations, since no escape plan is needed: if the attack is successful, there is no assailant to capture and interrogate.

Not every terrorist group carries out suicide attacks. It is a weapon of last resort and from terrorist’s perspective there are strategic and tactical advantages to suicide attacks.

14 Suicide Terrorism: An In –Depth Study with Policy Options (Nov 2005).
15 Colonel Arif Ekmen,
16 Dr Boaz Ganor,ICT,Herzlyja Israel.
• Suicide attacks are relatively simple and cheap to plan and execute. There is no need for an escape plan, losses are limited and perpetrators are easy to replace.
• The attack has the potential to kill and injure many people and cause a lot of damage to the opponent.
• Perpetrators can determine the time, the location and the circumstances of the attack. These are difficult to detect and are even able to penetrate heavily guarded areas.
• Perpetrators cannot be arrested afterwards and therefore cannot give away any information to intelligence and investigative services.
• The attacks have a huge impact on the public and the media due to their high casualty rate and apparently irrational nature.
• Suicide attacks give the impression that the perpetrators are so resolute that more attacks are likely to follow. It is a kind of psychological warfare as well.
• Suicide attacks have the aura of martyrdom, which provides a certain degree of religious justification.
• The attacks have a positive effect on recruitment and help to strengthen the terrorist group’s support base.\textsuperscript{17}

What are the nine stages of a suicide terrorist operation:
1. Opting for suicide terrorism,
2. Recruiting candidates,
3. Training suicide terrorists,
4. Target selection, identifying the weaknesses of target,
5. Terrorist surveillance on target,
6. Preparation of the attack,
7. The final surveillance on target, and
8. The attack itself, and
9. The aftermath,

Among the nine stages, the areas for attention in counter terrorism were highlighted and measures proposed from multiple perspectives. The general impression is that these areas for attention are basically the same for suicide terrorism, ordinary terrorism and radicalization. These areas are the most important to counterintelligence organization combating polarization and radicalization, cracking down on terrorist groups and their effort to recruit new members. The radical islam is the hotbed of terrorism, and an important factor for suicide terrorism because the religious climate glorifies martyrdom and suicide attacks.\textsuperscript{18} It is a very effective form of attack, both psychologically and physically alike. It is not necessary born of poverty or ill education. Most

\textsuperscript{17} Suicideterrorism: An In-depth Study with Policy Options (November.2005)
\textsuperscript{18} “The arab relief has a great price, the growing and spreading radical islam in the Balkan.” Colonel Antal Beraczka, International Terrorism and Extremism conference Bp. 2006.
suicide bombers have a high school or higher education, and are generally from above the poverty line. In present days suicide bombers are overwhelmingly single young males. How can we define what is the main aim of suicide attacks? It is not easy but a citation from Robert Pape can help us” What over 95% of all suicide attacks around the world since 1980 until today have is common is not religion, but a clear, strategic objective: to compel a modern democracy to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland.”

The use of counterintelligence and intelligence to be able to disrupt terror cells at the planning, research, construction or execution the stages of their plan is the key. The fundamental role against the terrorism is in the hand of counterintelligence and intelligence services which can help the military forces what to do or how to identify the different stages. They have tactical and strategical tasks in the fight against terrorism.

What can be the strategical steps that can be taken against suicide terrorism?

1. Reducing the religious approval and glorification of these actions.
2. Internet surveillance, focusing on radical individuals, and formulating sect formation.
3. Lurking individuals becoming radicalised.
4. Helping mainstream Muslim sites become more resistant to radicalism.
5. Shutting down radical sites.
6. Circulating counter-arguments to suicide terrorism.
7. Putting up barriers to prevent terrorists from obtaining materials and resources that can be used to make explosives.
8. Tracking down materials and resources that can be used to make explosives.
9. Placing detection devices in areas that attract large number of people/or the territory is within a security circle.
10. Gathering intelligence on individuals who are capable of making explosives.
11. Removing books and instructional materials on making explosives.
12. Increasing surveillance of potential targets.
13. Trace mobile phone communication in the vicinity of the potential target or after the attack.
14. Use mobile jammer to prevent attacks.

The terrorists used twenty different tactics in 2007. Among the traditional tactics the suicide bombing which was repeated for 491 times was the deadliest one as 4372 people lost their lives and 9745 more sustained injuries. Iraq was the country suffered most of this tactic with 269 attacks while Afghanistan was
also hit with 135 attacks. Some 58 suicide attacks were as reported from Pakistan.

János Sallai PhD

INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUNGARY

1. The Unification of the Police and the Border Guards

After accession to the EU in 2004, Hungary was preparing for the complete application of the Schengen acquis. Since 21st December 2007, it has been the member of the Schengen zone on the land. In parallel with this, the main border policing and controlling body, the Hungarian Border Guard Service was “integrated” into the Police on 1st January 2008. According to the experiences of the past ten months, the elements of the earlier formed Integrated Border Management, creating a border control system suitable for the Schengen acquis evolving, after the cessation of the independent Border Guard Service - lost their function from a certain point of view. Therefore, the stop checking in the territory of the country that should be done by police departments is hardly realized.¹⁹

As earlier predictions established, it was expected that Hungary, due to its EU and Schengen membership, would became a migration target country. This presumption was supported by local experiences in Ukraine: it became widely known among refugees and illegal border crossers residing there that human rights are respected in Hungary. Therefore, their purpose is to cross the Ukrainian-Hungarian border. The statistic data of the past ten months all support this conjecture. The entrance activity of Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Somali citizens has especially increased. In the Ukrainian and Russian refugee camps they often get “instructions” that having left the camp how they should travel in the direction of Hungary. From the south-eastern direction it is Moldavian citizens who participate in illegal border crossing most frequently. They wish to enter the EU in organised groups, in order to be employed.

Independently of organizational changes, the positive effects the development of borderline areas and cross-border cooperation systems on the economy become observable only very slow. On the short run, it largely influences the behaviour of the inhabitants of borderline areas that the rates of unemployment are very high. Therefore, they attempt to obtain some income from “business”, and

¹⁹ According to own field research (24-28th October 2008)
smuggling of goods and refugees is operating along the Ukrainian-Hungarian and Serbian-Hungarian borderlines.

2. General Experiences along the Seven Borderlines

2.1. Croatia
The sphere of authority of the police departments operating in Zala, Somogy and Baranya counties is the Croatian-Hungarian borderlines. Here the alleviation of border crossing (acceptance of identity card together with supplementary notice instead of passport) remained. This caused no problem in the Schengen area. Here the danger rates of illegal migration have been low for years. Since the complete application of the Schengen acquis, only 4 cases of man-smuggling, 24 cases of public document forgery, 24 offences connected to alien policing and one single forbidden border crossing have occurred. In the control of border traffic, it is the summer dumping of traffic that means the main challenge, similarly to the previous year. 179 cases of refused entry occurred in Hungary as for Croatian border crossers, and it means 88 % of increase, but it is not very considerable comparing to the normally present high rates in border traffic. However, it is prominent that the number of hits in the SIS alert system was 175. This means 8 % of the nationwide data. 165 persons were Croatian citizens who, based on § 96 SchVE, were forbidden to travel in. Based on the expatriation contract, one person was readmitted by Croatia, and it is nearly irrelevant.

2.2. Serbia
The sphere of authority of the police departments operation in Bács-Kiskin and Csongrád counties is the Serbian-Hungarian borderline, one of the external borderlines of the EU. The visa obligation of the EU has made it more difficult for citizens living in Serbia to cross the border. It may contribute to the increase in the number of offences and crimes. Comparing to a similar period of 2007, 68 % more, 681 actions of illegal migration have been explored in 2008. This is 23 % of nationwide rates. The main reason for the increase of actions of illegal migration is that more and more Serbian and Kosovian citizens attempt to cross the border illegally, mainly along green borderlines. The experiences of the previous years seem to support it, examining goods and man-smuggling channels.

Illegal actions of migration along these borderlines:
- 68 % of them were illegal border crossing in the direction of Hungary (407 persons: 342 Serbians, 17 Albanians, 12 Georgians)
- 23 % of them were offences connected to alien policing (82 persons), 69 % of the perpetrators were Serbians, 12 % Croatian and 5 % Macedonian
- 6 % of them were forgeries of official documents, 5 % of it were committed by Serbian, 11 % by Macedonian, 8 % by Hungarian citizens.

20 Background material to the Government Session, HQP 2008.
As a result of the activity supporting the criminal investigations, penal procedures were initiated against 31 persons in the period evaluated (2007: 12 persons). 41 % of man-smugglers were Hungarian, 40 % Serbian, 7 % German and 7 % Austrian citizens. The citizenship of man-smugglers marks that unemployment and difficulties of existence motivate many local inhabitants to contribute in man-smuggling activities.

Only 1 Austrian and 1 Serbian citizen committed forbidden border crossing at Tompa road border crossing point. They were readmitted by the Serbian authorities. Furthermore, 5 Serbian, 2 Czech, 1 Turkish and 1 Macedonian citizens were arrested for the attempt of illegal border crossing. In Hungary, 11 illegal border crossers were not arrested, but 10 persons were perceived by a border guard patrol vehicle equipped with an infra camera while attempting illegal border crossing, in the sphere of authority of the border police department of Szeged. However, the border police did not manage to arrest the illegal border crossers.

Hungarian law enforcement bodies, within the simplified procedure of the Serbian-Hungarian readmission agreement, in 2008, readmitted 73 persons to the Serbian authorities (63 Serbian, 5 Macedonian, 4 Albanian and 1 Russian citizens). However, the Serbian authorities, referring to different reasons, denied taking over 22 persons (14 Kosovian and 8 Serbian citizens). In the case of 3 Serbian citizens, the competent authorities transported the illegal border crossers.

2. 3. Romania

Along the Romanian-Hungarian borderlines (the sphere of authorities of the county police departments of Csongrád, Békés, Hajdú-Bihar and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg counties), comparing to the similar period of 2007, 64 % more, 794 actions of illegal migration occurred. This is 28% of nationwide rates. The increase of actions of illegal migration is caused by the migration pressure from the part of Moldavian and Turkish citizens, and the increase of official document forgeries committed by Romanian citizens.

Along this borderline, the rate of actions of illegal migration is the following: 48 % (386 persons) is official document forgeries, 28 % is forbidden border crossings inwards. The majority of public document forgeries (41 %) are committed by Moldavian (using up Romanian identity cards), Turkish (using up Bulgarian identity cards) and Romanian citizens.

Public document forgeries explored from the part of Romanian citizens more and more derive from forgeries discovered in registration books of vehicles from EU-member states (mainly from Italy and France). In the period evaluated, penal procedures were initiated against 104 Romanian citizens for official document forgeries, 55 % of this were forgeries explored (in the majority of cases, connected to the entry certifying the validity of the engineering documents) in the registration books of vehicles.
55% of the illegal border crossing committed inwards to Hungary was committed by Moldavian (121 persons), 12% of them by Turkish (24 persons), 6% of them by Serbian and 6% of them by Romanian citizens. In these cases, alien policing procedures were initiated. In 5 cases from the illegal border crossings explored, groups reaching 10 persons who attempted to enter the country hidden in a lorry were arrested.

For the violation of permit of traveling in and residence, legal procedures were initiated against 31 persons (70% of them are Moldavian, 10% of them are Turkish, and 10% of them are Serbian citizens), while in 97 cases, offence procedures were initiated against the perpetrators. (46% of them are Moldavian, 21% of them are Romanian, 12% of them are Turkish, and 4% of them are Albanian citizens.) For man-smuggling, 37 persons were arrested, 44% of the perpetrators are Romanian, 11% of them are German, 8% of them are Hungarian and Romanian, 6% of them are Dutch and 6% of them are Lithuanian citizens.

From the number of illegal border crossers, the Moldavian dominance becomes clear, and it must be expected also in the future. Knowing the social and economic situation of Moldavia, this will not change very quickly; therefore, even in the case of the full Schengen membership of Romania, illegal Moldavian border crossers can appear along these borderlines.

Based on the Hungarian-Romanian readmission agreement, Hungarian law enforcement bodies forwarded 91 people (51 Moldavian, 28 Romanian, 14 unknown, 3 Ukrainian and 2 Russian citizens) to the Romanian authority, and one Romanian citizen was transported by the competent authorities. Due to the lack of identification (?), one Mauritanian citizen was not admitted by the Romanian authority.

2.4. Ukraine

The Ukrainian-Hungarian external borderlines are 136.7 km long. (It is a sphere of authority of the county police department of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county.) Comparing to the similar period in 2007, 12% more, 838 actions of illegal migration occurred. This is 30% of the nationwide rates.

In the Ukrainian context, illegal border crossings inwards in the direction of Hungary are characteristic. Due to these actions, in the period evaluated 470 persons were arrested. 41% of the persons in concern are Pakistani (193 persons), 19% of them are Somali (91 persons), 9% of them are Bangladeshi (40 persons), 8% of them (39 persons) are Iraqi, 6% of them (29 persons) are Georgian, and 2-2% of them are Ukrainian and Palestine citizens. 80% of the persons arrested requested for refugee status during the alien policing procedures; therefore, they are impossible to be forwarded by the readmission agreements. Comparing to the previous year, the number of illegal border crossings and border crossers have increased along these borderlines, and, in my opinion, it has the following reasons:
• The line of cameras settled along the neighbouring Slovakian-Ukrainian borderlines chases man-smugglers to the Hungarian borders.
• From the refugee camps in Ukraine, refugees are often inspired (e.g. by poor accommodation conditions) or instructed to travel to Hungary, mainly Pakistani and Bangladeshi citizens.
• Man-smugglers have supposedly been informed about the cessation of the border surveillance investigative service inside the police units.
• In the region, due to the high rates of unemployment, the local population helps illegal border crossers, in some cases participating in human smuggling.

Due to official document forgery, 148 persons were arrested, 75 of them (111 persons) were Ukrainian, 19% of them (28 persons) were Moldavians who forged the visa seals of Schengen visa format in their private passports or used up Romanian identity cards. It is a new phenomenon from the part of Ukrainian citizens that they want to cross the border with forged homecoming documents. This method is applied by Ukrainians residing illegally in Western Europe trying to return home in order to be exempted from the sanction of illegal residence.

Due to the violation of travelling in or residence constraints, legal procedures were initiated against 42 persons (85 % of them are Ukrainian, 5-5 % of them are Georgian and Iraqi citizens), one Ukrainian citizen was arrested for man-smuggling, while 174 persons were placed under legal procedures for offences connected to alien policing (90 % of them are Ukrainian, 3,5-3,5 % of them are Moldavian and Belorussian, and 3 % of them are Russian citizens).

In the period evaluated, within the frameworks of the Ukrainian-Hungarian readmission agreement, in simplified procedures, the Hungarian law enforcement bodies forwarded 190 persons to the Ukrainian authority (according to nationality: 86 Ukrainian, 34 Moldavian, 29 Pakistani, 12 Bangladeshi, 6 Georgian, 6 Iraqi, 9 Somali and 8 other citizens) (In 2007 the total figure was 102 persons). The Ukrainian authorities denied taking over 2 Georgian citizens from among the persons readmitted, and, for other reasons, expelled 2 Hungarian citizens from Ukraine.

It is characteristic of the Ukrainian-Hungarian border region that tobacco and man-smuggling activities are continuing. At the same time, the considerable increase of petrol prices in Ukraine ceased petrol smuggling. Today in the

21 Excerpt from an interview with an officer of the police department of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county: “The smuggling of goods and humans is an evergreen topic. Since the borders with Ukraine are already also borders of the Schengen Zone, can we observe any change in tendencies?” “In the previous year, along the Ukrainian-Hungarian borderlines, 294 forbidden border crossings were registered. The increase is caused by migrants having arrived from Africa and Far East since October 2007. Comparing: while until the end of August 2007, only 73 persons committed illegal border crossing, in the same period of 2008 593 persons were registered; that is, it means a huge increase. As for the nationality of illegal border crossers,
border transport – mainly as for local border traffic – mainly Ukrainian citizens participate. Based on my local experiences, the unification of the Border Guards with Police had a negative effect on the level of border crossing. The number of human forces and equipments involved in border control also decreased. The statuses of officers retiring from executive service ceased. A certain part of the equipment bough from the earlier Schengen Foundation is not operating (for example, petrol is too expensive, infra cameras are not repaired, etc.). As a “result” of this unification, the Police rearranged the used-to-be border guard vehicles to the public safety and criminal investigative fields. Therefore, the second step of the Integrated Border Management is not operating effectively enough.

2.5. Austria

Along the Austrian borderlines, comparing to the similar period of 2007, 87 % less, only 178 actions of illegal migration were explored. In 2008, up to now only 127 persons committed or attempted to commit illegal border crossing outwards from Hungary. Penal procedures were initiated against 9 persons for man-smuggling, 2 persons for official document forgery, 3 persons for violation of travelling in and residence constraint, and against 34 persons for offences connected to alien policing.

The Hungarian law enforcement bodies, based on the Hungarian-Austrian readmission agreement, readmitted one Albanian citizen to the Austrian authority. At the same time, the Hungarian authority took over 16 persons (7 Serbian, 3 Ukrainian, 3 Angolan, 1-1 Egyptian, Moldavian and Vietnamese citizens), but in the case of 2 Serbian and one Romanian citizen, the readmission was denied. 72 people (49 Romanian, 17 Serbian and 6 Ukrainian citizens) were transported by the authority (along Austrian-Romanian and Austrian-Ukrainian itineraries).

For the period of the European Football Championship, organised by Austrian and Switzerland, Austria reintroduced border control (from 12 a. m. 2nd June 2008. to 12 a. m. 1st July 2008.). This time 4 Serbian citizens were readmitted.

the proportion of Pakistani, Somali, Palestine, Afghan, Bangladeshi, Georgian and Iraqi citizens is the largest. According to our experience, man- smugglers escort the migrants to the Ukrainian-Hungarian borderlines where the migrants are shown in which direction to go ahead, but the smugglers themselves do not cross the borders. Due to the stricter Schengen border control, persons attempting to cross the green borders are easy to arrest.” “What about the smuggling of hit products like petrol, tobacco, alcohol?” “The control of revenue products is not the sphere of authority of the police, yet until the end of August more than 200 persons committed crimes connected to revenue products – 663,598 boxes of tobacco the value of which is 353.4 million HUF have been confiscated. Furthermore, 470 litres of petrol product were also confiscated along the border stations. We can see that the rates of smuggling of goods and human-beings is continuously increasing, the perpetrators try new techniques, but we also react successfully to these attempts with the wide application of personal and material conditions. The application of modern equipments can lead to successful prevention. (György Dunda, Kárpáti Igaz Szó, 20th September 2008.)
Although it was denied in public (for example, on 25th September 2008, by a military leader at the international law enforcement conference held in Keszthely), the Federal Army of Austria is still present along the common borderlines, fulfilling patrol missions.

Since the enlargement of the Schengen zone, the Hungarian-Austrian state borderlines are in the centre of professional and political interests, since the cessation of the control of border traffic has caused serious objections from the part of several Austrian politicians and citizens living in Burgenland province. According to the present situations, the soldiers of the Federal Army of Austria are supposed to stay in the region and fulfill patrol missions along the common borderlines. “The plan of the order about this was handed in by Defence Minister Norbert Darabos and Minister of Internal Affairs Maria Fekter at the government session on Wednesday. They justified their proposals with the demand of security of the population living in the eastern part of the country. The decision, that is criticised by the opposition Green Party and certain constitutional judges, will revised next summer.”

2.6. Slovenia
Along the Slovenian-Hungarian borderlines, comparing to the similar period of 2007, 46 % less, 68 actions of illegal migration were explored. 52 persons committed or attempted to commit illegal border crossing. From the 52 persons, 15 Moldavian citizens were apprehended by the mobile patrol team of the Zalaegerszeg Custom Guards Department within the area of the public border station at Réđics, in the cargo bay of a Romanian vehicle. Penal procedures were initiated against 6 persons for man-smuggling and 10 persons for official document forgery.

In alien policing procedures, based on the Slovenian-Hungarian readmission agreement, the Hungarian authorities took over 28 persons from the Slovenian law enforcement bodies (12 of theme Georgian, 7 Ukrainian, 2 Russian, 1-1 Chinese and Moroccan citizens). The Hungarian law enforcement readmitted one Moldavian citizen to the Slovenian authority. Furthermore, the Hungarian law enforcement denied the readmission of 3 Georgian, 2 Ukrainian and one Russian citizen.

2.7. Slovakia
Along the Slovakian-Hungarian borderlines, comparing to the similar period of 2007, 78 % less, only 110 illegal actions of migration were explored. 2 persons committed forbidden border crossing, penal procedures were initiated against 1 Chinese citizen for the violation of constraints of travelling in and residence, and against 107 persons for offences connected to alien policing.

In the period evaluated, within simplified alien policing procedures, based on the readmission agreement, 2 Serbian and one Macedonian citizens (2007: none) were readmitted, and 4 persons were transported by the authorities.

Slovakian experiences are similar to the Hungarian ones. While in the first half of last year 690 people attempted to cross the Slovakian borders from the direction of Ukraine, since the beginning of this year the number of illegal border crossers showed 33% of decrease. The Slovakian police also experienced decrease along other borderlines as for the number of illegal border crossers, the only exemption is the Polish-Slovakian borderline is. Mainly Moldavian citizens (162 persons) attempted to illegally enter Slovakia from the direction of Ukraine, they are followed by Pakistani citizens (72 illegal border crossers), and finally, it is Georgian citizens who are at the third place – 53 persons attempted illegal border crossing.

2.8. From among international airport
It was only Ferihegy Airport where illegal actions connected to migration were explored, 65 of which (56 persons) were official document forgeries. In 25% of the cases, the citizenship of the perpetrators was impossible to establish, since they had no document that could have proven their identity. 35% of the persons using false travel documents arrived from one of the Arabian countries. Legal procedures were initiated against one person for man-smuggling, and against 29 persons for offences connected to alien policing.

Via airplane, 18 persons (13 Moldavian, 3 Serbian, one person from Code’ Ivory and one Albanian citizens were readmitted by the Hungarian authorities, and 3 Hungarian and one Columbian citizens were taken over. However, they denied the readmission of 2 Georgian, one stateless and one Ukrainian citizen. In 246 cases, perpetrators were deported via airplane.

3. Applicability of SISoneforAll

Since enlargement of the Schengen zone, the control of travelling in and residence conditions became much more complex, and the SIS alert system made a large contribution to this control. At the same time, both technical and legal problems arose during the application. These problems are the following:

- According to the experiences in Ukraine, the system stops operating several times a week, thus the possibility of control becomes more difficult in these periods.
- As for the accreditation of travel documents, there is no uniform regulation within the EU; therefore, the acceptance of travel documents issued by third countries can differ in member states.
- The financial conditions of travelling in differ in member states.
There are many types of permit of residence issued by the member states, and these types have to be known by all member states.

In some cases, it is the EU law that provides the opportunity for member states to decide on visa regulations on their national legislative level; consequently, there can be large differences in the national regulations of member states.

### Table 1: Hits in the SIS system at border stations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian</td>
<td>918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakian</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budapest Airport</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Altogether:</strong></td>
<td><strong>2175</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. Other Characteristics of Border Traffic

The border traffic along the internal EU borders, after the cessation of the control, operates without problems. The only difference was only the re-introduction of border control during the European Football Championship along the Austrian borderlines. Until September 2008, at the same time, the numbers of light traffic have shown a large increase on neighbouring and Hungarian holidays.

Along the external EU borders, in Ukrainian-Hungarian context, there was no increase, because the introduction of the small border traffic permit counter-balanced the restriction of visa requirements. The earlier free visa was ceased in Ukraine, but the uniform Schengen visa fees are substituted by the cheaper small border traffic permit.

### Table 2: Changes in the traffic along the Ukrainian and Romanian borderlines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borderline</th>
<th>Jan-Sept. 2007</th>
<th>Jan-Sept. 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>Persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 There are five border stations: Záhony-Chop international railway, light traffic and heavy traffic (no pedestrian traffic; Lónya-Dzinkove morning light traffic (also pedestrian) open from 7 a. m. to 7 p. m.; Barabás-Koson morning light traffic (also pedestrian) open from 7 a. m. to 4. p. m.; Beregsuránya-Asztej international light traffic (also pedestrian) open all day; Tiszabecs-Vilok international light traffic (also pedestrian) open all day.
The possessor of the small border traffic permit is enabled to enter Hungary visa-free several times within six months and reside in the border regions for at most three months. The aim of the entry can especially be social, cultural, family or economic residence. The document is issued by the Head Consulate of the Hungarian Republic of Uzhhorod or the Consulate of Berehove. The permit can be granted to persons who are Ukraine citizens and their close family members (spouse, minor and dependent children) who live at one of the settlements defined in the convention signed with Ukraine, have a valid passport and have been having a permanent address at least for three years before the solicitation for the document. The spouse, and the minor or adult child (including adopted or foster children) of the entitled can also be granted the small border traffic permit if they have had a permanent address along the borderlines for less than 3 years. The solicitation for the permit is judged within 30 days after the date of handing in. The validity of the permit cannot reach the expiry date of the passport and can be granted at most for 5 years. The minimal validity of the permit is one year. The fee for the small border traffic permit is 20 €. Retired persons, minors, dependent children younger than 21 years and disabled persons can obtain the document for free. Since the permit is only valid for the 244 settlements mentioned, without visa it is forbidden to enter other settlements in possession of the small border traffic permit. The stop checking is the assignment of the police, in order that the possessors of small border traffic permits should not leave the border zone or be employed, and they should abide the rules valid for the period of residence. This means much extra work for the police. In case of abusing the small border traffic permit, the sanctions to be applied against the perpetrator are the following: the perpetrator is obliged to leave Hungary, is expelled from Hungary within the framework of alien policing procedure, and is forbidden to travel back to Hungary. The prohibition of travelling in and residence can also entail that the applicant cannot enter Hungary even in possession of a visa. That is, the abuse of small border traffic permit can entail the refusal of visa applications.
About 30-35% of Ukrainian citizens entering Hungary cross the borders with small border traffic permits. This proportion is changing at different border stations. For example, at Lónya this proportion is 90%, at Barabás 70%, but also at Tiszabecs more than 50% of the border crossers enter with such a document. Nevertheless, no abuse of small border traffic permit, for example, official document forgery has been explored. The constant stop checking is concentrated on crossing points, highways and transport itineraries important from the point of view of migration and areas outside the small border control agreement. Apart from the control of public roads, railway traffic is also controlled along the Záhony-Kisvárda-Nyíregyháza line, and at these railway stations and in their neighbourhood. For example, during stop checking mainly crimes and offences connected to public road traffic are explored, but also wanted criminals, illegal border crossers and perpetrators of custom offences were arrested. “It is agreeable that within the sphere of authority of our police department there has been no Ukrainian citizen who would have violated the constraint defined in the small border traffic agreement arrested.”

Along the Serbian-Hungarian borderlines, the border traffic has not essentially changed. The signing of the small border traffic agreement in the autumn of 2008 and the drafting of the new international border traffic contract is still being prepared.

Along the Romanian-Hungarian borderlines, the citizens coming from Romania are glad at the simpler border control system due to the EU membership, since travellers has to stop only one time in order to be checked. It seems to be a good solution.

The length of the external EU borders is 1103,5 km, while the internal borders are 1139 km. The main direction of the migration is the Ukrainian-Hungarian border – Budapest – Austrian-Hungarian border itinerary. The fulfilment of border policing assignment was organised within the police according to the legal character of the borders (external or internal), independently of the fact that Romania is not yet part of the Schengen zone and the number of illegal actions shows significant differences along different borderlines. The system is divided into 3 parts:
- central: Department of Operation of the National Police Directorate (HQ),
- county: operational services of the police departments
- local level: border police stations

Consequently, the Integrated Border Management system focuses on the local border police stations in the Hungarian practice, while on the second and third

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24 Lieutenant-Colonel Csaba Fenyőfalvi, the neighbouring Police Department of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county, Kárpáti Igaz Szó, 20th September 2008.
level, it is the criminal and public safety conditions that are in the centre (central competence).

In the meantime, in the EU, the Ministerial Conference on the Challenges of the EU External Border Management\textsuperscript{25} is pursuing a long debate about how to realize the proposals of the Commission as for the borders. The three proposals are the following that as new measures would be implemented between 2012 and 2015.

- The first proposal, which is the most ambitious one of the three, contains an innovative «set of measures», using new technologies, which Europe needs to implement in order to bring its border management strategy into the 21st century (entry-exit system, the registered traveller programme and the electronic authorisation system);
- The second proposal examines the parameters within which a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) could be developed.
- The third proposal focuses on a review of the tasks of Frontex (revision of the mandate of Frontex).

According to the Commission, new approaches are necessary, because the changing and increasing dangers of security deriving from globalisation and increasing mobility must be treated effectively: “\textit{We need to be one step ahead to the increasingly better organized networks of terrorists and criminals who have discovered the lucrative traffic in human beings, drugs and weapons. Innovative and effective border controls have to strike a difficult balance between ensuring the free movement of a growing number of people across borders and guaranteeing greater security for Europe’s citizens. Border controls therefore have to focus more on potential challenges, be flexible enough to adapt to unexpected circumstances and be easy to operate by border guards. [...] This does not mean turning Europe into a fortress. It simply means streamlining border controls for bona fide travellers while making the lives of human traffickers, drug smugglers and terrorists much more difficult.}”\textsuperscript{26} It is possible that the reorganised Police (and the integrated Border Guard Service) will not have the time to evaluate their own experiences, compensate deficiencies and improve their own organisational system via the modernisation of their own training system. Namely it is the field of migration of border control where a new era is to be begun: Union continues to focus on developing a common legislative framework, putting common large-scale IT systems in place, and cultivating practical cooperation between Member States (e.g. improving coordination on border management with Frontex, enhancing

\textsuperscript{25} Brdo (Slovenia), 12 March 2008
\textsuperscript{26} Franco Frattini. Providing Europe with the tools to bring its border management into the 21st century, 31 March 2008

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cooperation with countries such as the Western Balkans, European Neighbourhood Policy countries).

5. Conclusions

It seems that it was an unfortunate decision to integrate the Border Guard Service into the Police exactly when Hungary introduced the complete application of the Schengen acquis. Fearing the uncertain future, the Police lost many border guards trained definitively for border, document and vehicle control, because several officers left the organisation. Those who remained in the service of the Police did not unconditionally obtain appropriate assignments. This means serious consequences as for the effective application of the IBM. It was an especially premature step to cease squads of criminal investigation and the integration of border guard officers knowing the local population and circumstances into the general criminal investigative directorates of the Police.

Hungary is supposed to have external EU (Schengen) borders for a long time in the future, and it will be responsible for the effective control for the sake of common security, while on the long run it is a must to consider illegal migration especially along these borderlines. Border defence and the quality of border policing have an effect on the channels and directions of migration; therefore, it is indispensable to permanently cooperate with the border policing bodies of the neighbouring countries. For example, sharing control experiences and data obtained in the field of small border traffic is one of such topics – if small border traffic is established between Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria. As Bulgarian Minister for the Interior Mihail Mikov declared, according to the plans, the representatives of the three countries will sign the convention on visa-free border traffic in the autumn of 2008, and it will concern the 20-km circle of the borders. Or, it will be similar to the Slovakian authorities, since the Slovakian-Ukrainian small border traffic convention has been established, and this convention defines the validity of permits within the 50-km circles of the borders, and citizens living within this border zone can solicit for a document entitling them to cross the border visa-free, paying a 20-euro fee.

In 2008, a relevant change can be observed in the proportion of the nationality of persons committing actions of illegal migrations. Along the Romanian borderlines, instead of Romanian citizens it is the Moldavians who are in majority. Along the Ukrainian borders, the majority of Georgian citizens have been replaced by migrants coming from the countries of Africa or the Near East.

From the part of the Commission, the realisation of the migration package proposed demands new legislative, cooperative, training and organizational work also from the Hungarian law enforcement bodies, while the conditions of stable operation of high quality are partly missing.

Major János Besenyő

EU SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR - AMIS


The mandate for this supporting action by the EU came to an end on 31 December 2007 when AMIS handed over to the African Union / United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

The purpose of the EU's supporting action was to ensure effective and timely EU assistance to the AU's enhanced AMIS II mission. In providing this support, the EU upheld the principle of African ownership and backed the AU and it’s political, military and police efforts aimed at addressing the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan.

The EU supporting action comprised both a civilian and a military component. It made available equipment and assets, provided planning and technical assistance and sent out military observers. It trained African troops, helped with tactical and strategic transportation and provided police assistance and training. During the two-and-a-half year mandate, several dozen military and civilian personnel were deployed from the EU. In 2005 I was one of the first observers who arrived in Darfur to serve as a military advisor in logistic matters. In this time I had served as Deputy Field Support Service and I would like to present you the logistic matters and experiences in the mission are of Darfur. Everything that is written in this article is based on my personal experience, observation and opinion.

Antecedent:

In prehistoric times, the peoples of what is now Darfur were related to those of the Nile Valley (including Egypt), whose caravans probably reached the region by 2500 B.C.E. According to tradition, the region’s first rulers were the Daju. By around 900 C.E., Christianity had spread to the area; by the thirteenth
century, however, the region had fallen under the domination of the powerful Islamic empire of Kanem-Bornu to the west, and the Tunjur replaced the Daju as the ruling elite of the region. The sultanate of Darfur first entered the historical record during the seventeenth century, under Sulayman. Sulayman belonged to the Keira Dynasty, which claimed Arab descent and which removed the Tunjur from power. Except for an interval during the nineteenth century, this dynasty ruled Darfur until 1916. Gradually the Keira merged with the Fur, the agricultural people over whom they ruled. (The state’s name, Dar Fur, means “house of the Fur” in Arabic.)

The slave trade figured prominently in both the formation and the expansion of the Darfur Sultanate. Parties from Darfur obtained slaves and ivory by either raiding or trading with the stateless societies that lay to its south and southwest. Not only did Darfur’s rulers export slaves to North Africa and along the “forty days’ road,” which crossed the desert from Darfur to Egypt, but slaves also served the sultan as soldiers, laborers, and bureaucrats. Sulayman’s successors expanded the state. In 1786 Sultan Muhammad Tayrab conquered the province of Kordofan from the Funj Sultanate of Sennar to the east. In 1821, however, Egyptian forces conquered the Funj Sultanate and wrested Kordofan from Darfur. Traders from Khartoum then began to compete in the slave trade with those in Darfur. Turkish-Egyptian forces under Rahma al-Zubayr conquered Darfur in 1874 and overthrew the Keira sultan. In 1885 a Sudanese rebellion under a religious leader called the Mahdi overthrew the Egyptian state, which had come under increasing British influence. In 1898 British forces defeated the Mahdist state and placed it under Anglo-Egyptian administration. Under their policy of indirect rule, the British restored the Darfur Sultanate under Ali Dinar Zakariyya. Ali Dinar played a significant role in an Islamic, anti-Western alliance that formed during World War I. The Anglo-Egyptian government subsequently invaded Darfur, killed Ali Dinar, ended the sultanate, and incorporated Darfur into Sudan. After Sudan attained independence in 1956, Darfur remained under Sudanese rule. Darfur was ruled by commissioners who neglected the basic needs of the people and merely fulfilled the interests of the central government. Only after the inhabitants of El-Fasher revolted against Khartoum in the early 1980s, were they allowed to have several regional governors from Darfur in brief succession. However, since the Islamists usurped power in Sudan in 1989, the majority of the governors appointed in Darfur have been of Arab origin. According to the motto “divide and rule” and constantly trying to weaken the spirit of unity among the Darfurians, the Khartoum government divided Darfur, which was originally one state, into three smaller states with three capitals:

- El-Fasher for Northern Darfur (Shamal Darfur)
- Nyala for Southern Darfur (Janub Darfur)
- El-Geneina for Western Darfur (Gharb Darfur)
Conflict:

Open warfare erupted in February 2003 when the two loosely allied rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), attacked military installations.

This was followed closely by peace agreements brokered by the United States to end the twenty-year-old civil war in the south of Sudan which allocated government positions and oil revenue to the rebels in the south. At that time rebels in Darfur, seeking an end to the region's chronic economic and political marginalization, also took up arms to protect their communities against a twenty-year campaign by government-backed militias recruited among groups of Arab extraction in Darfur and Chad. These "Janjaweed" militias have over the past year received government support to clear civilians from areas considered disloyal to the Sudanese government. Militia attacks and a scorched-earth government offensive has led to massive displacement, indiscriminate killings, looting and mass rape, all in infringement of the 1949 Geneva Convention that prohibits attacks on civilians.

The war, which risks inflicting irreparable damage on a delicate ethnic balance of seven million people who are uniformly Muslim, is actually multiple intertwined conflicts. One is between government-aligned forces and rebels; a second entails indiscriminate attacks of the government-sponsored Janjaweed militia on civilians; and a third involves a struggle among Darfur communities themselves. Its implications go far beyond Darfur's borders. The war indirectly threatens the regimes in both Sudan and Chad and has the potential to inspire
insurgencies in other parts of the country. But this conflict instabilizes not only these countries but the others around as well.

**Mission:**

For this reason, after the Peace negotiations when the Parties (African countries, various fighting fractions-SLA, JEM, NRMD,-UN, EU, NATO and USA) agreed to send peacekeepers to Darfur to stop the violence, they had to act immediately. African Union (AU) decided to send troops as soon as possible to the area to secure it. Because the AU as a new organization faced with serious financial shortages and with some capacities (Logistic, Air Ops, IT) the EU, USA and NATO offered him help on these fields.

After the Donor conference all organization decided to send observers to help and participate in the AU second peacekeeping mission (African Union Mission in Sudan-AMIS) in Africa. The donors begun to send their aid (money and equipments as well) to the mission area but the African troops weren’t prepare to handle them. Both of the shortage of military and police forces and the missing positions mostly in the logistic field made the situation very difficult on the ground. The African countries sent mostly infantry troops without working logistic support system (combat support units, etc). However the soldiers made good work as infantry units, nobody takes care about keeping the records or put in file the donated equipments for this reason a lot of things were missing or were used in a wrong way.

There were shortages of staff officers in the Logistic and planning sections, which caused real problems and various problems with the provision (food, drinking and potable water, bed items, sanitation, communication, etc).

The donors offered sometimes all services or facilities to AU, for example USA provided the all camps construction through the state own company, PAE. Although the PAE made a really good job, which based on the contract between AU and USA, from the AU/AMIS part nobody could directed and check them properly, because the missing logistic experience.

In the same time the AU officials realized that they overcharged their troops on the ground and they didn’t have enough capacity to secure the Darfur area and run the mission as well. So for this reason they deceived to enlarge the troop numbers and expand the all mission. In the first phase the real strength of the troops were 138 MILOB’s (Military Observer) and 195 Rwandese and 193 Nigerian Protection Forces (Aug 04)

On the second phase the strength of troops supposed to be 3320 person but the AU and the participants couldn’t manage to fill the all position.(2774 troops, included Civpol’s were on the field at the end of June 05.) This happened in the enhancement phase as well (AMIS-IIE), where the mission expected to
expand to 6171 military personal and 1560 civilian police (at the end of October 05.) but they couldn’t fill the all positions and the third phase, where 12300 personal were planned, this phase never come on board…

The donors agreed on it and offered not only money, Air lift for the African troops and equipments but logistic advisors/expertise as well, which offers were requested and accepted by AU officials. This phase was AMIS II-E and begun on 1 July 05. For this time the EU logistic expertise begun to deploy to Addis Ababa, Khartoum and El-Fasher as well.

With wide scale agreement between AU and the donors there were constructed various new position inside the AU and the mission to encourage the growth of the logistic capacity in AMIS. The highest organization inside AU who coordinated the mission in Darfur, the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) was, where was located the ACMC section where the EU, NATO and USA advisors worked. Generally the ACMC is the J4 and J8 function within the DITF, working directly to the Chief of Staff.

The ACMC is responsible for coordinating all logistic support between the AU, the Donor and Partner nations and Contractors in order to provide support to the operational commanders. It provides logistic synchronization support to the movement plan, the force generation plan, the infrastructure development plan and the equipment delivery programme working in co-ordination with the Logistic Cell at Mission HQ in Khartoum and the JLOC in El Fasher.

The ACMC co-ordinates and prioritises the overall sustainment effort for AMIS tasking the JLOC through the chain of command as required.

Because Darfur is only a part of Sudan it was important to establish an Headquarter in Khartoum to deal with the Sudanese authorities and represent the AU in all matters which are related with AMIS. In Khartoum we had a logistic cell as well.

Generally this section acted as the logistic transit hub in co-ordination with ACMC and the JLOC. Provided diplomatic clearances (Visas and Customs clearance), as required, and provided movement and contractual support to AMIS.

In El-Fasher (the capital of Darfur) deployed the Joint Logistic Operation Centre (JLOC), which is organized and directed the logistic system in the mission area and made the real work on the field.

Generally the JLOC acted as the logistic focus within the FHQ for both the Military and Police missions. It prepared operational logistic plans in support of the operation and acted as the operational level logistic authority. The JLOC
ensured that the operational theatre is properly sustained. The JLOC worked in direct co-ordination with the Logistic Cell at Mission HQ in Khartoum and the AMC in Addis Ababa. You can see the organization chart here:

**AU / JLOC STRUCTURE AT EL FASHER**

**Chief JLOC.**

The Chief JLOC was responsible for the delivery of logistic support to AMIS within the operational theatre. He worked through the Deputy Head of Mission and operates on behalf of both the Force Commander and the CIVPOL Commissioner.

**Deputy Chief JLOC.**

He acted on behalf of the Chief JLOC and is the JLOC Chief of Staff, coordinating all operational logistic staff effort.

**Field Support Section (FSS).**
The FSS provided the direct logistic contact with Sectors on behalf of Chief JLOC and worked in co-ordination with the functional cells. The FSS was responsible for the delivery of up to date logistic reports and returns from Sectors to the Chief JLOC.

He was responsible in the mission area (with close relation with PAE and its subcontractors) for the food-catering service, camp management, water supply, environmental, health and camp sanitation, fire marshalling and for other orders from Chief JLOC.

Log Ops and Plans.

He provided logistic planning support to the Force Commander and the CIVPOL Commissioner. Provided real time logistic support to the operation ensuring that the military and CIVPOL are properly sustained with C Sups in co-ordination with PAE.

Maintenance.

He ensured that all vehicles in theatre are properly maintained and supported in co-ordination with Contractors.

Materiel Management

He ensured that all equipment is properly distributed and managed to support the needs of the operation and all equipment is properly accounted for.

Movement / Air Ops.

He coordinated all in-theatre J4 movement including tactical airlift, SH, (when in a J4 function) and road convoys.

Medical / Environmental Health

He coordinated medical and health service support to include treatment and evacuation of casualties, medical logistics, preventative medicine and environmental health with PAE and other medical providers. This position wasn’t filled nor by EU or AU in this time, for this everybody from JLOC deled with this matters.

Communications / IT

He coordinated the distribution and maintenance of all communications and IT equipment in accordance with the communications plan.

CIVPOL
He acted as the CIVPOL interface to the JLOC ensuring that all CIVPOL requirements and enhancement needs are met. This position wasn’t manned by EU under my service time.

**EU advisors-JLOC**

The first EU advisors arrived in the theatre on 29 June from United Kingdom, Spain and Hungary. We spent our first weeks in Addis Ababa because we didn’t get our visas in time, so we occupied ourselves in Addis to help inside the DITF. Thereafter we received our visas and went to Khartoum first after that to Darfur. When we arrived there we got temporarily accommodation only for a time because the camp was overcrowded. Nearly all European expertise worked and lived in Africa previously (Myself in Western Sahara-MINURSO) but we didn’t prepared ourselves so many difficulties what we find there.

We needed some days to accommodate ourselves and try to begin our job. Unfortunately we didn’t have offices, the JLOC were existing only on paper and not in the real life, and we didn’t find our African counter partners, who we have to work together. For this reason the Force Commander decided that we have to work in the FHQ logistic section and take part the replacement and development of AMIS II-E. Despite that we weren’t under the Force Commander command we begun to work with the FHQ Logistic cell and met with more problems. However the PAE and their subcontractor worked hard to construct new camps and enlarge the previous facilities they were late because the rainy season (In this time the only way to transport materials was with helicopters).

We had to support the troops on the ground and organize the Airlift in close cooperation with AU, EU, NATO and USA and provide accommodations, food, water and others for the newcomers. The next chart show the AMIS II-E deployment schedule:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalions</th>
<th>Deployment Dates</th>
<th>Number of Pax</th>
<th>Estimated Freight (Tons)</th>
<th>Est Ammo (Tons)</th>
<th>Preferred APOE</th>
<th>Preferred APOD</th>
<th>Airlift Donor Nation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nigerian Bn 1</td>
<td>1 – 14 Jul</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>Nyala</td>
<td>GER UE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandan Bn 1</td>
<td>15 – 29 Jul</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Kigali</td>
<td>Nyala</td>
<td>US NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandan Bn 2</td>
<td>30 Jul – 9 Aug</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Kigali</td>
<td>El Fasher</td>
<td>US NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 7</td>
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<th>Battalions</th>
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<th>Number</th>
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<td>Deployment Dates</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Estimated</td>
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<td>Preferred</td>
<td>Preferred</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>Deployment Dates</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Estimated</td>
<td>Est</td>
<td>Preferred</td>
<td>Preferred</td>
<td>Airlift Donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>of Pax</td>
<td>Freight (Tons)</td>
<td>Ammo (Tons)</td>
<td>APOE</td>
<td>APOD</td>
<td>Nation</td>
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<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambian Coy Force HHQ</td>
<td>30 Jul – 9 Aug</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Banjul*</td>
<td>El Fasher</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Bn 2 Sector 8</td>
<td>10 – 18 Aug</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>(note 3)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Abuja*</td>
<td>Nyala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegalese Bn Sector 5</td>
<td>20 – 29 Aug</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>El Fasher</td>
<td>France UE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Bn 3 Sector 3</td>
<td>1 – 9 Sep</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>(note 3)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Abuja*</td>
<td>El Fasher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandan Bn 3 Sector 4</td>
<td>30 Sept – 6 Oct</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Kigali</td>
<td>El Fasher</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African Bn Sector 6</td>
<td>22 – 25 Oct</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>(Note 4)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Bloemfontein or Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African Eng Coy, EOD team Reserve Coy</td>
<td>28 – 29 Sep</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>(Note 2)</td>
<td>Bloemfontein or Pretoria</td>
<td>El Fasher</td>
<td>Netherlands NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyan MP Sector 1</td>
<td>30 Sep</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>El Fasher</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AMIS 2005

Of course this schedule changed because of the circumstances (weather, readiness of camps, etc) and only in October we could finish the enlargement of AMIS.

Under this time the all JLOC positions (except the CivPol and the Medical Environmental Health) were filled by the donor countries (Spain, France, United Kingdom, Sweden, Dania, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, USA and CA) but the AU only filled the logistic positions in JLOC at the end of October, till this time we worked alone with all responsibility. When we received our partners it was clear that expect some they don’t have any logistic background (graduation in logistic school or experience on the field), this made our job more difficult.

The other problem was that no any African unit (except the South Africans) arrived with full capacity units, because in the battalions only on paper worked Combat Support Units (Sector Support Cell). These units filled with
infantry soldiers and not with logistics. The lack of logistic skill, everybody
expected everything from the civilian contractor (PAE). However there is a new
trend in peacekeeping or other operations that civilian companies make a lot of
job, for what the army don’t want waste soldiers or they don’t have the
necessary qualification for it (Logistic, Air Ops, IT, Communication, cleaning
and construction jobs), the military component has to plan the mission needs,
order the service and properly check the contractors before the payment. For this
reason very important that the J4 (logistic) section will be manned with qualified
and capable officers, who can deal with the civilian companies in all matters and
level. In Darfur this isn’t worked properly and the mission leaders didn’t know
really what was in the contracts, for this reason they expected sometimes more
service from the contractor, what AU and USA government agreed on
previously. One of our first jobs was to read through the contracts to finalize what
the civilian companies have to do and what is our (AMIS) right and obligation
and create a working system together with sectors and the civilian companies
(reports, registrations, etc). After that all of us begun to work on his job, because
I was responsible for the Field Support Service, this mean for the food-catering
service, camp management, water supply, environmental, health and camp
sanitation, fire marshalling and for other orders from Chief JLOC. The mission
area was the same size as France and in the 8 sectors 33 camps were located.

What made our job more difficult that in this time (from June till the end
of 2005) the security situation was relatively calm but unpredictable, the
banditry attacks, stealing of livestock, harassment of the civil populace by armed
militias were usual nearly on every weeks.

The fighting’s renewed in the general areas (Jebel Marra, Amu valley,
Muhjeria, etc.) between Sudanese Armed Forces, Janjaweed militias and SLA
and JEM. The armed Arab militias attacked villages (Tawila, Mukjar, etc) and
IDP’s camps as well. The rebels attacked GOS and Humanitarian convoys as
well and there were some clashes between SLA and JEM. Violent threats
against AMIS, UN and NGO (Non Governmental Organizations) have increased
so the situation begun to be more problematic. I think sometimes the fighting
fractions agreed that AMIS could be a target. It happened that between Khor
Abechi and Menawashi an unknown fighting fraction attacked to PAE trucks,
where they killed the civilian drivers and not so later other 5 Nigerian soldiers,
who arrive to relive the convoy. In another case other group attacked a patrol in
Sector 5, where they took over all the equipments from the soldiers and released
them without combat boots, so they had to walk back to the camp on bare foot.
A lot of times they shouted for AMIS helicopters (on 24 December 05 one fall
down and everybody on the board died) convoys and camps. But the Sudanese
Army wasn’t much better because they painted their attack helicopters and
military vehicles for white and attacked the SLA and JEM positions with them.
Of course after a time the fighters didn’t take any difference between GOS or
AMIS white cars. Time to time the Sudanese Army organized us quite nice military parade around the FHQ, which were frustrated our soldiers. When we received the first Canadian APC’s (Armoured Personal Vehicle) the Sudanese authorities send us an official warning letter that they won’t tolerate if any of them going in the hand of SLA or JEM. After this letter they organized a tour with soldiers, tanks and various military equipment (from the 1960’s till today, mostly Russian equipments). The soldiers were yelling, crying and shouting with weapons around the camp, I think they try to show us who has the real power in Sudan. Under my time I could observe two of this kind of parade in El-Fasher.

The Humanitarian situation in the IDP’s camps were becoming over congested, the facilities at the camps were overstretched. However the Humanitarian Agencies had continued to provide life-saving Humanitarian assistance to IDP’s as well residents in the villages but some of them evacuated their aid workers because the banditries and attacks against the Humanitarian convoys and workers.

Although the situation was unpredictable the presence of Humanitarian agencies, AMIS Milob’s, CivPol’s and foreign observers helped in stemming the tide of hostilities.

In this situation AMIS/CFC (Cease Fire Committee) had continued to intensify its activities to reduce the incidence of ceasefire violations in Darfur. In accordance with its mandate as contained in article 4 of HCFA (8 April 2004 AMIS) continuously investigated allegations in response to reports of ceasefire violations (Baraka, Graida, Kalma, etc). The regular patrols were conducted by Milob’s to promote confidence building and also to show AU presence on the ground. Unfortunately after some shouting incident against AU personals or in difficult situations the leaders of AMIS gave orders to delay patrols to save our soldiers. These situations were only temporarily time and after that we begun to conduct the patrols again. The mission leaders and the CFC embarked on consultations with all parties in the conflict and the Humanitarian Agencies and attended the Joint commission meeting once a month at N’djamena, Chad. This was the real situation in AMIS-IIE phase and at the end of October we had 3 infantry battalion from Nigeria, 3 infantry battalion from Rwanda, 1 infantry battalion from Senegal, 1 infantry company from Gambia (as a reserve unit in FHQ), 1 Military Police Unit from Kenya and 1 infantry company, 1 engineer platoon and a EOD section from South Africa.

In the same time we had Military Observers, Civilian Police members, the workers of contractors (PAE-USA and Skylink-Canada) and their subcontractors (Amzar-Food, catering service, MSS-medical and Hygienic service, etc.) and other local workers (building and cleaning camps, etc) who didn’t live all in the
camps but they used our facilities as well. This caused new challenges to our overloaded camps systems.

The strength of AMIS was grown up quickly and when I left it was the next:

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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military all ranks:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CivPol:</td>
<td>1195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAE:</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMZAR:</td>
<td>418</td>
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<tr>
<td>Skylink:</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>7589</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the Deputy Field Support Service I had to work in close relationship with my African counter partner and the contractors on the next topics.

**Food-catering service.**

Monitoring PAE and AMZAR in the field are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU. In close cooperation with AMZAR & PAE organise the food delivery to the remote camps with AirOps. I was working with the PAE Food & Facilities Manager any problems regarding with the AU. I gave advice AMZAR in catering field, training for cooks (kitchen guideline, etc.). Our section had to cooperate with other sections (Ops and Plans, Logistics, Mess committee, etc.) and we had take care of delegations, guests

**Camp management.**

Monitoring PAE in the field, are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU.

I had total responsibility for the smooth running of the camp catering, liaising with the Catering Contractor on a daily basis. All Facilities including but not limited to Laundry, Dining Rooms, Accommodation, Camp Maintenance & Equipment Security.

**Water supply.**

I had monitored PAE in the field, are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU.

I worked in close cooperation with PAE water manager to provide drinkable and potable water to all mission area. We checked the quality of water time to time (with normal senses and labor as well)

**Environmental, Health and Camp sanitation.**

I had monitored PAE and MSS in the field, are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU. We worked in close cooperation with PAE
camp sanitation manager and MSS operational manager. Our job was the Health & Hygiene Management within the Camp Facilities, to include waste management (Fuel spillage, waste disposal, sewage) and the Stress management (entertainment)

**Fire Marshall.**

I had monitored PAE camp managers in the field, are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU. We planned and checked the Fire evacuation plans, and worked in close cooperation with PAE. We organized Fire extinguishes delivery and refresh to the remote camps with AirOps. We coordinated with the PAE Operational Manager any problems regarding the AU (cooking inside the tents, etc.).

**The difficulties and challenges**

However most of EU advisor had served in Africa previously, because the shortage of time we got only one day training to prepare ourselves for this mission in Brussels. I think later in other operation need to organize a course at least 2-3 days to know each other better and make more detailed preparations.

AU wasn’t prepared to handle the EU-NATO-USA advisors in a right way (“white face problem”). We faced with a lot of uncomfortable situation when African officers told us that we are colonialist or the spy of western countries. It happened that an African politician questioned the contents of our reports from Darfur. He told that our report didn’t reflect the real and true situation on the field and he sent us emails, in which he stated our limited capacity to help AU mission in Sudan. As a Hungarian it caused me very bad time because we never-ever had any colony in Africa and we don’t have any economic or other interest in this place. We arrived to help and left behind us our families, job and everything and risked our life and personal safety. No any of us from the JLOC received salary or any goods from AU, we were paid by EU and our own countries. Fortunately this wasn’t too usual situation because most of our colleagues were helpful and from the AU officials we got all support what we needed. However, we learned that the Africans are very sensitive and to give them advice and help sometimes difficult.

We had quite basic environment, no EU standard (camp sanitation, personal hygiene, accommodation, food, etc.) As I mentioned previously when we arrived to Darfur, it was the enhancement time and most of the camps were overcrowded, that caused problems.

We met with different cultural conventions, different nationals. Religious practice and possible oversensitive (to work in Muslim environment as a Christian) caused us problems as well.
The different approach about responsibilities and rights in the Mission (rank, position, qualification, etc.) gave us headache all the time.

**Problems which we are faced:**

- To live/work in a unknown environment. Not only for us but some African officers and soldiers were unknown this place and we had to learn to respect and understand the locals and cooperate with them.

- No JOC only JLOC was worked in the mission. When the JLOC was created we saw that there is some misunderstanding between the military and civilian components and this caused unnecessary difficulties in the everyday life. The JLOC begun to harmonize between the components to clarify their logistic needs and give them advice and help to fulfill their tasks. We faced another problems as well, which we couldn’t solved alone so for this reason we suggested to create JOC (Joint Operation Centre) to harmonize the work of all part of AMIS (CFC, military, police and civilian parts). I don’t know why but some high ranking officers rejected this idea and in 2005 this section/group was only in our dreams.

- No real responsibility (missing positions as well camp commandants, logistic, hygiene and fire officers). As I mentioned before we needed to take more responsibility in the work with civilian companies/contractors. For example, I suggested that we have to appoint in each camp logistic officers, camp commandants (a kind of quartermaster, who is dealing with the camp order and organize everything that is related with the camp), hygiene and fire officers, who had to work in close relationship with PAE camp managers (their responsibilities were to run the camps) and with the MSS doctors. No any soldiers like if a civilian try to give them orders (how they have to clean their tents, behave in the camps etc.) for this reason it was important that the Army part of this mission, not to be only a customer who order services from the civilians but a participant who take his own responsibility to run the mission. When I left only in El-Fasher we had an appointed camp commander and his work proved that when the military and police forces took more responsibility and worked with the contractors, everything went more smoothly than before.

- Slow decision making. Because of lack of information, problems with communications and other short falls made difficult to decide on time and act rapidly as necessary in a military operation.

- No any daily logistic sitreps from sectors to FHQ. Some camps didn’t have radios, laptops or computers and if they send any reports they wrote them with hands. Most of camps didn’t send any daily logistic reports as we did in UN or NATO missions for this reason we didn’t get correct information from their needs. The sector logistic officers (who were mostly infantry, artillery or other specialties) without this information could report only their request to us.
For this reason they got more logistical help than the camps. When we arrived in any camps the problems came out immediately (we don’t have cars, spare tires, communication equipment, cameras, computers, no enough food, etc) and we were surprised because nobody reported their real situation. If we want to run smoothly a military or peacekeeping operation very important to receive real information from the field and act immediately to fulfill the logistic needs.

- No proper planning. It means logistically not as an operational way. For example it caused a lot of problem when AU officials planned their fuel needs (helicopters, cars, etc) because they planned for 12 days but the amount fuel that they calculated was enough only for 8 days. So AU could save approximately 1million USD but Canada (who donated the helicopters and the flight hours) had cost this more. For this reason in the rainy season we couldn’t send enough food to the camps to feed our soldiers. One soldiers supposed to get 15 kg food/week (including the wrapping materials) so we needed for the all mission weekly 120 tons of food. When I arrived we received 35-45 % of the necessary amount of ingredients and when I left 76%, but we never received the full amount. This happened because we didn’t get enough fuel and other reasons as well. A lot of times the PAE used its own helicopters to supply African troops on the ground because the AMIS helicopters couldn’t flight the lack of kerosene. As I know we never paid the extra work and the used fuel, flight hours to PAE. This only one of the problems what we are faced because the improper planning.

- Lack of Human resources or using them in a wrong way, in a wrong position. For example when the positions in JLOC were filled by AU, we didn’t have enough African officers who graduate in Logistic school or have logistic experience. We requested an officer from FHQ who has 15 years experience in transportation field and we couldn’t get her, because she was the only who could make PowerPoint presentation in her section. For this reason they didn’t released her and we got another officer who didn’t know too much about transportation matters and he had to learn it. Fortunately all officers who got position in JLOC wanted to perform good job and this made our job easier.

- Lack of communication between sections or components and rivalrization. First we didn’t have enough communication equipments and the donors gave not the same type systems. This is a technical thing, which we can solve with professional communication and IT personals and harmonize the systems to work. But we never had enough specialists for this job. Another problem was that there were clashes between the military and police components and the JLOC as well (rights, responsibilities, etc.).It takes extra time and efforts to solve these situations.

- African officials and high ranking officers (not all!) behavior towards non African advisors that I mentioned previously

Possible future for EU in Africa.

- Bringing some of our experience as advisors
Take part in the training and build a working training system (Communications, IT, Logistic and AirOps). We can expect growing ethical and religious problems in Africa and more hot places but not a good idea to send any European troops there, only military and police advisors and trainers (historical reasons, sensitiveness).

Establish a planning process in the EU to be able to provide support to other organizations (AU) in crisis management operations and provide short and long-term support. It can be a long-term support to have staff or liaison officers at AU HQ in Addis Ababa to support the AU with long-term crisis management (mostly in logistic and contract issues).

Take part in the rebuilding process and help to develop the local economy.

I think the EU advisors made useful work in AMIS and if we use the experience we got in Sudan we can prepare ourselves to make a better job in the next missions in Africa (Somalia, Bissau-Guinea, etc) and develop a real partnership with the African countries to solve the problems of the continent.

János Béres – András Tóth

HEZBOLLAH – POLITICAL PARTY OR TERRORIST GROUP

Hezbollah ("Party of God") is a militant Lebanon-based Shiite organization that has developed from a social movement to a terrorist group. It was founded in 1982 and during the decades it has evolved from a local menace into a worldwide terrorist network. At the beginning it was just a splinter that had split off the wider AMAL movement whose aim was to help the poor and discriminated Shiite group within the Lebanese society. Later it established a network of educational and cultural institutions, and also health and social welfare services. The latter included an Islamic health authority that operated pharmacies, clinics and even hospitals where thousands of people were treated every day. Despite of all this, today it is considered to be a radical terrorist organization that has conducted a series of deadly attacks on Western and Israeli targets.

The question is simple: What is Hezbollah? A political organization with wide charitable activities or a militant terrorist group that represents danger not only to Israel but to the whole world.
In our essay we examine meticulously the process of this modern Muslim radical movement’s development. We point at the fact that the radical Hezbollah group was a splinter of a much wider peaceful Lebanese social movement whose main goal was to modernize the Shiite society but at least lessen the lag of the poor Shiite population from the other social groups of Lebanon.

In the first part we use the American researcher, Rodney Stark’s sociologic approach to study the development of the Lebanese social movement and at the second part of our essay we introduce the emergence of the violent clandestine organization, how has it been changed from a social movement to a terrorist organization, and finally, we render its present state.

**Social movement**

According to Rodney Stark, whenever people organize to cause or prevent social change, we identify them as a social movement. According to his theory there are eight phases to explain how social movements arise and succeed or fail in their quest to change society.

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<th>For a social movement to OCCUR:</th>
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<td>1.) Grievances</td>
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<td>2.) Hope</td>
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<td>3.) Precipitating event</td>
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<td>4.) Network of attachment</td>
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<th>For a social movement to SUCCEED:</th>
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<td>5.) Internal factors: mobilization of people and resources</td>
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<td>7.) External allies</td>
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<td>8.) Separate organizations/splits</td>
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1. Some members of the society must share *grievances* which they want to correct, either by changing society or by preventing a change they oppose.
2. These people must have *hope* – they must think there is some possibility of success.
3. Usually a *precipitating event* will ignite pent-up grievances and convince people that time for action has arrived.
4. People are recruited by social movements through *networks of attachments* (church congregation, civic-improvement club, trade union, sport club, etc.)
5. It must achieve an effective *mobilization of people and resources*. A social movement will be more successful to the degree that it enjoys effective
leadership, attracts committed and disciplined members, and able to secure the necessary finances and facilities.

6. It must withstand or overcome external opposition. Usually a social movement will generate one or more counter-movements. (If a group organizes to cause social change, it is likely to be opposed by a group that is against this change.)

7. The fate of a social movement depends on enlisting external allies from other major groups and powerful institutions in the society – or at least must be able to keep them neutral.

8. Whenever social movements arise in response to a grievance that is widely shared, and when substantial resources are available, the movement will tend to be embodied in a number of separate organizations. These organizations may cooperate but often they compete vigorously.29

By using Stark’s theory the evolution of the Hezbollah was as follows.

The prelude of Hezbollah: social movement within the Shiite society

In order to understand Hezbollah’s changing, we should take a look at its history, especially its emergence from the Shiite society. The Lebanese society consists of 18 religious sects, among them the Shiites. For a long time, the Lebanese Shiites had different attitude. When the Lebanese survey was last taken in the 1936, they were the smallest of the major sects behind the Maronites (Christians), the Sunni (Muslims) and the Druze (Muslims). Accordingly, following the proportional representation system in Lebanon, they were given few political, economic and educational opportunities. They were religiously separated from the Maronites and the Druze, and regarded infernally by the overwhelmingly more numerous and politically powerful Sunni Muslims. They suffered for decades as an underclass with a history of denial and discrimination. Indeed, in Lebanon, until quite recently, they were described as the "Dregs."30

The above mentioned situation attracted an Iranian-born Lebanese Shiite cleric, the Sayed (Master) Moussa Al-Sadr.31 He received a traditional Islamic education in Qum (Iran), Al Najaf (Iraq), and mostly in the Iranian capital where he got a degree in political economy and law at Teheran University. As the son of an Ayatollah, Al-Sadr was seen among the Shiites as a future leader. In fact, in 1960 after the death of the Shiite religious leader of the southern city Tyre, Al-Sadr was called to take his place. Not far from that date, in 1969, after long

negotiations between the Lebanese Shiites leaders, coupled with Iranian spiritual intervention, the Higher Islamic Shiite Council was founded. Sayed was elected as the president of this council, and was promoted to be Imam. In addition to the religious field, he began to be interested in the social and living conditions of the Shiite sect. In fact, Imam Moussa Al-Sadr founded many social institutions, vocational schools, healthcare centers, and special institutions for handicappeds. These social activities were mostly funded by the rich Iranian Shiite regime.

The social activities of Imam Al-Sadr gained an important dimension amid the Shiites. He established the “AMAL movement”, which attracted most of the young enthusiastic Shiites, among them most of the leaders of the future Shiite group, “Hezbollah”. One of those concerned was “Hassan Nasrallah”32, the actual Hezbollah leader. In fact, Nasrallah, who is originally from southern Lebanon but born in neighborhood of Beirut, was raised in a non-particularly religious family. In conjunction with the rising of Al-Sadr reputation, Nasrallah, became obsessed with Islam and began reading fundamentalist literature at an age when most of his fellows were playing soccer. In 1975, the outbreak of the civil war in the heart of the Lebanese capital forced his family to return to home town Bazouriyeh. Nasrallah's move to south Lebanon brought him into direct contact with AMAL movement, and he quickly became a member. While attending a public school in Tyre, the biggest southern Lebanese coastal city, Nasrallah frequently visited the city's main mosque and drew the attention of its most influential cleric, Muhammad al-Gharawi. Impressed by the teenagers’ intelligence and interest in higher Islamic learning, Gharawi facilitated the registration of Nasrallah in the highest Shiite religious educational school “Alhawza” of Najaf in Iraq. The following year, after finishing his secondary education, Nasrallah traveled there to begin his studies. Upon his arrival to Najaf, Nasrallah met with the leader cleric of Alhawza, who placed him under the supervision of one of his disciples, Abbas al-Musawi, another Lebanese cleric from the Beqaa Valley and a member of AMAL movement. The sixteen-year-old boy formed a personal long lasting link with his adviser and formulated much of his ideology under his guidance. Meanwhile, Al-Sadr’s social activities required close contacts with the remaining Lebanese counterparts (Christians, Sunnis and Druze). In that friendly atmosphere, Al-Sadr viewed the Lebanese state as a “legitimate entity in need of reform”. However, Musawi, Nasrallah and other Lebanese seminarians in Najaf refused to accept Al-Sadr’s point of view concerning the state of Lebanon and its political formula. Their recognized leader was Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (an authority in religious law) who returned to Lebanon from Najaf. Rejected by the Higher Islamic Shiite Council, Fadlallah left the AMAL movement to establish the Lebanese Islamic Da'wa Party, and ran an independent network of clinics, schools, and charitable associations.

Due to the Iran-Iraq war in 1978, hundreds of Lebanese Shiite clerics and students, including Musawi and Nasrallah, were forced to leave Iraq. Their return to Lebanon coincided with the mysterious disappearance of Imam Moussa Al-Sadr during his visit to Libya in August 1978. After his disappearance the leadership of AMAL passed to Nabih Berri, a lawyer with close ties to Syria. Under Berri's leadership, AMAL alienated many religious Shiites due to Berri’s support to the Lebanese Christian president, and his participation in Sadr's struggle for social and political reforms. Berri’s political view provided the Najaf deportees with an ideal tool to split off the AMAL movement. Meanwhile after his return, Nasrallah studied and taught at a religious institute established by Musawi in Baalbeck, where he built a rough charisma, which impressed lots of young Shiites followers.

Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, Iran sent several hundred Islamic Revolutionary Guard officers into the Lebanese Beqaa Valley, to organize a revolutionary movement aimed at waging jihad against Israeli forces and establishing an Islamic republic in Lebanon. Following the lead of Musawi, Nasrallah quickly left AMAL, taking many of his followers with him. The new organization, which later on will be called “Hezbollah” (the Party of God), was initially an umbrella coalition group composed of pro-Iranian clerics and their followers. At the beginning most of Hezbollah’s operations were carried out under cover names, such as the "Revolutionary Justice Organization" and the "Organization of the Oppressed on Earth." In 1983, Hezbollah officially announced its existence in an open letter to a Lebanese newspaper and vowed to wage holy war against Israel and its Western supporters, with an ultimate goal “The establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon based on the Iranian model”.

Right after the establishment of the new organization rivalry broke out among the enthusiastic young clerics and the Hezbollah's leadership was deeply divided. One section, led by Musawi, advocated the acceptance of the 1989 Taif Accord, the political proposal for a “Second Lebanese Republic” (the Taif Accord was a joint effort of American and Saudi diplomacy, in which Lebanese deputies gathered in the city of Taif in Saudi Arabia to implement political reforms). In other words, it meant a rejection of Hezbollah's declared goal of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. Musawi's section, backed by Fadlallah, also mandated the release of Western hostages held by Hezbollah and a narrower focus on combating Israel. The other faction headed by Nasrallah and Sayed Ibrahim Al-Amin, who had close relations with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and direct control over Western hostages, advocated refusal of the Taif Accord and had merciless hostility toward the United States and the

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Western hostages. Internal rivalry was escalated until February 1992, when Hassan Nasrallah was appointed as secretary general for “The Party of God”.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned historical overview, let’s examine the main phases of the Shiite movement with the Stark model.

According to Rodney Stark\(^\text{34}\), the first step for a social movement to occur is that some members of the society must share common grievances which they want to correct. In fact, as previously mentioned, the Shiites in Lebanon were mistreated by giving them few political, economic and educational opportunities. The underclass status led them to create an attempt to change their social situation. When Imam Moussa Al-Sadr, the father of the Shiite movement appeared, the social movement could start. His action started with the establishment of “AMAL movement” as a helping hand to the poor Shiites. Additionally, AMAL was the social center of gravity for the majority of the enthusiastic youth Shiites, and was also the political focus center for other Lebanese parties. Due to the fact that the later established Hezbollah’s leaders and supporters were deeply involved in the social and political activities of AMAL movement, they shared the same grievances of all Shiites. It was the first step towards launching a social movement.

The second step to approach a social movement is having hope. It was Al-Sadrs’ social activity what could gain important support and respect amid the Shiites. In fact this movement was essential for every single Shiite family. Besides, joining the religious institutions was another reason why Shiites started to believe in the success of their movement. Shiite families encouraged their youths to join that kind of institutions. The main purpose was to teach young generation, in free institutions, which enable them to reach the high social classes. Taking a glance on the list of those who headed AMAL and Hezbollah, one can realize that all of them were religious clerics (with the exception of Nabih Berri).

The third step towards building a social movement, according to Stark, is the precipitating event which will ignite pent-up grievances. In Lebanon there were many such events but the most important factors were the Iranian Islamic revolution and later the Israeli invasion. Besides, the situation of Palestinians was also an important factor. The southern Lebanese region shares borders with northern Palestine (actually Israel state). This part of the country is overwhelmed by Lebanese Shiites. After the eminent Israeli-Palestinian war in 1948, a great number of Palestinians found shelter in south Lebanon. The issue added enormous harms to the Shiite community, which was already suffering from its own problems. Lebanese politicians were divided, and so were the

\[^{34}\text{STARK, Rodney: Sociology. (Tenth ed.) Wadsworth, Belmont, 1992. p. 613}\]
people, about what kind of relieves should be presented to the Palestinian refugees. Some wanted to give them full Lebanese citizenship, others insisted on “jailing” them in refugee camps until the time comes for a solution. Disputes took place while the Shiites were struggling against their existing troubles. The government failure of solving the problem led to the escalation of the situation. The actual ignition occurred in connection with the arrival of the future leader, Imam Moussa Al-Sadr. When he was promoting better social and living conditions for the Shiites, by founding more social institutions, vocational schools, and healthcare centers the awakening was manifested.

As a next point of his approach, Stark cited that people are joining to social movements through networks of attachments. Indeed, the first network of attachment was the network of the religion itself and the religious institutions. This network facilitated the spread of the movement. Most of the Shiites joined the movement because of their interpersonal attachment to their religious leaders.

Through the religious network and by Al-Sadr’s charisma the Shiites started to organize more effectively their activities and it could be considered as mobilization of people and resources.

Stark’s external allies condition was the Iranian influence. The Shiites existed mainly in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. The religious educational institutions were concentrated mainly in Iran and Iraq. Moreover, Iraq was ruled by Sunnis, and Iran was ruled by Shiites, so it was in the political-religious interest of Iran to have good relations with the Lebanese Shiites. Therefore, Iran presented lots of financial and spiritual aid, and had a great influence on widening the Lebanese Shiite’s social movement.

The countermovement was represented by the other sects of the Lebanese society. The Sunni and Christian parties committed everything to preserve the Shiites’ low profile but they failed. After many bloody collisions the AMAL got stronger and soon became the most important representative of the oppressed Lebanese Shiite population.

According to Stark when substantial resources are available, the social movement will tend to be embodied in a number of separate organizations. The new splinters leave the movement because they usually find the volume of changes too weak or too slow. It happened in the AMAL case too. After the Israeli invasion to Lebanon in June 1982, Nasrallah left the AMAL, taking many young followers with him. The new radical organization, Hezbollah was officially established in 1983 and they announced to step up their fight against Israel and its Western supporters.
Hezbollah: political party or terrorist organization?

From the very beginning of its existence there is a great debate over the Hezbollah’s terrorist activity but it has been ignited since November 2001, when the State Department of the United States of America placed Hezbollah on a formal list of foreign terrorist organizations whose financial assets can be seized. Actually since that date, an endless debate was lunched between accusers and supporters to determine what Hezbollah is.

Many supporters believe that Hezbollah is first of all a political party and its militant branch is only a handful group of people who are not representing the whole organization. Therefore Hezbollah is not a terrorist group.

Another argument of this kind is the legitimacy of Hezbollah. The organization is having twelve deputies in the Lebanese parliament what shows clearly its legitimate existence.

The third argument is their fight against the occupying Israeli forces in the southern parts of Lebanon. Nobody can deny the right of a legitimate resistance for forcing an occupier to withdraw its forces. In fact, internally, every single Lebanese pay respect to Hezbollah’s role in expelling the Israelis from Lebanon, and externally, even the accuser, the United States did not label Hezbollah’s activities against Israeli troops as terrorism.

Besides, Hezbollah has an important role in the social and financial sphere of the Lebanese Shiite society. Hezbollah, as a social and political organization, has played an essential role in the Shiite community, as poured enormous sums of money into building and consolidating an extensive social welfare network. In fact, Hezbollah had established its most notorious charitable institution “Jihad Al-Bina” (Holy war for constructions) which was and still is promoter of “free of charge”-type construction of poor Shiites houses. This institution has constructed many schools, healthcare centers, and a wide variety of social institutions dedicated to Shiite activities.

The accusers have different approach that is based on the Hezbollah’s ideology to use terror as a method to attain its goals. Hezbollah justifies the use of terror against its enemies as an asymmetric weapon in the hands of the weak against the strong aggressor. In fact, in addition to the series of kidnappings of Westerners (Americans, British, French, and Germans), Hezbollah has been linked to a lengthy series of terrorist attacks against America, Israel, and other Western targets. These attacks include (as a brief example): April 1983, an attack against the US embassy in Beirut killing 49 and injuring 120 others; October 23, 1983 a suicide bomb attack on US Marine and French military barracks in Beirut killed 241 US and 56 French personnel working among the
United Nations multinational peacekeeping force to restore peace in Lebanon; June 1992 bombing the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires; July 1994 bombing a Jewish center in Buenos Aires; July 1985 and April 1986 bombing the Northwest Orient airlines offices respectively in Copenhagen and Stockholm; 1996 accused of providing support and expertise in the bombing of Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia killing American servicemen, and hijacking airplanes. All the above mentioned activities were held against civilians, in exception of the Marines and the French troops attack (even though, they were working under the United Nations mandate), and the Khobar attack in Saudi Arabia, which supports the claim against Hezbollah being a terrorist group.

In the accusers’ approach even the social activity of the Hezbollah is considered to be a dangerous and doubtful action. According to their opinion the organization’s purpose of wide spreading aid was to gain support of the local Shiite population in favor of the organization’s military (terrorist) activities. The great bulk of Hezbollah's finances for such projects mostly was, and still, the Iranian aid. Besides, Hezbollah cultivated an elaborate network of financing from Lebanese Shiites immigrants spread around the world. Small-scale donors tended to be moved by mass-produced Hezbollah propaganda videos and cassettes that flooded their mosques. The largest "charitable contribution" to Hezbollah arrived from the Shiite Lebanese Diaspora which had provided its financial support from criminal activities such as diamond smuggling in Africa, drug trafficking in Latin American and tobacco smuggling in the United States (The arrest of 18 Hezbollah supporters in North Carolina in charge of tobacco smuggling in order to supply the group with cash and weapons). Even today Hezbollah supporters attempt to raise funds, launder money, obtain fraudulent documents, pass counterfeit currency, and smuggle drugs, arms, and people all over the world in order to finance the terrorist activities.

According to the accusers Hezbollah established a presence inside European countries too in the 80’s amid the influx of Lebanese citizens seeking to escape Lebanon's brutal civil war and the recurring clashes between Israel and Palestinian terrorists based in Lebanese refugee camps. Hezbollah took root among Lebanese Shiite immigrant communities throughout Europe. According to intelligence officials, Hezbollah operatives are deployed throughout Europe, including Belgium, Bosnia, Britain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the Ukraine. Through its affiliates Hezbollah is taking efforts of radicalizing European Muslims by converting them to its harsh ideology. Even its fundraising cells can easily transform themselves into operational terror cells.

Beside the European influence the Hezbollah’s most dangerous attempt is to destabilize the Middle East. It is cooperating with many organizations considered to be terrorist like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Today, Hezbollah doubles its effort to cooperate with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to destabilize the situation in Iraq. It helps to train and arm the Mahdi Army, the militant anti-Western Shiite militia led by the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

**Conclusion**

The Lebanese Shiite group, Hezbollah, which started its existence as a social movement among the poor Shiite community, ended up to be one of the most wanted terrorist organizations. However, the expression “terrorist organization” is not correct because Hezbollah is not an isolated militant group. Despite its terrorist activities that are focused mainly on Lebanon it has a widespread popularity within the Arab world by forcing Israel to pull back from Lebanese territories. It is something what no Arab government or group had ever accomplished. Beside the military results Hezbollah’s popularity expanded certainly among the Lebanese Shiite society due to its parliamentary and social activities.

Hezbollah is not a small, isolated terrorist organization that can easily be defeated. Due to its social background and wide mass base it could be considered as a kind of insurgency. Consequently, the right approach to deal with this organization is a thoroughly elaborated counter-insurgency strategy instead of a counter-terrorism strategy. It has to be understood that Hezbollah is the product of a modern Muslim social movement. Hezbollah is a militant group that has split off from a much wider social movement the AMAL. AMAL’s main goal is to modernize the Lebanese Shiite society but at least lessen the lag between the Muslim population and the other part of the Lebanese society. Consequently the solution is to cure the most important problems of the Lebanese Shiite population. A possible and feasible strategy has to be elaborated that intends to reduce the grievances of the Shiites. The main elements of this strategy could be political, economical and cultural. This kind of strategy and its results could be labelled to the AMAL representatives. In this way AMAL could become again a serious rival of the Hezbollah in the battle over the control of the Shiites. Many Shiites do indeed prefer AMAL and view Hezbollah as too radical. AMAL’s largely secular leadership also appeals more to many individual members of the community.

Choosing this strategy the Hezbollah could be isolated and on a middle run its base of support could be reduced significantly. However in the absence of
such a complex counter-insurgency approach the fight against this organization could not be successful. In the near future the Hezbollah will gain more and stronger support and not only from the Lebanese Shiite population but from the wider Muslim society as well.

József Kis-Benedek PhD

TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Abstract

The September 11. 2001. terror attacks against the United States of America had major impacts on the Middle East, the world’s most complicated and controversial region.

Middle East and Islam do not mean terrorism. The ME can not be considered as a homogenous area. The weaker regimes the higher the chances for the development and support of terrorism are.

Basic questions: Is Islam a threat to the democracy? What are the objectives of Islamic fundamentalism? Who can be considered as a terrorist and why? The effect of al Kaida on the region. Is really Iraq the key battleground in the war on terror? What are the connections of the Iraq war and the European terrorism or threat of terrorism? Can Hamas and Hezbollah threaten the ME? Suicide bombings as a typical terrorist’s method in the region. The role of North-African terrorist groups in the region and its effect on Europe.

Features of the region

The “Middle East” – reaching from Morocco to Iran and with the sideline to Central Asia – offers all ingredients for crises and conflicts as well as for stabilization and democratization. Almost all decisive factors in worldwide security policy play a role: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism combined with organized crime, ethnic conflicts, huge gaps between the have-and-have-not, migration, flight into “megapolis”, aids, shortage of fresh water and food, discrimination of minorities, lack of democracy, freedom and justice 37.

Influential factors on terrorism in the region are:

- The impact of US intervention in the region: role in Iraq, Afghanistan, ties to Israel.
- Post 9/11 tensions between the US and Saudi Arabia, US and the West and Islamic world.
- Ongoing struggles in Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen etc.
- Islamic extremism.
- Division between Sunnis and Shi’ites and by sect.
- Islamic immigration to Europe.
- How to address the “causes” of terrorism.
- The broader Kurdish issue.
- Differences over control of charities, financial institutions, fund transfers.
- Differences over control of population movements, tracking individuals etc.

The Middle East has been prior to the discovery of oil a hotbed for religious conflict, and wars over other rich resources and arable land. To maintain superiority, control and influence over the region, the West has placed corrupt Arab leaders into positions of power and supported the overthrow of those that are not seen as favorable. This has also served to keep their populations at bay, in return for militarization, power and personal wealth of the elite. The common theme underlying it though has been the struggle to control access to important resources such as oil. After the Second World War, countries around the world had a chance to break for their freedom away from colonial rule. This struggle for freedom and the Cold War had a geopolitical impact on the Middle East. Within this backdrop, we see another complex reason for the rise of terrorism and extremism.

The Middle East is the most militarized region in the world and most arms sales head there. A suppressed people that sees US influence as a major root cause of the current problems in the Middle East has led to a rise in Islamic militancy, acts of terrorism and anti-west sentiment, anti-US in particular. When looking at some of the actions of the US, it can often be seen why this is unfortunately so. As a result, the western population has been acclimatized to a type of propaganda and vilification of the Arab and other people of the Middle East, and of Islam in general.

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39 http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Middle East/Resources.asp
The 9/11. terror attacks against the United States had major impacts on the Middle East, the world’s most complicated and controversial region.

Terrorism originating from the region comprises a major component of the challenge posed by international terrorism, especially as perceived by the West. This feature of Middle Eastern terrorism in the international arena has historical roots: the violent struggle conducted by Palestinian organizations against Israeli and other states since the late 1960s, took place in most cases within the jurisdiction of western countries. During the 1980s, this threat was coupled by acts of violence committed by organizations, fueled by both Sunni and Shiite Islamic ideology, against targets of western states. The support that Middle Eastern states gave to these organizations, and states' direct involvement in terrorism through their own organizations, have added to the degree of threat and made the formulation of appropriate counter-measure a highly complex task. Terrorism in the Middle East has not been confined solely to Arabs. It is often not recognized that, in the years before the creation of the state of Israel, terrorism was practiced disproportionately by Jewish extremists who lived in the territory that was then called the Palestinian Mandate.

Terrorists do not periodically descend upon the planet as extraterrestrials. Middle East terrorism has its own natural history, shaped by circumstances and events. New generations draw from and build upon the ideologies and tactics of previous generations. Contemporary international terrorism emerged in the late 1960s from a confluence of political circumstances and technological developments. Its practitioners shared no common cause beyond frustration borne of failure. Israel’s stunning victory in the Six Day War of 1967 made it clear that Arab military power was not going to be the solution to the grievances of the Palestinians who then found themselves under direct Israeli military occupation. Traditional guerrilla warfare in the occupied territories wasn’t going to work either. Instead, the Palestinians turned to the model provided by the Algerian resistance which, after years of bloody warfare that involved terrorism and terror on both sides, drove the French from the colony.

The threat now for the West is a diffuse and diverse group of “micro” cells implanted both in diasporas in countries where Muslims are in the minority (Spain and UK, for example) and in majority Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Although there are small, these groups are capable of coordinating deadly and multiple attacks, including suicide bombings. They typically select “soft” civilian targets such as public transportation and tourist hotels or restaurants. It is important to note that the majority of attacks were aimed at foreign targets within the borders of the terrorists' home countries; only a minority took place within the borders of a third state.
Other post 9/11 attacks in Morocco, Tunisia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and elsewhere reveal more organizational diversity. Some groups, for example, do resemble social networks with highly developed interconnections. Some are more closely associated with the central Al Qaeda organizations than others. Some are tiny autonomous cells. In each case, however, the important point is that the groups are essentially local although inspired or emboldened by a global cause. They are embittered by the same grievances, including fear of Western domination of the Muslim world, hatred for corrupt and authoritarian regimes in majority Muslim countries, and opposition to U.S. policies such as support for Israel and the occupation of Iraq. Since 2003, the war in Iraq has become a powerful motivator and training ground. Their extreme beliefs are not widely accepted in the Muslim world, which may contribute to a sense of isolation.

In July 2007, Al Qaeda Organization for the Countries of the Arab Maghreb posted a communiqué on the Internet warning that it was planning a series of attacks against “infidels and government forces” in the region. The communiqué warned Muslims to avoid gathering points of infidels and apostates, because Jihadists would be striking at their quarters, centers and barracks with all means of detonations, bombing and demolition possible. The militants’ statement sounds serious, but was probably more for appearances than an actual indication of the group’s capabilities. If the group is capable of carrying out attacks, it will do so rather than threaten to do so. We can see some disagreements within the insurgency’s leadership between former members of Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and the newer members influenced by Al Qaeda. This often happens when transnational militant movement tries to capitalize on local insurgencies. Al Qaeda regional nodes overall have not been faring well. Nodes in Saudi Arabia and Iraq have been weakened as security forces arrest commanders, disrupt plots and kill operatives. The North African node, which supposedly encompasses Jihadist elements in Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Libya, has spread itself too thin to be effective in any location. It might be still able to carry out occasional major attack, but it will be unable to sustain a long-term campaign.

The methods of organization as well as ideological direction of these groups depend to a large extent on electronic media, including television, Internet, and cell phones. Communication via Internet has become essential. Organizations and small cells are thus able to access both technical information and inspirational tracts, share information among them, and publicize their activities to the outside world, sometimes via graphic videos of atrocities such as beheadings. The shift from a group to a movement was evident in the last years, and I believe there will be further signs of the evolution in the future.

40 http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read-article.php?id=291030
Islamic extremism

I find it extremely important to highlight the fact that it would be a fatal error to confuse the Islamic religion and the terrorism. Two phrases often used interchangeably are “Muslim terrorist” and “Muslim fundamentalist”. Muslim terrorist is an oxymoron; one who truly practices Islam cannot be a terrorist. And if we refer to the definition of fundamentalism, we would know these two phrases are mistakenly or intentionally interchangeable and that they actually have opposite meanings. Within the thru Islamic fundamentalism one would never see crimes against humanity, political killing, terrorism, religious extremism, or the forcing of one’ religion on others. When it comes to the media, the spotlight is shining on dramatic murderers who are repeatedly referred to as “Islamic fundamentalists”. This is a total contradiction to the definition of the truly Muslim fundamentalists. So, we have to make a clear distinction between what we call “moderate Muslims” and “radical Islamists and Jihadists.” It is important to make a difference between Muslim terrorist, Muslim fundamentalist and religious based terrorism as well.

The Islamic movement in Europe and the Broader Middle East are closely intertwined, they fuel each other. The problem is not with Islam, but with those extremists who misuse Islam41.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is perhaps one of the most sensitive issues in the Middle East42. From the religious backdrops (the region being centres of Judaism, Christianity and Islam) to the regional ally for the US that Israel is, the Palestinian people have been denied a right to their land. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is assessed by many experts as the main source of the conflicts in the Broader Middle East.

Among the wide variety of methods used by terrorist organizations in the Middle East region I have to emphasize the suicide terrorism. Suicide attacks are portrayed as heroic acts. During the “Oslo years” suicide terrorism was a tactic employed by religious fundamentalist. Since the outbreak of al Aqsa intifada this tactic was adopted by secular organizations as well. Despite the fact that lately many of the suicide terrorists belong to secular organizations, there is an increase in the number of perpetrators who were educated in religious institutions. Because of the unemployment status there is an increase of fatalist suicide terrorism. Fatalists turn to suicide terrorism out of despair and sometimes as a result of the belief that their families will be paid for their act of sacrifice.

42 http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Middle East/Palestine asp.
In contrast to the Palestinian national struggle, the social and political struggles of Islamic forces have focused on the domestic arena. Even when faced with increasing opposition from forces at home, Islamic movements, concerned with social affairs and internal politics, did not turn the international arena their main battlefield. Iran, Iraq, Palestine and Israel the „threat“ of Islam political terrorism, often sponsored by states, has long been a major factor in Middle East politics. To many people, „Islam“ conjures up negative impressions of fundamentalists, intolerance and terrorism. Islamic movements and organizations are automatically linked with terrorism and are blamed for the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process.

Islam is also often portrayed as a threat to the (mainly Christian) West. Some claim that it is the new threat to replace the communist fears from the Cold War. However, the stereotypical image of the Middle East is very negative. Islam is stereotyped as a threat to democracy without distinguishing it from terrorism or corrupt leaders who use the ideals of Islam to their own ends. Thus, US foreign policy has been criticized for not taking this distinction into account and also hypocritically supporting terrorist regimes in the past for its own political gains and only now doing something about it.

The involvement of British Muslims in the London bombings, along with the killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a radical Dutch Muslim of Moroccan descent, have raised concerns that Jihadist Islam is penetrating Europe not only through new immigrants but also by appealing to European-born Muslims. The active armed struggles in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Caucasus still serve as a kind of "Jihadist war college," predicted that its graduates would continue to share their training and experience upon returning to their countries of origin.\(^{43}\)

We already have seen a transfer of terrorism tactics and technology to Afghanistan, and we anticipate that this will continue in the future. In addition, the interpersonal connections that the militants make in places such as Iraq and Chechnya also will link them to the global movement in the same way the jihad in Afghanistan did for the preceding generation. There is increasing evidence, that ‘core’ Al-Qaeda is proving adaptable and resilient, and has retained the ability to plan and coordinate large-scale attacks in the Western world. Regional Jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb have sworn allegiance to Al-Qaeda and have begun to show ambitions beyond parochial concerns in support of Al-Qaeda’s global objectives. Plots that have come to light in Europe and elsewhere point to a growing trend of Islamic radicalization. But the major attacks in the last years were conducted by existing

\(^{43}\) http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read-article.php?id=275324
regional nodes and not the main Al Qaeda organization. These attacks did show a broad geographic reach stretching across the Middle East.

The majority of Islamic influenced North-African and Middle Eastern terrorist groups has logistical and support basis in Europe. The most significant terrorist threat for South-West Europe is Morocco. Among the groups activated in the country several groups has been organised in the northern part of the country, members speak well Spanish, can easily travel to Spain (after the Madrid bombing the majority of the 17 arrested people were originated from Morocco). The March 2004 attacks in Madrid, consisting of ten bombs in four different commuter trains (three others failed to explode), reveal another distinctive organizational pattern. Several members of the group had previously been noticed by the security forces in connection with Islamist networks in Spain. Some of the members of the extended group who did not kill themselves apparently fled to Iraq to become suicide bombers. None of the members was a Spanish citizen, most were Moroccan.

North African extremist organizations having activities in France, Italy, Belgium, Spain and UK, cooperating or not cooperating with Al Qaeda, can execute terrorist attack against European targets.

The most important Middle East Islamic terrorist organizations that can endanger Europe are: Algerian Group al Qaeda Organization of the Arab Maghreb (formal Group of Salafist for Preaching and Combat – GSPC), Group of Islamic Army – GIA, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group – LIFG, (Zawahiri announced in November 2007. that the group joined to Al Qaeda) Tunisian Combat Group – TCG, Moroccan Islamic Combat Group – MICG.

Iraq

Before the war, Iraq was not a terrorist centre, which had several reasons. Saddam Hussein’s regime was an oppressive, total police state; international terrorist organizations did not trust the dictator. To the present, the situation has radically changed, there are numerous local, regional and global terrorist organizations functioning in Iraq. The question is whether they can connect to Europe, and if yes, then how.

Among the terrorist organizations functioning in Iraq the foreign Islam extreme groups mean the greatest danger to Europe, mainly if they put their operational territory to Europe after the Iraqi fights. Many extremist Muslims have a European citizenship as well; however, most of them have got to Europe in an illegal way or as a refugee. European experiences show that the young

44 http://stratfor.com/products/premium/read-article.php?id=275324
people arriving here mostly do not have Jihad experience. In other words, we are facing a new generation that is influenced by the Iraqi conflict. Apart from this, several warriors who have Jihad experience did travel to Iraq with the purpose of participating in the revolt.

War experiences are highly important. In Iraq, the Jihadist warriors activate in a rather tough, hostile environment, they gain great experience in city guerrilla war, in using improvised explosives devices, mortars, RPG’s, sniper actions, kidnapping, attacks against convoys and checkpoints, moreover, in the application of air defence rockets. It is expected that in their future actions, these terrorists e.g. in Europe will have enough practice in target observation, attacks, interrogation of hostages, handling the media and in general accomplishing covered operations. The war in Iraq has produced a tremendous change in the Middle East and in the Muslim world at large. For the first time in history, an Arab country is controlled by the Shi’a. The West does not grasp yet the full meaning of the Shi’a revival and the potential for deep change in many of the countries in the region. One of the important questions since 9/11 and more so since the war in Iraq is if the potential for a coalition between radical Sunni and Shi’a forces active in the region can indeed materialize. Many reflections have appeared in recent years on the nature of terrorism. In a study of the specific phenomenon of suicide terrorism, for example, the Chicago-based academic, Robert A. Pape concluded that ninety-five percent of suicide bombings since 1980 were directly related to the perceived or real occupation by foreign – and predominately democratic – state forces of land claimed by the groups promoting suicide as a tactic. Citing Israel’s occupation of Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza, the Sinhalese domination of lands claimed by Tamils in Sri Lanka and the recent coalition forces’ occupation of Iraq, he found that suicide bombing had been a largely effective weapon in changing public opinion in the democracies targeted, and hence public support for official policy. The corollary is that the same tactic would be less effective in dictatorships, because they would be less responsive to public opinion. Suicide bomb attacks within the home country of the occupying forces, however, fell entirely within the logic of the suicide terrorists’ overall strategy. The main conclusion to be drawn is that there is likely to be a link between the foreign military presence in Iraq and the upsurge in domestic suicide bombing plots.

Likewise, many predict that Iraq would plunge into deeper chaos with the removal of US-led Coalition forces precisely because the only thing that keeps the various opposition elements from “really” taking their gloves off and going after each other is the occupation. Is it wiser for the Americans to stay and avoid the potential vacuum.

But Iraq is not an American problem – it is our common problem. There is no alternative to success even if it takes a long breath. If the world fails in Iraq, we will get no second chance for a long time.
Iran

Iran has emerged as the biggest threat, not simply to U.S. interests in the region, but the Saudi, Egyptian, and other moderate Arab interests as well. It is true, for example, that U.S. leaders are attempting to strengthen client regimes in an attempt to counterbalance regional "enemies" such as Iran and Syria, and Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran controls a powerful terrorism card, the Hezbollah. Unlike al Qaeda, which has been badly damaged as an organization since 9/11, Hezbollah does pose a strategic threat to the West. Thanks to Iran, Hezbollah has far more – and better trained – operational cadre than Al Qaeda ever had. If the United States does attack Iran and the Iranians call upon Hezbollah to take action, the organization is able to conduct attacks in many parts of the world than the Iranian government itself. Do not forget the fact, that Hezbollah was the first to use children is suicide attack. Hezbollah had received advanced military and intelligence training. The organization has continued to refine its already considerable core competency in militant specialties such as kidnapping, assassination, construction and employment of improvised explosive devices, spectacular attacks, such as vehicle bombings and hijackings. Hezbollah, however, has much clearer vulnerabilities than Al Qaeda. For example, its training camps and political and social components constitute recognizable infrastructure in Lebanon. While some of that infrastructure is deliberately placed in Lebanese civilian concentrations, a good deal of it, particularly the facilities in the Bekaa Valley, can be attacked without major concern for civilian life. Another consideration for Hezbollah is that the group also maintains close ties to the Syrian regime, and its Syrian handlers do not want to make any confrontation with the US.

The Lebanese arena constitutes a relatively comfortable operating space for radical Islamic organizations affiliated with Al Qaeda. The weakness of the central government, the religious and political diversity, and the attempts of outsiders to meddle in Lebanese affairs all come together to create an unsecured situation in Lebanon. The fighting between the Lebanese army and the Fatah al Islam poses a serious threat to the fragile stability of the Lebanese political structure. In context with Lebanon I have to mention Syria. Syria is harbouring groups posing a threat to the West such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian-General Command, all groups financed by Iran.

Saudi Arabia

The country is at a critical stage in both its struggle against terrorism and its on-again, off-again efforts at reform, and Islamism is at the heart of both.

Wahhabi influence, Saudi Islamism developed over several decades a wide variety of strains. These included radical preachers, who condemned what they considered the regime's deviation from the principles of Islam and its submission to the U.S.; social reformers, convinced of the need to modernize educational and religious practices and challenging the puritan strand of Islam that dominates the Kingdom; political reformers, who gave priority to such issues as popular participation, institution-building, constitutionalisation of the monarchy, and elections; and Jihadist activists, for the most part formed in Afghanistan and who gradually brought their violent struggle against Western – in particular U.S. – influence to their homeland46.

Jihadist organization, face of Saudi Islamism has manifested itself most prominently since early 2003, when a network of hardened militant Islamists operating under the name of "Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula" (QAP) began a violent campaign targeting Western and in particular U.S. interests. Large-scale terrorist operations and lower-level violence against Westerners have undermined the traditional sense of personal security among expatriate workers, prompting an unknown number to depart. In the process, militants have been drawn into a full-blown confrontation with the government and its security forces.

Egypt

Terrorist organizations in Egypt have four main targets: public and administration figures and heads of the security establishment; foreign tourists; the Coptic minority; and Egyptian and other targets abroad.

The wave of terrorism that broke out in Egypt in mid-1992 surprised the regime both in its scope and in its force. The Egyptian leadership did not have a suitable response. It lacked sufficient intelligence and a comprehensive strategy to fight back. Under these circumstances, the regime reacted to the terrorist attacks by applying force, using fire arms, carrying out mass arrests and imposing collective punishments in the communities near the sites of the attacks or where arms were uncovered. Security forces placed curfews on urban neighbourhoods and in towns in order to capture wanted fundamentalists and to discover weapons caches.

Following the mass arrests, Egypt's prisons were quickly filled beyond capacity and it was no longer possible to separate the fundamentalist prisoners

from common criminals. In many prisons, the fundamentalists ruled over the
inmates, forcing them to follow the rules of Islam and recruiting them to their
organizations. Thus, the prisons became schools of terrorism. Many who were
arrested – despite their innocence – were released from prison straight into the
arms of fundamentalist organizations. The Egyptian government’s strategy for
combating terrorism is focused on the following means: recruiting agents from
within the fundamentalist organizations; establishing a computerized
information database on the fundamentalists and their activities; raising the
personal and professional standards of the internal security forces; direct strikes
against commanders and leaders of terrorist organizations; and concluding
intelligence and operational cooperation agreements with Arab and Western
countries.

The internal security forces implemented this strategy successfully. In
addition, Egypt reached agreements on combating terrorism with Jordan,
Yemen, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco and Pakistan. The
agreements provided for an exchange of intelligence information, and wanted
terrorists were extradited to Egypt. An understanding was reached with Western
countries on intelligence exchange, but due to legal and moral considerations
they refused to extradite to Egypt wanted fundamentalists. The fundamentalists
have been pushed out of the Cairo area and from the north, toward southern
Egypt. Terrorism does not pose an existential threat to the Egyptian regime, but
it certainly poses an ongoing strategic challenge.

To summarize we can determine that because of the unresolved conflicts,
the Middle East is and will be a breeding ground for terrorism. The West has a
huge responsibility to help the region by finding the commune interests. We can
not forget: only Islam can defeat Islamic extremism.
CURRENT ISSUES

Colonel Mihály Récei
Military Security Office

SUMMARY OF THE ACTIVITY OF MULTINATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP (MISWG)

Personnel and Industrial Security Vetting Directorate of Military Security Office is in close co-operation with Hungarian National Security Authority on the field of participation of MISWG conferences. Hungary became a full member of MISWG following NATO accession in 1999. Our first common effort was to invite MISWG countries to Budapest in 2000. During the conference Hungary suggested to create a new MISWG document about the criteria and responsibilities of Facility Security Officers appointed to the cleared facilities. After a 3-year-long preparation Document Number 21 was accepted in 2003 with consensus. Hungary was happy to finish this work with success. In my publication I would like to introduce first of all history of MISWG, MISWG document Number 21, and additionally some details from German Manual of Industrial Security.

A SHORT HISTORY

The origin of the Multinational Industrial Security Working Group can be traced to mid-1985. At that time, the United States Department of Defence (DoD) under new legislation designed to solicit cooperation with the NATO allies in research and development efforts leading to the production of interoperable weapons systems had begun to negotiate agreements for cooperative arms programs with those allies. The negotiators of the agreements for these early programs soon began to note that the information and industrial security requirements of the various governments that were to be participants in the programs were not compatible. This lack of compatibility had become an impediment to international arms cooperation. It was agreed, that incompatible security requirements among governments participating in the cooperative arms
programs were becoming a problem and procedures should be developed to apply standard security procedures to these programs.

Later in 1985 the German Federal Ministry of Economics hosted a meeting in Bonn of industrial security officials from all of the NATO countries, less Iceland. (Iceland declined, because it was not participating in the cooperative arms programs.) The German, UK, and U. S. representatives proposed the establishment of a working group, which would review each country’s security procedures, determine the extent of any differences, and make recommendations for standard procedures. The German and Dutch representatives raised two questions: 1) Was the NATO Security Committee the appropriate forum in which to discuss the initiative; and, 2) was the group to be an officially constituted group or an ad hoc group? It was agreed that the NATO Security Committee should not be involved because the principal purpose of the initiative would be to address security issues for non-NATO cooperative programs among NATO members, and possibly other countries. It was decided that the representatives would pursue the question of the status of the group with other officials within their respective governments. The Belgian representative agreed to host another meeting to discuss the results.

The Belgium meeting was hosted at the facility of the European F-16 Production Group outside of Brussels in early 1986. Each country’s representative presented a briefing on industrial security requirements and differences were noted. When the discussion turned to the status of the group, one of the delegations did not favour the establishment of a formal, legally constituted group, and recommended that it operate under an ad hoc arrangement. The other representatives agreed. It was decided that the group would be limited to NATO member nations, a position that was later changed (see below). The name Multinational Industrial Security Cooperation Working Group was also adopted. The name was shortened at a subsequent meeting, hosted in the UK, to Multinational Industrial Security Working Group, abbreviated MISWG. A standard emblem for the MISWG was developed by the Netherlands in 1993.

These decisions raised another question – how to ensure that procedures developed by the group were used in cooperative programs. The establishment of the Senior Security Officials answered this question. The National Security Authorities (NSAs) (i.e., those officials recognized in NATO security regulations) or senior officials in each country who were responsible for international industrial security matters (Designated Security Authorities), would represent their countries at Forum meetings. The Senior Officials would meet approximately annually. They would approve any study initiatives that were proposed by the working group and approve any procedures that resulted from the initiatives. This would be accomplished in a set of minutes in which the
signatories would “endeavor to ensure” that the procedures recommended by the group would be applied to cooperative programs.

It was also decided that because the MISWG is an ad hoc group, it would not be necessary for each member country to subscribe to recommended procedures in order for them to be adopted. Those countries that desired to use the procedures could sign the minutes reflecting their agreement to use them; any country that did not desire to use them would not sign the minutes and not be obligated to use them. In fact, all of the documents were eventually accepted by all of the countries. The Seniors Forum continued to meet until November 1998 when it was decided that, since the Seniors were often participating in the working group meetings, the groups would be combined. Acceptance of the Working Group minutes by the participants was considered intent by the nations to use the procedures in cooperative programs.

Initially, MISWG member countries were encouraged to consult with their program management officials and defense contractors to develop recommendations for procedures to be analysed and standardized by the member countries. The current MISWG documents number 1 (Hand Carriage Procedures) and number 7 (International Visits) resulted from that initial effort. Document number 2 contained the original procedures for visits, but these procedures proved to be impractical. Document number 2 was cancelled and new procedures were published as document number 7. Subsequent documents (currently numbering 20) addressed other procedures for industrial security. The MISWG initially met at least twice a year, particularly when the first 20 MISWG documents were being developed. The MISWG now usually meets at least annually. The members are afforded the opportunity to meet face-to-face with their counterparts from other countries and discuss current security issues that would be difficult to discuss by mail, the telephone, or by e-mail. Many participants have noted that by knowing their counterparts on a personal basis, and by meeting with them face-to-face, many problems that might otherwise have been impediments to cooperation have been solved. The MISWG also may designate sub-groups to analyse and prepare recommendations on a particular issue. With the advent of automated information systems, the MISWG participants are able to conduct a lot of business over the Internet.

Although the MISWG was established originally to standardize security procedures for non-NATO cooperative arms programs involving NATO member nations, other countries have asked to use the MISWG procedures in their cooperative arms programs. As a result, the procedures were made available to many other countries, and are now posted on the Internet for public use. The procedures also have been used by defense contractors in some countries to apply standard procedures for commercial contracts. More recently, the NATO Security Committee incorporated many MISWG procedures in the
NATO security regulation. Many NATO member nations have adopted MISWG procedures as their national procedures.

Membership in the MISWG originally was limited to NATO member countries; however the idea of inviting non-NATO countries to become members was discussed at several meetings. Major concerns expressed by some countries were that non-NATO countries might not have the same objectives and motivation as the NATO countries, and with the addition of new members the group might become too large to remain effective. However, in 1999 at the meeting in Bergen, Norway the original MISWG member countries agreed to invite Sweden into the group. Austria and Switzerland were invited at the meeting in Budapest, Hungary in 2000, bringing the total of participant countries to nineteen. These non-NATO countries were sponsored by NATO countries, whose companies participated in industrial arrangements with companies in the other countries. The Scope of Operations of the MISWG was amended at the meeting in The Hague, the Netherlands in 2001 to describe criteria and procedures under which non-NATO countries might be invited into the MISWG in the future. At that time, the term referring to countries participating in the MISWG was changed from “Member” to “Participant.”

Finally, in addition to its efforts to standardize security procedures for cooperative programs, the MISWG also conducted briefing sessions related to security and export control for the so-called “Partnership for Peace” countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which aspired to join NATO. These sessions, which were held at the Marshall Center in Germany in October 1994 and in Trencin, Slovakia in September 1996 helped to establish MISWG procedures in those countries’ were developing industrial security programs. Hungarian representatives visited first time this MISWG Special Conference in Trencin. Our first official participation in the MISWG conference was in 1999 in Bergen, Norway, having been an official member of NATO. MISWG can be proud of the role it has played in facilitating international arms cooperative programs.

Based on Scope of Operations of MISWG, this organization is an informal body to develop common measures for the protection of classified information with regard to non-NATO Multinational Defence Programs and international industrial security matters. MISWG is composed of representatives of those departments of participating countries that deal with international industrial security matters. The role of the MISWG is to achieve commonality of security practices and procedures for the exchange of classified and certain unclassified information. MISWG also provides a forum to discuss ways to adapt security practices to continuing changes in the overall security environment, defence industry trends and international industrial security.

For that purpose, MISWG will:
• Set direction, priorities and timetable for the work of the MISWG Ad Hoc Working Groups (AHWGs);
• Explore and recommend methods to improve and harmonise international industrial security standards, procedures and means of communication for the exchange of classified and certain unclassified information with emphasis on measures designed to achieve efficiency and economy;
• Develop and review documentation on industrial security regarding the harmonisation of practices;
• Promote co-operation and understanding on matters of industrial security practices and procedures among participating countries and with non-participating countries, especially those seeking to qualify for inclusion in NATO;
• Promote implementation and subsequent review of agreed methods and procedures by each participating country and recommend changes as needed.

Participating countries will send representatives of necessary expertise and seniority to address issues on the agenda and with the authority to make decisions. MISWG has no permanent structures or permanent secretariat. The secretariat duties are assumed by the respective host country of a MISWG meeting. This includes the drafting of the agenda and the minutes and assistance to the next host in making arrangements of the meeting. A representative of the host country serves as chairperson of the meeting. The MISWG meets on a regular basis, as a rule once a year. A second meeting can be scheduled if sufficient justifications exist. AHWGs can meet as needed.

MISWG documents, practices and procedures are not legally binding. They do not constitute international agreements and are not intended to contradict or violate national rules and regulations. Whenever practical, participating countries should apply MISWG documents, practices and procedures in whole or in part in connection with bilateral and multinational co-operative defence programs.

During the 23-year-long activity of MISWG 21 documents were created, as below:

1. Arrangements for the International Hand Carriage of Classified Documents, Equipment, and/or Components.
2. Deleted.
5. Program/Project Security Instruction.
6. Procedures for the Protection of Restricted Information.
8. Controlled Unclassified Information Clauses.
11. Control of Security Cleared Facilities.
14. Contract Security Clauses
15. International Transportation by Commercial Carriers of Classified Documents and Equipment or Components as Freight.
16. Guidelines for Assessing Protection and Control of Classified Information in a Multinational Non-NATO Cooperative Defence Program
17. International Hand Carriage of Classified Documents, Equipment, and/or Components by Visitors
19. Personal Security Clearance Information/Action Sheet
20. International Transfer of Material Classified Restricted by Express Commercial Courier Companies
21. Role of the Facility Security Officer (the lead nation for creating the document was Hungary).

ROLE OF THE FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER

INTRODUCTION

Documents approved by the MISWG for use in bilateral- and/or multilateral classified programs require the appointment of a facility security officer (FSO) to exercise the national protective security requirements for classified information. Whilst the protection of classified information is a responsibility of each employee in the facility, the role of the FSO is the most critical. The FSO has an overall individual responsibility for protecting classified information, a contractual obligation to ensure the effective implementation of security requirements and procedures within a facility involved in classified projects. His actions are vital to provide the overall efficiency of the security system on behalf of facility management and indirectly of the government. The duties and responsibilities of the FSO are organized, met and controlled by national laws and regulations.
This document can not be in any way binding on the nations but involves all important criteria, rules and obligations concerning FSO’s, and provides guidance on the requirements for appointment, objectives and requirements for FSO’s which may be used by all MISWG countries in their future industrial security activity in this field.

1 GENERAL

1.1 The FSO should be a part of the facility’s management, or directly is to be subordinated to one member of the management. All decisions have to be concerned to security interdependence. For this reason, the FSO is the technical advisor to the management on security matters. He is responsible for the proper implementation of security related decisions, for co-ordination of available security resources and measures. His duty is to co-operate efficiently first of all with NSA/DSA and, where appropriate, with the local security services and forces.

1.2 The FSO should draft and maintain an up-to-date version of the security implementation standards and procedures within the facility. He should be the focal point for all security-related aspects of international classified programs, involving review import/export approval requests, foreign contract activity, government-to-government transfers and liaison with various authorities and other involved facilities.

2 CRITERIA

2.1 The FSO can only be a citizen/national of the country where the facility is located. He has to be vetted at the appropriate level as a part of the facility security clearance. The FSO must be an adult. He should be of a sufficient senior rank or should report to a senior member of management in order to exercise security authority. The FSO should be provided with appropriate training.

2.2 The FSO should have at least secondary school education. Knowledge of English is not a requirement for the FSO’s position, but in the future it is advisable. This criteria does not apply to countries whose official language is English.

2.3 The management of the facility nominates the FSO but the appointment has to be approved by the NSA/DSA.
2.4 The FSO’s position should be a full time activity, but in the small companies it is acceptable for the FSO position a to be a part time activity.

2.5 The FSO must be an employee of the given facilities organization.

3 COOPERATION BETWEEN THE FSO AND THE NSA/DSA

3.1 The NSA/DSA maintains close co-operation with FSO’s through all available means. The FSO’s suitability is confirmed by close working relationship, interviews, vetting procedures and training.

3.2 The FSO will report any changes of the ownership, operating name and location of the organization.

3.3 The FSO will report any changes to the information previously submitted for key management personnel, including the names of the individuals they are replacing, in addition a statement will be made indicating, whether the new key management personnel are cleared and if so, to what level. Individuals who have not been vetted will be excluded from access.

3.4 The FSO must report any important changes to physical, document security and to INFOSEC.

3.5 The FSO will report the details of any security risks concerning classified information as soon as possible after they are discovered.

3.6 The FSO must report any possible espionage, sabotage or subversive activities at any of the facility’s locations in written form to the NSA/DSA.

3.7 The FSO will direct and co-ordinate the work of his deputy (if applicable), and other security personnel.

3.8 The FSO will report efforts of individual’s (regardless of the nationality) to obtain unauthorised access to classified information or to compromise a vetted employee.

3.9 The FSO will seek prior authority from the NSA/DSA for any contractual or any other type of agreement with any foreign interest that involves the release or access to national classified information by foreign organisations or citizens/nationals.
3.10 The FSO is required to report any events that may have an impact on the status of the FSC, PSCs, including any indications of loss, compromise or suspected compromise of classified information.

3.11 The FSO sends the NSA/DSA a registration list about the vetted personnel and annotates it with any corrections. (Organizations in the ISP are not required to do this)

3.12 The FSO will co-operate in routine and unannounced security inspections and investigations involving the protection of classified information and during personnel security investigations of current or former employees and others.

3.13 The FSO will initiate a preliminary inquiry to ascertain all of the circumstances into any security violation, and will submit an initial investigation report of the incident to the NSA/DSA. When the investigation has been completed, a final report will be submitted by the FSO to the NSA/DSA.

3.14 Where necessary this requirement should also apply to foreign governments RESTRICTED information.

3.15 The FSO will report any adverse information coming to her/his attention concerning any of the facility’s cleared employees to the management and to the NSA/DSA.

3.16 The FSO will report about the administrative actions taken against the individual having access to classified information and other employees, if they are involved in a deliberate disregard of security requirements or gross negligence on the handling of classified material.

3.17 The FSO will develop procedures for safeguarding classified material in emergency situations, and will report any emergency situation to the NSA/DSA which renders the facility incapable of safeguarding the classified material.

3.18 The FSO will periodically attend security seminars offered by the NSA/DSA.

4 COOPERATION BETWEEN THE FSO AND THE MANAGEMENT

4.1. The FSO is the technical advisor to management regarding security-related issues. The FSO’s duties and responsibilities which
relate to national security regulations should be set out in a job description which is to be approved by the head of management. Additionally a Security Manual must be issued on company level ensuring the effective implementation of national industrial security regulations.

4.2. The FSO should maintain continuous contact with the people in charge of the different administrative and operational areas of the facility.

4.3. The FSO will identify changes of national industrial security regulations and, where appropriate, will inform the management about the changes.

4.4. The FSO will, where required, draft and implement the annual facility inspection plan based on security issues. Having implemented the plan, the FSO will submit the results in the annual report to the management.

4.5. The FSO will record information about employees who violate security requirements. The FSO in consultation with management will establish and apply a graduated scale of actions against the employees’ violations, or negligence.

5 PERSONNEL SECURITY

5.1. The FSO will develop and implement the procedures necessary to obtain the personnel security clearance of those persons in the organization who require access to classified information.

5.2. The FSO will initiate a new vetting action for new employees who require access to classified information and for existing employees, before the end of the validity of a PSC.

5.3. The FSO provides during the vetting procedure suitable arrangements within the facility for conducting private interviews with employees and provides relevant employment and security records for review, when requested.

5.4. The FSO prepares an access list of vetted persons and updates it on a regular basis or when changes occur.

5.5. The FSO continuously monitors the security profile status of individuals within the organization and will report any changes and
circumstances, which may adversely affect the individual’s loyalty, reliability and trustworthiness.

5.6. The FSO will report any abnormal or suspicious activities that may affect the security of classified information.

5.7. The FSO will ensure that individuals having access to classified information sign a “responsibility declaration”.

5.8. The FSO develops and provides security briefings to new employees and to cleared persons before they are given access to classified information.

5.9. The FSO conducts exit interviews with individuals who are terminating employment with the organization and debriefs the individuals on their continuing responsibilities. The FSO will arrange to terminate the security clearances of personnel who no longer require access.

5.10. The FSO will develop and distribute identity cards as well as access cards, whenever required.

5.11. The FSO deals with procedures for international and national travel requests for the organization’s personnel involving the handling of classified information.

5.12. The FSO will prepare procedures for handling classified visits to the facility by national or foreign persons.

5.13. The FSO will ensure that only personnel security cleared to the appropriate level and with a “need-to-know” have access to classified information and assets.

6 PHYSICAL SECURITY

6.1. Regular maintenance of security systems is necessary to ensure that the equipment operates at optimum performance. It is necessary to re-evaluate the effectiveness of individual security measures and the complete security system periodically.

6.1. FSO’s must develop measures for the protection of facilities containing classified information against espionage, terrorism, public disorders, sabotage, bombs, explosive devices and theft. Fire protection procedures must be implemented by the FSO.
6.2. The FSO will develop emergency evacuation plans for personnel and for classified information.

6.2. The FSO should define the boundaries for security areas, as well as the security measures for each of the areas. The FSO shall coordinate the security aspects of all construction at the facility.

6.3. The FSO develops procedures for the efficient control of all copies, translations and quotations of classified information, providing for the registration, numbering via the head of the registry. The FSO should also record the receipt, distribution, origination, and transmittal of classified information.

6.4. The FSO develops procedures for the normal and emergency destruction of classified documents and provides suitable means for the purpose.

6.5. The FSO must plan and supervise the work of the security guards, when required.

6.6. The FSO is responsible for protection of combinations to security containers, cabinets, vaults and closed areas.

6.7. Combinations will be changed by the FSO when personnel having knowledge of the combinations terminate employment or transfer to a position where knowledge of the combination is not required or if the combination is suspected or known to have been compromised.

6.8. The personal identification numbers (PIN) and passwords must be changed when it is considered necessary.

6.9. The FSO will check alarm systems periodically and will provide for adequate maintenance of the system.

6.10. The FSO should conduct random checks within the facility during working hours and after working hours in order to verify that no classified material has been left unsecured.

6.11. The FSO must implement procedures for cleaning and maintenance operations in the secure areas of the facility, and must provide, as a minimum, an annual inventory of classified information and assets.

7 INFORMATION SECURITY (INFOSEC)
INFOSEC is the application of security measures to protect information processed, stored or transmitted in communication, information and other electronic systems against of confidentiality, integrity or availability, whether accidental or intentional, and to prevent loss of integrity or availability of the systems themselves. INFOSEC involves security risk management, security approval, security-related documentation, security inspection, computer and local area network security, interconnection of network security, cryptographic security, transmission security and emission security.

7.1. Automated Access Control Systems and electronic, mechanical, or electromechanical devices may be used provided they have been approved/accredited by NSA/DSA and controlled by the FSO.

7.2. The FSO will ensure the confidentiality, integrity and the availability of classified information, which is processed or handled, via information technology systems, networks, and other devices.

7.3. The FSO develops procedures for the registration of all incoming classified information via all information technology systems.

7.4. Computer and networking systems used to capture, create, process and to distribute classified information must be operated to ensure that all information is protected in accordance with its level of sensitivity.

7.5. The ADP security plan should be prepared using the special skills of the computer specialist, under the supervision of the FSO.

7.6. The management of the facility, the FSO, the system security representative (ADP Security Officer) and the NSA/DSA (in case of CONFIDENTIAL and above) are all responsible for the safe operation of all classified systems. Security management mechanisms and procedures must be in place to deter, prevent, detect, and recover from the impact of incidents affecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of classified information.

7.7. The FSO will develop procedures for the security of ADP systems and for communications security.

7.8. The FSO must control the issue of passwords and other access control devices and should ensure they are changed regularly in accordance with the Threat and Risk Assessment.
7.9. The FSO will brief system users on system security responsibilities.

8 PROJECT SECURITY

8.1. FSO’s of the prime contractor and the subcontractors should be in direct contact throughout the life of the classified project as stipulated in written agreements. All organizations involved in the classified project must possess an appropriate Facility Security Clearance. The FSO will obtain approval from the NSA/DSA prior to subcontracting contracts having security requirements.

8.2. The FSO ensures that the government contract security clauses are properly included in any subcontracts.

8.3 The Project Security Instruction and Security Classification Guide must be prepared at the appropriate level and approved by the NSA/DSA. The FSO must ensure that all security requirements are adhered to.

8.4. The appropriate requirements of the PSI and Security Classification Guide will apply to subcontractor’s involved in classified international projects and must be reflected in contractual documentation.

8.5. In the implementation of international classified projects, the security requirements related to security clearances, visit procedures and the transmission of classified material must be in accordance with international agreements, Arrangements or Treaties.

8.6. The FSO will collaborate in the drafting of transportation plans and in the implementation of the plans.

8.7. The FSO will prepare procedures for international and national travel requests for the organization’s personnel.

8.8. Classified material will be hand carried and delivered according to the MISWG document N° 1.

8.9. The FSO must ensure that Visit Clearance Requests are prepared and forwarded in accordance with MISWG Document No. 7.

8.10. The FSO develops procedures and promotes the proper implementation of security measures for the security of the facilities
where meetings, conferences, briefings and other activities are held for the purpose of protecting classified information.

8.11. The FSO maintains records of all visitors, including their names, the organisations, they represent, the dates of the visits and the names of the person’s who were visited.

8.12. The FSO ensures that visitors have approval for access to classified information based on “need-to-know” principle and that their movement is controlled as needed.

8.13. Where permitted by national security rules, and regulations, RESTRICTED level visits may be arranged directly between the FSO of the visitor and the FSO of the facility to be visited.

I would like to add some background information for this document regarding the components of security.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

During the personnel security vetting procedures there shall be an agreed standard of confidence about the loyalty, trustworthiness and reliability of all individuals authorised to have an access to classified information. They shall have an appropriate PSC granted by the NSA/DSA. They will be briefed on their security responsibilities, and shall have a need-to-know. Granting a PSC should be considered only as a first step in the personnel security process. There is a requirement to ensure an individual’s continuing eligibility through continuous evaluation, revalidation of PSCs, through procedures for addressing adverse information and through security education program.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

Physical security is the application of physical protective measures to sites, buildings or facilities that contain information requiring protection against loss or compromise, involving active and passive security measures. It shall be established according to the threat, security classification and quantity of the information.

INFORMATION SECURITY (INFOSEC)

INFOSEC is the application of security measures to protect information processed, stored or transmitted in communication, information and other electronic systems against breaches of
confidentiality, integrity or availability, whether accidental or intentional, and to prevent loss of integrity or availability of the systems themselves. INFOSEC involves security risk management, security approval, security-related documentation, security inspection, computer and local area network security, interconnection of network security, cryptographic security, transmission security and emission security. The Protection of Information Handled in IT and Communication Systems are contained in MISWG Document Number 13.

**PROJECT SECURITY**

Industrial security is the application of protective measures and procedures to prevent, detect and recover from the loss or compromise of classified information handled by industry in contracts. Bilateral and multilateral classified information disseminated to industry, generated as a result of a contract with industry, and classified contracts with industry shall be protected in accordance with MISWG Security Policy and supporting documents. Industrial security involves the negotiation and the letting of classified contracts, the security requirements, the release of classified information in contracting, Facility Security Clearances for contracts, the international transportation of classified material, international visits and appropriate level vetted personnel on loan within a classified project.

**SECURITY AWARENESS**

All individuals employed in positions where they have access to classified information shall be thoroughly briefed on the security procedures and their security obligations. All cleared individuals shall acknowledge that they fully understand their responsibilities and the consequences that the national laws or administrative orders provide. They shall be periodically reminded of the dangers to security arising from indiscreet conversation with the media, unauthorised persons and of the threat presented by the activities of opposing intelligence services.

In my opinion Document No 21 is full of some very practical and useful information. I can tell you, that some MISWG nations used this document in preparing their Industrial Security Handbook. I would like to introduce, how this document was used by Germany in their Industrial Security Handbook, released in 2004.

**The Facility Security Clearance contains the**
Appointment, institution, dismissal

(1) The Security Officer is the central security authority in the company. The company management proposes to BMWi a specialized and suitable employee who already occupies a managerial position in the company. Following approval from BMWi, the company management appoints the Security Officer. The same applies to the position of permanent on-site Deputy Security Officer. The management assigns the responsibility for implementation of all security measures to this person – where necessary as a full-time position – and equips him/her with the appropriate authority. In the absence of the Security Officer, his/her Deputy takes on all his / her tasks and obligations.

(2) As a general principle, the Security Officer shall carry out this function in only one company. With the assent of BMWi, an exception may be made to this rule, in particular when one company holds an equity stake in another or the companies involved are affiliated. In such cases it must be ensured that

- the Security Officer regularly is personally present at the companies involved, and
- the Security Officer reports directly to the Managing Director of each individual company involved. This reporting line defining the right to give instructions is to be documented in agreements between the companies involved and between the employing company and the Security Officer and/or his/her staff.

(3) When making a nomination for several companies, a permanent local Deputy Security Officer is to be appointed for each separate company.

(4) The appointment of a Security Officer does not relieve the company (classified contractor-consignee) of its duties and obligations vis-à-vis the classified contractor and the security authorities.

(5) BMWi will instruct the Security Officer in his/her tasks and brief him/her on his/her special duties and obligations. The Security Officer is obliged to participate in information meetings and in-service training held by BMWi on matters of Industrial Security.
(6) Upon directive of BMWi, the company is to dismiss the Security Officer if
   - there are well-founded doubts about his/her professional or personal suitability for the position or
   - if it is not possible to grant him/her the required security clearance.

(7) If the company plans to remove the Security Officer from his function or the Security Officer leaves the company, the company management is to inform BMWI prior to the dismissal or departure and is to appoint a successor once the latter has been approved by BMWi. In the case of dismissal, the company is to present the reasons for this to the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. To ensure work is not interrupted, the Security Officer should not be removed from his position unless there are compelling reasons for this.

(8) At a change of Security Officer, the company management ensures that a written record is kept of the handover of
   - all Classified Information,
   - the security files,
   - the lists kept by the Security Officer,
   - any keys, number combinations for classified containers and intrusion detection systems,
   - the Security Plan, if one exists, and
   - the existing “Facility Security Clearances; this is to be signed by the outgoing Security Officer and the incoming Security Officer and filed for at least five years.

**Position and powers of the Security Officer**

(1) In matters of Industrial Security, the Security Officer has to be subordinated organisationally unequivocally and directly to the Chief Executive Officer or, where this is not possible, to the member the management who according to the Rules of Procedure bears the relevant responsibility or, where appointed to serve several companies, to the Managing Director of each individual company. He/she is to be involved in all company decisions relating to Classified Information and has the right to report directly to the member of the company management responsible for him/her.

(2) The Security Officer and his/her staff are not permitted to be members of the employee committee nor carry out the tasks of the Data Protection Officer. Nor is he/she permitted to take on any personnel administration tasks. With the approval of BMWi, an
exception to this may be made in companies with a small workforce or in companies where this separation cannot be implemented because of their personnel structure. In such cases, the Security Officer is to instruct all security cleared personnel in writing and inform them of their right to appeal to the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection. BMWi is to be informed without delay of changes that could have significant consequences for the special exemption.

(3) The company is to equip the Security Officer with the necessary powers and provide him with all the human and material resources (staff, rooms, technical equipment, etc.) he needs. He is also to be involved and receive support in all measures relating to the protection of Classified Information.

(4) The Security Officer may be entrusted with non-security tasks only to the extent that these do not affect his / her overriding tasks as Security Officer.

(5) The Security Officer is to be equipped with all the authority needed to fulfill the security obligations entered into by the company. These include:

- Participation in the planning and preparation phases and also the contractual negotiations for classified contracts;
- Participation in personnel measures affecting Industrial Security in the company, including the right to consult an employee's personal file;
- Involvement in all safety and security precautions taken in the company (plant protection, protection of information, fire service, etc.) and in all measures that may be of significance for the security of the company;
- Rights of information, instruction, directive and control, as well as right of access at all times to all locations in the company, to the extent required to carry out his / her duties;
- The right to issue instructions to the permanent on-site Deputy Security Officer;
- The authorization to conduct negotiations on security matters with the authorities and companies involved in the Industrial Security process;
- The decision whether to order the duplication of Classified Information;
- Right to issue instructions to the Plant Protection Unit and IT and Communication Security departments to the extent required carrying out his/her duties.
Duties and obligations of the Security Officer

General

(1) The Security Officer bears final responsibility for the planning, authorization, implementation and monitoring of all measures for the protection of classified material associated with classified contracts, classified subcontracts and other instances.

(2) The Security Officer is also responsible for
  - Constantly updating the company details to be sent to BMWi;
  - Informing BMWi without delay when insolvency proceedings are opened;
  - Informing the liquidator about the existence of classified contracts in the company and briefing him on his obligations i.a.w. GHB;
  - Keeping a written record at the change of a Security Officer;
  - Checking that the monitoring records (logged data sets) are in line with the directives on telecommunications monitoring;
  - The Security Officer is especially obliged to maintain discretion when processing matters relating to Vetting Procedures on individuals. He/she may divulge information from the security files of persons with clearance only to the authorities involved in the Industrial Security process.

(3) The Security Officer is to submit a report to the company management at least once a year and this report is to be discussed with him/her.

Classified contracts

(1) In agreement with the company management, the classified contractors and the authorities participating in the Industrial Security process, the Security Officer is to be involved at the earliest moment possible in the grading of the Classified Information and in clarifying any doubts relating to this.

(2) In this connection, his/her obligations comprise:
  - keeping records of
    - the classified contracts being prepared, processed, implemented and completed within the company and classified subcontracts placed with other companies (Classified Contracts List),
    - all units of the company in which Classified Information is processed or stored (Classified Material Location List),
    - persons with security clearance (Classified Personnel List),
• submitting requests to BMWi for Facility Security Clearances and/or FSCs relating to non-governmental classified contractors and classified contractors (consignees),
• examining in international projects whether and to what extent special agreements (e.g. international agreements, project agreements, specific security instructions) apply,
• ensuring that
  - the Report on Classified Contracts is submitted to BMWi in a complete and timely manner,
  - any classified subcontracts have been placed in accordance with the stipulations of the GHB, and during the implementation of a classified contract and after its final completion every opportunity is taken to downgrade, destroy or return Classified Information

(3) When requested, the Security Officer is at any time to detail to BMWi the security protection measures prepared or already taken by the company and demonstrate their adequacy.

Violation of security regulations

(1) The Security Officer will take the appropriate measures to ward off or reduce damage and prevent repetition if
  - it becomes known or there is a suspicion that unauthorized persons have gained access to Classified Information,
  - Classified Information, a key to a classified container, to a classified key box or a key for activating and deactivating an intrusion detection system has been lost,
  - other security regulations have been violated, or
  - an observation has been made that is of consequence for security (e.g. defective security equipment or exceptional interest shown by certain persons in classified material).

(2) He/she is to inform BMWi and the responsible State Office for the Protection of the Constitution (where applicable also the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) without delay, or in case of imminent danger (e.g. danger of a suspect absconding) the responsible police station, of
  - hints, observations and knowledge that might give reason for suspicion of intelligence gathering, of other kinds of treasonable acts or of sabotage, terrorism and similar,
  - security-related incidents during travelling of persons with security clearance.
He/she is to inform BMWi without delay in case of suspicion or it becomes known that unauthorized persons have gained access to Classified Information, keys to a classified container, to a lockable compartment of a classified key box or for activating and deactivating an intrusion detection system have been lost.

**Security Clearance Certificate/Supplementary Contractual Agreement**

(1) BMWi authorizes the concerned person for access to Classified Information up to a specific level by issuing a Security Clearance Certificate and sends this to the Security Officer. The clearance may be supplemented by a time limitation, special conditions, requirements or a right of rescission.

(2) The Security Officer informs the concerned person that the security clearance has been granted, hands out the "Instructions on Industrial of Security and briefs him/her on the obligations deriving from the clearance that has been granted ('Initial Briefing').

(3) The precondition for the security clearance coming into force is that the concerned person signs a contractual agreement with the company, by which he/she undertakes to maintain Security.

(4) With the person's signature, the security clearance takes effect. A confirmation of the security clearance is to be sent to BMWi without delay, at the latest three months after the Security Clearance Certificate has been issued.

(1) The Security Officer may grant cleared personnel access to classified material, only under observance of the "need-to-know" principle. It must be kept in mind that access may be granted
- only to nationals of those States that are parties to the bilateral and multilateral security agreements,
- in case of NATO Classified Information to nationals of NATO Member States as well as nationals of Australia, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland,
- in case of Classified Information of an EDIR Member State, to nationals solely in possession of the nationality of an EDIR Member State as well as persons with dual nationality who possess the nationality of an EDIR Member State plus the nationality of an EU Member State

Exceptions will only be allowed with the permission of the states involved, which is to be obtained via BMWi.
(2) If representatives from authorities or organizations demand access to Classified Information even though they are not involved in the classified contracts that are being processed in the company, BMWi is to be informed of this.

(3) In emergencies and disasters, personnel providing assistance are to be granted direct access to the rooms where Classified Information is stored. These persons are to be pledged to Security by the Security Officer. Judges, public prosecutors and assistants to the public prosecutors may to the extent necessary be granted access to Classified Information without having to produce proof of security clearance.

(1) A security cleared person is, in addition to receiving the Initial Briefing, to be instructed by the Security Officer
   - at regular intervals and at least every five years, in line with the security requirements of the company, his / her behaviour in security matters and the quantity / type of Classified Information to which he / she has access to (re-briefing),
   - for specific reasons prior to journeys abroad,
   - when a security clearance expires.

(2) Briefings are to be carried out by the Security Officer or his/her deputy personally. A written confirmation of this has to be signed by the person briefed and stored in the Security File.

(3) Following the expiration of a security clearance, the Security Officer will instruct the concerned person that he/she is no longer authorized to access Classified Information and that there is a continued obligation to maintain Security.

**International RFV procedures**

(1) If a company wishes to security send cleared personnel for visits to a foreign country, foreign authorities based in Germany or intergovernmental organizations, the Security Officer is to file an RFV with the Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement (BWB). Before the application is filed, the company has to be in possession of a valid FSC or this is to be obtained from BMWI.

(2) The trip should not commence before the company or authority receiving the personnel has confirmed that the visit can go ahead.

(3) In urgent cases, i.e. if observance of the internationally agreed processing times might put the classified contract at risk, the Security Officers of the companies concerned may propose a visit at
short notice. The relevant agreement is to be enclosed with the RFV. In principle, a visit cannot take place until three days after the application has been filed.

(4) Visitors from abroad may only be received with the authorization of BWB.

(5) The Security Officer of the company receiving the visitor will verify his/her identity. He has to ensure that the details (name, company/authority represented, date of visit, name of person visited) of all visitors are registered and stored for two years.

(6) Special programme-/project-specific security instructions are to be observed.

**NATO RFV procedures**

(1) is to apply to visits conducted within the frame of NATO programmes and NATO infrastructure projects.

(2) BMWI is responsible for the acceptance of RFVs where visits take place within the scope of NATO programmes and are supervised by a NATO agency.

(3) Visitors from abroad may only be received with the authorization of BMWi.

(4) Annex of the document contains the processing times of RFVs for NATO programmes and NATO infrastructure projects.

(5) If within the scope of a NATO programme classified contracts are awarded to companies in non-NATO states, RFVs to such companies are to be applied for at BWB.

Finally I would like letting you know, what is our plan for 2008. This year we are ready to initiate a new project. Hungary will propose MISWG to initiate a review of the practice of industrial security vetting procedures of Participating countries, in order for all of us to be able to see what actions are undertaken by the individual countries before issuing a Facility Security Clearance (FSC) that NSAs mutually accept from each other. We believe such a survey will enhance the mutual trust among us and may, perhaps, serve as a basis for drafting MISWG common standards of industrial security vetting procedures.

As for the method and schedule of above survey, Hungary is to prepare and distribute a survey questionnaire and analyse the Participating countries’ responses. This will result in a summary of
similarities and/or discrepancies as regards to the different issues and actions undertaken by individual countries. Survey results should be shared at MISWG 2009 Meeting, when conclusions can be drawn and the way ahead discussed and agreed.

The survey questionnaire should focus on the following aspects of FSC procedures:
- Legal framework of Participating countries;
- Requirements & measures used by relevant security authorities;
- Content of company security questionnaire;
- Investigative actions carried out by relevant security authorities/services;
- Security risk factors;
- Authoritative actions by NSAs/DSAs (FSC issuance/denial);
- Post-FSC requirements.

**Conclusion**

Our aim is to introduce our proceedings by providing an insight of the complex of actions undertaken by the different players in our industrial security vetting procedures first. After than all MISWG nations are kindly requested to share with us some details about their industrial security vetting procedure as well. We are fully aware; this common work will be useful for all of us. Taking everything into consideration further co-operation with MISWG countries will be very exciting and fruitful.

**References:**

(1) Scope of Operation of MISWG
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CONSULTATION

Gábor Csizmadia

Risk analysis in a changing world

In our increasingly quickly changing world, maintaining economical and security stability means more often, never before seen challenges. In many cases, the bottleneck of preparations and prevention is the efficient and up to date analysis of the vast available amount of data. There is no sense in further extending the data collection and monitoring systems, if the analysis of the increased amount of data cannot be carried on the same high level. Risk analysis can be considered as a filter, which selects and groups the input data, automatically filtering out the cases to be further investigated. Thus it not only decreases the change of false or missed alarms, but by freeing up considerable amount of resources, it makes more elaborate analysis possible.

The task of risk analysis could be stated as decreasing the risk to a level that is acceptable for the society or the decision maker. The software support also aims to automatically cut back and eliminate the risk peaks (known, or risk factors that show certain regularities, or other risk factors that can be identified by certain well defined properties, making it possible to make it algorithmic).

Application areas

The fields of applications are particularly wide spread. The success of application begins with formulating the proper questions. Decision support systems are able to suggest an answer for a wide class of different queries (the correct interpretation is very important; decision support systems might be considered as a certain class of expert systems: it does not answer a question, but rather suggests an answer or restricts the set of possible choices). The typical query might be to decide (e.g. can a certain event be consider as a source of risk), data mining type (e.g. are there signs of processes preparing a speculation against a currency), filtering type (which parts of the input data are to be further investigated, or the opposite, which are the parts of the input data that may safely be ignored). A wrongly defined question might even decrease the efficiency of detection. It is the task of the decision maker and the analyst to keep the examined set of questions up to date.

Such questions arise not only in the economical environments, but in the fields of terrorism, drugs, speculation, fraud, but even in fields like migration. In fact,
it might be successfully applied in any area, where sufficient data is available and the analysis is driven by proper motivation.

**Factors of risk analysis**

The efficiency of risk analysis, due to its nature, depends greatly on the quantity and quality of available data, and shows several surprising similarities to intelligence type information protection. Even the most accurate information can only be used as training data and not for prediction, if it is not the newest. As with most of the applications, it holds that the actual value of some particular information is the higher when it is less widely available and known. A well known example is failure of the scoring systems (on of the textbook examples for risk analysis) used by banks. One of the most widespread such systems in the United States is the FICO score used to evaluate loan risks. Even tough the algorithm itself is an industrial secret, the fact that it’s evaluation over a very large set of input data is virtually freely available, made it possible to counter engineer it’s working mechanism, identifying the factors that play a major role in defining it’s value, enabling some players to alter and even fool it (there are known cases, where so called “experts” for a price of 1 percent, boosted the loan a user could request based on the FICO score by 200 percent). In light of the recent financial instabilities, it is easy to grab the importance of the phenomenon.
As the political, economical and security factors are less and less indistinguishable, the unified risk analysis naturally depends on unified data sets, which comes with a significant increase in the amount of data flows. Most mathematical methods scale linearly even in the best cases, meaning that the analysis of twice as much data takes at least twice as much time. To counter affect this phenomenon, several methods apply statistics, aggregation or factor analysis to decrease the dimension of information to be analyzed (the identification of factors with large information content and the known factors of interest). The selection of the right factors and statistics is a time consuming task, and constant reevaluation is necessary. The analysis of the such reduced amount of data is drastically more efficient.

The chosen method for the analyses depends on the desired kind of response. Online type (few seconds response time) decision supports (like the authorizing of bank transfers) are usually based on methods incorporating rule systems. The common feature of such systems, is that they are based on a throughout learning process using historical data, they set up a set of rules, and accepts input satisfying these rules, and declines the outliers (a typical such system is the decision trees). These systems need to be retrained regularly.

In the case of offline methods (when there is a reasonable amount of time to carry out the analysis) for risk analysis, it is best to use methods that do not (exclusively) rely on predefined values (e.g. pattern fitting methods). For these cases, it is important to emphasize the difference between risk analysis and risk management. The aim of the analysis is to filter the data, simplify and group it, since in this case there is possibility for deeper analysis.

| Analytic analysis: Basic transformations and calculation of statistics, … | Filtering based on rules, selection of outliers with markers deviating from the average, … | Detecting similarities with patterns known to belong to risk factors/events, … |

Event independent background processes, model building

Factor analysis, data mining, refining rule systems, …

The layers of the analysis framework

Implementation approaches
There are several methods available for the identification of behaviors significantly differing from usual, or the opposite, for behaviors showing similarities of known hostile behaviors. Among such systems, some of the most well known are the implementations for the automatic detections of credit card frauds, or the banking scoring systems working as a pre filter on loan requests (like the already mentioned infamous FICO score).

Risk analysis is particularly widespread and popular among large corporations. The economical decision support systems (business rules) and risk analysis are very closely related, since one of the main aims of decision support is to automatically identify hidden risk factors. The extra time made available for the analyzers by the use of automatic risk analysis can be used to carry out deeper investigations. Although the complexities of the mathematical methods in the background are often surprisingly simple, several systems today are capable of self learning and recognizing new hostile patterns. Still, the human factor for controlling and checking the developed methods is very important (several systems would first forward any newly recognized patterns for approval before actually implementing it). Several large IT solution providers have their own, highly specialized (for economical use) solution (e.g. IBM, Fair Isaac, SAS).

From the mathematical point of view, these risk analysis methods are classifications (classifying the input as either having a high or low risk ratio) and pattern fitting / recognition problems (recognizing event sequences where connections are assumed, and resembling patterns typical to hostile processes).

The obvious advantage of the off the shelf solutions is the fast deployment, the relatively low initial cost and investment required, the efficient, and easily accessible training possibilities. Most systems are easily integrated with other already existing ones (e.g. SPPS might be controlled by Python modules), contain most important data validating, statistical, machine learning methods, prediction algorithms in the same framework alongside with such extras as integrated geographical support and databases.

A disadvantage of the off the self systems however, is that they are based on relatively well known methods, are widely spread and available, thus the analysis provided by them (or at least their building blocks and methodology) are known or available to most important players. Thus their application alone does not provide a real advantage, but rather eliminates the disadvantage of not applying them. A possible way of gaining advantage is to make the systems unique, decreasing it’s predictability for an external observer. Building a new system from scratch might take an excessive amount of time and might consume very significant resources. A sensible alternative seems to be the application of a highly customizable system that already contains most of the statistical, machine learning and basic modeling methods (e.g. SPSS). An other seemingly effective
compromise would be to use the available free codes as building blocks, providing maximum control over the systems, but requiring significantly more development effort (both for statistical methods (like the R language) and machine learning (like the Weka package) there are several free implementations). However, today, the importance of the fields of applications makes it very important not to underestimate the danger of using free codes. This danger comes not only from the possible lack of quality insurance elements, but from the lack of control over the developer communities. The identification (proof of not having one) of probable back doors or planned deficiencies is a very hard task, often equivalent with implementing the method from scratch.

In light of the successful counter engineering of several known decision support systems, the most robust approach seems to be the implementation of highly specialized systems containing several unique modules, but based on existing professional solutions.

Summary

The changing world means changing, often unexpected challenges. The monitored and available data for analysis is ever increasing. In fact, we are just at the beginning of this process, and the data to be analyzed and processed is expected to increase by at least a magnitude over the next decade. Without efficient methods for risk analysis, it will virtually become impossible to filter out the relevant information from the vast amount of available data. The mathematical and methodical requirements are given. The most important task is to identify the most important fields of application, and the selection of the most efficient implementations.

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www.wikipedia.com – The internet lexicon
Globalization, including its unwanted impacts, literally means an all-over-tendency—no region is likely to escape its major trends. For example: one of its odds is the unjust circles of profit (revenue) redistribution, against which an indirect counteraction is showing itself in the form of regionalism. As it can hardly result in much success, an unfavourable current of polarization and pauperization and criminality is sure to engulf the main regions of the countries worldwide. No social community may be left untouched.

Globalization’s worldwide conquest took a start around the beginning of the 20th century. The first symptom was its impact on the world economy. However, it should be noted that in the meantime globalization has gained a wider sense and nowadays it applies to all walks of life. It effects almost all fields of social existence, and their (asymmetric) interdependence is getting all the more intensive.

As an overall result of the process,

1) the forceful idea of competition makes the gap between the less developed and the economically developed nations growing wider and wider;

2) the latter have become differentiated through their efforts to gain economic independence and dominance over as many other countries as possible. The most successful of them all are frequently referred to as “the members of the center of the world economy”. As West European countries have failed to keep their most leading positions, the “center” itself has moved from the North Atlantic region (Europe and North America) to the Pacific region (North America and East Asia);

3) the counteraction to such a worldwide dominance has taken shape in the form of global terrorism that undermines security.

Let us see some problems inherent in these questions.

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47 Pharaoh of Ancient Egypt around 2160 BC.
The role of competition:

Adam Smith’s traditional theory presupposed that
a) free competition was an essential ingredient of any efficient economy;

b) every one of the self-interest-motivated individuals was guided by an ‘invisible hand’, and so contributed to the good of the whole. And indeed, history provides a series of examples that the absence of competition and international (or at least: regional) co-operation usually resulted in economic atrophy.48

That simple theory is difficult to apply to the global world economy. In that nations’ equal chances to a fair competition have been well distorted by geographical & geopolitical & religion-related circumstances. The oddness of the situation is turning from bad to worse because of a widely accepted idea that we can achieve better positions by getting the edge over our competitors—even at the cost of disregarding humanitarian and environmental issues. Some people hold that the idea of competition is outdated. In their essay titled ‘The Limits of Competition’ members of the so called ‘Lisbon Group’49 point out that – unless the aggressive competition is regulated – the world economy will soon come under the rules of social-Darwinism that knows neither humanism nor environment-protection. Human right organizations also raised cries against the dangerous aspects of globalization.

Obviously there cannot be much ‘good of the whole’ if competition disqualifies everyone except the winner. According to the Human Development Report50 that is just what happens between the post-industrial economies and the developing countries on the global markets. Therefore, globalization in not a process to unify free nations; it is a process which forces nations into one consequent hierarchical system. After the end of the ‘two polar world’, most (local) wars broke out because one or another loser of the worldwide economic competition rejected to accept a humble rank in that untold but perceived hierarchy.

The gap between the economically developed and the rest

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48 For example: some of the tribes in today’s Angola used to have an autarkic economy before colonization. Any surplus was considered to be ‘straight from the devil’ and confiscated by tribal chiefs. No production-enhancement – consequently: no competition – was allowed. In the 16th to 17th century Ottoman Empire competition was hindered by a severe control over trade-guilds. Some western theoreticians point out that rivalry among trade-guilds could have fostered the birth of manufactures, and manufactures could have started the birth of mass production. But it was out of the question: the scanty manufactories of the day lived on state-orders, consequently they withered away as soon as the military strength of the Empire vanished.

49 Lisbon Group: Limits to Competition. 1996.

A man of high renown, Joseph Schumpeter, native of Austria, became known for analysing production circulation. As early as in the 1940s he described capitalism as “the most resourceful system of innovation & production & distribution”, which is, at the same time, “capable of ruining itself by sacrificing stability & moral & family life for economic reasons”. He named it “a construction-born destruction”.51

In the meantime Schumpeter has proven right. The contrast between the positions of the few rich on the one hand and the positions of the billions of the poor on the other is so sharp, that it might breed destabilizing currents. At the beginning of the 21st century some 7.2 million people are said to be worth more than 1 million dollars—they are the people who control one third (some 88 billion dollars) of the world’s total capital. At the same time half the population on Earth lives on less than 2 dollars a day.52 There seems an imbalance between the rich countries on the North (their one billion inhabitants earn 60 % of the total incomes) and the poor ones on the South (3.5 billion of whom earn only 20 %).53

Analysing the ‘world-property’ some researches state that the total number of millionaires changed significantly from 1986 to the beginning of the 21st century. They put the increase in Asia to 600 %; in Europe to 410 %; in North America to 300 %; in the Near East to 210 %; in Latin America to 220 % and in Africa to 190 %. Out of every one hundred millionaires 33 persons live in North America, 27 in Europe, 18 in Asia, 12 in Latin America, 5 in the Near East and 2 in Africa.

The gap – kept growing by the results of neo-liberal economics – has resulted far reaching consequences. While detecting the causes of crime, researchers – associated with the World Bank and the UN – have named inequality as the most significant underlying cause of violent crimes (that is: homicide and robbery). Should inequality increase, the crime-rate will continue to grow. In countries, where liberalism influenced decision-makers, social maintenance and services and institutions suffered serious financial cutbacks. And so did the sphere of education. In other words: besides the gap on the “outside” (the gap between the economically developed and the less developed countries) there is a gap “inside” (between the rich and the poor of every given nation). The poor suffer from lack of health-care, and their descendants will also suffer the same fate because they lack access to high education.

52 ‘Two dollars a day’: that is considered a minimum sum for any man on Earth to live. Half of it (or even less) is considered to be ‘abject poverty’—on that level, it is estimated, there live more than 1.2 billion people
The question of security

The implication of the word ‘security’ has changed over the past fifteen years, as terrorist attacks are no more as predictable as they once were. Pockets of resistance and terrorism have grown into a network not so much as a result of mutual agreement or centrally organized plans but rather because of world-wide “on the spot” press reports. If such events are still foreseeable to some degree, it is because of their “in response” character.

Another new feature of weakening security is that the “traditional” (or: “common”, or “gangster-like” or “violent”) forms of danger are combined with new ones. The latter are generally named as “non-military” perils—the term refers to such unwelcome events as deliberately caused catastrophes and mass exoduses (and their “side effects” like entailed epidemics) etc.

Yet another new feature is that new achievements (in information technology, in bio-genetics, in miniaturization, in accuracy of fire weapons, in intelligence and the like) have also contributed to security weakening. These – so called “revolutionary achievements in military techniques” – have side effects on “non-military fields”. There is a paradox there. Via new communication techniques a great majority of mankind can be convinced to say “No!” to slogans calling for “traditional” war. But those very modern communication techniques are also available for the terrorist, thus make societies all the more vulnerable. In addition to that not only harmless civilians but terrorists too can make use of other facilities: They use, for example, personal freedom to get about the world and purchase weapons on world markets.

Yet another new feature of weakening security is that the above mentioned phenomena – with their technological, economical, ecological and social consequences – hit societies unexpectedly. In the absence of theoretical forecasts the world could not save quite a number of unpleasant revelations. Scientists and political leaders may justifiably be expected to take the necessary steps in that direction.

In the 1990s we had to rest satisfied with some exploratory surveys. Huntington prognosticated the clash of civilizations. Fukuyama announced the end of history. Then – after articles and interviews by Kissinger and Brzezinski – local threats came into focus as the main form of danger: local crises and ethnic unrests were considered conflicts of “low intensity”. In fact they had their effects on the process of transience in the post-socialist countries of Middle Europe as well as elsewhere in the world.

I should not give the impression as if, in those years, I heard no news of terrorism. I did. All of us did. Everybody knew of terrorist acts. But all of them appeared to happen in remote countries. In 1938 Chamberlain said: “What is
terrorism? It is the devil among peoples of far away lands whom we do not know.”

Later, in the second half of the 20th century, terrorism meant something that belonged to the Bask and/or Irish and/or Sandinista extremists. Then such activities crept closer in the form of attacks by the Red Brigades and the assassination of Aldo Moro.

However, all those have proven to be but the tip of the iceberg. Hardly anyone noticed that, by influencing economical undercurrents, new scientific discoveries undermined stability all over the world. The information-boom and IT provided new means to the terrorists, who do not hesitate to use these to build wide and even wider international network of mafia-like criminal gangs. For example: in the first decade of the new millennium, AL-KHAIDA suffered heavy losses in terms of number of guerillas and different kinds of weaponry. Nevertheless, their members manage to harmonize their activity by “keeping in touch” via Internet. They also use the Net to spray their ideology and to recruit volunteers. And, for such activity, the limit is the sky. Via Internet it is no more science fiction to remote control the lock-gates of high dams as well as nation-wide networks of electricity and railways and telecommunications.

Neither the virtual fronts of terrorism nor the global business policy of multinational companies can be counteracted by regular warfare. After all, armies – even the ones equipped with the most modern arms – can not confront with chips and e-mails. The cyber sphere cannot be occupied by tanks.

The number and intensity of conflicts remain as high as ever, but the fronts form on the field of high technology and global economy, not on military terrains. In other words: fronts are not so much between armies of strong countries waging war for world dominance. Rather, the fronts are between the multinational companies as well as the economically developed countries on the one side and the rest of the nations on the other. The latter – with their economies restricted to agriculture – have no chance of evading poverty and have no other ideological safeguard than nationalism. However, their ultra-leftist “de-linking” policy is doomed to failure as less and less efforts and time are needed to reach any part of the globe.

In addition to impoverishment, globalization gives rise to other odds. One of them – the so called ‘computer-illiteracy’ – reflects a new type of social handicap. Computers of our age provide abundant information that can direct us on where to invest capital and / or how to reduce costs. From such opportunities – be them local or even cross-continental – hundreds of millions of individuals (most of whom live in certain districts and states) are already excluded; this

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*See: Balázs Judit Gazdasági biztonságról. In Biztonságpolitikai kézikönyv. 2008 Osiris, Budapest*
game of ‘invest-and-grow’ is mostly available for the multinationals that can employ educated people with good computer skills.

However, computerization is not without its drawbacks. Not even the well equipped companies and institutions can evade viruses. Of them those are considered most devastating which copy confidential information. The ones that “simply” destroy saved data are perhaps not so evil, nevertheless dangerous. Less harmful are the ones that belong to the category of “spam”. These serve as means of guerrilla-marketing by making their ways to PC screens to convince readers of buying one or another product. They advertise a wide choice of “goods” such as stimulators and sex-gadgets, investment-guidance and charity requests. Some of these “guerrillas” may even make profits by convincing Internet-mongers to visit a certain homepage.

For the time being, no trustable forecasts indicate when the fashion of spam may come to an end. In 2004 Bill Gates aired his view that the spam-phenomenon would disappear in two years time. Contrary to that, in terms of received spam, the year 2006 brought the highest number ever in the US. Nine out of every ten e-mails were spam.

Yet another drawback of computerization – closely associated with spasm – is the so called “botnetting”. The word “botnet” refers to clusters of computers that, by working in pools, are capable of intruding any PC without any prior permission from the PC owner. After a “botnet” virus made its way to the memory of a computer (or “zomby”), the PC acts as a pathway for spam: it transfers messages and collects data. That, serving as technical background, enables one botnet to send as many as one billion e-mails in 3-4 hours. Anyone may rent a botnet for 500-600 dollars/week and can send millions of spam... assuming he has a list of addresses.

Spam are illegal and punishable in almost all countries. However, as yet, the profit/fine ratio makes such kind of “business” attractive. 55

We must notice that the timing and the scale of interventions against such misuse of modern technology are less and less left for the states to decide. It is because of certain differences. What counts to be ‘illegal’ in some parts of the world is probably ‘legal’ in some other part(s); information and abundance of capital provide ‘virtual-economy-investors’ the means to gain extra profits from the differences. The state can only prevent such an outflow of capital by rendering more and more parts of the ‘illegal’ to be ‘legal’. So an ever growing ‘financial bubble’ there is behind the ‘money driven economy’. 56 However it is

55 Van olyan teoria is, hogy a kuldok és a szurok készítői ugyanazok, esertheto modon a szurok készítői egy lepessel mindig szandekosan lemaradnak.

not without the danger that it may explode one day—like a ticking time-bomb in
the luggage of an unaware traveller.

In addition to all these there is an ethical/moral question: the obligation of
language-protection. Besides applying the rules of the language, grammatical
correctness means nursing its idiomatic variety by everyday use. Languages are
not only extremely adequate tools of communication. They reflect the nation’s
view of the world. They also reflect the very value system we act by. In short:
language is a factor which determines the identity of groups and individuals of
one nation. Therefore languages are essential components of the living heritage
of mankind. Yet, over 50 % of some 6700 languages spoken today are in danger
of disappearing. The experts estimate that, once the national languages are
pushed into the background, “language imperialism” paves the way to more and
more effective mass-manipulation. It is alarming that over 3000 languages are in
danger of disappearing...

- 96 % of the world's languages are spoken by 4 % of the world's
  population
- One language disappears on average every two weeks
- 80 % of the African languages have no orthography

With their complex implications – for identity, communication, social
integration, education and development –, languages are of strategic importance
for people and the planet. Yet, due to the processes inherent in globalization,
they are increasingly under threat, or disappear altogether. The fade of
languages entail the decline of the world’s cultural diversity: traditions, national
memory, unique modes of thinking and expression.

Knowledge has become one of the magic words of our time. Nevertheless
it is Janus-faced, because the advantages of new technical achievements and
surgery skills are counterbalanced with destabilization growing world-wide. The
basis of that mournful phenomenon is the widening gap between the rich and the
poor. In other words: knowledge remains Janus-faced as long as it devalues
honest work and human efforts.

The Chinese curse says it all: ‘May you live in interesting
times’ these
certainly are interesting times, and are likely to become even more interesting
times for our children to live in. Understanding these matters therefore is a
prime prerequisite for all of us, and for our membership of the world citizenry as
we advanced into the twenty first century.

“A century ago H. G. Wells said that human civilization was engaged in a
race between education and its own destruction. When we considered the wars
and barbarism of the twentieth century, his forebodings seem uncannily
accurate. Let us hope that Homo sapiens can get through the twenty-first century with less self-inflicted damage.”

József Tóth

LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
IN ECONOMY – EQUAL CHANCES

You can feel the irreversible „impossibilities” of a hopeless future. The fact that wider and wider layers of society have been greatly affected by poverty may be able to force – through thoughtful economic strategies, in the long run, which will result in improvements in the living conditions of the whole society, in this area too. This train will only arrive at its destination when the last carriage has rolled into the station. This analogy is true for society as well. Most of society, indeed over half of the country, has not closed in on the European standard of living but has been moving further away. This highlights, no doubt, that the followed economic policy is flawed. Obviously, if we think of those parts of Hungary which are dropping behind and sinking deeper into poverty, we cannot talk about equal chances. This situation resulted from the economic and social policies applied until now. If we resign to our fate, and recognize that help from exterior powers takes place only when supporting their own interests, we have to admit that a widely different way of thinking is needed to solve our problems. Quoting Einstein „a problem cannot be solved by the same way of thinking which has created it”. The main element of a widely different way of thinking is not profit but a value prior to it, which refers to the local inhabitants, the creative man. Complete Austrian and Norwegian examples prove that equal opportunities in society are not only vision – what is needed is only anthropocentric and nature centric, mature, long-term economic strategy. To create equal opportunities is primarily a question of making a range of economic policy decisions. The local model of economic development – based on international experience- is suitable for providing the opportunity to earn a living, creating workplaces, bringing about the conditions for real equal opportunities, and reducing the differences in society. While doing this, it manages to meet the criteria for sustainable development because it originates from the geographical area’s capability to provide a living, by applying the principle of creative employment. The local economic development’s key task is to subordinate the issue of land to national and local interests in harmony with

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the requirements of the European Union. Concerning living and employment – it is crucially important to stabilize land and to create such size and structure of it which optimize the welfare use of our greatest value. Denmark’s approach where they enforce local and national interests in harmony with the regulations of the EU serves as a model to be followed in the case of dealing with land.

**Local Economic Development**

The economic logic of creating value dictates that the backbone of rural improvement is to development of the local economy in all aspects. In the process of planning and action, to create a strong and stable local economy should have priority. The main point of the local small-scale economy is to use local resources to meet local wants based on local decisions by applying local capital, labour force, knowledge, and ecologically suitable technology in order to support the interests of the area’s inhabitants. The local small-scale economy’s territorial unit, basis, and theoretical model are the landscape and the region (Hajnal K. 2006). Subsidiary and devolution are the essential keys to developing the local economy. In the European Union, it is both natural and practical for local problems to be solved locally. To do this, it is obvious that a specific local economic policy is needed at the community level. This local level policy may differ from the central political orientation and may not always meet the traditionally meant market interests. The main aim of the local economic development is, first and foremost, to improve the overall living conditions of the local inhabitants, meaning that instead of competition, cooperation is needed, instead of the effective private investment, social capital dominates. This theory can be adapted to smaller communities, settlements, and regions too, as well as for short term programmes (Faragó L. 1994.) It is a significant aspect of employment policy that the conditions of workplaces which are created by small and medium sized businesses are rooted locally, thereby making the local economy more stable. As opposed to workplaces based on foreign or global capital, local businesses managed by local employers are tied to the local economy as well as to community. Another great advantage of applying the local economic development model is that profits created by using local resources in the suitable local entrepreneurial business environment is locally spent. This return can even make the local resources grow while contributing to the improvement of the local economy and standard of living.

**Multifunctional Employment**

Today the issue of employment has become a determining factor of economic development. Impoverishment and low activity level in employment have become key problems further obstructing development. Solving these problems is unavoidable. In case of the region, multifunctional employment can be a solution in line with local developments.
Multifunctional employment means that the employment of the given local population (individuals and groups), and the income which derives from it, combines not only one but more types of activities. These activities are closely tied to the capability of the given geographic, social and economic space. They also provide stability and flexibility to changing conditions. This capacity allocation represents unique social and economic value, and can be created by the social community’s value-creating strength, while subsequently applying multifunctional vocational training for adults. Accepting Einstein’s statement, the first step is to establish a new way of thinking and its values. The fundamentals of this new way of thinking reveal more than consumer society’s thoughts, which are against people and nature, and can point towards a holistic future more optimistically. In everyday life, sustainable development’s keystones can be created by a population living in the area applying the economic developing model with the help of multifunctional employment. Local people are able to find needed job opportunities, in such a way that local resources are used in the most effective way by:

- protecting the environment
- producing social and economic value
- contributing to their own family’s self-sufficiency
- adapting to continuously changing circumstances with a combination of knowledge and an enterprising attitude
- keeping urban and regional customs and traditions

The main aim can be for those individuals and groups living in a given geographic area to be able to create their own and their family’s income through the previously mentioned activities in order to make a living and improve their quality of life. The use of multifunctional employment provides a wide choice for applying various types of employment, and in doing this provides flexible adaptation to the continuously changing natural and social environment.

The task is given, and science shows sustainable development’s main trends. There is local economic development model, which can be applied on the regional as well as the local level. Also, an employment model exists, and we have seen a good example for it, as our Austrian neighbours have been employing it successfully, adapted to their own conditions for more than a decade. It may be useful to learn from and adapt this model to current Hungarian circumstances (or in other words, maybe the conditions should be adapted to a well working model.) It should be done only if, for us truly, it is primarily important to provide security of existence based on the values of sustainable development, providing a good quality of life in a healthy environment, locally for us and the future generation.
What to do?

The first and inevitable step is to create the conditions for sustainable development, local economic development, and multifunctional employment nationally and locally. To do this, it is important to change the current and problematic attitudes and the ways of thinking. Also, a critical mass of forcing social tension or that of a natural disaster is needed to shift society from a chaotic point to start and maintain a process of sensible, necessary activities with a quality change in attitude, and in the way of thinking.

Besides the critical mass, which results in changes, and the previously mentioned factors, the generating effect of the learning–knowledge–recognition process is necessary. On the local governmental level, an inevitable task, which results in quality change, must be added to the environmental conditions, the generating effect of the process of learning–knowledge–recognition. Namely, if the local government wants to represent the local population truly and wants improvements, it must undertake serious functions such as economic organizing.

Implementing this model is unimaginable without:

1. Preparing the management of local government, members of the governing body, and groups which are able to influence the community for developing and maintaining economic organizing function
2. Preparing local businesses and involving them in workshops
3. Preparing local inhabitants and involving them in workshops and creating improvements.
4. Providing permanent local improvements in the economy.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that concerning equal chances, there is a complex socioeconomic developing system which is based on the values of sustainable development and the keystone of the local economic development’s model, and applies multifunctional employment’s possibilities. This system (as a promising developing model) is suitable – according to international and national examples- for providing a sustainable quality of life. The question of knowing, learning, recognition is decision, adaptation, implementing. According to the wise men Hope is what dies last, so the author hopes that the critical mass’s energy which is approaching in time and space will not appear on the horizon, because that may be fatal for us.
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NOTIONS OF ZERO TOLERANCE

Today it is becoming more and more obvious that the idea of a drug-free society is an illusion but the existence of a society retaining the necessary techniques for handling and coping with the problem may be a realistic goal. We have to accept that drug-related criminal activity has not excluded the barracks and we cannot expect to sustain the intactness of the Armed Forces of the Hungarian Republic in spite of all our determination and efforts. Still, illegal practices can be, and must be kept under control and they can be influenced. The interests of the armed forces demand that the professional officers or contract-soldiers be free of drugs. A realistic goal we can set today - let it be on the shorter or longer term – is to have as few soldiers influenced by drugs in the armed forces as possible and to reduce the danger they pose to its operation. This aim is practically a softer phrasing of “zero tolerance”.

Total prohibition as the realistic alternative for military drug prevention

Zero tolerance, in other words the “prohibitionist” model of the illegal use of drugs is the concept of the total prohibition of drugs. There is a difference in the extent of prohibition, the level of sanctions, the acts to be sanctioned and the forms of behavior (i.e.: judgment of consumption or distribution). Prohibition forbids and uncompromisingly sanctions every drug-related illegal activity. It enforces prohibition on the side of demand and the side of supply as well. Eliminating the possibility of acquiring and sanctioning distribution and consumption of drugs can prevent the expansion of drug-abuse and eventually may result in the suppression of the phenomenon. According to certain evaluations the theory of zero tolerance – although logically built– has not achieved the results hoped, since the social intervention is often contradictory, causing unpredictable effects. In a way the problem is becoming more severe as drug-criminality increases due to sanctioning. Those connected to these crimes tend to hide and a higher, more sophisticated method of concealment becomes characteristic of the illegal activity. The utilization of the model requires enormous sources and a high level of professional knowledge from law enforcement agencies. Even with significant financial resources the goals cannot be achieved to full extent. In a simplified form, this approach leaves a few UN
recommendations out of consideration. In favor of effective sanctioning it does not consider prevention and distraction to be its task. [1]

Nowadays, when professional or contract-soldiers are admitted to the army – in spite of the compulsory drug tests – in most of the cases there is no sign of the candidates’ drug-addiction. One of the reasons is that those applying for military service receive an official notice of the time for the planned medical aptitude examination well ahead, thus those candidates using drugs can rely on having enough time prior to the examination for the decomposition products of the drugs to empty. If the candidate uses drugs with metabolites that cannot be detected in the urine-sample after a few days, the fact of using drugs cannot be identified with the drug-test based on examining the urine-sample after the critical time has elapsed.

Altogether with this, we well know that some of the young candidates admitted to service arrive from social environments which are deeply affected with the problem. When deciding whether a drug addict can become a soldier, the answer “no” comes immediately, since how could we give a weapon in the hands of a person influenced by drugs, whose reaction is totally unpredictable. Thus, no one can be in working relation with the Ministry of Defense, with its background-organizations or with the Hungarian Army when producing a positive drug-test result on the medical aptitude examination. He will be refused also in the case we receive confirmed information from the Military Security Office or partner law enforcement agencies that the candidate has already had contact with drugs (as a producer, distributor, dealer, consumer, etc.). So the first step on the way to becoming "drug-free" is operating an effective, wide-scale screening system.

Further analysis of the situation raises a new problem. Finding a solution for this is a little more complicated than the first one. The question is how should the later detected drug addiction of a professional or contract-soldier be handled? The answer that a person with drug addiction cannot be a member of the service seems logical and obvious. Nobody argues with the fact that the threat represented by the presence of a drug-addict soldier has to be eliminated immediately. An obvious solution to this problem is to terminate the service relation with this person. Currently the regulations about the medical, psychological and physical aptitude of soldiers are not clear regarding this possibility so the proper protocol has not been established yet. Although criminal procedure may be initiated, this alone does not substantiate the termination of the suspect’s service relation.

With regards to motivation, naturally there is a difference between drug-addiction, casual drug consumption and the case of those soldiers, who just try it out. As to the evaluation of motivation background I believe Dr. Zsuzsanna
Szilágyi’s observations in her Ph.D. thesis to be extremely useful and realistic. Based on her study made in 2004 concerning the attitudes of drug consumption and trying out drugs she highlights the above psychological deviances. According to this, among the younger soldiers the presence and testing of prohibited drugs is more accepted. Correspondingly, the danger-awareness connected to drug-consumption decreases. The inappropriate handling of the problem, the lack of correct information, the different understanding of environment and the professionally often objectionable media-interpretation altogether obstruct the development and strengthening of the repulsive capabilities of young people. The narrations of soldiers who have tried drugs – with special respect to amphetamines and marihuana – suggest risk-free, positive experience quest for the others. According to the observations of the research, it is no question that the notion to try and consume drugs is present among the soldiers. To be able to handle this problem and, as a preventive measure, be able to influence the indecisive people as much information has to be provided as possible concerning the intention of trying out drugs. They must be acquainted with the reasons behind drug-consumption, let it be the so-called risk-factors inspiring tryout, or the facts assuring immunity [2].

Accepting the justification of the above observations my equation is that examining from the point of security risk every form of drug-consumption has to be considered as an extreme crisis-situation, if you like, a time-bomb within the army let it be drug-addiction or casual drug-consumption including trying out drugs. So the question arises, where does the responsibility of the army start, and how far does it go when it comes to educating the personnel concerned with drug-consumption? Furthermore, we have to clarify where is the border of responsibility for judging the acts endangering alertness, military techniques and the security of personnel committed by soldiers influenced by drugs. Can the system of social and health measures, which serve the post-treatment of addicted soldiers and guiding them back into the healthy society, be conciliated with the basic designation of the Armed Forces? If we examine the answer to be given from a rational point, starting with the increasing number of the soldiers’ connection to drugs, taking the fact that the number of personnel is typically decreasing nowadays into consideration, we have to see that this approach is not viable. Nobody has the right to endanger the life and security of others with the unpredictable behavior of a soldier influenced by drugs, or who has been coerced to medical therapy to treat drug-addiction or any other drug-related disorder. I believe it to be important that in the case of the mentioned criminal acts the right of society to collective self-defense should not suffer any disadvantages resulting from reference to personality rights of criminals because of the deviances bearing increased security risks. This is true for determining criminal responsibility, but it is at least as important in the every day life of the Armed Forces with regards to preventing extraordinary events possibly causing dramatic consequences. This theory represents the basis for the new
interpretation I have preferred for years, which can solely be adapted to the armed forces and law enforcement agencies, and which is close to the zero tolerance theory that is debated by so many people.

Due to the above detailed, extreme security risks I see no possibility for applying the method of dissuasion within the armed forces. The Army has to discharge immediately the drug-consumer soldiers. In the aspect of armed forces and law enforcement agencies I believe the only applicable solution to be “zero tolerance” in a way that vindication of the rights of drug-concerned individuals has to be guaranteed via civil organizations.

**The relation of zero tolerance applied in the Army and the national drug-strategy**

For first reading it may seem that the zero tolerance prohibiting all drugs, which I prefer, is contradictory with the drug-policy accepted in the national drug-strategy. To illustrate this, I quote the definitions of the main goals showing the complexity of the drug-problem and the related countermeasures.

“5.2. Main goals

1. Society should become sensitive to the effective handling of drug matters, and the local communities should increase their problem-solving capabilities in the suppression of narcotics-problem (community cooperation)
2. Create chance for the young people to become capable of establishing a productive lifestyle and reject drugs (prevention)
3. Assist those people – and their families – who get in contact with drugs and who are coping with drug-problems (social work, medical treatment, rehabilitation)
4. Decrease the possibilities of acquiring drugs (reducing supply).” [1]

From this quotation the essence of the specific drug-policy I stated in the beginning of my thesis can well be seen: can the zero tolerance model created for military drug-prevention exist within a national drug-strategy adequate to a national drug-policy based on the balance of reducing the demand and supply? The situation is only seemingly contradictory. I believe the core question is that does the military drug-strategy operating differently from the national strategy endanger the attainment of the national program? Can the national anti-narcotics strategy be carried out beside the total prohibition applied in the army? My opinion is yes, because the regulations related to zero tolerance within the military drug-strategy do not hinder the attainment of the goals of community cooperation, harm reduction, social work, medical treatment and rehabilitation related national strategy. Just at the time when the national drug-strategy was
created, it made total prohibition possible for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary, although the legislators have not gotten this far based on the interpretation of the quoted idea.

“6.2.2.8. Armed forces

... With regards to its means the Armed Forces is operating as a “dangerous plant”. Because of this, the security of military service – and thus the country – demands to be free of drugs. ...

My personal equation is that – knowing the anatomy of the drug situation in Hungary - creating a drug-free army is equivalent with inaugurating zero tolerance. In this respect the national drug-strategy provides ample flexibility and space for movement for all participants in the fight against narcotics, thus for the Drug Prevention Committee of the Armed forces of the Republic of Hungary as well, when it sets out the following in the middle-term goals:

“6.2.3.2 Middle-term goals

- Based on the drug-strategy of the Armed forces of the Republic of Hungary we have to recognize and achieve the possibilities of prevention within the army. On the basis of its contents it is necessary to strengthen the training of experts, and by increasing the effectiveness of prevention programs, the controlling functions of reducing supply, and the media activity to work on reducing the drug-relatedness of those serving in the Armed Forces.”...

Finally, we must clarify the difference between the military drug-strategy I have sketched and the national strategy. Of the listed goals the 3rd point of the national drug-strategy is the one in the fight against narcotics applied in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary which is different to the drug-strategy based on total prohibition of narcotics.

“...Assist those people – and their families – who get in contact with drugs and who are struggling with drug-problems (social-work, medical treatment, rehabilitation)...”

Because of the mentioned increased security risks I see no possibility for medical treatment and rehabilitation within the armed forces. With regards to the army, I believe the only appropriate solution to be zero tolerance. Those people, who are discharged from the armed forces for drug-related matters, have a right to medical treatment necessary to cure the addiction in the civilian sphere. This solution is both advantageous from the point of reducing security risks endangering the army and from the point of medically treating the individual.

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We can come across this idea in the report prepared for the Drug Coordination Committee of the Ministry of Defense of the Government of the Republic of Hungary, stating that:

“... the armed forces, as an institution, is not competent in establishing the special methods of secondary and tertiary prevention – since, based on “zero tolerance”, the person consuming drugs is not fit for military service – so it becomes the task of the civilian medical system to provide the necessary treatment for the drug-addict and support and rehabilitate them on the long term.

Other than the mentioned exemption, the approach and content of the national and military drug-strategies is identical. It is clear that all further goals set in the national drug-strategy have to be fully executed in the military drug-strategy.

**Contradictions in the execution of zero tolerance**

In November 2004, when the last conscript was dismissed, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary transformed into a professional army. As a result, this raised the illusion in many that there will be a significant decrease in the presence of drugs in the barracks. The basis for this theory was that the professional officers and contract-soldiers choosing the army for a form of life are interested in keeping their profession for a long time. Viewing this from the side of motivation, they – compared to conscripts – will not risk the possible penalties for drug-consumption, which may result in their immediate discharge from the army. But life overruled these optimistic expectations. Naturally, as mentioned earlier, a lot remained hidden, making it difficult to detect even with secret service means and methods. During the years I spent at the Military Security Office (MSO) I have become convinced of the fact that the drug-problems of the defense sphere cannot be separated from the drug-situation of the civilian sphere. The military personnel are practically screened, that is, they go through a full physical and psychological medical examination, but its composition and characteristics are a unique mirror of society as well. With those wishing to enter the army different forms of behavior, subcultures and deviances enter the walls of the barracks, like drug-criminality and all connected manifestations. So the problem of drugs is still present in the military facilities.

In the period following the termination of the conscript service the majority of those applying for contract military service – in spite of the previous optimistic expectations – did not only come from the law abiding civilians who at least have high school diplomas and wish to undertake military service as a carrier. A part of the recruited personnel came from disadvantageous footings, sometimes unemployed and drifted to the peripheries of society. They saw a
possibility for survival in the Army. A great portion of them considers it to be natural that different drugs are concomitant with the amusement forms of the young generation of today, the so-called “disco culture”. Among these young people there are often ones who earlier have had connections with narcotics – either as consumers, or as perpetrators of some kind of drug-related criminal acts -, but since no charges were filed against them there are no possibilities to identify them via tracing. Thus, from the point of effective drug-prevention I believe a continuous, well-operating screening-system to be extremely important.

The 58/2004 Order of the Medical Directorate of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense regulated the detection of drug-consuming soldiers. The order determined the number of compulsory drug-tests per month. Furthermore, the 66/2003 Order of the Minister of Defense states that in case of those applying for actual military service (work) and soldiers fulfilling special positions the annual drug-tests have to be carried out within the allotted medical aptitude examination.

By examining the situation of executing the above referred orders of the Minister of Defense and the Medical Directorate, as a result of studying the documents used as sources, I have established that the tight resources of the central budget earmarked for drug-prevention in 2006 and 2007 endangered the drug-prevention training of experts and the compulsory drug-tests which form a part of the medical aptitude examinations. Due to financing difficulties only a part of the compulsory, monthly preventive drug-tests were carried out. In my opinion, the mere existence of the testing-system and the declaration of zero tolerance do not represent a retentive power for the appearance of behavior forms infringing social norms. Only the combined application of drug-tests carried out consequently and in the number determined in the relative legislation and zero tolerance can lead to success.

According to the order the screening examination has to be ordained if possession of substances qualified as narcotics is suspected. Screening examinations have to be done once a month based on the order of the person authorized to do so. The number of tests has to be commensurable to the number of personnel (number of personnel: if less than 100, then 10 % of the personnel has to be screened; if between 100 and 500 then 5-7 / of the personnel has to be screened; an if above 500 then 5 % of the personnel has to be screened). While writing my thesis the replacement of the 58/2004 Order of the Medical Directorate of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense regulating the tasks of controlling the status of personnel of the Armed Forces under influence of drugs, and the personnel’s drug-consumption and possession, which legislation has been adapted to a professional army. The draft contains several differences to the previous orders but does not make any changes with regards to compulsory annual drug-tests.

The common understanding of the related ministerial decree, orders and regulations, their fulfillment and the strengthening of military discipline have to be emphasized most. Besides modifying legislation, it is necessary to basically change the attitude of those who take part in the execution of the programs. Due to the novel change it is inevitable to correct a few contradictory ideas of the personnel concerned in executing zero tolerance, of which a part has already come from the misunderstanding of the legislation and the wrong approach, and which endanger the successful implementation of the drug-strategy. After presenting the contradictory situations which cannot be held against the personnel concerned with drug-prevention, let’s see a few examples implicated by subjective factors, which decreased the efficiency of drug-prevention in the past. Managing these problems is inevitable to step forward. For years the misunderstood idea of “innocent until proven guilty” was dominant among commanders of certain corps, and also the practice of not initiating procedures against the individual suspected of drug-related criminal activity in the lack of a court decision, thus the person could not be discharged from service. A drug-related investigation, depending on the number of concerned individuals can take several months, but depending on the complexity of the cases the investigation can even take up to a year. During this time the presence of soldiers using drugs is waiting to swoop down on us like a sword. In other cases, when the investigation is ordained, the prosecution had the possibility to practice equity with adjourned charge. The prosecutor may postpone the charge for a year if the person suspected of drug-consumption is willing to undergo medical treatment or any other therapy treating drug-addiction or take part in preventive-informative programs. If the soldier can show documents proving this fact then the criminal procedure against him is abolished. The Military Prosecution – in harmony with the national drug-strategy – often applies this solution. This, by itself, would not be a problem, if this criminal legislative reform would not endanger the safe operation of the army. So, charges have been brought against the drug-consuming soldier but automatic measures for discharging him from the armed forces have not been taken.

In case the criminal procedure, after investigation is closed, is taken to court – if the soldier has committed a criminal act other than drug-consumption – the perpetrator is usually only fined or imprisoned with suspension. According to the Criminal Code, if in a court decision the perpetrator is fined, then

“the convict is automatically acquitted from all negative legal consequences without any special plea or procedure. The acquisition comes into force on the day the verdict becomes legally binding.” [5]

Thus, in these cases the soldiers punished with fines as a result of binding verdicts for drug-related criminal acts do not have to leave the army. In other words: the soldier remains to have a clear record, so he does not have to leave

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the army. The drug-consuming soldier can remain in the army in case of a suspended imprisonment if the court has applied preliminary exoneration\textsuperscript{60} in his case because the perpetrator in this case was immediately acquitted from the negative legal consequences. If the exoneration comes into effect, the convict will have a clean record, just as in the case of being fined. So the level of threat towards the armed forces has not changed at all, since the soldiers using drugs remain to pose a permanent threat to the army. Because of the “innocent until proven guilty” principal the majority of commanders authorized to take measures often – wrongly – did not inaugurate the discharging of the drug-consuming soldiers because they, based on the above presented circumstances, remained to be citizens with clear records.

Further questions are generated by those cases when the instrumental laboratory drug-tests credibly detect the presence of drugs in casual drug-consuming soldiers but the quantity - due to the relatively long elapsed time from consumption – does not reach the level of culpability. These test-results suggest that although the tested individual may have consumed drugs days or weeks before the examination, the amount detected by the drug-test is not enough to initiate a criminal procedure. From the aspect of the army’s security these soldiers represent danger sources just as those addicted to drugs. Here I again have to draw the attention to the fact that we tend to come across more and more drugs having decomposition products which clear out from the body within a few days. Often the drug-consuming soldiers obliged to take drug-tests try to manipulate – with more or less success – the result of the test with different tricks. In such circumstances it is extremely difficult to provide consistent evidence necessary to prove drug-addiction. In these cases drug-consumption – no matter whether traces of the drug are detected – is not considered to be a criminal offence, nor any other illegal behavior, so the soldier does not even have to face a disciplinary procedure. I believe it would be necessary to create a system of measures which make it possible to prove the use of drugs in the case of these soldiers and to be able to discharge them from the army even if their criminal responsibility has not been established.

I have presented my recommendations for modernizing the drug-test procedures in the army in “The Possibilities for Proving Drug-consumption” and the “Complex, Criminalized Drug-test” chapters. Recently there have been several examples where a soldier was discharged from a corps of the Armed Forces for the reason of drug-connection but shortly after this the same person was admitted to another garrison. From now on we must pay greater attention to avoid those drug-infected soldiers getting back into the system who have once been forced to leave the army. With a smaller technical correction of the registry systems of the Recruiting Centers we may find an appropriate solution to

\textsuperscript{60} Criminal Code 104 § (1) The court can preliminary exonerate the convict if it suspends the execution of the imprisonment and the convict is worthy of exoneration.
prevent these cases. Together with this modification the legal background of data-handling at the Recruitment Centers has to be changed as well.

It has happened several times that some subunit commanders chose to close their eyes over a drug-consuming group or an act of a soldier, partly in order to assure that the disciplinary statistics of their unit meet the requirements, and because of the tasks that have to be carried out by the unit. Perhaps these officers and non-commissioned officers are not aware of the fact that by this they themselves are committing a crime. This is because based on the 26/2008 Order of the Minister of Defense controlling the condition of personnel regarding the influence of drugs, drug-consumption and possession is not an optional, but is an obligatory responsibility of the commanders.

“examination of certain individuals or smaller groups for controlling the capability for service of a soldier, civil servant, public servant; and an employee falling under the scope of the Code of Labor Legislation (physical and psychological aptitude) – not for preventive reasons – has to be ordered if there is probable cause that the person reporting for service (work) is under the influence of drugs”. [6]

The commander in charge of personnel is obliged to inform the responsible investigative authorities of positive drug-tests which have been confirmed by laboratory tests. This requirement is stated in § 10 of 26/2008 Order of the Minister of Defense on controlling the drug-influenced condition of the personnel of the Armed Forces and their drug-consumption and possession as follows:

“If the control laboratory test, which is carried out according to articles (2) or (5) of § 6, detects substances qualified as narcotics, or as a result of the control according to section b) of article (6) of § 3 the institution performing the examination determines of the substance that it is narcotics or contains substances qualified as narcotics, the commander in charge (leader) or superior practicing the employer’s powers follows the rules of immediate reporting. At the same time, if a soldier is involved the commander informs the military prosecution of the result of the institutional or laboratory text and, if a civil servant or an employee falling under the jurisdiction of the Code on Labor Legislation is involved informs the responsible police organ....”[6]

If this is missed, the concerned commander may be suspected of “failing to take superior’s measures” based on section a) of article (1) of § 361 of the Criminal Code.
“That person who by violating superior’s obligations fails to take measures for a) preventing the subordinate’s breach of duty or criminal act, b) surmounting instability endangering service order, discipline or public security commits an offence and is culpable of punishment up to one-year imprisonment.” [5]

At certain corps, as a result of information oozing, it can be experienced that the personnel has previous knowledge of drug-searching dogs planned to be used – which is supposed to be an operation based on unexpected factors – and of the drug-tests which are for preventive purposes and are also supposed to be carried out randomly. In these cases the drug-related soldiers have a chance to get “prepared” to mislead the controls. I believe that if we manage to make all subunit commanders understand the drug-phenomenon as an increased security risk factor, then by that we will be half way on our path to fighting back narcomania.

I consider the 51/2005 Order of the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces coming into effect to be a step towards zero tolerance. I must underline though that this is still not a regulation based on total prohibition of drugs. Because of the increasing number of crimes against military property, and drunken driving, breech of peace and drug-abuse the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Ministry of Defense disposed with high priority of drug-abuse crimes among the tasks related to strengthening the disciplinary situation. According to this regulation the commanders in charge have to examine – with increased circumspection – those circumstances which exclude the aptitude of drug-consuming soldiers for service. In legitimate cases, repeated medical, psychological aptitude examinations of the concerned individuals have to be initiated immediately, [7] but according to the order, this solution can only be applied if the probable cause of the criminal act exists in the sense of the criminal legislation as well. In order to decrease risk the institution of “unworthiness” set in the Act on the legal stance of soldiers can be made appropriate for handling the above problems if we state that letting drug-consuming soldiers be present in the defense sphere leads to the severe detriment of public confidence in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary.

In my recent publications, with the need for unavoidable changes, I tried to propagate one of the significant thoughts of the zero tolerance theory. A single positive drug-test should be judged the same way as in the medical aptitude examination of candidates applying for military service. [8][9][10] Based on a drug-test confirmed by a laboratory the medical inaptitude of the soldier has to be declared. We had to wait long for the solution, when the 26/2008 Order of the Minister of Defense on controlling the condition of personnel under the influence of drugs, and consumption and possession eventually opened the way for the implementation of institutionalized zero
tolerance. So the first step was when the Order of the Minister of Defense came into effect, but as I know, procedural regulations concerning the termination of personnel relation corresponding with labor legislation have not been prepared yet. In order to realize the Order of the Minister of Defense and to achieve uniform understanding and application of the legislation I believe it necessary to urgently work out an executive directive for the commanders in charge.

In 2005 the Armed Forces updated its drug-strategy. In this I found ideas concerning the reduction of harms which can be difficultly accommodated with the logic of zero tolerance also and may create contradictory situations. As I understand, we can only speak of reducing harm if the fact of drug-consumption is proven in the case of the concerned individuals. But if the person using drugs is identified – according to the zero tolerance – the concerned soldier has to leave the army. On the other hand, the drug-strategy of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary disposes based on the circumstances of zero tolerance.

“...establishing fast accessibility of civilian, medical and special institutions capable of providing treatment for drug-consuming soldiers in order to assist the drug-consumer in integrating society and editing publications on harm reduction...”

My opinion is that based on the reasons given in the above chapters the drug-consuming soldiers also have a right to assistance to minimize harm, rehabilitation and integrating healthy society, but only as civilian citizens. In the sense of drug-policy the significant element of harm reduction is that it wishes to primarily reduce the harms related to drug-consumption and not drug-consumption itself. [11] The “harm” can appear on the level of the individual, community and society, and it can appear as social and economic harm as well. Within zero tolerance the army cannot undertake these tasks. Editing “harm reducing publications” – based on their content and function - are rather a form of preventive measures.

According to further statements of drug-strategy:

“We can expect the mitigation of individual and community harms within a relatively short time from the drug-strategy containing harm reducing elements and labor legislation sanctions...”

Harm reduction, as a drug-policy concept appeared in the late 80s and early 90s (Newcombe, 1987, 1992), and the Hippocrates theory also contains this. An important element of it is that it wishes to reduce the harms caused by drug-consumption and not drug-consumption itself. “Harm” can appear on the level of the individual, community and society, and it can appear as social and economic harm. Risk-reduction and harm minimizing expressions are also used as separate concepts, but in the international literature harm reduction has become the commonly used expression (József Rácz: Harm reducing Drug Policy – Study, Hungarian Science, 2005/8).
The harm reduction – mentioned together with zero tolerance – is again difficult to interpret here. We must concentrate more on operating a system of criminalized measures and drug-prevention based on dissuading. The order of the1/2008 of the Chief of General Staff, which deals with the uniform understanding of unworthiness mentions drug-consumption as a circumstance substantiating the discharging from service. The document takes measures for discharging the drug-consuming individual for reasons of unworthiness and to establish medical inaptitude in case of drug-addicts.

The basis of dissuasion is the inevitability of prosecution

In the interest of keeping up the internal security of the Hungarian Armed Forces I believe sanctioning the forms of behavior dangerous to society by laws and all legislative means at the disposal of the State to be important for its retentiveness. For dissuasion from drug-related crimes, together with conversion to zero tolerance – we have to continuously keep the attention on the security risks and medical, criminal and livelihood consequences of drug-consumption by using the traditional and electronic media channels beside the already institutionalized methods in the army. By presenting successfully realized drug cases, we have to repeatedly confront the members of personnel with the fact that in case of a drug-crime no one can avoid legal consequences and discharging from the army. Open court trials have to be held in those corps, where drug-cases have been identified. Cases, which have resulted in – for unworthiness or medical inaptitude – immediate discharging from service before the criminal procedures were closed have to be discussed on personnel meetings. The basis of dissuasion in these cases should not be the expected court verdict or the extent of criminal law consequences, but the accentuation of the fact that no one can avoid prosecution.

Jeremy Bentham British law philosopher’s idea from the 18th Century is now an ever-true fundamental assumption in criminology. According to him, the fact that prosecution cannot be avoided dissuades more from committing a crime than the extent of punishment itself. Sanctions only help in forming law-abiding behavior if they are consequently applied in case of all criminal offences. The results of the studies of Antunes and Hunt support this conclusion as well. According to them, it is not severity, but the fact that prosecution is unavoidable the element which shows connection with behavior refraining from committing crimes. [12][13]

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62 Order of the Armed Forces Chief of General Staff of the Ministry of Defense on the tasks to be carried out to maintain the high level of discipline within the military organizations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary.
Projecting this on drug-prevention present in the defense sphere, the dissuasion will not be substituted by imprisonment, since sometimes the verdict in long trials is only reached after months or even years, but it will be substituted by the threat of loosing livelihood, meaning that the soldier may be immediately discharged from the army. The method of abolishing the drug-consuming soldier’s service relation – as one of the techniques for managing drug-problems – is in the modified drug strategy of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary which has been approved in 2005. Besides the criminal procedure initiated for drug abuse an unworthiness procedure has to be conducted against the soldier committing the crime and the decision regarding the abolishment of service has to be substantiated here if the following can be officially declared: *The public trust in the Armed Forces is severely damaged if the army tolerates individuals abusing drugs among its personnel.* With the 1/2008 Order of the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Ministry of Defense on the tasks to be carried out to maintain the high level of discipline within the military organizations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary coming into force this problem has become manageable. The Order of the Chief of General Staff lists those privileged criminal acts in the interpretation of unworthiness procedure in case of which the unworthiness investigation has to be initiated. The legal stance of drug abuse is not exactly in the listing but based on the 16th Chapter of the Criminal code (crimes against public order) these cases can be identified in point 72 j).

“...Unworthiness procedures

71. In case of certain crimes, behaviors in order to maintain high level discipline unworthiness to military service, the uniform and rank has to be acutely examined.

72. The commander authorized to abolish service relation is obliged to carry out an investigation if the behavior of the soldier may be suitable for establishing unworthiness according to the Act XCV of 2001 on the legal stance of professional officers and contract-soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary, and based on his act the probable cause of
   a) crime against the state;
   b) crime against humanity;
   c) first-degree murder;
   d) failure to give assistance;
   e) offence or crime of drunken or dazed driving;
   f) misdemeanor of a hit-and-run accident;

63 The order came into force on 1 September 2008. At the same time, the 51/2005 Order of the Armed Forces Chief of General Staff of the Ministry of Defense on strengthening the disciplinary situation within the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary lost effect.

64 See Article 6 of § 59 of the Act XCV of 2001 on the legal stance of professional officers and contract-soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary.
g) offence against marriage, family or sexual moral;
h) crime against functionary, representative of authorities;
i) crime against national or international public life;
j) crime against public order; or
k) theft, embezzlement, fraud, malfeasance, negligent attendance, robbery, depredation, blackmailing may emerge.

In the cases determined in the above two points if the abolishment of service or disranking is the authority of the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary then: in the case of an active soldier the initiation of unworthiness procedure, while in the case of a retired soldier the ordainment of unworthiness procedure is obligatory…”

Point 50 and 51 of the order separately regulate commanding tasks to be executed in case of a few criminal acts, among them drug abuse.

Aptitude examinations connected to certain criminal acts

“50. Because of the incidence rate of drunken driving, theft, breech of peace and the offence of drug abuse and crimes committed in a dazed status preventive, informative personnel meetings have to be held at all military organizations annually with the assistance of medical, legal and administration services…”

“51. In connection with criminal or disciplinary procedures initiated for the probable cause of these criminal acts all commanders in charge investigate the personal, material and perpetration circumstances with special circumspection which exclude the aptitude of the perpetrator for service. If needed, beside preparing a commanding, troop-doctor characterization, the medical, psychological and physical aptitude examination has to be initiated as well65…”[14]

This solution does not substitute the unworthiness procedure to full extent, since several perpetrating behavior forms of drug-crime are known in the penal law. Drug-consumption, which is qualified as a crime based on the acquisition and possession of drugs, is only two of the many perpetrating behaviors which do not necessarily involve drug-consumption. In case of producing, offering, handing over and trading with drugs we cannot expect such results from the medical aptitude examinations which would confirm the abolishment of service relation based on medical or psychological inaptitude. The solution is the consequent implementation of point 72 of the 1/2008 Order

65 These tasks have to be carried out according to the 7/2006 Decree of the Minister of Defense on deciding the aptitude of a person for professional or contracted military service and for studies at military educational institutions; and of sick-leave, service exemption and reduced daily service hours regulations.

At the same time, we have to see that besides practicing effective dissuasion, the subjective security comfort feeling of the citizens does not really depend on the penal law and threat, but much more on the result of reconnaissance and prevention. The facts that instead of 2 years the perpetrator – for the same crime – will be sentenced to three-year imprisonment by itself will not make the citizens feel better. In this sense often only rhetorical parallelism can be drawn between the severity of punishment and the citizens’ security comfort feeling. The police, prosecution, law enforcement agencies or national security services do not become more effective by changing the legal judging of the criminal acts. The reconnaissance-ratio of different crime-categories will not be better because the Criminal Code has been modified in some places. In the sense of criminology the feeling of security depends on the number, preparedness, financial and material support, technical quality of the services, investigative authorities and law enforcement organs engaged in fighting crime and on the actual work they do.

It is not a secret that with my study I wanted to assist social communication related to managing the drug-problem which is present in the army. Besides, in order to increase the effectiveness of military drug-prevention I believe it important to conduct further scientific studies of the drug-phenomenon and the related criminal components of deviances from the aspects of criminology. Therefore, my further scientific studies will be determined by examining the deeper correlations behind drug-crimes, and the goals aimed at increasing the effectiveness of zero tolerance.

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Colonel István Tarján

THE EFFECTS OF THE „CROSSROAD” TYPE GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF HUNGARY

Hungary’s „crossroad” type geographical position is usually compared to the Andrew’s cross (Crux decussate), which is more than adequate. The expression comes from the crucifixion of Saint Andrew, the form refers to the cross on which he died as a martyr.

We always tried to profit from our geographical location (salt-road, ivy-road), but compared to the Western-European locations like the German flatlands, Northern Italy, and the Hanseatic cities - especially in the XVII. Century – the importance of our location was never so high. Parallel with this is the fact that after Mathias Corvin, Hungary became partly or totally a part of different empires and states, because the geographical location fell into the meeting /clashing point of big powers, cultures and what is most important, spheres of interests.

The occupying power formed our economy, our political and market possibilities according to its interests. For a long time, we couldn’t even possibly think about a strong political hegemony in the Carpathian area. Within
the existing monarchy there was not too much hope until World War I., although after the compromise we became “more equal” partners.

In the history naturally every assumption beginning with “if” is a nonsense. If Dózsa or Rákóczi win, if the revolution and freedom-fights of 1848 would not have been defeated, etc. It is unquestionable that as an independent, strong country we could also have profited more from our Middle-Europe location, only because from a strict geographical point of view, our location of a North and South, but especially East and West intersection is obvious.

In spite of all this we can say that after the compromise, beside Wien Budapest had also gained a more important role not only in economical, but also in political sense. Looking at the first illustration, Hungary’s regional leading role is obvious. Further in my study, I want to show the determination effects this objectively existing fact has on the different aspects of our analysis.

Regional central areas and regions under establishment along the Danube at the beginning of the 21st Century.

I used Prof. Dr. József Tóth’s tetrahedron-model for the complex analysis of all the aspects of society. Although the illustration refers to settlements, I think it can be also interpreted at a regional level. The main point of the theory is that the elements of the “tetrahedron” (social, economic, infrastructure, natural sphere) are in interaction with each other, and if one changes, that affects the others.
The tetrahedron-model of settlements

social sphere

 economical sphere

infrastructural sphere

natural sphere

From a geographical aspect – natural sphere – it is obvious that it can hardly be eluded. This alone is not enough. We could see many examples that the favourable geographical circumstances do not mean automatically that they are maximal used. (For example: the thought of Russia to go around Ukraine regarding gas pipelines). To be able to achieve that, other spheres also have to harmonize with each other and with the whole.

The most sensitive aspect of Hungary becoming a regional center and consolidating is the infrastructure. The communicational network is already at an appropriate level. (Remember that before 1990 the situation in this field was terrible, because for a telephone at home one needed years to wait and sometimes protection as well.) There is an urgent need for highways, which connect not only the regions of the country but have also strategic importance in maintaining the country’s central character. One knows that these investments are very expensive and might not be directly remunerative at the place where the finances were taken, regrouped, but looking at the interest of the country still essential. An example from the neighbourhood, the German Dresden can be reached from Budapest mainly on two routes. One goes through Bratislava and Prague, the other through Vienna, Passau and Nürnberg. Although the second is 250 kilometres longer, but until the recent past many had chosen this because so they only had to cross one controlled border in contrast with the three on other way, and had to pay toll only in Austria and not also in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. Beside, the German roads have more lanes, so the time needed for the travel is more predictable, while in Slovakia the highway was not contiguous, that meant more hectic. Hungary – if it wants to maintain the central
character – has to build or to finish those constructions through which the
country is traversable in all directions of the Andrew-Cross.

Looking at the economical side, we are witnessing a certain search of
ways. We have to go our own way. Resulting from the different geographical
conditions we do not have to try to make a competition in areas where others are
in advantage (gold mining, timber industry, etc.), but there where we are unique.
It is already a banality that Hungary “swims”. In Hungary the geothermal
conditions are most obvious. The simple explanation is that the thickness of the
earth is thinner here then usual. Because of these conditions here, the
temperature at 1000 meters depth reaches 60 degrees Celsius, at 2000 meters
you can find more than 100 degrees Celsius. The use of this advantage can be
considered as the unexploited possibility of not only a source of energy, but also
of a form of tourism, of the curative tourism, and the so called wellness. The
better utilization of the available intellectual capacity, to use the intellectual
capital at home, to support it, to stimulate the bio-energetic researches, and
finally but not least beside the already mentioned tourism, developing other
branches of the servicing industry could be the areas which strengthen the
economy of Hungary with the regional central character. Our central position is
elegant for these ideas. This is the reason why president Putin during his visit
in February 2006 outlined two projects that could bring Hungary in a central
position in the area of economics. Alone building the distribution-end of the gas
pipeline going around Ukraine could make our position and role to strategic
importance. Transforming the underdeveloped Szabolcs-Szatmár county into a
logistical centre could shift Hungary from the east margin of Europe to one of its
centres, because it would play a bond between East and West Europe, and
according to plans one part of the goods going to Asia would also cross
Hungary. Beside the above, we have to make an effort to prefer the third or
fourth type of economy most appropriate for our natural circumstances.

I have intentionally left the elements of the sphere of society for last. This
is such a sensitive question, it is not easy to see it as a whole. We must point
out: Hungary can not give up its tasks and duties arising from its character as a
homeland. The Hungarians belonging to the region but living over our borders
have always given reasons for misunderstandings. We know the historical
reasons for that. The old reflexes are working there as well, but today nobody
can deny our rights to be the political, cultural and – when needed –
administrative support for all Hungarian nationalities. We have to do that
without offending the sovereignty of other states. Here a big step forward
will/could be when the surrounding countries will also become members of the
EU. On the one hand they have to guarantee the minority rights which are not
always available yet, on the other hand a line of questions – partly they originate
from the time when the borders were still existing and restricted the country of
functioning as a regional centre – have became outdated, with no reasons.
Hungary – in contradiction with all statements – have proved its accepting
nation character many times during its history. Could not even do anything else because already after the Mongol invasion and the Turkish occupation the population of Hungary could have died out. In today’s words, migration was already at that time, what we mention today more often as society-forming power.

A more sensitive point of the economically more developed societies of Europe is the migration. A part from them arrived/arrive from the former colonies in growing numbers, others (Germany) face difficulties in connection with the so-called second and third generation of those invited in to restore the economy (underschooling, unemploymency, problems with integration, segregation). Regarding migration, Hungary is not a target-country yet. This arises mainly from the fact that the social allowances are lower than the ones in the Western societies. It is more worthwhile to be even unemployed in the more developed Western country as to work hard here.

A large number of the immigrants living in Hungary for a longer time now coming from the surrounding countries, are of Hungarian origin, came mainly in the hope of a better life. Although also here you can see some conflicts, but they integrate more easily into the society then in the already mentioned countries, as migrants who do not or hardly speak the language, and are traditionally of other religion and culture. But because of the cross-road character we have to take into consideration that we are on one of the main routes of migration - either legal or illegal - and when they are only transiting, it will still affect us. If we really want to have a central role, the society should be ready to accept that the target-countries will be through many ways connected to our country. But this coin also has two sides. The migrants, foreign employees bring not only problems with themselves but in many cases they intensify and stimulate the economy. The interaction is obvious when among others the situation of the economy gets better, more and more migrants can think that it is worthwhile to come here. So that reflects back to the economy, infrastructure and nature.

The elements of the above-mentioned aspects prove that they have a mutual effect. If I make a change in one of the elements, that some way affects all the others as well. The development of the infrastructure influences the natural sphere - this is not always positive - as well as the economical and social side. This applies to all elements and to the relation of the whole. As I have mentioned already in the beginning of my study, the cross-road character of Hungary is usually compared to the Andrew-Cross with fateful content. We do not have to be crucified if we develop our economy and infrastructure, form our society in compliance with the objective nature surrounding us and in case one of the elements change, we realistically count with the effects it has on the other elements.
In our developing world, the security threats and challenges often come up jointly and we meet more and more those kinds of hazards which are neither local, nor country level but trans-national. Illegal immigration is such a phenomenon, which has a lot of negative effects on the security of Europe both in the short and in the long term.

Surveying the different security threats, it is evident that wide spectrum of threats has geographical background, and it is expedient to make such an analysis from “regional viewpoint”. The territory of the Carpathian Euroregion is the regional “frame” of this short overview, where the aim is to point the place and role of Euroregion concerning the flow of east-west illegal immigration.

The Euroregion - which geostrategically is at the external border of the European Union - was established 15 years ago in 1993. It is located in the neighbouring areas of Poland, Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. The member areas of Euroregion:

- Poland (Krosno, Przemyśl, Rzeszow and Tarnow voivodships),
- Slovakia (Kosice and Presov regions),
- Hungary (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Hajdú-Bihar, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Heves, and Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok counties),
- Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk, Tsernovcy, Lviv, Transcarpathian oblast),
- Romania (Satu Mare, Maramures, Bihor, Suceava, Zilah, Botosani counties)

At the end of 2006, the area of the region was 161,192 km² and the population was more than 16 million people, which is almost equal to a middle-sized European country. The aim to create such an international region was to improve the interregional cooperation among the territories forming part of the region. In spite of the fact that the Euroregion is not a regional form of security cooperation, it is worth to study the security-political factors in this cross-border zone, because of the geographical location of the region.

The partake areas of this five-nation region - which is comminuted strongly with the administrative borders of countries - have some common features related to security:

- all the five members of the Euroregion were socialist countries, so the roots and the heritage were similar at the beginning of nineties,
• the expansion of EU and the Schengen zone have direct effects to areas of the region,
• it’s borderland “…only the area of the small Benelux states have more borders per square kilometer than this region”
• the territories forming the region are peripheral zones (in comparison with the central territories, are underdeveloped and geographically far away from the developed territories),
• language, religion and ethnical diversity of the population,
• high level of migrant population,
• this territory is the stage of lots of security problems such as illegal immigration, human trafficking, smuggling of illegal materials, etc.

In the last decades the diversified territory of the Euroregion was the subject of many researches. We have found studies and publications about the economic situation, the strategic regional development, and with other security approaches (e.g. I. Süli-Zakar, Z. Kordela-Borczyk, Zs. Ludvig, A. Duleba), but it is to be mentioned that nowadays illegal immigration as a security factor comes up for discussion as well.

In the middle of the last decade, the main effects to the Euroregion were the continuously changing left or right side of foreign policies of the countries. Thereafter the NATO membership of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, and later the EU enlargement created a new security situation. Poland and Hungary were the first in the choice of west orientation, while Slovakia and Romania joined to the NATO and EU only later. The effects of NATO enlargement are discoverable in the field of security and stability, while the importance of EU expansion in 2004 was basic to the whole Central and Eastern European area. Nowadays Ukraine is the only one among the countries of the Euroregion, which is not an EU and NATO member, but with its neighbourhood and efficient approaches it is an integrant member of the area. While in the middle of the nineties this country had a „bridge” role between east and west, lately Ukraine’s ambitions related to the EU have changed and perhaps it’s more than just having a good neighbourhood.

The second geopolitical turning-point is the Schengen expansion. The new member-states during the preparation period had taken steps to meet the requirements of Schengen, modernized their checkpoints, reformed their bureaucracies, but as we know, the Eastern European countries didn't become Schengen member straightaway when they joined the EU. The abolition of internal borders ensures the free movement inside the EU area, but one can be realize that the emotions are dual at two sides of new Schengen borders. Outside of the Schengen zone the strictly guarded borders appear as a new Iron Curtain.

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66 Prof. dr. István Süli-Zakar (2004) – Carpathian Euroregion – Interregional Association Hungarian Department Working Committee on Regional Development, Strategic Development Program
According to a relevant SWOT analysis concern1ng the cross-border cooperation development in the Carpathian region study, Schengen - as “threat” parameters could cause complication of the conditions for the cross border contacts.

With joining the Schengen area, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia have finished the passport checks at the internal borders, but it also means, that the major aim of the illegal migrants could be one: to cross one border and to disappear inside the EU.

Indeed, the enlargement and its geopolitical changes have deeply influenced the eastern border-areas of EU. The external frontiers of the EU have moved eastwards so the role of this territory concerning the security of Europe is revalued. The expansion of the Schengen area on December 21st 2007 have created four types of borders within this region: EU internal borders (Slovakia-Poland, Slovakia-Hungary), Schengen border inside the EU (Hungary-Romania), coincident Schengen and EU external borders (Ukraine-Hungary, Ukraine-Slovakia, Ukraine-Poland), and EU external border (Romania-Ukraine).

Parallel with the enlargement of the European Union, and the expansion of the Schengen borders, the amount of possible bulk migration and its illegal form came up as a current security problem too. Moreover, because of the complexity of illegal immigration and the adjunct illicit actions (e.g. smuggling, drug traffic, traffic in arms, terrorism) this phenomenon perhaps is one of the most important latent security problem. According to the World Migration Report (2005) “the EU members have became magnets for migrants smuggling and the trafficking en route to Western Europe”.

The transit illegal immigration

It's obvious that fight against illegal immigration is a common basic aim of the EU members, but it is to be emphasized that they meet distinctly with the phenomenon of migration: they could be transit or destination territories. Some of the member states defend the borders - which could be Schengen borders as well -, while others as destination countries (e.g. Great Britain, Italy, Germany) face the problem.

The members of Euroregion – excluding Ukraine – are in a special situation; they are transit and destination areas. When the illegal immigrants cross the EU external borders they find themselves on the territory of EU, and free the routes towards the developed western areas. The role of Ukraine is different: with joining the Schengen zone the former „filter state” role of the

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new EU members disappeared, and Ukraine as a huge country have got to face the large numbers of migrants, who swell the population.

The territory of Carpathian Euroregion historically has been gate role and this function hasn’t been changed so far. It’s on the way of the main east-west routes, and as a transit zone aggregates the migration channels towards the EU from the directions of Ukraine/Kiev, and Moldova. Taking everything into consideration, the „buffer”, the „gate” and the „transit” roles appear in this Euroregion cumulatively.

The countrywide figures of Poland, Slovakia and Hungary bellow, show that the illegal movements mainly were from Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. Consequently, these routes lead across the Carpathian Euroregion towards the member countries of European Union.

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1278</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1884</td>
<td>1388</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>394</td>
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<td>941</td>
<td>1126</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>355</td>
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<td>882</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>582</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>China</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Albania</td>
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<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1416</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 2004 and the first half of 2006 “the number of irregular migrants detained at the borders” of Poland, Slovakia and Hungary were 29613. The amount of illegal border crossings continuously decrease year by year (2004 – 14950, 2005 – 10726, 2006. 6 months – 3937), and it’s not easy to find the real causes, but perhaps it explicable with the modernization and development of the border control.

Those parts of Slovakia that are part of Euroregion are exceedingly affected by the east-west illegal immigration. In the eastern part of Slovakia the Slovak-Ukrainian border is comparatively short (about 100 kilometers long), but the importance of this area after the EU enlargement continuously increased. “In 2002-2003 when Slovakia was preparing for EU membership the number of intercepted and registered irregular migrants trying to cross the Ukrainian –

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68 source of data: www.soderkoping.org.ua
Slovak border almost doubled. Afterwards in 2005-2006 this border-land was one of the most active inwards the EU as well, but it's true that the numbers of foreigners who were apprehended at the borders decreased after Slovakia joined to the EU.

The east-west routes have lead from Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, while during the outwards movements the illegal immigrants mostly chose the direction of Austria. However, the final destination of immigrants is not Poland, Slovakia or Hungary, but Western Europe, mostly Germany and Great Britain.

If we examine the number of refugees, we are able to deduce the direction of movements as well. The ethnic combination of refugees is like on the other parts of the Euroregion, because of the source territories usually are common. Considering 2004 most of them arrived from Russia, India, China, Armenia, Afghanistan and Moldavia. The data of illegal border crossing in 2004-2005 show the same main origin of illegal migrants in Slovakia: Russia, Moldova, India, China, Georgia, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Hungary – as the other country in this region – after the 1989-91 transition period encountered with the large inflows of migrants, and slowly have become one of the most remarkable transit country in this region. Examining the routes of illegal movements it is evident that the parts of Hungary that belong to the Euroregion are affected by at least two directions, and these routes lead through Romania and Ukraine. Between 2002-2005, the non-EU country Ukraine, and Romania were the significant emissive neighbours and lots of people arrived to the territory of Hungary as a heavy migration flow. Afterwards Ukraine and Moldova (according to the statistics data of „number of persons detained on the border” between 2004/first half of 2006) were the two largest concerned countries, which so directly affected the territory of Carpathian Euroregion.

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Of course, in the statistics data we meet the “large distance” type illegal immigration as well. People arrive across this region from the overpopulated (e.g. Bangladesh, India) or conflicts areas (e.g. Pakistan) and besides the immigrants leaving for religious or the ethnic reasons one could meet those who try to move towards the better developed area simply to find a job and better living conditions.

As a new EU member, Romania is in a special situation. Besides its geographical location and its seaports, Moldavia, the eastern neighbour is one of the most important factor concerning the illegal immigration. Parallel with the Romania joining the EU in 2007, some experts give notice about the danger of increasing illegal immigration from Moldavia, because of the historical connecting link between the two nations. The statistic figures show that since 1997 the 75% of the immigrants have been coming from Moldavia to Romania. Many Moldavians have tried to get dual citizenship, because of the free-movement in the EU, and the poor living conditions in Moldavia.

Examining the geographical location of Romania it can be realized that the territory of the country collects the channels of illegal movement of persons from the north-eastern direction (Moldavia) and the direction of Turkey, and then as being a transit zone it connects them to the territory of the EU.

The data of Söderköping Process show that Turkey, Moldavia, China, Syria, Israel and Ukraine are on the top of the list of “the number of foreigners apprehended for illegal entry/stay in Romania”. It means that the routes leading through this territory are not only from the direction of neighbouring countries, but from the Middle-East and Asia as well.

Moldavia – just like Ukraine – is another important “emissive” country in this region. Out of the defined migration routes listed in a relevant study\(^{72}\), there are at least three that affect the territory of the Carpathian Euroregion.

The illegal migrants leave Moldova:
- to the direction of Romania,
- through Ukraine, Slovakia and Poland,
- towards the Baltic States.

With the Poland joining the EU in 2004, the eastern border of Poland became the longest part of the EU’s external land border\(^{73}\) (1163 km length), where the border segment with Ukraine is 535 kilometers long.

Concerning the “east-west” illegal migration channels Poland have been affected at least from two directions: first of all from Russia and Belarus,
secondly from Ukraine and Moldavia. Of late years the migrants mostly came from the post-soviet countries to Poland, but we have met illegal migrants form the overpopulated areas too. Between 2004 and the first half of 2006 most of the persons apprehended on the border were from Ukraine, Moldavia, and Russia, but Vietnam and China are at the top of the list as well. (According to a relevant study „The Office of Repatriation and Foreigners estimated just the number of illegal Vietnamese in Poland in 2003 at 30,000 and the total undocumented population at around 45,000 to 50,000.”

The part of Ukraine belonging to the territory of the Euroregion is between two fires: from the northern and eastern direction, at its “quite porous borders” it has been facing the pressure of emissive areas, and at its western borders it is facing with the strict, more than one thousand kilometers external European frontiers.

The expansion of the EU have created a new situation for Ukraine. With Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania joining the EU the thin transit zone between Ukraine and the European Union have disappeared. Nowadays Ukraine is still a huge transit zone, nevertheless lots of migrants wait in Ukraine to enter the EU, so “Ukraine is gradually changing from a transit country into a country accumulator of illegal migrants.”

According to an estimation of a relevant study “around 0,5 million persons are staying illegally in the territory of Ukraine”, or even „Ukraine is home to the world’s fourth-largest number of migrants, at 6.8 million”. Most of them arrive from the countries of South-East, Central Asia and Caucasus.

It’s a fact that Ukraine is on the way of a major east-west route of movements and lots of people try to move illegally across this country towards the developed Western-Europe. The migrants dominantly come from the ex-soviet countries (e.g. Russia, Armenina, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Georgia) and Asia (e.g. China, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan) as well.

The outward direction from Ukraine lead through the Ukrainian-Slovak border segment, where the Transcarpathian region – as the center area of the Carpathian Euroregion – is in specific situation. This territory is a predominantly mountainous (more than 80 %) area, and this Ukrainian region has borders with

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75 Irina Pribytkova: Regular and Irregular Migration an Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 2004-2006.
77 Dominic Swire Slovakia: The EU’s Thin Line Transitions Online (www.tol.cz), 3 August 2007
four EU countries (Poland - 33,4 km, Slovakia - 98,5 km, Hungary 136,6 km, Romania – 205,4 km) in a comparatively small geographical territory.

Between 1991-2003, about 100,000 illegal migrants were detained at the western border of Ukraine\(^79\), but talking about the statistic figures, it should be mentioned that it is difficult to establish correctly the amplitude of this phenomenon.

In Ukraine between 2003 and the first half of 2006 the number of illegal immigrants registered by the Border Guards were 59,438\(^80\) and - according to a study, which mentioned the data of State Border Service of Ukraine, - in the first two months of 2007 the number of illegal migrants detected have measurably increased.

The role of the traffic infrastructure is to be mentioned. It makes connection between the far areas and, at the same time, provides facilities for the migrants to choose their ways. Lots of European traffic routes, such as E50 (Prague – Prešov – Vyšné Nemecké –Uzhgorod – Mukachevo – Ternopil – Khmelnytskyi...), E58 (Vienna – Bratislava – Košice – Uzhgorod – Mukachevo – Suceava – Chisinau – Odessa), E40 (.Rzeszów – Przemysl-L'viv -Kiev...)etc. pass through the Euroregion. The planned Pan-European Transport Corridor V. (Venice-Ljubljana-Budapest-Uzhgorod-L'viv) is worth to mention as well, which will make connection between the area of adriatic sea and the zone of eastern-Europe.

It’s not the aim of this short overview to examine the situation of emigration from the territory of Carpathian Euroregion, but we shouldn’t forget that because of the poor economic situation and the problems of prosperity Ukraine itself is an emissive country concerning the migration. Besides the population of Ukraine drastically decrease, hundreds and thousands of people (according to unofficial estimates 4-7 million Ukrainians) work abroad, where the main reception area are Russia, Poland and Italy.

* * *

Taking everything into account, the area of the Carpathian Euroregion – though it is not the most significant transit area concerning the magnitude of illegal immigration inward the EU - has special geographical location, and strategic connecting role between east and west.

Four countries from the countries participating in this the Euroregion have


\(^80\) Source of data: www.soderkoppping.org.ua
already been the members of the EU, so Ukraine is followed with attention. Nowadays there are a lot of EU cross border cooperation surfaces and the aim of the members of the Carpathian Euroregion could be the same: effective cooperation with each other and particularly with the non-EU member state Ukraine, in order to promote the fight against illegal immigration, people trafficking, and organized crime. Hopefully the Schengen border not as an “Iron Curtain”, but a "bulwark" of the EU will stop the crowd of illegal migrants.

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**HEALTH-GEOGRAPHY RESEARCHES IN HUNGARY: LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDICAL DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORY PROVISION SYSTEM AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY**

**Introduction and Goals**

The future of a nation is as much determined by the state of health of its population as by demographic and other factors. The quality and quantity of human capital and resources are important factors in the development of society and in the competitiveness of the national economy. Consequently health-care has become a strategic economic sector around the world. There is no developed country today, the health provisional system of which has not had operational and financial problems.
The new focus on questions of health care and research into regional characteristics in Hungary are justified by the fact that regional differences became even deeper after the change of political system in 1989. Moreover, with Hungary’s joining the European Union, stress was laid upon regional provision of health care, where in vitro diagnostics and thus laboratory medicine both have a significant role.

According to the Medical Diagnostics Committee of the Hungarian Scientific Academy, in vitro diagnostic disciplines have always played a notable role and are ever prominent in supporting and facilitating curative and preventive medicine, providing indispensable prognostic and predictive data for therapists, and also play an important role in the quality control of medical interventions. Despite these facts, as a result of unfavourable financing, more and more laboratories are in danger of being closed down or losing their function.

In the present situation it is not only reasonable but also necessary for us to examine the characteristics of this health care sector and analyse the data, since this discipline provides an essential back-up to curative and preventive health provision by the information it gives to therapeutic fields. One of the goals of this study is to show an up-to-date and factual picture of the characteristics of the Hungarian medical diagnostic laboratory provisional system as they are in the early 21st century, and highlight the regional differences with regard to infrastructure, capacity, performance and human resources. The other goal is to draw up a list of both human resources and material assets which may foster the organisation and rearrangement of provision according to actual needs and demands.

The authors are unaware of any statistical research done in Hungary with this approach and this end in view. They are further unaware of the results of similar research being published in any other member state of the European Union.

Regional and national health characteristics of Hungary

In 1999, in order to help Hungary become compatible with the regional policy of the European Union, a system of planning statistics regions (NUTS II.) was set up, on the basis of which the country was divided into seven regions (Figure 1). The division was an artificial one made by the grouping of the 19 counties, and does not respect the actual economic processes within certain areas.
The state of health of the Hungarian population is far worse than that of other countries of similar economic status. The major problems are the following: the continuing decline of the overall health of the population, the ageing of the population and its decreasing size. By international comparison, the average life expectancy at birth of both sexes, but especially of men, is low, and the indexes with regards to the four major death causing disease groups are very unfavourable. Cardiovascular disease – causing approximately 50% of all deaths – and tumours (causing nearly a quarter of fatalities) are considered the chief causes of death today and have been over the past two decades.

The cause structure of mortality corresponds to that of countries with similar social, economic and health culture. The higher figures in mortality statistics are due to the fact that in Hungary more people die, and at a younger age, of the major death-causing illnesses than in more developed countries. The high and only slowly improving mortality rate along with the growing percentage of elderly people is connected with the level of health and the lifestyle of the population and the state of the health service.

There is no uniform regulation across the European Union regarding the operation of health care services, thus the system varies from country to country.

After the change of political system, the system of health insurance in Hungary turned back to Bismarckian traditions. Basic features of the Hungarian health care system are that responsibility and tasks are shared between the state, local governments and health insurance institutions. National insurance covers the whole population, and provides a practically all-inclusive service. Complementary or alternative insurance plays a minor role. Health service is supervised by the state, ownership is mostly in the hands of central and local government. (Figure 2) Health expenditure is mainly financed from the state...
budget, private ownership and financing appears in the capital-intensive fields, such as laboratories, visual diagnostics, CT, MR, and kidney dialysis. Provision is two-tiered (basic and specialised provision), and is based on the services general practitioners provide as gate keepers. Within the framework of progressive provision, hospitals in a given region have a three-tier structure.

Performance-based financing was introduced in 1993. It applies the WHO codes and the German score system to outpatient provision and uses the homogenous illness groups (in Hungarian HBCS) classification with acute inpatient cases, and is calculated on the basis of in-days for cases of chronic illness.

Figure 2: The structure of the Hungarian health care provision system – a possible grouping

The place of medical diagnostic laboratories in the health service

The minimal requirements of the profession concerning medical laboratories were first defined in the 19/1996 in the (vii. 26.) NM (ministry of welfare) regulation and its amendments (2003, 2004). These regulations define the minimum professional requirements of medical laboratories, and place them in different categories of competence (1-5). The regulation sets out the minimum conditions for human resources, physical assets and the work environment (Table 1).

Table 1: Categories of the diagnostic laboratories
(J – outpatient service, FJ – inpatient/outpatient service)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Tasks and competence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>J0</td>
<td>Sample-taking site for taking samples for lab tests and examinations, forwarding the samples or doing minor lab</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
tests under doctoral supervision. Basic provision level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2</th>
<th>J1</th>
<th>Laboratory attached to general outpatient provision. Independent specialised outpatient provision.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>FJ1</td>
<td>Laboratory attached to community hospitals or smaller hospitals in the capital, provides inpatient and general outpatient provision. Community (towns) laboratory level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>FJ2</td>
<td>Laboratory attached to county or regional hospitals (in the capital), provides inpatient and general outpatient provision. County laboratory level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>FJ3</td>
<td>Laboratory attached to a university centre or laboratory of an independent institution, which provides general and special inpatient and outpatient care. Regional or national laboratory level.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The performance of laboratories is measured on the basis of the German score system and the WHO codes. Financing is done on the basis of outpatient test statistics reported monthly. The laboratory budget is closed at present (this is a point/Forint value which varies each month), the refund given on the basis of the number of tests does not cover the costs of operation. The laboratories work to order, which makes the situation even graver, as it cannot be known in advance how many tests doctors will request for their patients, and unnecessary test orders are fairly frequent.

**Methods**

Our methodology has been to use the statistical data of the Central Bureau of Statistics (KSH) and of the National Laboratory Institution (OLI) as primary sources, combined with indicators created for our specific needs. Four indicator groups were set up to analyse the data of laboratories by: structure, capacity, performance and human resources. Results will be shown in tables and figures.

**Data Collection and Management**

In our research we analysed the 2002 and 2003 data on two levels – national and regional – by quantitative methods. (In 2000 and 2001 the OLI database still included blood bank laboratory statistics, which we did not wish to include in the research.) For the illustration of geographical differences and features the actual statistical regions of Hungary were taken as units of analysis (Figure 1). The basic data was collected from KSH annuals and the OLI database.

Indicators included in the research:

1. *Geographical features of the regions*:
   - The breakdown of regions by area (%); population (%) in regions
2. *Major details of outpatient and inpatient provision*
Number of hospitals; number of hospital beds in use (total and per 1000 citizens); days of care/in-days use (total and per 1000 citizens); percentage division of interventions/test cases in outpatient provision.

3. *Indicators of the medical diagnostic laboratory provision system*\(^{18,19}\)

The basic data was collected from the yearly reports No.1495 of the National Statistical Data Collecting Program (OSAP), which the OLI made accessible for us. The annual supplying of records is obligatory for all the institutions of the health-care system, and all services and workplaces where in vitro medical diagnostic laboratory tests are carried out, irrespective of their owners and maintainers.

In our research, the data of only those laboratories could be included, which complied to their obligation of giving information, i.e. 95-98 % of all laboratories in the examined period. Workplaces also carrying out tests (such as isotope diagnostics, ward quick lab, blood sample taking sites, blood bank laboratories, one-person research labs, ÁNTSZ and KŐJÁL\(^{2}\) laboratories) but not belonging to the central laboratory of the given institution were not included in the research.

*The four indicator groups and their indexes/indicators:*

*Structure:* breakdown of laboratories by categories.

*Capacity:* number of laboratories per 1000 citizens; number of measuring instruments and devices; number and distribution of automated laboratory instruments; number of automated devices per laboratory; number of tests per auto-lab machines; number of tests per laboratory worker/assistant.

*Performance:* number and distribution (%) of tests; ratio (%) of the number of tests done for outpatient and inpatients; number of tests per 1000 citizens.

*Human resources:* number of laboratory workers.

*Statistical Analysis*

Statistical analyses of the collected data were carried out with the Excel for Windows software. The indicators received during data processing were systematically grouped according to the four indicator groups (*structure, capacity, performance and human resources*). In the case of some indicators we created our own indicators from the basic data (in case of the number of inhabitants the source was: KSH\(^{16,17}\)): percentage indicators (to illustrate changes in 2002, 2003), percentage ratios (outpatient vs. inpatients) and specific indicators (number of hospital beds in use per 1000 citizens; in-days / days of provision/care per 1000 inhabitants; number of tests per worker; number of
laboratories per 1000 citizens; number of automated devices per laboratory; number of tests per lab machine; number of tests per 100,000 citizens).

With the data obtained we made analyses on the national and regional level on the one hand, and, on the other – in order to discover regional differences – we made comparative analyses between regions, and between regions and the national average.

Results

In this report – due to the extensive database and the large amount which could be written – only those results will be published for which the changes in the examined period of time were significant.

Table 2 and figure 3 show the status and features of the actual statistical regions and of the population of the regions. Figure 3 shows the percentage breakdown of the population by the 7 statistical regions on the basis of data for 1st January 2002.

It is apparent that the largest part of the population (27.8 %) live in the smallest area (Central Hungary), which includes the capital city, Budapest, while in the largest region (Southern Great Plain) the population is only 13.5 % of the total number of inhabitants in Hungary (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Area km²</th>
<th>Number of population (1st of January)</th>
<th>Percentage breakdown of the population (1st of January)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Hungary</td>
<td>6 919</td>
<td>2 829 047</td>
<td>27,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Transdanubia</td>
<td>11 236</td>
<td>1 116 626</td>
<td>11,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Transdanubia</td>
<td>11 209</td>
<td>1 006 943</td>
<td>9,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Transdanubia</td>
<td>14 169</td>
<td>993 466</td>
<td>9,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Hungary</td>
<td>13 429</td>
<td>1 296 504</td>
<td>12,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Great Plain</td>
<td>17 729</td>
<td>1 559 073</td>
<td>15,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Great Plain</td>
<td>18 339</td>
<td>1 373 194</td>
<td>13,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National data</td>
<td>93 030</td>
<td>10 174 853</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Breakdown of the population of Hungary by regions as a percentage of the total population, 2002

n=10 174 853 (100 %)
The main features of inpatient provision are shown in table 3. According to the figures, compared to the national data, Central Hungary has the highest indices: 32.4 % of all hospitals are located here, the in-days are about one third of the total national figure, the number of beds in use per 1000 inhabitants is 12.5 % above the national average and the number of days of care per 1000 citizens is 19.9 % higher than the national average.

Table 3: Main characteristics of the inpatient provision, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of hospitals</th>
<th>Number of active beds</th>
<th>Number of active beds per 1000 population</th>
<th>Number of nursing days</th>
<th>Number of nursing days per 1000 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Hungary</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>26 649</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7 799 003</td>
<td>2 760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Transdanubia</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7 770</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 310 965</td>
<td>2 076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Transdanubia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7 954</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2 250 892</td>
<td>2 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Transdanubia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7 370</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2 135 595</td>
<td>2 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Hungary</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9 546</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 788 513</td>
<td>2 165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Great Plain</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11 166</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3 218 464</td>
<td>2 070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Great Plain</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9 885</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 836 184</td>
<td>2 074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National data</strong></td>
<td><strong>176</strong></td>
<td><strong>80 340</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>23 339 616</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 301</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The breakdown of the number of clinical and diagnostic\textsuperscript{8} intervention (test) cases in outpatient provision shows that the share of laboratory diagnostics was large (59% in 2002, 62% in 2003) – figure 4.
Regional characteristics of the medical laboratory diagnostic provision system

Structure

The distribution of registered laboratories (443 in 2002 and 487 in 2003) by region is shown in table 4 and figure 5. It is apparent that most laboratories were located in Central Hungary and the fewest in Central Transdanubia in both years.

Table 4: Breakdown of the laboratories by regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of laboratories</th>
<th>Quantity of change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Hungary</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Transdanubia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Transdanubia</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Transdanubia</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Hungary</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Great Plain</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Great Plain</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National data</strong></td>
<td><strong>443</strong></td>
<td><strong>487</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Percentage distribution of the number of laboratories by regions
The distribution of laboratories (in 2002) by categories according to the ministerial order of 1996 is shown in table 5.

### Table 5: Distribution of categories of laboratories by regions, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>J0</th>
<th>J1</th>
<th>FJ1</th>
<th>FJ2</th>
<th>FJ3</th>
<th>Other*</th>
<th>Sum total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Hungary</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Transdanubia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Transdanubia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Transdanubia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Hungary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Great Plain</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Great Plain</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National data</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*State hospital laboratories, department/ward laboratories (small/quick labs), isotope laboratories, microbiological laboratories.

**Regional capacity**

The number of laboratories per 100,000 inhabitants is shown in figure 6.

It may be noted that while in both years in question the Southern Transdanubia and Southern Great Plain regions were pre-eminent, the indexes of Central Transdanubia were far below the national average.

Infrastructural (instrumental) situation in 2003 (Table 6): in regard to the number of auto-lab machines per region, Central Hungary stands first with 35.5% (939) of the total number. It is 4.7 times more than the 7.6% (200) in

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Central Transdanubia the least well provided region. The Southern Great Plain region leads the list with regard to the number of auto-lab machines per laboratories (10.9), and the last one on the list is Central Transdanubia again. The number of tests by machine is highest in Central Hungary and lowest in the Southern Great Plain region.

Figure 6: Number of laboratories per 100,000 inhabitants

Table 6: Infrastructural situation of the laboratories by regions, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number Of auto-lab machines</th>
<th>Number of laboratories</th>
<th>Number of auto-lab machines per laboratories</th>
<th>Number of tests by auto-lab machine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Hungary</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10 689 866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Great Plain</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>2 310 341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Great Plain</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2 883 331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Hungary</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3 811 087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Transdanubia</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3 035 812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Transdanubia</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3 932 271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Transdanubia</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7 431 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National data</td>
<td>2 641</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>33 360 007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the exception of a rise in Southern Transdanubia (+2.2 %) the number of tests per worker/lab assistant decreased in every region – in the Southern Great Plain in the greatest measure (-4.1 %). (Table 7)

Table 7: Number of tests per worker/lab assistant by regions
### Table 8: Number of tests by regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of tests 2002</th>
<th>Number of tests 2003</th>
<th>Quantity of change (%)</th>
<th>Number of tests per 100,000 citizens in 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Hungary</td>
<td>63 696 503</td>
<td>64 344 768</td>
<td>+1.0</td>
<td>2 277 889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Great Plain</td>
<td>26 324 264</td>
<td>25 073 997</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
<td>1 834 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Great Plain</td>
<td>25 717 041</td>
<td>25 115 329</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>1 615 989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Transdanubia</td>
<td>18 076 242</td>
<td>17 906 367</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>1 607 869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Transdanubia</td>
<td>15 415 517</td>
<td>15 879 633</td>
<td>+3.0</td>
<td>1 604 963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Transdanubia</td>
<td>14 595 305</td>
<td>14 585 149</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>1 452 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Hungary</td>
<td>18 284 853</td>
<td>18 006 004</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>1 396 940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National data</td>
<td>182 109 725</td>
<td>180 911 247</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>1 783 719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Distribution of laboratory tests as percentage
The distribution of the number of tests by the type of provision (outpatient and inpatient) grew in favour of outpatient care in every region: most of all in Northern Hungary (+3.3 %) and Central Hungary (+3.0 %) and least in Southern Transdanubia (+0.2 %) and in the Northern Great Plain region (+0.5 %). (Table 9)

Table 9: The distribution of the number of tests by the type of provision (outpatient and inpatient) by regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Outpatient service 2002</th>
<th>Inpatient service 2002</th>
<th>Outpatient service 2003</th>
<th>Inpatient service 2003</th>
<th>Quantity of change Outpatient service (%)</th>
<th>Quantity of change Inpatient service (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Hungary</td>
<td>70,3</td>
<td>29,7</td>
<td>72,4</td>
<td>27,6</td>
<td>+3,0%</td>
<td>-7,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Transdanubia</td>
<td>76,2</td>
<td>23,8</td>
<td>76,9</td>
<td>23,1</td>
<td>+0,9%</td>
<td>-2,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Transdanubia</td>
<td>74,4</td>
<td>25,6</td>
<td>76,4</td>
<td>23,6</td>
<td>+2,6%</td>
<td>-7,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Transdanubia</td>
<td>73,3</td>
<td>26,7</td>
<td>73,5</td>
<td>26,5</td>
<td>+0,2%</td>
<td>-0,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Hungary</td>
<td>71,8</td>
<td>28,2</td>
<td>74,1</td>
<td>25,9</td>
<td>+3,3%</td>
<td>-8,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Great Plain</td>
<td>74,4</td>
<td>25,6</td>
<td>74,7</td>
<td>25,3</td>
<td>+0,5%</td>
<td>-1,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Great Plain</td>
<td>74,8</td>
<td>25,2</td>
<td>75,9</td>
<td>24,1</td>
<td>+1,5%</td>
<td>-4,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National data</strong></td>
<td><strong>72,8</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,2</strong></td>
<td><strong>74,2</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,8</strong></td>
<td><strong>+1,9%</strong></td>
<td><strong>-5,1%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Distribution of human resources
The number of employees grew in every region with the exception of the Northern Great Plain region (-1.3 %) and the Southern Great Plain region (-0.6 %). The biggest increase was observed in Central Hungary (+1.1 %) and Northern Hungary (+1.0 %), the smallest increase was reported from Central Transdanubia (+0.4 %). (Table 10)

Table 10: Distribution of human resources of diagnostic laboratories by regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of lab-workers 2002</th>
<th>Number of lab-workers 2003</th>
<th>Quantity of change (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Hungary</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Transdanubia</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Transdanubia</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Transdanubia</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Hungary</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>+1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Great Plain</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Great Plain</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National data</td>
<td>5401</td>
<td>5426</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

It is an accepted fact that the state of health of the population is an important issue for the national economy and thus for health care provision. Thus we believe that the research and examination of health provision indicators cannot be done without analyses of the situation in the field of diagnostic work. As a result of our research on the special characteristics and regional features of the medical laboratory diagnostic provision system, an extensive database was set up, with the help of which we could present a report on the situation in 2002 and 2003 of an important branch of health care provision. In collating and summarising data, we acquired useful information, the essence of which is presented in the tables and diagrams. Obviously, further research is necessary in order to form a conception for the future development of the efficient operation of our profession at a high standard.

Results showed that while the number of registered laboratories grew in Hungary (+44 = +10 %), the performance of the network decreased by 1 198 478 tests (+0.7 %). At the regional level the number of laboratories grew in every region with the exception of Central Transdanubia (-5.5 %). The biggest increase was in Northern Hungary (+26.8 %) and Central Hungary (+13.8 %). By the end of 2003 the performance of laboratories decreased except for two regions (Southern Transdanubia and Central Hungary). The biggest drop was experienced in the Southern Great Plain region (-4.7 %). The highest number of
tests were performed in Central Hungary, and the lowest number of tests were done in Western Hungary.

Our analysis shows that the ratio of the number of tests performed for outpatient care over the number done for inpatients grew by 1.9% on a national level (72.8:27.2 in 2002, 74.2:25.8 in 2003). On a regional level the index grew for outpatient provision in every region. In 2003 an average of 17.8 laboratory tests were carried out on Hungarian citizens. Analysing the differences between regions we found that the index was highest in Central Hungary (22.8) and in the Southern Great Plain region (18.3), lowest in Northern Hungary (14.0) and Western Hungary (14.5).

Concerning infrastructural development, we can say that in the period examined the number of instruments increased significantly (24.9 %, including growth of 23.2 % in the number of automated machines). The regional breakdown in 2003: Central Hungary is the best-equipped of all regions, with the highest number of instruments and within that the highest number of auto-lab machines (939). In the rest of the regions this index is between 200 and 369.

The number of tests per worker only grew in one region (Southern Transdanubia, +2.2 %), and decreased in the other six. Compared to the national average, Southern Transdanubia is in the best situation with respect to workload – here a laboratory worker has to do 21 % fewer tests than the national average. The heaviest workload falls to those who work in Central Transdanubia, where the index is 14 % higher than the national average.

Conclusions

The results of our analysis of the characteristics of medical laboratory diagnostic provision make it obvious that regional differences are significant when comparing Central Hungary to the rest of the regions. We believe that the high indices in this region are undoubtedly due to the central role of Budapest – a phenomenon also seen in the health care system as a whole – as the institutions in the capital have health care provision obligation for inhabitants of other areas as well as or those living in or near Budapest. Several Budapest institutions have national obligations in health provision, and, with the exception of those involved in basic provision, all types of institutions cover areas outside the region.

During our research we found that the structure of provision is fragmented, and there are unused capacities which do not correspond to existing demands. In several institutions, and county and town community hospitals, there are ward or department laboratories as well as a central laboratory. At medical universities, working alongside the central laboratory,
there are 17-25 badly used laboratories, operating independently and in parallel with each other. On the basis of these observations we can say that the principle of “one institution - one laboratory” proclaimed in the Ministry of Health ruling has not found expression in reality.

We would like to emphasise that all of this research was carried out with a practical goal in view. The exploration of the characteristics of medical laboratory diagnostic provision and its regional structure and resources was done with the intention of drawing attention to, and providing a basis for the solution of regional provision management problems, and thus of fostering the planning and efficient operation of the network of medical laboratories in all health care regions.

The method developed, and the indicator groups defined during the research, may be expanded, improved and possibly adapted to international situations (e.g. Euro-regions) as needed. We hope that the results acquired will be useful in increasing the efficiency of this discipline, and that the database we have set up will be the starting point for further, more extensive research.

Notes

a NUTS: The basis of the EU regional political and statistical system is regional data, on which NUTS, the classification system run by EUROSTAT, is based. A criterion at the time of definition of the NUTS units (levels 1-5) was that they be related to existing administrative units within member states.

b In European history two prominent social security systems have evolved: the continental Bismarckian model and the Atlantic Beveridge, which draws on Anglo-Saxon tradition. The main feature of the Bismackian model is that it finances provision from obligatory payments made by employers and employees, and the state or local governments play only a minor role in budgeting.

c HBCS: The Hungarian adaptation of DRG (diagnosis related groups) used in the medicare system which has provided health care for the over 65s since 1983 in the USA. This is a categorisation of active institution-bound cases of provision, in which the basis for grouping is the specialist field of provision and the homogeneity of treatment days

d The minimum requirements for medical laboratories were first dealt with by the 19/1996. (VII. 26.) NM (welfare ministry) regulation and then by 12/1997. (VI. 5.). Currently a 60/2003. (X. 20.) ESZCSM (Health care, Social and Family Affairs Ministry) regulation and its 16/2004. (III. 23.) ESZCSM modification (which does not affect medical laboratories) is in force.

e ÁNTSZ: National Public Health and Medical Officer Service: an administrative body which ensures uniformity in health care administration.

f KÖJÁL: Office of Public Health and Epidemiology.

g Clinical medical disciplines fall under five categories: internal medicine,
Dear Reader,

It is our pleasure to inform you about the following:

"HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCE
IX. Economical and Juridical Department
Military Science Committee

Colonel Dr. István Kobolka

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Dear Mr. Chairman!

I am informing you with honour and with pleasure that the Military Science Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Science, according to its annual plan and your request, had examined the relevant journals as well as the new applications within the military science. We thank you for your assistance and cooperation during the supply of data.

Among the relevant journals accepted from 2008 by the Military Science Committee the following journal was confirmed


According to your request the Military Science Committee examined and had registered to the list of the relevant journals the following publication:


Dear Mr. Chairman! To your further scientifical work we wish you in the name of the Committee everlasting creative power and excellent health, lot of success and results in serving Hungarian science, including military science which needs a lot of responsibility.


With friendly greetings

Eng.LtC. Dr. Sándor Felházi
Secretary